The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

1CHAPTER 2: SUB-REGIONAL (CENTRAL AFRICA)

FACTORS FOR US INTEREST IN CAMEROON

Factors within Cameroon are not sufficient to explain the new posture in US interest toward Cameroon. In geopolitical studies, the environments within which foreign policy decisions are taken are indispensable in understanding the meaning of those decisions. From 9/11, US foreign policy was re-adapted to meet new challenges; a re-adapting that took note of Cameroon's geopolitical and geostrategic importance. If the threat to US world power came from powerful challengers during the Cold War, the real threat since 9/11 comes from new sources. These are terrorism, diverse kinds of religious fundamentalism, the drug trade, climate change, situations of extreme poverty coupled with stagnation still existent in some parts of the globe, particularly Africa, and from the feeling of long-term economic decadence and exclusion.

The definition, in US minds, of the nature of relations with Cameroon was going to be done within the CA sub-region in particular and Sub-Saharan Africa in general. Developing relations with Cameroon as a model and a gateway into that vast region became paradigmatic to the US. The importance of the Gulf of Guinea and its opening to the large Atlantic Ocean, as we will see, particularly explains this new posture. Inside this vast body of water lies an important sub-marine fauna and some of the most productive fishing sites and oil reserves in the world. This ocean that opens to the Cameroonian coast equally spreads to the British Isle, Ireland, North America, and the coasts of West, Central and South Africa. The riches of the Gulf of Guinea in terms of natural resources and strategic position makes the area one of the busiest and most coveted in the world, such that building strategic alliances and securing it has several pay-offs.

Section 1: US policy after 9/11, from defense of democratic values to fight against terrorism.

We have understood that from 1990 upwards, the US moved from the fight against communism to the defense of democratic values. However, the 9/11 events changed everything, introducing new imperatives to the US policy maker. Prior to those events, there lived in the US a generation of Americans who had been born into peace and prosperity and had come to think of America as invulnerable. With the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama, as many Americans thought, proclaimed The End of History^151(*). By this, he meant that the end of communism was synonymous to the triumph of capitalism and democracy as the sole world politico-economic system. The kind of conflicts the world would experience would be what Fukuyama's contemporary, Huntington termed The Clash of Civilizations.^152(*) In that thinking, the 19th century was that of a clash of nations, the 20th the clash of ideas while the 21st would be a century of a clash of civilizations in which religion would be a predominant factor.

However, 9/11 changed all that. Americans learned that their primacy does not mean invulnerability. The post-Cold War rhetoric of democracy and free trade was to be modified by a greater paradigm - the fight against terrorism. President Bush expressed this change in a September (12) address, saying that «For America, 9/11 was more than a tragedy -- it changed the way we look at the world.» America had come a long way to discover her weaknesses. In the words of State Department Policy Planning Staff, Donald K. Steinberg, «Even a country with an unprecedented economic, political, military and cultural power, and nestled behind vast oceans cannot be fully insulated from every threat, particularly in a world marked by globalization.»^153(*) The threats and the dangers of this new period included transnational threats ranging from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to global poverty and HIV/AIDS.

1. US interests in the sub-region. The growth of strategic interests

Since the tragic events of 9/11, the US has been reassessing its interests and strategies at a global level. This reassessment stands on strong ideological grounds which President Bush expressed thus: «On September the 11th, we learned that America must confront threats before they reach our shores, whether those threats come from terrorist networks or terrorist states.» In this reassessment, Africa has come to play a greater role. This is the summary of the Foreign Policy Agenda which is updated annually by the State Department. The role Africa has to play can be explained by security strings of interdependence emerging from 9/11. This idea was succinctly expressed by Greg Behrman during a lecture on African Agenda thus, «Today, the destinies of the United States and Africa are bound in many ways that are not widely appreciated. They are bound by common challenges, common threats, and common opportunities.»^154(*) On his part, Steinberg argues for the importance of security, and especially security in the broad sense to American citizens, asserting that «September 11 reminded us that the most fundamental charge of any government is to protect its own citizens. In the words of the Constitution, we must `provide the common defense.'» (op, cit.) It is in this view that several task forces have been created, with one covering Africa and the Middle East and concerned with arms smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and infectious diseases.

Does military superiority guarantee national security? The answer to this question is important in understanding US engagement in Africa in general and the Central African Sub-region in particular in post-9/11 security planning. As Foreign Policy editor, Moísé Naim put it, «A key surprise of 9-11 was that the impregnability of the American territory was a myth and that massive military spending was not enough to shelter the nation from its enemies.»^155(*) Responding to the terrorists' attacks by boosting military spending, outweighing the combined defense budgets of the next 25 countries that rank highest in the world, was not enough. It was necessary to engage with ally countries and strengthen regional organizations such that they should be ready for military intervention.

Prior to the events of 9/11, Africa's place in US security interest was minimal. This can be seen through the place Africa occupied in the Department of Defense; the whole continent was managed under the European Command (EUCOM), while the other continents each had separate commands. J endayi Fr azer explained the place of Africa in US priorities before and after 9/11 thus;

Befo r e September 11^th, there was a hier a rchy of r egional inter ests, and that hier a rchy star ted with E ur ope, then w ent to Asia, and the Middle East, and encompassed economic interests, par ticularly those in the emerging markets in Asia, then Latin America, and then Africa somewher e at the bottom.^156(*)

This hierarchy as Frazer explains is due to historical, economic and strategic interests. Post Cold War campaign raised the visibility of other regions in the world, leaving Africa where it has always been - at the bottom. But 9/11 changed that hierarchy of interests. «Now it is much more of a circle. The terrorist network that we are trying to disrupt and disband is everywhere», declared Mrs. Frazer.^157(*)

Africa's place is underscored by the creation of African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) launched in 2002 in replacement of African Crisis and Response Initiative (ACRI) which could no more cope with the new face of American security challenges. Studying ACRI as US response to security challenges to Africa, Ndjock Bapah puts it this way: «ACRI corresponds with the new US security policy towards Africa, to work with regional allies who eventually would do the interventions where neither Washington nor the Europeans do want to get involved any more».^158(*) ACRI therefore fitted in the solution for the resolution of conflicts in Central Africa. But with the 9/11 events, ACRI could no more meet up with the challenges. The establishment of ACOTA therefore corresponds with the changing nature of security challenges. It is intended to create partnership with African governments for join military operations towards addressing conflicts and crisis

It is also hoped that ACOTA would complete US support for democracy in Africa, and will foster peace and development. After more than 6000 African soldiers were trained under ACRI, ACOTA has been training thousands more, prepared for peacekeeping operations in the continent. Reflecting post-9/11 security thinking, ACOTA has been attributed a more robust capacity for military intervention in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN charter. One of the basic principles of ACOTA is the support for regional groupings. Central African groupings (ECCAS and CEMAC) are prominent in this regional perspective, and it is there that Cameroon has to play an indispensable role.

US security interest and strategies in Central Africa could be read from a double perspective: the ACOTA perspective and the military base perspective.
On the military base perspective, the US has indicated the need for a military base in the sub-region. The location of such a base has so far been Sao Tome and Principe, though it has been reported that a military base is underway for the south of Angola.^159(*) Washington's intention to boost its troop presence in the Gulf of Guinea is related to the fact that it is a troubled region that now provides more than 15% of all U.S. oil imports, a percentage slated to rise to 25% within 8 years. Vast offshore oil reserves in a large, ungoverned area where narco-trafficking and terrorists' training could provide hotbeds of instability, invites Washington and its NATO partners.

More over, the security of the American people is continually interlinked with the state of affairs in other parts of the world, especially Africa. It became clear after 9/11 that events happening in Africa had direct or indirect implications on the safety of the United States. The thought in 1994 that the Rwandan genocide did not threaten the security of the US could no longer be entertained. As Steinberg put it, «in today's interconnected world, crises in the Middle East, Kashmir, the Andes or central Africa won't stay put. They cause suffering and instability not just in one region, but spill over and spark conflict elsewhere.»^160(*) In this thinking, a failed state in Central Africa poses threats to the security of the entire region and consequently of the US.

This security threat of failed states is exacerbated by different kinds of conflicts. In almost all the countries in the sub-region, there are civil conflicts. We could cite here to illustrate the Southern Cameroon National Council's claims and the complain filed by the Bakweri people against the State of Cameroon; the persisting instability in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria; the civil war that has rocked Chad these past months as well as the confrontation between Northern and Southern traders the oil-rich region of Doba; the rebel action against government forces in the CAR; the 2004 aborted coup against Equato-Guinean President and the Bubi claims of marginalization; violent manifestations of the Ndolou people in South-East Gabon demanding better conditions and share of oil revenues; the unsettled instability in the Pool region in Congo (Brazzaville); the claims of the Cabinda people in Angola and the demobilization of former UNITA militia, the continuing violence and Balkanization of DR Congo; and lastly, the remaining suspicion between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. This high risk for conflicts heightens US security needs in Central Africa. Not that 9/11 has any direct links with these conflicts, but that global changes after that date, the grand strategy, have given a new meaning to these conflicts because of terrorism and the new meaning of African oil to Washington.

It is because of security in one of the most conflict-stricken areas in Africa that the US has heightened its military presence. In Africa, the US disposes Air Force installations in Dakar Senegal and Entebbe, Uganda. The largest US military base in Africa is the US Middle East Command Unit in Djibouti. But there are Naval installations in Sao Tome and Principe, and military trainings in Cameroon, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger and Chad.^161(*) While the Air Force in Senegal does surveillance in the countries in the sub-region, the one in Uganda follows up security issues in East Africa. The base in Djibouti is quite strategic because it supervises the Indian ocean, the Horn of Africa and terrorism and trafficking in the lower part of the Middle East (Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, etc). Trainings with Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia center around a security belt built around the Pan- Sahel solidarity.

In all, US Defense focus on Africa should go beyond strategic port and airfield access to include natural resources, particularly energy, in addition to military professionalism, capacity building, instability, and transnational terrorism. Ms. Theresa Whelan expressed this need thus, «As Africa becomes a larger player in the world oil market, and more exploration takes place, we need to assess possible implications for us, in terms of US security interests.»^162(*) An either-you-engage-in-all-or-in-nothing dilemma obliges the US to go beyond military garrisons to civilian community development projects. Security, then embraces a broad range of issues, though the prime issue in US minds is the fight against terrorism. In reality, US strategic interests in Africa lie in two areas, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalists in East Africa and the Horn, and access to African oil.»^163(*)

* ¹⁵¹ Fukuyama F., «The End of History?» The National Interest, Summer 1989. Once the competitors to liberal democracy and capitalism are conquered, there will be neither a great war nor revolution. Different forms of nationalism, religious fanaticisms, etc. are but minor skirmishes within the American liberal system.

* ¹⁵² Huntington S. P., « The Clash of Civilizations?» Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. According to Huntington, history had not ended but its features had changed. Conflicts were no more going to be between territorial states such as America and Russia, but between the great civilizations of the world (Judeo-Christian, Islamo-Arab-African and Hindus-Confucian).

* ¹⁵³ Donald K. Steinberg, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, State Department, «Foreign Policy Post-September 11: Learning the Right Lessons», Remarks to Town Hall Meeting, Dixie State College, St. George, Utah, February 27, 2003

* ¹⁵⁴ See Greg Behrman, author, The Invisible People: the History of U.S. Policy Toward HIV and AIDS, speaking during a Darryl G. Behrman Lecture on Africa Policy: The African Agenda. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y. May 10, 2005

* ¹⁵⁵ Moises Naim, op. cit.

* ¹⁵⁶ Mrs. Frazer is Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs but was then White House Advisor on Africa for the National Security Council and was speaking at a symposium organized by The African American Institute in Washington, DC on April 24, 2002 on «Is Africa important to the US? Perspectives from the Bush administration»

* ¹⁵⁷ See the paper she presents at the symposium organized by The African American Institute, op, cit.

* ¹⁵⁸ Ndjock Bapah Guillaume,  «La Régionalisation de la Sécurité Collective : Le cas de L'Afrique Centrale», DESS Thesis, Yaoundé: IRIC, 2001 p. 118.

* ¹⁵⁹ See La Lettre du Continent, N° 450, July 2004, p. 3

* ¹⁶⁰ Steinberg D. K., op, cit.

* ¹⁶¹ See the analysis of Colonel Daniel Smith, op, cit.

* ¹⁶² Ms. T heresa Whelan is Director of the Office of African Affairs, Office of the Secr etar y of Defense. She was speaking during The African American Institute symposium, op, cit

* ¹⁶³ See Jim Lobe, «Pentagon's `Footprint' Growing in Africa», Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, May 12, 2003, Web location: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305africa.html