WOW !! MUCH LOVE ! SO WORLD PEACE !
Fond bitcoin pour l'amélioration du site: 1memzGeKS7CB3ECNkzSn2qHwxU6NZoJ8o
  Dogecoin (tips/pourboires): DCLoo9Dd4qECqpMLurdgGnaoqbftj16Nvp


Home | Publier un mémoire | Une page au hasard

 > 

Geopolitical interests and the failure of the african peace and security architecture in political crisis : the case of the electoral crisis in the DRC (2016)


par Paul Ivan Beppe a Yombo
Protestant University of Central Africa - Masters 2018
  

précédent sommaire suivant

Extinction Rebellion

A-Congo before Kabila: The legacy of a fragmented state.....................................65

B-Congo under Joseph Kabila: Geopolitical interests and power struggle.................67

i-Four plus One Equals Zero: The Transitional Period (2003-2006)..............................67

ii-The third Republic.....................................................................................69

iii-National Elections 2006..............................................................................70

iv-The 2011 elections....................................................................................71

CHAPTER 5: THE AU LEAD FACILITATION.................................................73

A-Run up to facilitation....................................................................................73

i- Local actors in the Congolese electoral crisis.......................................................73

1. The National Episcopal Council.....................................................................73

2. The sitting President: Joseph Kabila................................................................73

3. The late veteran Etienne Tshisekedi................................................................74

4. The people's Favorite Moïse Katumbi..............................................................74

5.The Activists: Lucha...................................................................................75

6-The rest of the opposition.............................................................................75

ii-International actors....................................................................................75

1-Sub-regional powers...................................................................................76

1.1-The Republic of South Africa .....................................................................76

1.2-Uganda................................................................................................77

1.3Rwanda..................................................................................................78

2-The international support group......................................................................79

3-International powers...................................................................................79

iii- Chronology of the run-up to the facilitation......................................................80

B-The AU lead facilitation 26th April to 1st November..........................................81

i-Preparatory phase 26th April to 30th August.........................................................82

ii- Negotiations take place 1st September to 18th October............................................85

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS OF RESEARCH........................................................87

A-The Impact of Geopolitical interest on the AU lead facilitation.....................................87

i-first secondary hypothesis.............................................................................88

1. Foreign Policy dissonance induced by Geopolitical interests...................................88

2. limited support from the APSA member states...................................................89

2.1Structural limitations................................................................................89

2.2Political limitations.................................................................................89

3. The APSA intervention in Congo is not adapted to reach APSA goals........................90

ii-Second secondary hypothesis.........................................................................90

1. Some APSA states show preference to a party to the conflict...................................90

2.The other parties distrust the process and refuse to participate .................................92

iii-Results of doubly decisive test......................................................................92

précédent sommaire suivant






Extinction Rebellion





Changeons ce systeme injuste, Soyez votre propre syndic





"Il existe une chose plus puissante que toutes les armées du monde, c'est une idée dont l'heure est venue"   Victor Hugo