The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

CHAPTER 4: STAKES OF US PRESENCE IN CAMEROON

If the Gulf of Guinea in particular and Africa in general is understood to constitute a region of imperial struggle between great powers, could Cameroon be a Rimland by which these powers shall control the heartland? During the February 2007 Africa-French summit, President Chirac observed that «Africa's rich natural resources do not only provide for development but also attract competition.» This prefigures imperial rivalry, which is not new in colonial history. In the late 19^th century, there was an unexpected clash between Africa's most ardent colonialists, the British and the French. It was in the Sudanese province of Fachoda. While the French were coming in from Morocco through Mauritania and French Sudan (Mali), the British were descending from Egypt on the one hand and British East Africa, on the other hand. The clash that followed between French troops and those of Lord Kishner constituted the only major clash between the two colonial powers in those years in Africa. Our interest in this chapter is whether such an imperial clash is not likely in the Gulf of Guinea, through Cameroon, and this time around not between the British and the French but between the US, the French and the Chinese. In fact, throughout history, hegemons have been challenged.^250(*)

Writing about the prospects for such a clash, Awoumou noted that «the rush for the Gulf of Guinea can be understood as a quest for power through the control of a zone hitherto of benign neglect, and the need for a diversification of sources of raw materials - oil».^251(*) The Gulf of Guinea, and especially CA is traditionally a French backyard, but its natural resources and strategic (economic, military, humanitarian) importance has invited other powers such as the US and China. The US however stands as the major great power investor in the Gulf, not withstanding the interests of Western countries such as France, Britain, Belgium and Spain; Asian countries such as China, Japan, Israel and India; Latin American countries such as Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela; and African powers such as South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco and Libya. One must also note the interests of «private actors of all kinds: multinationals, international organizations, ideologists, preachers, predators, businessmen...»^252(*) who have all made of the region an international cause of disagreement.

Section 1: stakes for the US

1. US and empire building in the Gulf of Guinea: need for virgin ground?

The US, today, enjoys a virtually unrivalled and unprecedented position in the international system. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is little doubt that the global reach and unilateral freedom of action of the lone remaining superpower has grown far beyond that of previous world powers. No Greecean Alexander or Roman Caesar or British monarch could have imagined the scope of U.S. influence. The Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Spanish, Dutch, British and Soviet empires were formally territorial entities, which the US is not. The US Empire today is manifested in military, economic and cultural terms. Our interest here is to see how this informal empire extends to the Central African sub-region. Commenting on this, John Bellamy Foster said, «the global actions of the United States since September 11, 2001, are often seen as constituting a `new militarism' and a `new imperialism'.»^253(*)

Studying the effects of American empire building on other countries in the world, Brzezinski asserts that «at the wake of the 21st century, America enjoys an unprecedented power in world history».^254(*) In this position, US power has effects on the global system, «the effect of whose stabilizing power is indispensable for international stability» including Central African security.^255(*) In the present world, according to certain schools of thought, national security is no more the internal affairs of the sovereign state. Usually, national powers are confronted with international violence. Boundaries have become so fluid, peoples have become so interwoven and violence has become so spread that the notion of national security must be redefined. The central question is this, how far must the US go to cover the space for her security? In fact, to secure herself and her allies, the US must attain the highest level of security.

If the US needs virgin land to extend her hegemony, which she attests to be a world commodity, are other parts of the world ready to accept Americanization? What Brzezinski contends with, though he is not the first given that Niall Ferguson had already posited that, is that American hegemony benefits the rest of the world, at least to some extent and at different levels. It is possible to imagine that in case a different power was to rule the world, it is not sure the common good will be delivered at the same proportions. His reserves, however, lie in the practice of globalization. If there is «a natural doctrine of world hegemony» in which one power must rule the world as has been demonstrated by Paul Kennedy, it is obvious that there are victims who are hegemonized by the dominant power. In the same vein, Americanization is sending a message of a single culture around the world, which is not bad culture anyway, but which submerges other cultures. Finally, globalization has served American power, accelerating global integration to the level where there are «no frontiers except for persons».^256(*)

If «the great powers of the past are too tired or too weak to endorse the role played by the US today» as Brzezinski stated at the beginning,^257(*) then we must accept that the US has some interest in some weak form of unilateralism. It is clear to Brzezinski that if America was to withdraw from world affairs as China did some five centuries ago, the world would plunge into chaos, and America with it. In any case, even if not in the near future, America will one day give her seat to another hegemon, and that is why Americans must begin reflecting on the type of legacy they would want to leave behind. The US is either a fortress with a threatening shadow on a mountain, or a city that illuminates the whole world, showing the way of progress and development.

However, Africa is likely to be a victim of this new imperialism. Bellamy observed that «Imperialism is constant for capitalism.»^258(*) The building of the American empire around the world has gone through carious phases. If «At present the world is experiencing a new age of imperialism marked by a U.S. grand strategy of global domination,» as Bellamy says, then greater US presence in Cameroon is precisely in that framework.^259(*) Especially that «One indication of how things have changed [since 9/11] is that the U.S. military is now truly global in its operations with permanent bases on every continent, including Africa, where a new scramble for control is taking place focused on oil.»^260(*) Through different publications, Bellamy shows adequately that if the idea of imperialism was refuted or contended during the cold war, and to some extend, after the Cold War, after 9/11, it is not only accepted but also vigorously defended. In a series of articles published on the subject, Bellamy asserts that the «The New Age of Imperialism» (July-Aug. 2003) corresponds with Kipling's the «White Man's Burden,» of US Imperialism (Nov. 2003). If that be so, he wonders, «Is Iraq Another Vietnam?» (June 2004). In «The American Empire: Pax Americana or Pox Americana?» (Sept. 2004), Bellamy states that America cannot bring peace to the world. He furthers this idea in another articles, with Brett Clark
»Empire of Barbarism» (Dec. 2004) looking at American atrocities in the name of empire, to end with «The Failure of Empire» (Jan. 2005).^261(*)

However, not everyone agrees with Bellamy's rather pessimistic reading of American imperialism and its effects on Africa. Naill Ferguson makes a point by making a difference between empire and hegemony - though empire is difficult to assert, hegemony is much easier and profitable to all across the board.^262(*) He quotes Kaplan as saying «there is a positive side to empire» in the same way as Sebastian Mallaby's American `neo-imperialism' as the best remedy for `chaos' engendered by `failed states' around the world.<sup>263(*)</sup> At the head of an `Anglophone Empire', America intends to bring about the `benefits of colonization' as an effect of imperialism.<sup>264(*)</sup> In this sense, the situation of Africans, and Central Africans in particular, creates the extension of `empire by invitation'.^265(*) If empire is «the extension of one's civilization, usually by military force to rule over other peoples»,^266(*) then American military presence in the Gulf of Guinea incorporates the region into the American empire. This dilemma becomes fearful when «imperialism of internationalism could last indefinitely in countries palpably incapable of stable self-rule».^267(*) Central Africa therefore appears to be an area to be incorporated in the Pax Americana, at all cost.

* ²⁵⁰ On the challenges hegemons have faced in history see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New-York: Randon House, 1987, Owen Harris, «Challengers», Lecture 5, Boyer Lectures, 14 December 2003.

* ²⁵¹ Awoumou, op, cit. p4.

* ²⁵² Awoumou, op, cit. p3.

* ²⁵³John Bellamy Foster, «Naked Imperialism», Monthly Review, Volume 57, Number 4, 2005

* ²⁵⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Choice, Dominion or Leadership. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004. p2

* ²⁵⁵ Ibid, p19

* ²⁵⁶ Ibid, p224.

* ²⁵⁷ Ibid, p 17

* ²⁵⁸ John Bellamy Foster, «A Warning to Africa: The New U.S. Imperial Grand Strategy», Monthly Review, Volume 58, Number 2, June 2006

* ²⁵⁹ John Bellamy Foster, idem

* ²⁶⁰ Idem

* ²⁶¹ Bellamy, Naked Imperialism. The U.S. Pursuit of Global Dominance, Chicago: Monthly Review Press, 2006.

* ²⁶² Naill Ferguson, Colossus. The Price of America's Empire, New York: Penguin Press, 2004, pp6-7. He argues for example that `hegemony means more than mere leadership, but less than outright empire' (p9).

* ²⁶³ Ibid, p5. See also Sebastian Mallaby, «Reluctant Imperialist» in Foreign Affairs, September 2002, p6

* ²⁶⁴ Ferguson, op, cit. pp11-12.

* ²⁶⁵ Ibid, p12. He borrows this term from Geir Lundestad, The American `Empire' and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective, Oxford: OUP, 1990.

* ²⁶⁶ Ibid, p169.

* ²⁶⁷ Ferguson, op, cit, p170.