The U.S foreign policy in the horn of Africa

Somalia-Ethiopia conflicts played an important role for Moscow to determine policy over these countries. In the beginning, The USSR supported both rival states, Somalia and Ethiopia. Concerning this geopolitical contest, the socialist bloc had achieved an important outcome. However, Ogaden Battle between Somalia and Ethiopia changed the alliances in region and Somalia joined the Western camp and demonstrated the cliché that «there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies'. While the United States was arming Somalia, the USSR and Cuba were helping Ethiopia. Ogaden Battle became one of the reasons of demise of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, Treaty in 1979) agreement and Détente between the Cold War Superpowers. Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski went so far as to declare that «SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden», signifying the death of Détente (Woodroofe 2013, p.2).

During the late 1970-80s, each government in the Horn supported rebels fighting its neighbor and rival, but none of these opposition movements received significant backing from the US or USSR. Even the Soviet advisors and Cuban troops helped the Ethiopians in the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1978 (Griffiths 2005, p.135). Soviet support for Mengistu was not sufficient to defeat the Eritreans or the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). After the defeat of the military regime in Ethiopia in 1991, it seemed that there might be a new peaceful order in the Horn. However, along with the end of the superpower rivalry in the region, the United States no longer had any real need for Somalia (Woodward 2002, p.150). The United States finally suspended all financial aid, and it showed the Somali regime's full weakness and sudden collapse. As a result of Soviet and American proxy war in the Horn of Africa has been one of the most conflict-prone zones in the world (Abbink 2003). Lyons and Samatar (1995) emphasized the failure of the U.S.-backed UN military intervention in 1992-94, Somalia fell off Washington's radar screen (cited in Lefebvre 2012).

In view of the historical background, the United States should be flexible on Eritrea and Ogaden as long as Ethiopia is assured access to Djibouti and Assab. Regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, should be left to handle the situation in the Horn. The conflict is not ideological, but above all strategic and military. The heart of the matter is the control of the Red Sea, and whatever the outcome, it is bound to have a major impact beyond the Horn, affecting the course of superpower relation.^56(*) The analysts of the region's politics asserted that the overriding concern of both leaders, however, was not the resolution of the Ogaden conflict, but a shared desire to defuse external conflict relations in order to free military resources for effectively dealing with internal, regime-threatening guerrilla insurgencies.^57(*)

According to Egypt treaty, the national claims of Somalia are seen as de facto annexation. In this essence, Siad Barre turned to the United States supplying a military support as well as equipment of weapons and so on but in contrast, the awareness of Carter administration of Siad's violation of human right had deliberately rejected to supply the aid into Somalia's regime. Therefore, American foreign policy under Carter administration believed that stabilizing Africa through» African solutions»^58(*) would be a good way of protection of the U.S. national interests.

Regarding the international border, the United States has warned the Soviet Union, Cuba and Ethiopia against crossing into Somalia when and if the attacking forces in the Ogaden are beaten or withdrawn voluntarily. All three combatants guaranteed and underlined they have no intention of moving into Somalia. But it is far from clear what could be done about it effectively if they change their minds. Even though the doubling counterattack stops at the border, the expected Soviet-Cuban victory in Ethiopia is likely to have major consequences. In Somalia, the regime of Siad Barre is likely to fall or sharply change direction. In Ethiopia, a fiercely radical regime will have been rescued in time of crisis.

The history of Somalia and Ethiopia is joined by distrust, enemy and war. Suspicion of neighboring expansionism and political and religious extremism is deeply rooted in both states. Even though it can be traced to the pre-colonial interaction, their misunderstanding has been led principally by colonial legacy and arbitrary borders drawn up by the European powers, economic interests and by the efforts to administrate scarce resources.

With the defeat of leaders from both countries to solve the issue through diplomacy and negotiation connected with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Union(now the African Union) lack of regular efforts in finding solutions had driven the border war of Ethiopia-Somalia in 1964 just four years after the latter's independence. Since then, both Ethiopia and Somalia who share approximately 994 miles' long border had followed overt and covert policies targeted at subversion at each other's statehood and exchange alliances between the World's Super Powers -Soviet Union and United States -during the cold war.

Ethiopia and Somalia's inability to solve the conflict has also led to the use of military means including the Ogaden War of 1977 which only complicated the situation. After the fall of the two countries' dictatorial governments in early 1990s, there was high hopes for the beginning of a new era and for solutions for the conflict. It is cornerstone to note that the hope ended in vain. Ethiopia's post-cold war government took advantage of the civil war in its neighbor and interfered in Somalia's domestic politics progressively and continuously, created proxy factions/agent clans it armed and weakened Somali's peace process.

* ⁵⁶ The Horn of Africa's Dilemma, Author(s): Gérard Chaliand

Source: Foreign Policy, No. 30 (Spring, 1978), pp. 116-131

Published by: Washington post. News week Interactive, LLC

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148190

Accessed: 02-12-2017 06:11 UTC

* ⁵⁷The Horn of Afria: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment, Author: Peter J. Schraeder, Middle East Journal, Volume 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992

* ⁵⁸Ibid. 404