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Geopolitical interests and the failure of the african peace and security architecture in political crisis : the case of the electoral crisis in the DRC (2016)


par Paul Ivan Beppe a Yombo
Protestant University of Central Africa - Masters 2018
  

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A-Congo before Kabila: The legacy of a fragmented state.....................................65

B-Congo under Joseph Kabila: Geopolitical interests and power struggle.................67

i-Four plus One Equals Zero: The Transitional Period (2003-2006)..............................67

ii-The third Republic.....................................................................................69

iii-National Elections 2006..............................................................................70

iv-The 2011 elections....................................................................................71

CHAPTER 5: THE AU LEAD FACILITATION.................................................73

A-Run up to facilitation....................................................................................73

i- Local actors in the Congolese electoral crisis.......................................................73

1. The National Episcopal Council.....................................................................73

2. The sitting President: Joseph Kabila................................................................73

3. The late veteran Etienne Tshisekedi................................................................74

4. The people's Favorite Moïse Katumbi..............................................................74

5.The Activists: Lucha...................................................................................75

6-The rest of the opposition.............................................................................75

ii-International actors....................................................................................75

1-Sub-regional powers...................................................................................76

1.1-The Republic of South Africa .....................................................................76

1.2-Uganda................................................................................................77

1.3Rwanda..................................................................................................78

2-The international support group......................................................................79

3-International powers...................................................................................79

iii- Chronology of the run-up to the facilitation......................................................80

B-The AU lead facilitation 26th April to 1st November..........................................81

i-Preparatory phase 26th April to 30th August.........................................................82

ii- Negotiations take place 1st September to 18th October............................................85

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS OF RESEARCH........................................................87

A-The Impact of Geopolitical interest on the AU lead facilitation.....................................87

i-first secondary hypothesis.............................................................................88

1. Foreign Policy dissonance induced by Geopolitical interests...................................88

2. limited support from the APSA member states...................................................89

2.1Structural limitations................................................................................89

2.2Political limitations.................................................................................89

3. The APSA intervention in Congo is not adapted to reach APSA goals........................90

ii-Second secondary hypothesis.........................................................................90

1. Some APSA states show preference to a party to the conflict...................................90

2.The other parties distrust the process and refuse to participate .................................92

iii-Results of doubly decisive test......................................................................92

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