Willingness to pay of the notability for local leadership empowerment in the ngweshe chiefdom

II.THEORIES

After the above-mentioned overview of the research concepts, this other share gives an overview on the way that local governance is legally set in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It first provides a laconic material on what is to be considered as local governance through which local leaders emerge and how they are legally supported either politically or economically. The purpose of both trends' combination is attempting to develop local entities. The following sub-section as for it provides several ways to reinforce local governance throughout the available literature.

II.1. Local government in Democratic Republic of the Congo

III.1.1. Governance organization

In DR Congo, the form of governance has been seen as a result of a great wave of confrontation between a unitary-ruled state and federalism supporters. This controversy led to the creation of new provinces and within them decentralization was established (BAD and FAD, 2009; Englebert and Kasongo, 2016). The article 2 and 3 of the constitution and article 3-5 of the organic law no. 08/016 of 7 October 2008 relative to the composition; organization and functioning of the decentralized territorial entities and their relations with the state and provinces distinguish three kinds of territorial entities. They are provinces, Decentralized Territorial Entities (EntitésTerritorialesDécentralisés) and Deconcentrated Territorial Entities (EntitésTerritorialesDéconcentrées).This legislation breaks with the past by the fact that it directly preaches decentralization for which the golden rule is to consolidate national unity, eroded by successive wars, and to create impetus and development centers at the grassroots (Zongwe, 2019). Are considered as Deconcentrated Territorial Entities: territories, quarters, groupings and village. On the other hand, cities, communes, sectors and chiefdoms compose the category of Decentralized Territorial Entities. At the local level, the head of the executive is the mayor (maire), burgomaster (bourgmestre), head of sector (chef de secteur), and head of chiefdom (chef de chefferie), in accordance with the territorial entity under which they exercise their authority: cities, communes, sectors and chiefdoms, respectively (Zongwe, 2019).

Specifically, the Congolese law defines the chiefdom (chefferie) as a group of homogenous traditional communities organized and led in reference to customary laws (Zongwe, 2019). Among the other Decentralized Territorial Entities and Deconcentrated Territorial Entities; it is the only one to which a legal personality is recognized. In such a situation, the Congolese central government recognizes and vests the leader of chiefdoms. He is appointed in terms of the applicable customary law.

III.1.2. Legal financial disposal for local governance and failure of decentralization

The Congolese law requires a net autonomy and separation of each local entity's budget from the others'. The constitution of the DR Congo defines in its article 203, as modified by the law n° 11/002 of January 20, 2011, the establishment of taxes including exercise and consumer taxes. It requires, however, the avoidance of tax duplication between provinces and the central government. Furthermore, the revenue-sharing formula and financial transfers from central toward the province should legally translate 50% of national tax revenue, transfers of 40% of the national tax revenue directly to provinces and 10% to the National Equalization Fund (Caisse National de Perequation) and the remaining 50% are kept at national level (BAD and FAD, 2009).

But as deem Englebert and Kasongo (2016) and Zongwe (2019), the budgets of provinces and other entities remain meager to tackle their policy and strengthen their faith towards the folks they lead. As a result, the mission of decentralization has not come closer to its fulfillment. Only a slice of the reforms that the Congolese nation has waited for has been undertaken. This is mainly due to a much narrowed share of the budget allowed to decentralization on one side, and an unfulfilled application and disbursement of the amount towards political entities (Englebert and Kasongo, 2016).

Table one: Status Decentralization Reforms in the DRC in June 2015

Reform	Status
Self-administration of provinces and ETDs	Law passed (`8), poorly implemented*
Conference of governors	Law passed (`8), poorly implemented
Provincial elections	One (`7); not since
Financial transfers (`retrocession')	Partial
New Public Finance law	Law passed (`11)
Public investment fund for provinces**	No
Creation of new provinces (`decoupage')	Law promulgated March 15***
ETD Elections	No
Transfer of jurisdiction in decentralized areas	No
Transfer of personnel to provincial ministries	No
Separating decentralized and deconcentrated services	No
Reform of public service	No
Transfer of assets `patrimoine' to provinces	No
Transparency of provincial expenditure chains	No****

Source: Englebert and Kasongo (2016)

*Undermined by 2011 constitutional reform which authorizes the president to move provincial governors and appoint new ones.

** National Equalization Fund

***Undermined by subsequent appointment of «special commissioners» by the president, and suspension of provincial assemblies.

****Aside from ex post audits by «cour des comptes» in 2013 for the 2011 accounts of seven provinces^5(*)

Near from this fact, three provinces (Katanga, Kinshasa and Kongo Central) receive about 90% of total amounts of retrocession whereas others remain very far behind. In 2013, for instance, Katanga received U.S.USD 300 million, and respectively 54 and 21 million allocated to Kinshasa and Kongo Central.

* ⁵This table is altogether referred from Englebert and Kasongo (2016) with the whole related legend