The U.S foreign policy in the horn of Africa

In addition, the coalition of the Arabic league led by Saudi Arabia, especially the United Arab Emirates sometimes simply called the Emirates, has requested Somaliland; a self-declared country located in the Horn of Africa which declared deliberately its independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991, to construct a military base in Berbera, a city near the capital Hargeysa. The members of the parliament of the self-declared republic of Somaliland agreed to allow the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to set up a military base in the port of Berbera.9(*)The Emirates which is part of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia that has fought Houthi rebels and have imposed a naval blockade on Yemen since 2015, wants to strengthen its power by having a military base in Berbera. At the same this base will facilitate, the coalition led by Saudi, to double the air-attack against the rebels Houthi in order to weaken the rebels and establish a democratic government in Yemen.

c) The Horn of Africa: A Playing Field for Foreign Powers

The Horn of Africa has been the "battleground" for foreign superpowers and at the same time it has been the «playing field» of both regional and international powers. Most of the foreign powers have a military base in Djibouti and of course this is absolutely due to the regions' strategic location. In addition, the region is the subject of «Big powers» competition and this has its own repercussion on the region's states. But the region should pay more attention and basically it should beware the consequences of these foreign military bases stationed in the Horn.

Thus, the HOA has become the «springboard» for foreign powers. Their involvement in the region have economic, political and security implications for the countries of the region particularly Djibouti, the military heart of the region. The region is a very fragile and volatile. In it; conflict and war may take the form of interstate, intrastate, ethnic, and war by proxies. Scholars and the region's political analysts subscribe to the view that the region's instability is largely due to external players. Thus, Ethiopia is a country torn between regional dynamics and external players.

However, the U.S. has constructed its first military base called «Camp Lemonier» (this camp was a former camp for the French military in Djibouti) in Djibouti in 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The United States of America has a good relation with Djibouti but this base makes it easier for the U.S. to fight against terrorist group that are spreading in the Gulf Arab states and as well as the HOA.

First, the United States cooperates with each state of the Horn in order to safeguard its interests. Second, the U.S. military base in the Horn is part of the strategy of the so-called «global War on Terror». The spread of Islamic extremism in the region is a threat to the U.S. and its regional allies because terrorist groups may control oil areas and thus maritime security and oil fields might be at risk. In this regard, the region is vulnerable to terrorism since the region is close to the Middle East. In addition, seven of the nine states that line the Red Sea- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia -identify themselves with the Arab/Islamic world.

Moreover, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen are either the home to Al-shabab-Al-Qaeda affiliated groups or supporters of terrorist groups. Thus, the U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, is to neutralize terrorist groups from Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.

II. The American's foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa during Cold War

a)The Horn of Africa in the shadow of the Cold War

The Encyclopaedia Americana explains the Cold War as «the conflict between the Communist nations led by the Soviet Union and the Western nations led by United States, fought by all means of ideological, economic, political, limited military action, and short o f total war.»^10(*) Mark Vogl describes the cold war as «a zero sum global struggle between two ideologies, championed by two superpowers (USA and USSR), which occurred within a nuclear weapons' environment...»^11(*)The Cold War did not involve direct fights between the superpowers, rather between proxies. It encompassed a high degree of mistrust, spying and deception.

In fact, the Cold War was based on two opposing ideologies explaining how people should live and how governments should rule. These two ideologies which were in the center of the Cold War refer to the two great superpowers: the Western Bloc (the United Sates, NATO and others) and on the other hand powers in the Eastern Bloc (The Soviet Union and its allies). Also, the «Cold War» is also a conflict over ideological differences carried on by methods short of sustained overt military action and usually without breaking off diplomatic relations; specifically, often capitalized Cold War the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the second half of the 20th century.^12(*)It is important to underline that the term «Cold» is used because there was no large-scale fighting directly between the two sides, but they each propped up major regional wars known as proxy wars.^13(*)

However, the ideology was the underlying reason for East-West tensions during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. emerged from WWII as the world's most powerful nations, it was inevitable that their conflicting governmental ideologies of capitalism and communism would lead to hostility. Therefore, although not always directly involved, it put both countries on a collision course and provided them with reason for sustained suspicion, even during periods of Détente. Hence, the two political ideologies used in the Cold War were democracy and communism. The United States was a democratic country while the Soviet Union was a communist dictatorship. In addition, Democracy and Communism were the two ideologies that were at war with each other during the Cold War.The Cold War wasn't an extension and at the same time it wasn't a war but hopefully it was a tense arm's race in which each side "eyed" each other.

The majority of African countries began to gain independence from their colonial masters after World War Two. In the aftermath of the destruction and slaying of the World War II, it was obvious that a new world order had emerged. Japan and Germany were defeated, Europe was in ruins both physically and economically, and the old European colonial empires were disappearing. The United States, however, emerged from the war relatively unharmed, and a central question in geopolitical circles was the role that the United States would play in this new world order, and the strategy that the US would need to adopt to strengthen its foreign policy in order to become the first influencer of this new world order.

The onset of the Cold War, however, began in 1947 just two years after WWII. The political ideologies in the Cold War were in a state of rivalry and tension between two blocs, the USA &the USSR. Basically, it was a conflict that went on for over forty years. In addition, when John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address asked the world what «together we can do the freedom of man» his words inspired those who were searching the independence in Africa as the continent shook off its colonial past and moved closer to closer towards total independence.^14(*) U.S involvement in Africa was confined before World War II, with the exception of a few commercial treaties signed with a few countries in West Africa. In general, Washington was not drawn to African affairs and worded no real objection to European domination of the continent. However, the country paid attention to Africa when, on January 18, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson proposed his famous Fourteen Points declaration to a Joint Session of Congress in which he underlined the principle of self-determination and governance.^15(*) At that time, President Wilson wanted to counter the German threat which had transformed the American attitude toward European Colonies. His posture had obvious influences for the millions of Africans dominated by foreign rule.

The Atlantic Charter, signed in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was another initiative to achieve world peace by compromising imperialism. Both leaders admitted the importance of colonial people's rights to self-determination and self-governance.^16(*) After World War II, the Soviet Union joined world political affairs in opposing Western domination and imperialism as Mr. P. Woodward notes:

An early post-World War II consideration for the US was that of rising nationalism that affected the Horn and many other parts of the Third World, as much of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America were becoming known collectively. In general the US seemed sympathetic. Until the 1945 the Third World was not a major issue for American foreign policy makers, both because of the strength of isolationism after the World War I, and the dominance of European empires in Africa, Asia and Middle East; however after 1945 nationalism was once more the march and the powerful force in international politics. The US could identify with Third World nationalism having itself fought a revolutionary war to throw off British imperial rule, and the strain of thought was encouraged by such domestic developments as the African-American civil right movement.^17(*)

What is interesting to mention is the influence of the USA and the Soviet Union had upon Africa, especially the HOA. The Horn of Africa has long attracted the attention of external players, first in the era of European colonialism and then during the Cold War when it became an arena for the global struggle between East and West. By the time that Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency in January 1953, the Cold War was well and truly on. A CIA report prepared for the incoming president concluded that:

A war situation now exists between the Soviet Bloc and the group of western nations under the leadership of the United States....The USSR has virtually ended normal diplomatic relations with the West and has isolated the peoples of the Bloc from the rest of the world. Trade relations have been severely curtailed. Intense competition in armaments continues....The Soviet rulers are implacable in their antagonism toward the free world. They have made plain their intention to subvert or destroy it and to establish a communist world dominated from Moscow.^18(*)

The U.S. foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa between 1945 and 1990 was guided by a series of Cold War rationales that viewed the region as a means for solving non-Africa problems. Specifically, the U.S. policymakers did not perceive the countries and peoples of the Horn of Africa as important in their own right but, rather, as a means of preventing the further advances of Soviet communism. As a result, the U.S. relationships with various regimes in the region evolved according to their perceived importance within an East-West framework. Haile Selassie, for example, was courted from the 1940s to the 1970s because of the importance of Ethiopia as part of a worldwide telecommunication network directed against the Soviet Union.^19(*)

Despite the ideology rivalry, the U.S. perceived Communism as a monolithic force struggling for world supremacy. The America was against the spread of communist ideology in Middle East, Asia and Africa as well. In this regard, the U.S. established a strong foreign policy, especially in the Horn of Africa where it wanted to defeat the communist ideology as Mr. Donna Rosa Jackson states:

America interest in the Horn of Africa began in earnest with the Cold War. Then, the geographically location of the Horn, with its proximity to Middle East oil fields, the sea oil routes and the red Sea passage to the Mediterranean, as well as its role as link in the technological chain of Western communication and defense systems, made it strategically important.......and the radical Arab disruptive activities.^20(*)

Notwithstanding, the Soviet Union also understood the strategic location of the Horn of Africa and put forward their policies for expansionism of their ideology. Donna Rosa Jackson noted that:

The Americans were not alone in recognizing the strategic importance of both the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. The Soviet Union strove to gain a foothold in the area and counted the Ethiopian Emperor.^21(*)

A hallmark of the U.S. policy toward the HOA was to halt the expansion of the Soviet Union's ideology in the region regime's relation. The relation of the regime had faced challenges coming from both blocs and at same time the Horn of Africa states had no common goal namely Ethiopia and Somalia, even though some states conquered their independence in the aftermath of WWII such as Somalia and Kenya, of how to deal with this external powers which wanted to create instability in the region.

The main perspective revolves around the perception that the two blocs was willing to divide the region and create alliance in the Horn, and of course defending, each one of the both sides, its political agenda. The U.S. and The USSR planned to win in the competition by promising economy and military fund for the vulnerable countries in the Africa continent. In fact the main actors of the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR made allies inside the Horn states promising each state, like Ethiopia and Somalia fund development, military training, etc...But in return the states in question should have to provide bases or other facilities that the U.S. and the USSR could develop to spread their ideology influence around the world. For instance,

In 1953 Ethiopia and the U.S. signed an agreement in which gave the United States access to military bases and in return the U.S. offered for economic and military aid to Ethiopia that would endure for over twenty years.^22(*)

One of the most significant gains for the United States was an access to a communications facility at Asmara, in the province of Eritrea, on the Ethiopian coast. The facility was named «Kagnew Station»^23(*), in honor of the Ethiopian legion that had fought was part of the UN force in the Korean War,^24(*) and mainly this Radio station was useful for the American Intelligence Community to exchange news until the 1970s, while technology innovated in satellites and enhanced communication which minimized the need of relay stations.

The U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa centered on Ethiopia, where it acquired the Kagnew communications facility near Asmara in 1942. For more than two decades, it served as the most important U.S. communications station in Africa and the Indian Ocean. Hence, Ethiopia was the privileged American ally on the continent, and, between 1953 and 1970, received 20 per cent of all U.S. economic aid and half of all U.S. military aid to Africa.

In general, African countries especially the Horn states were perceived by the U.S. policymakers as a means for preventing further advances of Soviet communism. Therefore the U.S. relationships with African regimes evolved according to their relative importance within an East-West framework. In research of a new ally, the United States set up a diplomatic relationship with both Somalia and Ethiopia. In doing so, the United States devised a strategy to defeat the Soviet Union and at the same time to halt the expansion of Soviet Union's ideology in the Horn of Africa.

b) The U.S./U.S.S.R. rivalry in East Africa

1.1 The U.S. Strategic Interest in Ethiopia during the Cold War Era

In 1953, Ethiopia was the main target country the Horn of Africa states in the Cold War due to its area, covering an area of 455, 000 square miles; it was one of the largest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and also one of the most important countries, geographically, in the HOA. To meet those interests, America gave priority to the Horn of Africa states. The U.S. interest in Ethiopia shifted from trade to Cold War geopolitics. Similarly, the Eisenhower administration recognized Ethiopia as the most important country within the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles indicated that Ethiopia could «serve as base of operation to protect the shipping lanes and the Fast East, Europe and the Middle East.»^25(*) Thus, it was not surprising that the policy goals towards Ethiopia, as explained in May 1953, included:

The maintenance of friendly and co-operative relations; the prevention of Communist infiltration and influence and the continuance of Ethiopia's orientation toward the West; the establishment of stable administration in areas under Ethiopian sovereignty and the successful development of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Federation within the terms of the UN Resolution of December 2, 1950; the balanced and orderly development of the economy of Ethiopia, and a successful Point IV programme; and the maintenance of the right to use the military facilities required by the Department of Defense in Eritrea and to the rights and privileges we desire in connection therewith.^26(*)

Basically, D. Eisenhower administration's main policy objective toward Ethiopia was the «preventing of communist infiltration and influence and the continuance of Ethiopia's orientation toward the West,^27(*)the major feelings was that even though the U.S. was convinced about the Ethiopia's relation and of course Selassie's following his political agenda, but it (the U.S.) had no more options unless it loses this strategic place. On the other hand, Haile Selassie realized that this tactics had literally paid off.^28(*)

Haile Selassie, the Ethiopia's emperor, was determined to make Ethiopia the most powerful country in the continent and Addis Ababa «the capital of Africa».^29(*) Selassie's main strategy was to keep Eritrea, a former Italian colony with 45,000 square miles in size, under Ethiopian administration. In other words, he suggested to make federalism with Eritrea and requested the U.S. policymakers to support his plan.

In 1949, although the United States was initially in favor of Eritrea's independence after a period of trusteeship, this stance was modified by the end of Truman's presidential term, with the US ultimately supporting Ethiopian empirical claims to the region. While this could be explained as a contradictory of the pro-independentist and anti-colonialist philosophy of the U.S. The Cold War perspective that was being the most important issue in America's policy formulation meant that the Horn should have to minimize the Soviet Union influence. In order to realize this, the US should have to follow its interest and should have to offer total support for Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea. Donna R. Jackson states:

Truman's support for Haile Selassie's territorial ambitions was motivated not just from a desire to please the emperor but also by more pragmatic reasons. Located just outside the Eritrean capital of Asmara was Radio Marina, a communications facility that had first been established by the Italians and then utilized during the World War II, first by the British and then by the Americans. With the onset of the Cold War, the need for such facilities around the world increased exponentially and the importance of Eritrea in this context was recognized.^30(*)

An analysis made by the NSC (National Security Council) concluded that Eritrea is an important site for strategic radio facilities. The United States maintains an Army signal station at Asmara, with extensive relay facilities serving to large of the Middle East. It would therefore appear desirable to support such strategic interests in Eritrea.^31(*) The U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, argued in a Security Council debate:

«From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interests of the United States in the Red Sea basin and considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country has to be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.» (Cited in Kaplan, 2003, p. 56)

On the other hand, unlike the United States' support of federating Eritrea to Ethiopia, the Soviet Union was in favor of Eritrea's independence (A former Italian colony, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and annexed as the fourteenth province of Haile Selassie's empire in1962.) and expressed their support to the Eritrea's rebels including EPLF (Eritrean people's Liberation-Front) and ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front). Donna R. Jackson notes:

The Soviet also supported Eritrean rebels who were demanding independence from Ethiopia, in the hope that the unrest would led to a change of leadership of the major country of the Horn to one that might prove more receptive to Soviet overtures.^32(*)

The America was convinced that Ethiopia was a leader power in the Horn and it enjoyed a good relationship with Ethiopia as the U.S. regarded Ethiopia as a crucial and fundamental ally in the Cold War era. Additionally, the two countries established a long-lasting relationship in order to defeat the antagonists [Soviet Union]. The United States' objectives in Ethiopia were the «prevention of Soviet or communist influence over Ethiopia, and the maintenance of Ethiopia's orientation toward the United States and western Europe.»^33(*)

In 1974, the mutual cooperation and the relationship between both countries (Ethiopia & the U.S.) have grown until the collapse of the Ethiopia emperor and the country is overshadowed by a military coup d'état that led the country instability and fear of civil war. Haile Selassie was overthrow by Mangistu Haile Mariam. In that specific period, the leader of committee Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power and launched to establish his policy to face the Cold War competition ideology. The soviet hopes were boosted in 1974 when social problems and discontent within the military over pay and conditions led to overthrow the Emperor Haile Selassie. In his place, Ethiopia was ruled by the Provisional Military Government (PMG), led by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) known as the Derg, the Amharic word for committee.^34(*)

With regard of Ethiopia's foreign policy, the two successive Ethiopian recipient governments led by Haile Selassie (1941-1974) and Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991), was more dependants for the international donor community preciously the U.S. fund aid supporting. Moreover, Ethiopia's new regime turned clearly away from the United States, once its only arms supplier. Although the United States upheld a large military assistance group in Ethiopia for a time, the new regime became increasingly radical and anti-American, and complained that too few arms were being provided. Early in 1977, the Carter administration decided to put an end to military aid to Ethiopia altogether, officially because of gross violations of human rights. In order to meet his regards, Mengistu Haile Mariam cut off the relationship with the U.S. and went a secret visit to Moscow for the purpose of making a new agreement of the USSR and in turn Ethiopia will benefit economic and military aid. Protecting his own interest Haile Mariam; Ethiopia emperor, accepted the proposal and signed the amendment with the USSR. On the other hand, getting the advantage about the border tension between Somalia and Ethiopia, the U.S. made a new ally with Somali; an ancient pro-Soviet, and promised a military and economic support.

1.2 The U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia during the Cold War Era

The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the support of the newly independent nations was ever-present, and was clearly reflected in all aspects of policy formulation including military and economic aid, as well as in program such as Peace Corps. Somalia, a newly independent country, acquired its independence from the respective colonies Italian Somali and British Somaliland and set up the unification of the two sides in 1960.

After almost a decade of democratic rule (1960-1969), major General Mohammed Siyad Barre assumed political power through a blood less coup and ruled the country recklessly and ruthlessly for about two decades. Despite the fact that the country was under dictatorship, but the country was also the focus of the two blocs trying each one to make ally the newly independent nation of Somalia. It (Somalia) is the home of homogenous people, over then 14 million inhabitants, both linguistically and religiously. This turned out to be one of the most strategic countries in the Horn of Africa. It has a potential resource and locates the most strategic place both regionally and internationally. In that main reason, Somalia appeared mainly important both the U.S. and the USSR's political agenda in order to form an ally with Somalia.

Subsequently the coup in 1969, the Soviet's role in Somalia doubled as Somalia adopted socialism with a serious campaign o f striving to break Somalis' allegiances to clans. Barre abolished the constitution, prohibited all political parties and devastated democracy that existed. The strategic position of the Horn drew the attention of the superpowers' interests. It has proximity to the Gulf, which encompasses half o f the world's oil and the origin of Islam. It is also located next to the Red Sea, the bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and the old traditions of the Middle East and Europe.^35(*) Ottaway describes the reasons for the superpowers' interests in Somalia as,

first, the country had the location and the physical characteristics suitable for the establishment of a major communications centre, second, it lent itself to serve as a link on air routes toward India and the Far East; and third, as the only independent country in Africa at the time, it afforded United Slates an opportunity to establish a presence in the continent preparing itself to play a greater role in the years to come.^36(*)

Furthermore, the strategic position of Somalia at the mouth of Red Sea fascinated the Soviet strategy. The USSR planed to control the Indian Ocean as a powerful nuclear force country. Hence, it demonstrated continuous interest in the Horn of Africa. This was pointed out, among others, by continual arrangement of a naval squadron of about 18 ships in the waters.^37(*)Moreover, the long animosity between Ethiopia and Somalia attracted the superpowers as the superpowers could use these countries to fight each other.^38(*)By 1980, therefore, the Horn of Africa had become a microcosm of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and Cuba were with Ethiopia and the Americans were supporting Somalia. The problems of the region were seen through the Cold War prism, external powers involvement and globalism seemed to have triumphed over regionalism.

Through the Cold War, Moscow gave high weight to the HOA in terms of global competition with USA. The large and fast growth of Moscow's relations with the HOA countries began in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they were achieving independence respectively. Pursued by 1956, Khrushchev highlighted the importance of the `collapse of the colonial system of imperialism' and declared the USSR's `irreconcilable struggle against colonialism' at the 20^th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Supporting struggles for national liberation and social progress was designed in the 1977 Soviet Constitution as a foreign-policy objective. So, national liberation movements were acknowledged as `detachments' of the world anti-imperialist struggle. (Arkhangelskaya & Shubin 2013, p.6). American and Soviet foreign policy on the Horn of Africa generated more conflict in the decade of the 1970's. Not coincidentally, in the 1970-1980s the Horn of Africa was the field of strong game between the U.S. and the USSR for supremacy in regional forward military presence.

Hence, once Somalia was declared an independent republic in 1960, Khrushchev established relations, offered economic aid, and undertook a major port expansion in Berbera, beginning in1962.^39(*)The relationship between the USSR and Somalia was constantly in growth owing of Somalia was an important ally in the Horn of Africa states. In fact Moscow made a plan to defeat the U.S. foreign policy in the region offering the support to Somalia as a new fragile and independent state. It took a measure to counter-attack and minimize the U.S.'s spread ideology in the Horn; this is offering Somalia all the equipment it needs and at the same time it [Soviet Union] also successes to establish a vital collaboration both Ethiopia and Somalia despite their political disagreement.

What is required, above all, is a strategy for linking the goal with concrete policy actions. The U.S. regarded Somalia as the main target of America's ally after it recognized that Ethiopia allied with Soviet Union, and at that time Ethiopia was led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. He broke the diplomacy relation of the U.S. However, it is interesting to remain that the interests of the US can be described in terms of securing some strategic points like the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf also became major in the overall American strategy about the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. It was, accordingly, in the interests of the US to hold up any expansion of Soviet power and influence, whether through proxies or not, in the Middle East, Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa (Mesfin 2011, p.19).

However, superpower competition was not the only factor for Soviet activism in the Horn of Africa. During the Cold war era, the U.S. National Intelligence Council Memorandum `Soviet Policy and Africa' (1975) determined the USSR's interests Russia's Renewed Interests in the Horn of Africa As a Traditional and Rising Power in the region as; reducing Western influence, power, and presence; gaining political influence on the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea littoral, and supporting and protecting its flanks in the Middle East; securing access to support facilities for its naval forces in the Indian Ocean; countering Chinese influence. All of the interests are linked not only geopolitical but also including economic and culturally.

The USSR used military aid as the most effective means of gaining influence and cooperation. In 1962, Moscow gave $ 32 million credit to Somali in order to raise the number of soldiers to 14,000 and modernize the army. When it came to 1965, the USSR found technical and military assistance to build the Somali Navy. On the other hand, the USSR also made attempts to establish the Ethiopia national armed forces. Socialist leader Mengistu Haile Mariam also played an active role to strengthening of aid on Ethiopia. In 1976, $ 100 million secret military agreement was signed between the two sides. An estimated 20 000 Ethiopian were trained in the USSR, and thousands graduated from military and political schools. (Öztürk 2016, p.294). In 1977, The United States stopped all military aid, departing it without any influence on the strategic important Horn. This significant loss of influence resulted in total Soviet control over the Horn that made the situation even more complex (Schulz 2011).

Nevertheless, Somalia-Soviet relations turned sour when USSR started offering military aid to Ethiopia, Somalia's rival. Somalia recognized this as betrayal. USSR attempted to reconcile the two countries in vain. USSR honored to lead this reconciliation Fidel Castro of Cuba, who travelled all the way to the region to meet Mengistu and Siad Barre in Aden. He suggested creation of a federation comprising o f Ethiopia, Somalia and People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen. However, his suggestion was rejected, leaving the Soviets in dilemma.^40(*)

Mengistu Haile Mariam signed two friendship agreements with the Soviet Union and in publicized Moscow ceremony and a separate, unpublicized military aid agreement appraised at $400 million more than the United States had supplied to Ethiopia in three decades of alliance. The progressively close relations between Addis Ababa and Moscow led to anger in Somalia, the Soviet Union's longtime socialist ally in the area, and Somalia indicated to the United States that it had cut off the relationship with the Soviet Union and was willing to become for a new ally of the U.S., Saudi Arabia had started furnishing $20 million to $30 million a year to Somalia for purposes of Saudi security and Islamic solidarity, and early last year there were reports that Arab oil states were offering $300 million to $350 million if Somalia would break the relation with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, Washington started to make new ally with Barre's regime. The Somalia regime of Siad Barre, however, achieved greater status in Washington because of Somali's importance as an access country from which the United States could counter militarily any perceived Soviet threat to Middle Eastern oil field.^41(*) The U.S. preoccupation with anticommunism not only was manipulated by the leaders to obtain greater levels of the U.S. economic and military aid, more than $600 million for the Selassie regime and nearly $800 million for the Barre regime, It also served as an important rational for Washington's general disregard for the authoritarian excesses of these regimes, as well as for a host of interventionist practices designed to maintain the U.S. influence within the region.^42(*)

It should be noted, however, that during the period from the 1954 to 1970 the United States also enjoyed cordial relations with Somalia and expended almost the $60 million in aid.^43(*) American engagement in Somalia could hence be seen as an extension of America strategic policy known as «containment».^44(*) Somalia became an ally with the U.S. in order to accomplish its political agenda which was base on the unification of the Somali speaking population and it was convinced that the Ethiopia detained illegally some of the Somali region called Ogaden region.

1.3 The U.S. Strategic Interest Towards Kenya during the Cold War Era

The freshly come out independent African States soon became the scene of Cold War battles. The US and the Soviet Union accomplished for their allegiances, primarily through economic and military aid. These freshly independent States saw themselves being economically dependent on great superpower countries for development assistance. Their economic dependent made these countries vulnerable to foreign influences and pressures. Thus, foreign aid was offered the intention of capturing the political support of these new States.

Basically, three years after Somalia's independence, Kenya acquired its independence on December 12, 1963. Few days after its independence, Kenya was become part of in the international aid game war. The U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic partner and anchor state in East Africa, and as critical to counter to the Soviet Union spread in the region. Therefore, the U.S. immediately recognizedthe new nation and moved to establish diplomatic relations and effectively, the embassy in Nairobi was established one year after Kenya'sIndependence Day.

However, Soviet's attack of Afghanistan resulted in 1979 that the horn played a vital role in the Cold War. It is sharply that there were some doubts indicating Soviet military planning spread beyond Afghanistan into Iran and Kuwait. Accordingly the United States convinced the threat coming from its opponent and hopefully wanted and obtained military base rights, facilities and the Red Sea utilization from the Horn of Africa countries near the Persian Gulf. After Iran's revolution the America forgot the so called Carter Doctrine that offered the United States to utilize military means to save American interest in the oil rich Persian Gulf, according to Michael Clough this in turn this risen the Strategic importance of the Horn.

Hence in keeping with Kenya's need to defend herself any attack from her neighbors, the US signed the Facilities Access Agreement with Kenya in 1980. The agreement supplied for over flights, landing rights at three airfields, and access to the Mombasa sea port and was followed with military assistance of twenty million dollars in 1980 and in a period of two years it had increased to thirty million. This agreement authenticated the US as the major provider of arms and military support to Kenya, a stance previously held by the former colonial power. Kenya came to be considered as part of the Central Command (CENTCOM) under the Kenya US Liaison Office (KULSO).^45(*)12This office is still in permanence to date and has obtained prominence particularly with the war on terrorism in the region.

* ⁹http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38956093

* ¹⁰John W. Spanier, «The Cold War» in The Encyclopaedia Americana. Vol. 7 (int. edition) (Danbury:

Americana Corporation, 1979) p. 222.

* ¹¹Mark Vogl. Cold War: When Did It Begin? When Did It End? op. cit.

* ¹²https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cold%20war

* ¹³https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War

* ¹⁴Kennedy Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961; Speech Files, Digital Archives, Kennedy Library, WWW.jfklibrary.org/Asset-viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-034-002.aspx.

* ¹⁵Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 429.

* ¹⁶Ibid., 21

* ¹⁷P. Woodward, UN Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, p.10, published 2016.

* ¹⁸Report of President Roosevelt in Person to the congress on the Crimea conference,» New York Times, March 2, 1945.

* ¹⁹Peter J. Schraeder, THE OF AFRICA: US FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ALTERED COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT, Middle East Journal, Volume 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992.

* ²⁰Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, p.36, published 2007

* ²¹Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, p.37, published 2007

* ²²Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, p37, published 2007

* ²³Kagnew Station was a United States Army base in Asmara, Eritrea on the Horn of Africa. The base was established in 1943 as a U.S. Army radio station, coming to power and renovating a previous Italian naval radio station, Radio Marina, after Italian forces based in Asmara abandoned to the Allies in 1941. Kagnew Station served until April 29, 1977, when the last Americans left. The station was home to the United States Army's 4th Detachment of the Second Signal Service Battalion.

* ²⁴Samuel M. Makinda, Superpowers Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa ( New York: St Martin's, 1987), p.58

* ²⁵National Security Council Report, October 23, 1956; NSC series Box 19, NSC 5615/1- Policy Toward Ethiopia (2), Eisenhower Library.

* ²⁶Report, May 1953; RG59 Box 3, Military Assistance, National Archives II

* ²⁷Report, Operation Coordinating Board, September 13, 1956, NSC Staff Paper Box 28, OCB 091, Eisenhower Library.

* ²⁸Dulles to American Embassy, Addis Ababa, October 16, 1956; Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Box 8, Policy Toward Ethiopia, Eisenhower Library.

* ²⁹Henze, Horn of Africa, P. 162

* ³⁰Donna R. Jackson, US Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa: From Colonialism to Terrorism, p. 17 published in 2018

* ³¹NSC 19/1, A Report to the Presidency by the National Security Council on Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies in Africa, July 21, 1948; PSF Box 178, Meetings 17, Truman Library

* ³²Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, p.39, published 2007

* ³³Policy Statement, Ethiopia, Department of State, March 1, 1951; RG59 Dept of State Decimal File 1950-54, Box 2846, National Archives II.

* ³⁴Report, the Horn of Africa, House Committee on International Relations, November 11, 1976, H462-62, 95th Congress, Washington, D.C

* ³⁵African Studies Centre, The Horn of Africa Forum (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, November 11, 1993).

* ³⁶Marina Ottaway, «Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa» in R. Craig

Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa op. cit. p. 168.

* ³⁷Richard B. Rcinnek, «Soviet Policy in the Horn o f Africa: The Decision to Intervene» in Robert H.

Donaldson, cd The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures op. cit. p. 129.

* ³⁸Christopher Clapharm, Africa and the International System: The Politics o f State Survival op. cit. pp. 135-136.

* ³⁹Statement, Schaufele to Senate Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, August 6, 1976.

* ⁴⁰Cf. Marian Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. pp. 163-164.

* ⁴¹Peter J. Schraeder, THE OF AFRICA: US FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ALTERED COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT, Middle East Journal, Volume 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992.

* ⁴²The Study of the U.S. intervention in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War era has generated a tremendous amount of scholarship. For a general introduction to this literature, see David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United States and Soviet Union ( Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); Jeffrey A. Lefebre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991 ( Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); and Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974: The Politics of empire ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

* ⁴³Statement, Schaufele to Senate Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, August 6, 1976.

* ⁴⁴Thomas Magstadt, An Empire If You Can Keep It-Power and principales in American foreign policy.9

* ⁴⁵KULSO has the responsibility to support all US military activities and interests in Kenya. The senior

officer offers input, counsel and advice to the Ambassador and embassy country team regarding the

military perspective or viewpoint of US government policy vis-à-vis the host nation and region. KULSO is

still in existence to date. See, Karl E. Prinslow op. cit.