Indépendance de la banque centrale et croissance économique

Bibliographie

Akhand, H (1998) "central bank independence and growth ": Canadian journal of economics, vol 31,1998, pp 303-317.

Alesina, A (1988) «Macroeconomics and politics». NBER Macroeconomics Annual 3, pp.13-52.

Alesina, A. and L.H. Summers (1993), «Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence», Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 25, pp.151-162.

Bade, R. et M. Parkin (1982). «Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy», University of Western Ontario.

Barro Robert (1976) «Rational Expectations and the Role of Monetary Policy» Journal of Monetary Economics 2 p 1-32

Barro, R. J. and Gordon, D. B. (1983a), «A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model», Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, n. 4, pp. 589-610.

Barro, R.J. and D. Gordon (1983b), «Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Positive Model of Monetary Policy», Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, pp.101-121.

Cukierman, A. (1992), «Central bank strategy, credibility and independence: theory and evidence». Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press

Cukierman; A (1994), «Central bank independence and monetary control» The Economic Journal 104 pp. 1437-1448.

Cukierman, A (1996) «Targeting monetary aggregates and inflation in Europe» Paper presented at the conference on «European Monetary Policy», novembre -décembre 1995.

Cukierman, A. Webb, S & Neyapti, B (1992), «Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes». The World Bank Economic Review, vol 6 3 pp. 353-398.

Cukierman, A. & Webb, S. B. (1995), «Political influence on the central bank: international evidence», The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 9, 3, pp. 397-423.

Cukierman, A Webb, S & Neyapti, B (2002), «Central bank reform, liberalisation and inflation in transition economies». Journal of Monetary Economics 49 pp.237-264

Cukierman, A & Gerlach, S (2003), «the inflation bias revisited» The Manchester School vol 71 5 pp. 541-565

Debelle, G. & Fischer, S. (1994) «How independent should a central bank be?» Conference Series 38, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

De Gregorio & Federico Sturzenegger, 1994. " Credit Markets and the Welfare Costs of Inflation," NBER Working Papers 4873, National Bureau of Economic Research

Eijffinger, S. et Schaling, E. (1993), «Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries» Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 46, n. 184, mars, pp. 49-89

Friedman, M. (1977), «Nobel lectures: Inflation and unemployment», Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85, n. 3, juin, pp. 451-472.

Friedman, M. (1968), «The role of monetary policy» American Economic Review, vol. 58, pp. 1-17.

Gregory. N Mankiw, (1998) «Principles of Economics» The Dryen Press, traduit par Eric Bertrand, aux Editions Economica

Grilli, V. D, Masciandaro and G, Tabellini (1991); «Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries» Economic Policy 13: pp. 341-92.

Gylfason, T. (1991) Inflation, Growth, and External Debt: A View of the Landscape.

World Economy, 14, September, 279-298.

Kydland Finn E. & Prescott Edward C., (1977), «Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans» Journal of Political Economy vol 85 3

Lucas Robert (1972) «Expectations and the Neutrality of Money» Journal of Economic Theory 4 p 321-334

Phelps, E (1968) «Money-Wage Dynamics and Labour Market Equilibrium» Journal of Political Economy 76 pp.678-711

Phillips, A.W (1958) «The relation between unemployment and the rate of change of money wage rates in the United Kingdom 1862-1957». Economica 25 p 283-299

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1993), «Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability», Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, pp.53-84.

Rogoff, K. (1985), «The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target» Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp.1169-1190.

Sargent, N.J. and N. Wallace (1975) «Rational Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule» Journal of Political Economy 83 p 241-254

Walsh, C.E. (1995), «Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers», American Economic Review, 85, pp. 150-167.

LISTE DES TABLEAUX

Tableau 1 : les variables de l'indépendance légale selon CWN

Tableau 2 : les variables du questionnaire de Cukierman, Miller et Neyapti (1992)

Tableau 3 : les indices d'indépendance selon Cukierman (1992)

Tableau 4 : l'indice TOR (De Haan et Koo;2000)

Tableau 5 : le taux de croissance moyen et l'indépendance de la banque centrale

Tableau 6 : indépendance de la banque centrale et croissance 1918-1928

Tableau 7 : indépendance de la banque centrale et croissance 1923-1932

Tableau 8 : indépendance de la banque centrale et croissance 1929-1938

LISTE DES FIGURES

Figure 1 : la courbe de Phillips

Figure 2 : équilibre IS-LM en économie fermé

Figure 3 : effet d'une politique budgétaire expansionniste

Figure 4 : effet d'une politique monétaire restrictive

Figure 5 : effet simultané des politiques monétaire restrictive et budgétaire expansionniste