Section 2: stakes for other great powers.
1. A threat to the French
The importance of Cameroon to the French is underscored by
the hospitality given to General de Gaulle in October 1940. After several
attempts failed from his London refuge under Churchill,271(*) he embarked on a search for
a safe haven and troops in the African West Coast. After a failed attempt at
German positions in September 1940 in Dakar, it was finally in Douala that de
Gaulle landed. In his speech of gratitude, de Gaulle declared, «Today, I
have regained my trust». It is therefore from Cameroon that major French
attacks against German positions in the sub-region were launched, and from
there that troops were gathered to liberate France.272(*) So, not only can we say that
Cameroon played a major role in French liberalization during WWII, but also
that Cameroon has remained a central figure in French policies toward not only
Central Africa, but the whole of Francophone Africa.
In an interview granted by former French ambassador to Cameroon,
Jean Francois Valette, the latter assessed the negative image Cameroonians, and
francophone Africa has of French policies. Showing exasperation at media
perception of France, he said, «I simply belief that our Franco -
Cameroonian relations is perceived through parameters which belong to the
60-70s. That comes up time and again in the press through titles focused or
arrayed on the France-Afrique or such things.»273(*) Public opinion is not less
critical of the Americans or especially the Chinese, seems quite intolerant to
the French especially of the dubious France-Afrique of the 60s and 70s.
This does not mean that French economic interest in Cameroon has
diminished but that the media believes the French have never really left. Mr.
Valette acknowledges French presence from a development perspective, asserting
that «We need to know that today, after France, one of the main state
donors in Cameroon is the European Development Fund which intervenes
particularly in roads. Most roads existing in Cameroon are financed by Europe,
are inside this Europe there is 25% of France. This, people ignore.» In
other words, if France intervenes in its own right as the main donor for
development, and as 25% of Europe, what is going to be the future of relations
with greater intervention by the US? We should note that in spite of American
greater presence, France remains Cameroon's highest supplier and greatest
investor in terms of foreign direct investment, with about 160 commercial
branches and 200 companies. Great-power rivalry in the region might gain
unprecedented proportions.
Cameroon is not only a commercial center in French Africa
policies. In Central African sub-region in particular and francophone Africa in
general, Cameroon seems to play a pivot role in military operations. This
strategic position seems to be demonstrated by the place of Cameroon in the
French-sponsored Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la
Paix (RECAMP). It is in this light that Cameroon hosted a military exercise
(SAWA 2006) whose origin is French but which today has a completely
multilateral scope. The RECAMP SAWA 2006 concerned countries of the North such
as France, the US, Japan, Canada and ECCAS countries as Cameroon, Angola,
Gabon, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea
and Sao Tome and Principe. The choice of ECCAS as the geopolitical entity and
Cameroon as host country of this exercise further reveals the importance of
both the zone and the country, and especially the prospects of an oncoming
Fashoda.
In spite of dwindling French influence in Africa, their economic
interests have not diminished. At the continental level, «between 1997 and
2003, the investments of private French corporations in Africa have multiplied
by two».274(*) That
is to say that French influence has only decreased in some areas (development
aid and political power), and in relation to other powers whose presence are
better felt by the local population. In the same period when French private
investment is doubling by two, Mr. Valette states that «French investment
[in Cameroon] during the same period (1997-2003) multiplied by
2.5.,»275(*) that
is, Cameroon has benefited from French investment more the average of French
investment in Africa. The relative increase in French private investment in
Cameroon is due to the political problems they met in Cote d'Ivoire. The
situation in Cote d'Ivoire where the French are being accused of supporting the
rebels, a situation that led to the expropriation of French asserts, should
explain some of the anti-French feelings one might observe in Central Africa.
The boards crowds were carrying in 2004 in abijan titled «Chirac Go Home,
Bush Welcome» reveals an African context of exasperation with France and
the latter's replacement by the US.
Cameroonian writer, Mongo Beti has been insisting for over forty
years that a decline in French influence in Cameroon means the end of French
imperialism in the entire Central African sub-region. Most of his works such as
Mission to Kala (1964) are critically admired, amusing and popular
short novels on the dislocating effects of Western culture on African identity.
Beti's The Story of the Madman (Charlottesville, V. A.: University of
Virginia, 1994) is an attack on the postcolonial state. It is especially in his
book, Rape of Cameroon that he asserts the dwindling French influence
in Cameroon and consequently in the sub-region.
Even French researchers have increasingly criticized French
politics in Africa. Several titles of newspapers have raised the alarm on
dwindling French influence in Africa.276(*) In fact, France has progressively lost its place in
Africa since the end of the Cold War, largely because of the
Françafrique and French implication in conflicts such as the
Rwandan genocide. Stephen smith, writing about the consequences of French
politics in Africa, concludes that «An entire section of the continent is
being crushed in an identity crisis of anti-French feelings... as for France,
it is but a bigger Belgium which has just returned from the African shores -
too large for her.»277(*) It is therefore possible to think that in African
minds, «France/Africa is dead»278(*) and it is time for African countries to diversify
development partnership, especially when the newcomers have the means for their
policies.
A greater US presence in the Central African sub-region therefore
threatens the French in what can be called the last backyard of French presence
in Africa. In 1997, Eric Fottorino noticed the upcoming confrontations horizons
thus «[the] mastery of oil zones in Congo, Angola or in Chad prefigures
confrontations that are not necessarily amicable between Washington and
Paris»279(*) with
the 9/11 events and global American commitment to fight terrorists wherever
they be, this confrontation is today to be greater. It is equally in the same
sense that Delphine Lecoutre and Admore Mupoki Kambudzi observed that
«Disappointed by a France which has promised human rights and development
without really promoting them, African peoples are turning increasingly toward
the US and China».280(*)
A notable consequence of US engagement in Cameroon should be
French exasperation at how Cameroon is welcoming the US. French fears are based
on the same geopolitical calculations as the US: whoever controls Cameroon
controls the Gulf of Guinea, and whoever controls the Gulf of Guinea controls
the continent. It is not therefore with applause that the French apprehend
US greater presence in Cameroon. The question one should be asking is whether
the French have the means to compete with the US in its (French) `former'
backyard. In other woods, how can the French continue their policies unabated
in a region coveted by rivals that are by far more powerful? We might not be
able to answer that question here, but it is worth asking. Madina has witnessed
skirmishes of French counter attack in the cultural domain thus «in time
past, the American Cultural Center was really active, but lost its opulence
because of the French Cultural Center which has boosted its presence and has
been realizing several artistic and cultural works».281(*) The question we will rather
ask is this, what should Cameroon do with all that, what are the stakes when a
small power like Cameroon becomes the bone of contention of powerful states?
Shall the fate of Thucydides' Meleans befall this small Central African state?
One of the features of post 9/11 IR, especially after the
Iraq war, is the Transatlantic Divide. This divide relates to European
(especially France and Germany) resistance to US unilateralism and hegemony. In
this moment where the US is seeking reconciliation with her traditional allies
in Europe, what role can Cameroon play? It depends on how the relations are
managed. Basically, it could lead to greater confrontation (as we will see in
chapter 4) or greater cooperation or a dilemma. In a realists reading of IR as
essentially competitive, one would see a divide. But a liberal reading of
cooperation, especially with common values such as democracy, human rights and
the rule of law, and multilateral institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the African development bank could all make
of Cameroon a subject of accord between hitherto divided allies.
Working on the implications of Western powers in the
democratic process in Africa, and dealing with the case of France and the US in
Cameroon, Ebolo notes that these two powers, apart from their foreign policy
differences and historical models, pursue both the promotion of the liberal
model and their national interests.282(*) He however acknowledges that in spite of these
stated similarities in foreign pressure for democratization, «the US
commitment towards the instauration of a democratic state of law looks more
stated than the role, rather ambiguous played by the French in this key country
of their African backyard.»283(*) This US commitment, expressed in declarations of the
State Department and reports issued by the Yaoundé embassy are
reminiscent of the ideological beliefs and values in US history. The US
therefore found no remorse in supporting the opposition provided the latter
would bring democracy and the rule of law. Ebolo expresses opposition support
for US actions in Cameroon thus: «Opposition forces have largely cautioned
the US actions [in Cameroon] at the time when they were criticizing, not
without vehemence, French activism.»284(*) Opposition criticism of French actions or inaction
should be understood from the fact that the French were potentially more
influential in Cameroon than the Americans.
* 271 In the early days of
WWII, German troops rapidly occupied France, forcing de Gaulle to take refuge
in London, from where he organized several counter-attacks from the ports of
Liverpool.
* 272 see Nitcheu B.,
«Campagne Militaire Française au Cameroun :Chronique d'un
génocide annoncé», London, 17 August 2000. obtainable from
www.ogres.0rg
* 273 J.F. Valette,
Cameroon Tribune, Monday 11/09/2006 p.4.
* 274 J.F. Valette, op, cit.
p5
* 275 Idem
* 276 See for example
«The fall of the French empire», The Wall Street Journal,
New York, May 25 1997; «La France lâche l'Afrique», Jeune
Afrique, no 2098, Paris, March 27 - April 2 2001; «Paris is
overwhelmed», `Africa is tired of France, Le Figaro, Paris, April
28, 2005; François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus
long scandale de la République, Paris: Stock, 1998.
* 277 Stephen Smith,
«France-Afrique, l'adieu aux ex-neocolonies», Le Debat,
Paris, Gallimard, Nov-Dec, 2005 p 3. Though the paper argues from a
general African perspective, it however focuses on Central Africa, especially
Rwanda. An increasing number of French writers have criticized French role in
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, among whom are, François-Xavier Verschave,
Jean-Paul Gouteux, Mehdi Ba - Rwanda 1994, Un Genocide
Français, Paris, l'Esprit Frappeur, 1997
* 278 Stephen Smith, op, cit.
p5.
* 279 Eric Fottorino,
«L'Ultime Reve américain» - the Ultimate American dream,
L'Autre Afrique no. 7, July 1997, p. 31
* 280 Delphine Lecoutre and
Admore Mupoki Kambudzi, «Vers un divorce entre Paris et le continent
Africain?», Monde Diplomatique, June 2006 pp6-7
* 281 Madina, op, cit. p75
* 282 Ebolo Martin
Dieudonné «L'Implication des Puissances Occidentales Dans le
Processus de Démocratisation en Afrique : Analyse des actions
Américaines et Françaises au Cameroun» Th, 3e
Cycle, Yaoundé: IRIC, 1997 p293
* 283 Idem
* 284 Ibid, p294
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