The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

Figure 2. source: author's arrangement with data from US embassy, Yaoundé

Section 2: Geopolitical factors for US interest in Cameroon

In global political thought, Cameroon has particular potentials to attract the American policy maker due to location, stability and resources. In this sense, both the socio-cultural and the politico-economic prowess of this country plays an important role in understanding recent moves by Washington toward a hitherto `dead pole' of US foreign policy. In order to appreciate the internal factors within Cameroon that have brought about intensification in relations, we will examine the political changes that have taken place, before examining more constant factors such as natural resources and geographical location.

1. Political stability and change of US policy

The political changes that have been taking place in Cameroon are very important when studying internal factors for change of US policy. Historically, we can talk of tension in the early 1990s and stability at the turn of the century. A comparison between the difficult transition in Cameroon immediately after the Cold War and the relative stability around 2000 brings out clearly the American foreign policy game of a `big stick', within specific ideological settings.

i. A difficult political transition in the 1990s

With the Cold War and its ideological and geopolitical implications well over, it was necessary for the US to champion the cause for democracy world wide, since «... the traditional posture of US defense for human rights and democracy as a dogmatic, ideological and diplomatic message...»^102(*) was on its way. The democracy-oriented US foreign policy had been underway before the end of the Cold War and had even been attributed to the end of the war. In 1984, President Reagan helped form the National Endowment for Democracy, the international arms of labor unions, businesses, while encouraging the Republican and Democratic parties to support foreign political parties, free enterprise and independent unions as the foundations of democracy. In 1990, President George Bush emphatically insisted on the new role and posture of US policy in the world.

Out of the troubled times...a new world order can emerge: a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace... A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice...A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle.^103(*)

In other words, the Cold War paradigm of focus on anti-communist activities to the detriment of one of the fundamental ideological concepts in American foreign relations - democracy and human rights, was well over. It was now time for the US government to champion the cause of democracy in traditional Wilsonian thought. President Clinton who succeeded President Bush reiterated this perspective in a remarkable speech to congress in 1995. «As we move from the industrial to the information age, from the cold war world to the global village, he argued, we have an extraordinary opportunity to advance our values at home and around the world.»^104(*) What are these values which America must advance? They are democracy, the rule of law and peace - to make the world a safer place to live in. If the world becomes a global village, America would be obliged to deliver the global commodity to the entire village. «Let me say again, the one bright line between domestic and foreign policy is blurring, Clinton argued forcefully, you readily sea that foreign-domestic distinctions begin to evaporate in so many profound ways.»^105(*) The events happening in hitherto unknown areas or countries of benign neglect were not going to be ignored anymore. America was ready to pay the entire price and shoulder the whole burden. Though there has traditionally been Congressional disagreement on foreign policy issues, and that at this moment many congressionalists were clearly isolationalists, Clinton convinced the congress that «we have always agreed on the need for American leadership in the cause of democracy, freedom, security and prosperity.»^106(*) For these reasons, in Clinton's words, «The isolationist are simply wrong»^107(*) because the US would take democracy to the undemocratic peoples of the world. The cause of democracy in `undemocratic' parts of the world was not just rhetoric in US foreign policy formulation, but a defining working ideology, directly linked to state security. The US reading of the political events in Cameroon in the 1990s should be understood principally from this liberal interdependent perspective.

The post-Cold War political situation in Africa, on the other hand, was quite appalling. Several French newspapers wrote on African apocalyptic political transition to democracy. The March 26 edition of Jeune Afrique's provocative title, «Pourquoi la Presse Francaise s'attaque à l'Afrique» (Why French newspapers Attack Africa), captured this situation.^108(*) Reproducing some of the headlines of French newspapers such as «Que Faire de l'Afrique Noire?»; «La Faillite de l'Afrique»; «Pourquoi l'Afrique Craque»; «L'Afro pessimisme» «L'Afrique s'enfonce dans le marasme»; «L'Afrique en panne»; «L'Afrique en déroute» (what is to be done with black Africa?, the Failure of Africa, Why Africa is Breaking, Afro pessimism, Why Africa is Plunging into Waste, Africa in a breakdown, Africa uprooted). The conclusion is that Africa is not only on an economic collapse, but on a political delusion. That in spite of foreign aid for development and the so-called democratic wind of change, Africa, especially francophone Africa is doomed to fail. In this vast Francophone Africa, Cameroon was one of the key countries from which examples were drawn to demonstrate disappointment of a difficult dissolving into democracy.

Within academic circles, the debate on a `democratic culture' in African countries has centered on two poles. On the one hand, some researchers believe that democracy was totally absent in African countries because Africans are traditionally totalitarian<sup>109(*)</sup>; on the other hand, that democracy cannot work in Africa because it is an imported phenomenon. However, as Sindjoun or even Larry Diamonds argue, «authoritarianism being a social construction can also be deconstructed»<sup>110(*)</sup>, but since it is part of culture, it cannot disappear `overnight' though `not impermeable to change'. But this change required foreign intervention as argued by Patrick Quantin:

...the influence of external pressures on these societies... The origins of these pressures are found in the role of international actors: World Bank, International Monetary Fund and western donors: United States, France, Germany, etc. Their doctrine is expressed in the concept of `political conditionality' of which [is] the World Bank[`s] `From crisis to sustainable development' (World bank, 1989).^111(*)

The US is identified by Quantin as one of the principal external factors that put pressure on African countries to introduce democratic change. Cameroon, as one of the six countries studied by Quantin, does not escape this pressure.

Diplomatic documents from both Cameroon's MINREX and the US Department of State all indicate the period between 1989 and 1997 as a period when the US needed to reorient its African policy. Simultaneously, it was a period of socio-political instability in Cameroonian political history. In effect, the end of the Cold War left the US with an unprecedented hegemonic position. With the disappearance of communists' threats in Africa, there was the need to focus on market economy, free trade, democracy and human rights as well as humanitarian interests.

Cameroon's political situation was particularly violent. On May 25 1990, the SDF was born in Bamenda with so much heat that the whole country was shaken. Shortly after, several other political parties were born. In this era of confrontation and reported vast human right violations, as Mbile puts it, «A completely new and alarming complexion had come into our politics, burning, destruction and killing.»^112(*) Since the mid 1960s, Cameroon was ruled as a one-party state. However, in 1990, following public and international pressure for democracy, and in spite of cry for a single party state by members of the ruling party, President Biya declared to party members; «We must be ready to face competition».^113(*) Hardly did he know it was going to be a violent competition. In April 1991, riots and `ghost town' paralyzed the cities of Douala, Bamenda, Bafoussam and Buea, while the army constantly engaged in bloody confrontations with the population. The general out-cry was for a national conference and multi-party elections. It is out of this pressure that a series of elections were organized.

From 1990 to 1997, several elections held in Cameroon in a generally tensed environment. But these elections were in themselves what Ambroise Kom calls «the impossible swallowing of democracy».^114(*) Cameroon's democratic history was in its worst years. It was the March 1992 Parliamentary elections that opened the way to a period of turmoil. The elections held in a general context of violence and intercommunity confrontations especially in the Northern provinces of the country. C.P.D.M.'s victory could be attributed to dispersion within the opposition on the one hand and intimidation on the other.

The 1992 presidential elections were seen as crucial by political actors and observers. Many expected Fru Ndi to win the elections given his popularity. An example of stakes on Fru Ndi's electoral victory and pre-electoral maneuvers is the resignation of the then Governor of the East province who later sought asylum in the US, more reasons for Cameroon - US tension.^115(*)

The opposition took to the streets when the Supreme Court declared incumbent President Biya as winner of the October 11 presidential elections. The bras de fer between the authorities and the opposition obliged President Biya to declare a state of emergency till the end of that year. Mbile describes the situation in those years;

The general boycott ordered by the S.D.F. opposition created such an impact on the economy of the country coupled with the then prevailing world economic situation that the nation faced a near collapse, especially in the affected provinces of the North West, Littoral, West and South West^116(*).

With the declining legitimacy of the president's authority, the government was obliged to send the army to re-establish public order. Accused of electoral fraud, the party in power found itself in several corruption scandals while the country descended in a bleak future. In 1998, the imprisoning of Mr. Pius Njawe, a private journalist, for reporting on the president's health malaise, did not escape the attention of the public while raising an international campaign for press freedom in Cameroon. In this environment, the government needed the support of its partners, especially strong partners such as France and the United States.

Figure 3. source: author

Elections in Cameroon in the 1990s.

Date	Type of election		Feature/participation	01/03/1992
Parliamentary	Boycotted by S.D.F.		11/10/1992
Presidential	Most parties participated but vigorous contestations.		21/01/1996
Municipal	Boycotted by S.D.F.		17/05/1997
Parliamentary	Most parties participated, complains of fraud		12/10/1997
Presidential	Most opposition parties boycotted.

US reaction to political tensions and the human right situation was quite remarkable. The State Department's human right reports on Cameroon were regularly and overwhelmingly deploring. In a key Central African state such as Cameroon, some foreign diplomats, especially Americans pose publicly with opposition party leaders and clearly affirmed the need for free and fair elections. In the diplomatic tensions that emerged, Cameroonian authorities protested against what was termed in those days `interference in Cameroonian domestic affairs' while the Department of State published unequivocal communiqués criticizing Cameroon's democratic process. The publication of the 1992 presidential elections report by the US elections agency - National Democratic Institute (NDI) - showing the SDF candidate as winner, further worsened the already existing tension between the two countries. The report found «serious fault with the electoral process in Cameroon».^117(*)

This situation led the Bush administration in 1992 to freeze of all public funds to Cameroon, as well as the closure of the most important US development agency in the country, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Though the US administration has since ascribed the closure to budgetary constrains, it is hard to prove that the decision to close USAID was not motivated by the then diplomatic tension. This situation raised old debates of whether democratic institutions, behavior and ways of thought can be exported and transplanted to societies that have no experience of them, and that this can be done in the course of a few years. Harris Owens even argues against it; «While the United States can provide an example to emulate, democracy is not a commodity which can be exported, or a gift that can be bestowed. One size and style does not fit all.»^118(*) Democracy building usually requires more time to go full flesh.

With the heightening of political and social upheavals, the US authorities were not very optimistic about the political future of Cameroon. Describing the political history in retrospect, a 1996 background note on Cameroon described the country in the following way: `In 1982, Ahidjo resigned as President of Cameroon and was constitutionally succeeded by his Prime Minister, Paul Biya, a career official from the Bulu-Beti ethnic group. Ahidjo remained leader of the ruling party, but his influence waned. His supporters failed to overthrow Biya in a 1984 coup, and Biya won single-candidate elections in 1984 and 1988. Biya also won a multi-party election in 1992 which was considered seriously flawed by international observers'.^119(*)

Disagreement between the US and Cameroon stemmed principally from human rights issues. Washington expressed regular concerns over what they saw as a resolute gap between official statements and the actual respect of fundamental rights by the Cameroonian government. It is under these circumstances that the US ambassador to Cameroon, Mrs. Frances Cook was declared persona non grata by Cameroonian authorities in 1993. Cameroon government's grievances were principally the Head of Mission's `special relations with the opposition and her public declarations deemed contrary to her status and mission.'

US fears were exacerbated by the fears of `democratic conflicts', given that «to the democratic process of the late 1980s and early 1990s, succeeded a dynamics of conflictualization.»^120(*) Several countries in the Central African sub-region (CAR, Zaire, Congo, etc.) had experienced armed conflicts linked to the process of democratization. Cameroon did not need to follow in the same line.

From the late 1990s, it was becoming clear that any apocalyptic vision of Cameroon was not justified. With a `democratic', or at least a better constitution in 1996, elections in 1997 and a coalition government put in place, it became clear that Cameroon's young democracy needed to be supported, encouraged and helped, not derided. The US should have heeded Owen's remark; «To be viable, political institutions and political cultures require a long, organic, indigenous growth, and to attempt from without a sudden dislocation of what exists is more likely to produce unintended consequences than intended ones.»^121(*)

* ¹⁰² Pondi, op. cit. p. 19.

* ¹⁰³ Reported by Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol II, 5^th Ed, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000, p. 607.

* ¹⁰⁴ Reported by Merril and Paterson, op. cit. p. 608.

* ¹⁰⁵ Ibid, pp. 609-610.

* ¹⁰⁶ Merril and Paterson, op. cit. p. 609.

* ¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 610.

* ¹⁰⁸ Jeune Afrique No. 1525 of the 30^th year, March 26, 1990.

* ¹⁰⁹ Mbembe, A., «Traditions de l'autoritarisme et problèmes de gouvernement en Afrique subsaharienne» in Africa Development, 17(1), 1992, pp. 37-64.

* ¹¹⁰ Sindjoun, L., «La culture démocratique en Afrique subsaharienne: comment rencontrer l'arlésienne de la légende africaniste» no date, at http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/427-2.pdf. For Larry Diamond, see DIAMOND, L., «Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy» in Boulder, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, pp. 1-33.

* ¹¹¹ Quantin P. «Sub-Saharan Democratic Transitions as Political Crisis (1990-1994)» Centre d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire, 1997.

* ¹¹² Mbile, Cameroon Political Story, 1999, p. 335.

* ¹¹³Reported by N.N. Mbile, op. cit, p. 334

* ¹¹⁴See his interview in Les Cahiers de Mutation, op. cit. p. 13.

* ¹¹⁵ This resignation is described by Mbile (op. cit 337) as motivated by an SDF victory. A copy of the resignation letter is obtainable with the post electoral report by the US election agency National Democratic Institute.

* ¹¹⁶ Mbile, op. cit. p. 336.

* ¹¹⁷ On the NDI report and Cameroonian reaction, read An Assessment of the October 11, 1992 Election in Cameroon, Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1993. The report includes preliminary releases, Cameroonian government critique, the SDF report and the final NDI report. We should note that the composition of NDI delegation and its world wide experience made the report quite credible for both national and international public opinion, though Cameroonian democracy was quite young at the time. US reactions relied principally on this report. Read the report online on NDI website.

* 118Owen Harries, Lecture 3: «A Democratic World», in Boyer Lectures, 30 November 2003 at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyers/

* ¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Cameroon, March 1996 Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Central African Affairs.

* ¹²⁰ Daniel Bach, Luc Sindjoun, « Ordre et Désordre en Afrique », 1997, www.polis.sciencepobordeaux.fr, accessed on Nov. 25, 2006.

* ¹²¹ Owen Harris, «A Democratic World», op, cit.