The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

3. Zone Franc

Cameroon's leadership goes beyond the sub-region of Central Africa, extending to a greater part of francophone Africa. Apart from countries such as Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco and Madagascar which do not use the common currency known as the Communauté Financière Africaine franc, or simply the CFA franc, is used within CEMAC, the rest of former French African colonies use this currency. Within this geo-economic and geo-political entity lies the heart of yet another leadership strife on the one hand, and the French African influence on the other hand.

Cameroon has good geopolitical facilities like access to the sea, economic strength, and better basic structures and especially offers the US the opportunity to «balance the French in their own backyard, and Nigerian predominance in the West African basin.»^216(*) Cameroon's leadership offers a balancing opportunity not only to the Americans but also to the French. According to a report published by Jeune Afrique (January 28, 2007), «Cameroon is the biggest sub-Saharan French [Africa] client in 2005, 2, 8 millions USD of purchase» in military equipment.

At the end of this chapter, it appears clear that the construction of the national interest and its execution could create both peace and war, and that this construction usually takes into consideration the role of both private and public actors, beliefs and goals. Equally, we could say that national interest, in an interdependent world, has in mind the interests and needs of other actors, especially when these actors are allies. The September 11 attacks and the consequent reprisals in the Middle East first, and then to Africa and other parts of the world portray IR as essentially conflictual, though the conflicts could be born of liberal ideologies. If the authors of 9/11 were in a Clauswitzian theory of continuing war by other means, then the US response was geared in the same direction - oblige the adversary to fear and your will, while the dividends of this fight go to new-found [US] allies such as Cameroon.

The Cameroon official daily, Cameroon Tribune published an assertive title in October 2006, «Le Cameroun, leader de la zone franc» (Cameroon, leader of the franc zone).^217(*) Defining the franc zone as «West and Central African countries, including the Comoros Island, which use the CFA franc», the paper went on to explain how Cameroon has come to over-take Cote d'Ivoire. «It is now clear from the 2005 report of the Bank of France, cited by Jeune Afrique of September 24 -30, 2006, that «Cameroon has taken over from Cote d'Ivoire entangled in an inextricable political crisis. It makes up 18% of GNP of the franc zone and 37% of the CEMAC zone.» Cote d'Ivoire, which used to be first therefore, becomes second.

Cameroon's leadership in the three geo-economic zones described above should be considered with the main flaw of a quasi - absence of political leadership. Politically, Cameroon it is a beacon, not a hegemon, though with the potentials to lead. This politico-diplomatic handicap has considerable consequences on the economic from, given than diplomatic expertise and success usually woos investors and donors. In the same way that Ame r ican «hegemony» has never been truly hegemonic, Cameroonian leadership has not really been assertive. We should agree that a hegemonic power maintains its position of dominance not simply by force, business, or population, but also by the willingness of those in subordinate positions to accept the hegemon's leadership. This is the Weberian «belief,» which lacks in Cameroonian leadership - inner justifications and external consent.

* ²¹⁶ Chouala, op, cit. p8

* ²¹⁷ Cameroon Tribune, Wednesday October 04, 2006. p.11.