Ocean grabbing: a threath to food security in Sierra Leone

II. The state of food security in Sierra Leone: questioning the concept of

self-sufficiency

In this section we will tackle food security as a concept and an answer. We will detail the trends that food insecure people follow and the coping mechanism they use to endure food insecurity for a short time or month on end. Then we will analyse the flaws of the self-sufficiency policy the government has been trying to push to work, to show how and why Sierra Leone is now more inclined to apply food security policies rather than self-sufficiency.

1. Food security in Sierra Leone

Food security is a complex state of being that relies on multiple factors such as climate, state governance or the capacity of one's state and population to cope with a shock like war, drought, an epidemic or a decline in economic activity. To this day, with the exception of the recent EVO, food insecurity drivers in Sierra Leone remain the same. That is mainly but not restricted to, low agricultural productivity, poverty and poor infrastructures. As of 2015, 49.8% of Sierra Leoneans were food insecure compared to 45% in 2010 (GoSL, WFP et UNICEF 2010). The 5% increase means that an additional 2.5 million people suffered food

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insecurity. The total number of food insecurity stricken population includes 8.6% of «severely food insecure» and 41.2% «moderately food insecure». Rural regions show higher levels of food insecurity with 59.7% including 11.4% severely and 48.4 % moderately (GoSL, WFP et WHO 2015).

2. Trends in food insecurity within Sierra Leone

Populations can be subjected to food insecurity in three forms: chronic, seasonal or transitionary, each one linked to the different drivers of food insecurity.

a. Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food insecurity is a durable failure to meet the minimum recommended dietary intake. A state of food insecurity maintained for at least 6 months a year can be considered chronic¹⁹. Chronic food insecurity is due to structural elements that affect the food production system and keeps farmers from producing enough food. Some of the leading factors are: lack of demand for agricultural products, insufficient yields caused by traditional and inefficient agricultural methods, low soil fertility, high production costs and poor access to market²⁰. Agriculture remains essentially traditional with outdated farming methods like the predominant use of hand tool. This is especially problematic as 77.3% of the rural households indicate agriculture as their main mean of subsistence. Compared to the previous year's rice harvest, the 2014-2015 harvesting season experienced a 15% drop. Most importantly, farmers able to produce enough for their own consumption throughout the year equal only 4% of the farming population. This clearly indicates that the vast majority of farmers produce below subsistence levels²¹.

Adding to that, poverty rates are still high. 19.9% Sierra Leonean households are poverty-stricken while an added 33.5% is labelled `borderline'. If the latter is subject to any kind of shock they can quickly fall into the `poor' category with more risk of becoming food insecure. Also, challenging food access and availability increases the possibility of food

¹⁹ Ibid, p36

²⁰ Ibid, p52

²¹ Ibid, p13

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insecurity. Poor infrastructures push Sierra Leoneans to travel further in order to reach a market, with just 17% of Sierra Leoneans benefiting from a functional market within their own community²². On average they travel 7.7 miles, increasing the cost of transportation for farmers which subsequently increases the cost of purchase for buyers. Evidently, the added cost of transportation forces farmers to sell at a higher price. It not only affects buyers, but also farmers whose goods are then less competitive compared to the imported merchandise²³.

b. Seasonal food insecurity

Seasonal food insecurity takes place with natural season variations. Closely associated with climate and agriculture the phenomenon of `seasonal food insecurity' is a reality that 45% of the population faces during the lean season. That means that more than 2.5 million Sierra Leoneans are potentially food insecure from June to the end of September²⁴ (GoSL, WFP et UNICEF 2010). Three quarters of households are confronted with the difficulty to access food during lean season's peak in August. With agriculture employing 61% of the country's labour force, it is the seasonal-dependant production cycle that dictate the state of food security (Margolis, et al. 2016). The 2015, flooding that occurred in September worsened the state of food security of thousands in the chiefdoms closest to rivers and ocean (GoSL, WFP et WHO 2015).

c. Transitionary food insecurity

If food insecurity last less than 6 months a year it can be regarded as transitional (Margolis, et al. 2016). The disastrous state of the economy post-civil war, almost brought the agriculture to a stop. As a result, the GDP crashed, almost cut in half approaching its lowest value with US$142 (Welthungerhilfe et IFPRI 2006). Unsurprisingly, the rates of poverty peaked accompanied by food insecurity. Most recently, the 2014 EVO caused «unprecedented damage to the socio-economic fabric of Sierra Leone» (GoSL 2016). Negative repercussions persisted throughout 2015 and the number of people vulnerable to food insecurity was estimated to amount 2 million (FAO, WFP 2015). The National Ebola Strategy Paper assessed that half of the population was affected in some capacity, increasing

²² Ibid, p91

²³ Ibid, p13

²⁴ Lean season in Sierra Leone can vary from June to august or July to September

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levels of poverty and vulnerability nationwide (GoSL 2015). The impact of the EVO on food security is particularly visible in districts where populations were mostly food secure or showed low levels of food insecurity. By the end of the EVO, it caused a surge of 20 to 50% food insecure Sierra Leoneans (GoSL, WFP et WHO 2015).

3. The different responses to food insecurity: coping mechanisms

Coping mechanisms related to food security are strategies, both adaptive and behavioural, used by the population when they are subject to a shock in order to diffuse the impacts. Such coping mechanisms can be expressed in the form of a strategies that may or may not relate to food. In the event of a shock, when households adopt strategies unrelated to food they will spend their savings, reduce non-food expenses or borrow money²⁵. Regardless of the strategy used, household will then allocate or reallocate the money on food. It must be noted that a household can use multiple food-unrelated strategies in order to adapt. Households that turn to food-related strategies are often the poorest. The Reduced Coping Strategy Index (RCSI), a tool developed by the World Food Programme, identities 5 dietary habits used by food insecure populations. These habits involve: «consumption of less preferred and less expensive food, borrowing of food, reduction of portion size, restriction of adults consumption in favour of children and reduction in the number of meals per day» (USAID, et al. 2008). The level of food insecurity dictates the frequency and severity of the strategies used to cope. A high recurrence and severity of the strategies used demonstrates the great vulnerability of the household and results therefore in a higher RCSI score (GoSL, WFP et WHO 2015).

4. Self-sufficiency: a concept ill-suited to Sierra Leone's needs and reality

Self-sufficiency expresses the capacity of a country to satisfy its dietary needs with the domestic production (FAO 1998). The concept became popular in agricultural policy implemented in Africa in the 70's in response to two phenomenon : the rise of food prices on the global market following the 1973 oil shock; and the drought in the Sahel (Staube

²⁵ 36.5%, 33%, 29%

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Tercier et Sottas 2000). Self-sufficiency is then perceived as an answer to the insufficient local demand and the dependence on the international market. It comes after a bitter post-colonial economic realization: high inflation, budget and trade deficits and low growth which led Sub-Saharan countries to worry about their ability to keep pace with the accelerating globalisation (Robert s.d.). Self-sufficiency subsequently becomes an extension of the self-centred growth strategy (Azoulay et Dillon 1993). «Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance» (OAU 1980), when the State Members of the African Union adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPoA)²⁶ in 1980, self-reliance was the watchword. The goal was to achieve national, regional and sub-regional self-reliance in economic and social fields with the purpose of establishing a «new international economic order» (OAU 1980). The LPoA details a vast programme of measures for the 20 years following its launching, focusing on «self-reliance», «self-sustainability» and «self-sufficiency» where food self-sufficiency is envisioned as part of the regional development strategy. To this day, self-sufficiency still constitutes a political et economic imperative. However, complete self-sufficiency has not been asserted in any African country, even in countries most favourably endowed in natural resources (Azoulay et Dillon 1993).

As of 2017, the cost of basic food importation amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. More than 80% is still imported showcasing the failure of the rice self-sufficiency policies and their implementation some 15 years after the development of several programmes and papers. The government of Ahmad Teja Kabbah, which instigated the programmes in favour of self-sufficiency has been massively criticized (Thomas 2017). The succeeding government of Ernest Bai Koroma, didn't do better as the import expenses further increased during his term. In office for a decade, Koroma's strategy also proved to be unsuccessful as between 2007 and 2016 the country's rice importations increased from 4.4% to 8.5% (OEC 2016). Monty Patrick Jones, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS) intended on creating jobs across key value chains, in order to support and boost the agriculture sector. Farmers have been unable to provide for the country's food security needs due to lack of technology, corruption, and poor access to investment finance (Thomas 2017). According to the MAFFS:

²⁶ Officially: the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000

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«agriculture contributes to over 50 percent of Sierra Leone's GDP. Virtually all farmers in Sierra Leone grow rice which is the staple food. Rice development therefore would not

only provide food for the populace, it would provide employment for a considerable
number of farmers, save valuable foreign exchange and impact positively on the overall

economy of the country». (Jones, 2017)

Although, his strategy failed in the end, the logic behind it was clear and in line with the goals to be achieved. In addition to being cheaper local rice has the added benefit of having better nutritional quality as it contains 2% more protein than imported rice. The promotion of local rice production should therefore be valuable to food security. In spite of being, less favoured by Sierra Leoneans, local rice is particularly popular in Guinea who import it in large quantity (OEC 2016).

5. Self-sufficiency and food security: two concepts for one answer

The answer to the question «what is self-sufficiency?» is often too simplistic: it is the capacity to produce what we consume. The preconceived idea is that the desire to set up a self-sufficiency policy necessarily involves subsistence crop. This type of crop can present `traps' that cannot be guessed by following such an argument. To effectively put into effect such a policy a country must also consider its economic autonomy. It is what most Sub-Saharan countries including Sierra Leone attempted, with little success concerning Sierra Leone. Evidently, if achieving self-sufficiency requires an economic autonomy, it itself requires the right strategy, implemented through good governance (Rocher 1998).

Self-sufficiency doesn't mean food security as malnutrition and hunger levels can maintain and increase even when the self-sufficiency rate is growing. Production growth and a higher degree of self-sufficiency do not necessarily remedy a state of food insecurity because they do not necessarily lead to a better satisfaction of the food needs of poor households (Azoulay et Dillon 1993). Strengthening production potential in low-income and food-deficit countries is an imperative. Complete food self-sufficiency is not a goal to be pursued by all countries. The degree of self-sufficiency to be achieved must be determined by political, climatic and economic conditions. Some countries will have more interest in importing rather than producing locally if they possess the means to finance these imports. In the case of Sierra

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Leone, it seems plausible, by specializing its economy the country can export the goods produced in abundance and at low cost in order to reinvest the financial manna in economic diversification. However, the government continues to pursue a self-sufficiency that does not materialize and struggles to diversify its economy. An economy massively based on agriculture, supported by small scale farmers who have difficulties producing enough to feed themselves, and mining which is subject to strong price variation as it was the case in 2013 when the price dropped sharply causing a decline in the Sierra Leonean economy. Self-sufficiency must be achieved by seeking to increase national production capacities. This objective is not in contradiction with greater food security. This is a priority objective especially for countries like Sierra Leone that are in food deficit and low income (FAO 2017). Indeed, the increase in domestic production capacity allows a modernization of agriculture which is an essential basis for accumulation in a sector so important for the GDP (Azoulay et Dillon 1993).

The World Bank recognizes the benefits of such logic but nevertheless places food aid at the centre of its conception of food security and rejects the priority search for self-sufficiency considered less efficient. Self-sufficiency must be part of the desire for greater food security; it must be integrated into a global food strategy modulated according to climatic, economic and socio-political conditions. The financing capacity of deficit countries therefore becomes a central problem that refers to two main food security issues. Firstly, the state of international markets (fluctuation in prices, available quantities...), and secondly, the economic state of the country (productive potential, export levels, debt levels...). A country can only use imports to satisfy its domestic consumption if its agriculture or another economic sector provides the necessary foreign exchange resources, which isn't the case for Sierra Leone. It is obvious that no country can tolerate basing the satisfaction of its nutritional needs on the world market. The stakes of food security are so high that no country will be reluctant to achieve a certain degree of self-sustainability at more or less significant costs in order to finance national food sector protection policies (Azoulay et Dillon 1993).

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Whether one decides to see the cup half full or half empty, doesn't change the fact that
approximatively 3 million Sierra Leoneans are suffering from a form of food insecurity.

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While the numbers fluctuate with seasons and the occurrence of crisis of al kind, they are still high for a country that benefits from abundant natural resources and a rather stable democracy. The widespread food insecurity in Sierra Leone is the simple sum of the poor choices made by the governments regarding the agriculture sector as well as a combination of deficit. Sierra Leone like many African governments failed to realize that the economic and social development model they envisioned were not adapted and in line with globalization. Because the government was too obstinate it didn't take into account its environment, an environment that cannot be occulted as is shapes a country as much as a country shapes the rest of the world. The deficit of infrastructure, access or technology are just the manifestation of the government's misleading policies that facilitated the current state of food insecurity.