The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

2. US interests in the sub-region: the global fight against terrorism.

Three tendencies appeared in US foreign policy after the Cold War. The first tendency focused on global reform concentrated on human rights, development and democracy, in partnership with international organizations. The second tendency was that of `selective containment', another variant of world containment this time around confronting specific threats while building strategic alliances with regional partners. The last tendency was isolationist or `selective engagement' preferring that the US does not commit herself to the areas in without strategic US interest, rather, the US should build a fortress, an anti-missile fortress to protect itself against the world.^164(*) After 9/11, the US policy towards Africa carried these three tendencies, with more focus on the first two. Though Africa cannot be considered as the main front, the continent has played a no negligible role in the fight either because it has housed terrorists in the past or because it has several times been a victim to terrorists' attacks. In that respect, it could replay the scenes of the past (either as victim, author or both). It is because of this that the Bush Administration set aside $100 million to fight terrorism in Africa (excluding the horn which relies more on the Middle East Command MECOM).

We could understand 9/11 from the perspective of the motives for the terrorist attacks. President expressed this in a 2006 (12th September) Whitehouse address as follows: "Dangerous enemies have declared their intention to destroy our way of life.» 9/11 was therefore understood as an attack not just on a nation but on a way of life and the fight against such enemies of American power must be pursued everywhere they hide, even if it is Central Africa. This American war is not just military, Bush said, «It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation.»

The US has been committed to fighting against transnational threats such as drug and human trafficking, banditry, money laundry and piracy. Terrorism is only the most prominent form of such threats, such that the change after 9/11 has been more of emphasis than substance. That emphasis however required new thinking and better strategy and means. One of the newest factors to think about terrorism in Africa is its connection with energy resources. Africa's greater contribution to energy needs diversifies sources and creates relative stability as it reduces over-reliance on oil from say the Middle East. The US is quite aware of the dangers of this growing contribution, dangers linked to the so-called `oil curse'. This idea was expressed succinctly by Ms. Theresa Whelan thus: «the United States, because many of the oil companies operating in Africa are US companies, will have an increasing number of potentially soft targets in Africa that could become attractive to terrorist groups interested in making a point and poking at us.»<sup>165(*)</sup> Most of these `soft targets' which are rich in oil are found in the Gulf of Guinea. The vulnerability is exacerbated when governmental reaches of most of these countries do not go beyond their capital.

Most of the countries surrounding Cameroon have these traits of attractive targets to terrorist groups. The presence of suspicious groups in the north of Nigeria, especially their use of Shari'a laws, violence and proselytism, the violence surrounding oil installations in the south, and government incapacity to deal with these threat menaces the entire region. On the other hand, rebel movements in Chad, supposedly supported by the Islamic Sudanese government are feared to be infiltrated by terrorist movements. The same case applies to the CAR where the same ideological and Sudanese supported rebel group has invaded the north of the country. Considering that Chad, Sudan and Nigeria are oil producers and that the CAR has gold and diamond, these threats become more serious. The spillover effects of such conflicts required that the US adopt methods that can adequately address the situation.

An important factor in dealing with terrorism in Africa is to see how Africans perceived the terrorist attacks. In this sense, it should be acceptable that 9/11 has not only been a change in US perception of Africa, but also in African perception of the US. Talking about these changes and African response, Kansteiner affirmed that «Africa's tremendous support of and cooperation with the United States since the September 11 attack, through intelligence sharing and the tracking of `financial' and `people flows'» is significant both in understanding African response and in the fight against terrorism in the continent.^166(*) Africans have been dealing with one form of terrorism or another for a long time before America got its share. In other words, «Africa has had a long history of coping with domestic terrorism.»^167(*) However, before the fundamentalists, it is food security, diseases and lack of basic infrastructure that constitute the worst of all terrorism in Africa, and America has to coop with this too. In that sense, we might agree again with Frazer when she says that «We can look at 9-11 as having provided certain opportunities. It was a tragic event, and it was a wake-up call in many ways. But it also presented many opportunities.» These opportunities are both for Africans and Americans, to combat all forms of terrorism.

* ¹⁶⁴ For a broad view of this policies and their implications on Africa, see the Round Table conference organized by Politique Africaine on September 28, 2001, «La politique africaine des États-Unis après le 11 septembre 2001» with the participation of Peter Schraeder, Roland Marchal, Justin V aïsse.

* ¹⁶⁵ Ms. T heresa Whelan, op, cit

* ¹⁶⁶ Walter H. Kansteiner was then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and was speaking during the symposium organized by The African American Institute in Washington, DC on April 24, 2002 on «Is Africa important to the US? Perspectives from the Bush administration»

* ¹⁶⁷ J endayi Fr azer, idem.