The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

ii. Cameroon's acquisition of political stability at the turn of the century

The American policy-maker has really never lost heart of the importance of Cameroon as a partner or as a new member of the ever-growing democratic empire. The greater part of the post Cold War tension had been with hardliners under the Republican executive and Congress. With the coming of President Clinton, the idea of extending the American concept of national security to the economic sphere progressively applied. In this sense, Washington was prepared to invest in promising countries in the two domains of democracy and free trade.

The importance of Cameroon per se does not appear quite significant in US minds. What appears rational is Quantin's comment stating that «After the first phase of transition experiences, by 1991 - 1992, western and multilateral pressures became more prudent and conservative.»^122(*) Not only was the concept of democracy progressively replaced by good governance, but it appeared more useful to support incumbents than rely on `uncertain newcomers'. In this sense, Cameroon's political stability alone is not sufficient in explaining US temperance and moderation, on the one hand, and `return' to Cameroon on the other hand.

Though some trends of change were observable from 1994, it is actually in 1997 that smooth bilateral relations `resumed'. After the presidential elections that held that year, the US seemed to be less critical. Three visits by US officials leave us with these impressions; that of the director of Central African Affairs at the State Department in 1997, of the Secretary of Transport (Rodney Slater) in 1998 and the important delegation of US mayors and businessmen led by the Mayor of Washington D.C., Mr. Marion Barry from the 7^th to the 12^th November. Both personalities gave positive notes about the elections as they were received by the President of the Republic of Cameroon. The red-carpet reception given to these guests could be interpreted as efforts by Cameroonian government to woo a disgruntled major partner.

Though the election of President Bush in 2000 was with an isolationist air, with little interest in foreign policy, 9/11 seemed to change all that. With hard-liners in the Congress, the US became the more interventionist, reassessing its policies allover the world. On the other hand, Cameroon, as other African countries embraced a world wide assessment of its economic, political and social policies. With changes underway at the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards the creation of the African Union and the consequent challenges for African states, the Cameroonian government was obliged to adjust to international standards and work towards good governance and democracy.

Following the advent of 9/11, relations between Cameroon and the US needed to be more than smooth. They needed to be excellent, especially for the fact that the bombings had demonstrated that America needed friendly countries on the one hand and other sources of energy on the other hand. Cameroon needed to show itself as a friend of the US and willing to joint in the fight against terror. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (in 2001 and 2003 respectively) left no doubts as to how far the US was ready to go against their enemies.

With the passage of time, Cameroonians, both the governing and the governed acquired greater political maturity and readiness to fairly play the game of democracy. After most opposition parties boycotted the Presidential elections of 1997, we notice that since then electoral activities in Cameroon have seen the participation of major political parties. Also, electoral practices have been less violent, though not necessarily fair. It is with this in mind that, in his speech to the Senate Sub-Committee on International Relations, the Ambassador-designate, Marquardt described Cameroon as having «been relatively stable.»^123(*) This stability has not been acquired only by elections, but also by efforts in good governance, the rule of law and an improved human rights record. We should however keep in mind that «U.S., France and Great Britain stay severe censors only in the African countries were their interests are low.»^124(*)

This stability is however described as `relative'. This is because of three main factors; supposed elections fraud, separatists' threats and social ills such as poverty and corruption. In October 2001, growing tension between the Biya Government and separatists lobbying on behalf of the country's 5 million English-speakers intensified. The resulting confrontation led to three deaths, several arrests. The following year's Parliamentary and Municipal elections (July 2002) resulted in an overwhelming Biya's party's win amidst opposition claims of fraud and vote-rigging. But the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in October of the same year granting the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon consolidated national peace and stability through a patriotic effect, especially when Nigeria rejected the ruling. The events following this ruling gave patriots in Cameroon sympathy for the regime in place, thereby furthering political stability.^125(*)

The 2004 presidential elections were crucial to Cameroon's future - a test of its democratic progress. Since 2002, all major opposition parties were participating while international observers from the Francophonie, the Commonwealth and the African Union were present to follow the electoral process. President Paul Biya still emerged winner of a new seven-year term. In Marquardt's words, «Presidential elections in October offer Cameroon a new opportunity to demonstrate overdue progress on the road to democracy.»^126(*) The attainment of the Heavily Poor Indebted Countries initiative in April 2006 and the decision by the Paris Club of major lending nations, two months later, to cancel almost all of Cameroon's $3.5 billion debts, was further proof of relative political stability. In the words of former French ambassador to Cameroon, «What obstructed investment in the past, that is difficulties from the state and corporations that depend on the state, these difficulties are today removed.»^127(*)

* ¹²² Quantin, op. cit, no page.

* ¹²³ Statement of R. Niels Marquardt, Ambassador-designate to the Republics of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2004. //usinfo.state.gov\xarchives\xmlview.html

* ¹²⁴ Quantin, op, cit. for further reading on this phenomenon, see O'Donnel G. and Schmitter P., Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

* ¹²⁵ These events include: December 2003 - Nigeria hands over 32 villages to Cameroon as part of the 2002 ICJ border deal. In January 2004 both countries agree to mount joint border patrols. September 2004 - Nigeria fails to meet a deadline to hand over Bakassi. June 2006 - Nigeria agrees to withdraw its troops from the Bakassi peninsula to settle its long-running border dispute with Cameroon. The breakthrough comes at a UN-mediated summit. 2006 August - A ceremony marks the transfer of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon after Nigeria completes its troop withdrawal from the area.

* ¹²⁶ Marquardt N., op, cit.

* ¹²⁷ J.F. Valette, Cameroon Tribune, Monday 11/09/2006 p.5