The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

2. The cost of greater engagement

What will it cost the US if it is increasingly engaged in Central Africa, benefits and challenges? This question has underlined this work so far, but needs to be succinctly answered. In foreign policy formulation, in the realist tradition, policy-makers think first of their gain, the national interest. In our analysis, it will be important to start with what the US stands to gain by engaging in Central Africa through relations with Cameroon. But after we see that, we will have to see what it stands to loss, that is, challenges the US will be facing in the sub-region.

The US stands to gain in the following; fight against terrorism, fight against drug trafficking, access to natural resources, and control the sub-region. In the fight against terrorism, the US will monitor, in partnership with local governments the activities and possible infiltration of terrorists in such a strategic zone. This monitoring will involve a check on terrorists finance, recruitment and planning. As an important transit zone of drugs to the US and from Latin America, the fight against illicit drugs trafficking will be enhanced by greater control of the Gulf of Guinea. In the same way, greater engagement in Central Africa will secure energy resources against vandalism, expropriation and control by other rival powers. A total control of the sub-region will grant access to military facilities, the putting min place of a security belt and the furthering of democracy and the rule of law.

However, the US does not lose in mind the numerous challenges that engaging in the sub-region involves. These challenges could be budgetary, ideological, security and imperial clash. It has been noted throughout this paper that greater US presence in the sub-region requires budgetary sacrifices by US taxpayers. In fact, the more the engagement, the greater the cost. This budgetary sacrifice is made difficult by the slow pace to democracy and the rule of law in the sub-region. It could be explained that this slow pace is due to cultural differences between the two peoples, and that a people with a different political history will not embrace the American version of democracy over-night. It will cost time, energy and money to transform CA, though probably less sacrifices than in the Middle East. The US also has security challenges to face in the region. Local security systems are poor (both in funding and in management), putting US personnel and installations at risk. The Terrorist Index cited above also identified. In the Terrorism Index cited above, index's experts also disapprove of how it [US] is controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and its [US] dealings with failing states. Central Africa has most of these failing states and the US will have to develop a proactive approach in managing them.

The last challenge is how to manage relations with other powers, which also have interests in the sub-region. The prospects for imperial clash hunt the US policy-maker. The pace of Chinese penetration in the sub-region, the existing French installations make it a competition for the US to pursue its interests. The US would prefer to avoid confrontations, as it did during the Cold War, especially with the disagreements that exist between the US and traditional allies in places like the Middle East.

Managing relations with European allies is going to be a challenge. The Terrorism Index that assesses how America is tackling terrorism revealed in a pew that many policy experts in the US disapprove of how America is handling its relations with European allies.^268(*) It is therefore a real preoccupation for US policy-makers to engage in another confrontation with allies they need to woo. Ms. Theresa Whelan underscored this need in 2002 when she declared, «We have to continue to work with our European partners. This is a global partnership; the US and the Africans, as well as the US and the Europeans, that has been DoD's formula for success, and we now have to put that into practice.»^269(*) The problem of managing relations with European allies in the former backyard is well known in Washington, the real issue is what strategy to adopt. For the Department of Defense spokesperson, European expertise in military issues will be indispensable, especially in Francophone Africa. The case is however expected to be different in trade/resources issues.

When the AGOA was launched, it was immediately perceived in European capitals as a competitor to the Lome Accords. Agoa was then described in France as being «evidently part of a larger project for the promotion of a trade policy geared towards invading a market that till now has been European business and to secure the exploitation of strategic resources (oil, minerals...)».^270(*) In fact, if Washington needs Paris for peacekeeping, it does not need it for business, though there needs to be a concerted effort in promoting democracy. Though we do not know exactly how best the US has to manage relations with European allies while not losing sight of its own interest, it seems plausible that the US has to engage more formally and sincerely on African issues with European allies.

* ²⁶⁸ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ July/August 2006 FOREIGN POLICY and the Center for American Progress teamed up to survey more than 100 of America's top foreign-policy experts and get their assessment of how the United States is fighting the Global War on Terror.

* ²⁶⁹ Theresa Whelan, op, cit.

* ²⁷⁰ Defense nationale, January 2001, p. 98