The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

2. Future confrontations with China?

The duel between Washington and Beijing in Central Africa could have even far-reaching implications that the confrontation with the French. The place Cameroon gives to China came to the lamplight in September 2003 when Cameroonian President, Paul Biya was received as the first as the first African president to visit the newly installed Chinese government of Hu Jintao. Chinese relations with Africa, though to be traced two centuries away, only took considerable proportions in the 1950s and 60s. Apart from what Chietigj Bajpaee calls «China's goodwill with African states» which «can be traced back to its [Chinese] support for anti-colonial struggles in the 1960s», in those years, china was interested in three main domains: fostering the principle of `One China', countering capitalists' initiatives, and countering Russian initiatives.^285(*)

The principle of One China emerged after the Chinese civil war in the 1950s, which left the Beijing government seeking to isolate Taiwan while pressurizing Africa governments to break relations with Taiwan. This Beijing tactic was going to bear fruits in UN votes from African countries. On the other hand, since China belonged to the Communist block, China supported communist regimes allover Africa, especially in Ghana, Mozambique, Ethiopia, etc. China's other engagement in Africa in the late 60s was rivalry with its communist ally - Russia. This has been reported by Princeton Lyman when he wrote that «China's other objective was to compete not only with Western influence but Russia's.»^286(*) This happened in countries like Mozambique and Angola. In those early years of Sino-African relations, Chinese financial commitments in Africa were relative and could not compete with Western donations and investment.

The new posture in Sino-African relations was only observed in the 1990s when China embarked on huge economic, military and diplomatic reforms. It was in 1995 that the China National Petroleum Corporation (C.N.P.C.) established oil exploration rights in Sudan. In the years that followed, China had to return to the continent in force because of energy needs for its growing industry. According to Lyman, «China returns to Africa in the 21^st century with not only a need for economic resources but with the cash to play the game dramatically and competitively.»^287(*) With oil interests in Algeria, Angola, Chad and Sudan and increasing stakes in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria, China has greatly increased her presence in Cameroon. With the disappearance of the communist block, there are no anti-colonial struggles, capitalists rivals nor Russian competitor; today, it is only economics and sometimes insistence on the One China principle.

As for Sino-Cameroon relations, there has been considerable growth since both countries opened diplomatic relations in 1971. In comparison to the other two rival powers (France and US), China is therefore a newcomer into the region. Though Cameroon enjoyed better relations with China than other African countries because economic policy of mix-economy, it should be noted that official Chinese visits to Cameroon were only at Vice-ministerial level until 2000. The year 2000 is strategic because it marks Chinese decisive diplomatic and economic move to engage African countries in its raw material needs. In diplomatic history, we can note that whereas between 1978 and 1999, thirteen Chinese officials visited Cameroon, since 2000, at least, a Chinese top official visits Cameroon every year. After Dai Bingguo, Minister of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee (February 2000) and Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 2001), it was Zhu Rongji, Premier of the State Council to pay an official visit Cameroon in 2002.

Cameroonian authorities have shown interests in developing relations with China since the establishment of diplomatic relations. While President Ahmadu Ahidjo visited China twice (1972 and 1978), Paul Biya has been to Beijing at least four times (1986, 1993, 2003 and 2006).^288(*) President Biya has therefore paid more official visits to China than to the US, which gives a warning to the US on the future of relations with a country that is bent on increasing the level of cooperation with another rival power. Apart from the presidents, we should note that almost all Cameroonian top officials have been to China on official working visits.

Chinese interests in Cameroon could be studied from various perspectives, but principally from what Cameroon has as resources and the resources of the sub-region in which Cameroon is leader. The different areas which have received Chinese funding and investment include the Yaoundé Conference Center building, the Lagdo hydro-power station, the Chinese language-training center, the gynaco-obstetric hospital and multi-sport complex in Yaoundé. Apart from those, other Chinese-sponsored petit projects exist such as medical personnel (about 44), military cooperation, ten annual scholarships, road construction and medical equipments. Though these projects have appeased public opinion, several Cameroonians seem skeptical about the real intension of China in Cameroon. With trade agreements signed in 1972 and renewed in 2002, several Chinese corporations have stationed in Cameroon.^289(*) However, Chinese interests in Cameroon should be interpreted beyond Cameroonian borders. Most of the oil-rich countries where China has won contracts are either bordering Cameroon or are not too far. This is true with Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Gabon and Chad. This last country (Chad), as was formally the case with the CAR, is one of the countries still holding relations with Taiwan in Africa. China could solicit Cameroon's support given the latter's influence in the region, to have Chad renounce relations with Taiwan.

Though the Chinese are being increasingly criticized by the West for it despise and even sometimes tacit encouragement of bad governance, lack of democracy and human right abuses, African governments, including those of Central Africa are showing more interests in China. Such forums as the Asia-Africa Summit and the China-Africa Business Council, which was jointly established with the United Nations Development Program in November 2004, work to support China's private sector investment in such countries as Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. In the same vein, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was initiated in 2000, comprising 46 of the 53 African countries. The November 2006 China-Africa Forum marked the apex of Chinese engagement in Africa and African readiness to `diversify partnership'.

Writing on Sino-US competition in Africa, Chietigj Bajpaee acknowledges that «the competition to secure energy resources on the world stage could fuel their already shaky relationship.»^290(*) He then concludes that «Africa is likely to emerge as a volatile stage of Sino-US energy competition», because of «a plethora of internal crises ranging from poverty to poor governance and civil war».^291(*) The three important spots on the world stage where this competition is taking place are Iran, Sudan and the Gulf of Guinea. In these regions, US exasperation at Chinese disdain for human rights and the sole desire to secure energy resources in conflict-ridden states by offering aid or arms-for-oil could heighten instability in the region. This situation is worsened by the fact that African states have been drawn to China by its non-interventionist, non-ideological approach in conducting relations. The fear that China might leave Africa worst off is also made by the press. Writing on «The «Chinese Tsunami» that Threatens to Swamp Africa», Basildon Peta wondered how the world would Make Poverty History when nothing is done about the Chinese tsunami vulnerable developing states suffering from the impact of Peking's bad policies.^292(*)

In the face of all these challenges, Lyman states that «the United States does have to recognize that the United States, and the western nations altogether, cannot consider Africa any more their chasse gardé as the French once considered Francophone Africa.» Chinese bit for oil and market is rapidly out-weighing the West. There, Lyman concludes that «there is a new strategic framework operating on the continent and it demands new ways of operating.»^293(*) Lyman proposes three challenging ideas; 1. the impetus must come from Africans themselves with the US providing more fund for democracy, good governance and civil-society building; 2. the second opening Western markets for African goods; 3. US engaging China on African issues given that China wants to be respected as a world power.

* ²⁸⁵ Chietigj Bajpaee, «Sino-US Energy Competition in Africa», in Power and Interest News Report, October 7, 2005 available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ or http://www.pinr.com

* ²⁸⁶ Princeton Lyman, «China's Rising Role in Africa», Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2005

* ²⁸⁷ Idem.

* ²⁸⁸ On a recapitulation of Cameroon China relations, see «China and Cameroon: Bilateral Relations» at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn accessed on 2007-01-31 06:16:23    

* ²⁸⁹ Some of these corporations include China Geological Engineering Group Co. and China Hydro-power Foreign Project Co.

* ²⁹⁰ Chietigj Bajpaee, op, cit.

* ²⁹¹ Idem.

* ²⁹² Basildon Peta, «The `Chinese Tsunami' that Threatens to Swamp Africa», Independent, April 25, 2005

* ²⁹³ Princeton Lyman, «China's Rising Role in Africa», op, cit.