Memoire Online - Geopolitical interests and the failure of the african peace and security architecture in political crisis : the case of the electoral crisis in the DRC (2016)

«The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born»

This thesis is dedicated to all those brilliant spirits that have inspired me to do better: Kundera, Feynman, Imhotep, Manes, Mbembe, Hume, Bardon, Keohane, Risse, Mundimbe, Tagou and Newton.

This thesis is the result of various contributions, which all deserve recognition. In this regard, I would like to express my deep gratitude to:

· My thesis supervisor, Professor Celestin Tagou, who, with rigor, method and respect, introduced me to scientific writing. He initiated me to rigorous thought throughout the development of this work and during the many years I have spent under his guidance at the Protestant University. He has been a guide, mentor and is my academic father. I am deeply grateful for the interest he has displayed to the young scholar I am becoming.

· My parents Dr. Yombo Daniel and Thaaly Angele for the love and multi-dimensional support they have shown me all my life.

· My siblings Yombo Ingrid and Yombo Micheline for the endless encouragements and for reading my thesis more times than anyone else.

· The Rector of PUCA, Professor BOUBA MBIMA, as well as the staff of the Faculty of Social Sciences and International Relations for offering us a framework of studies conducive to healthyacquisition of knowledge: Mr. Dean, Professor Celestin TAGOU;Mr. Academic Secretary, Reverend Professor Charles ELOM NANGA; Head of Department of Peace and Development, Dr. William Hermann ARREY, and the Coordinator the AIPCD Dr. Bertrand Begoumenie.

· My numerous friends and classmates around the world, from the original Haagse School Vereeniging family in Den Haag to CSI La gaiete in Yaoundé and finally PUCA.

Epigraph.....................................................................................................2

Dedication...................................................................................................3

Table of contents...........................................................................................4

List of Tables...............................................................................................9

List of Acronyms.........................................................................................10

Abstract.....................................................................................................11

Resume......................................................................................................12

General Introduction....................................................................................13

I-Problem and Importance of study.....................................................................13

II-Research Objective and delimitation...............................................................16

III-Literature Review....................................................................................18

IV-Research gap..........................................................................................24

V-Research Questions....................................................................................25

VI-Hypothesis.............................................................................................25

VII-Methodology/ Research design....................................................................26

VIII-Method: Process tracing...........................................................................27

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK................................................29

A-Defensive structural realism.......................................................................30

i-Content of theory.......................................................................................30

ii-Use of theory in our present study...................................................................31

B-A theory of international regimes.................................................................32

i-Neoliberal institutionalism, interest based approaches of regimes...............................34

1-Content of approach....................................................................................34

1.1Regime creation/maintenance.......................................................................35

1.2Regime change........................................................................................36

2-Utility of neoliberal institutionalism in our research..............................................37

ii-Knowledge based approaches of international regimes...........................................38

1-Content of approach....................................................................................38

2-Utility of approach in research.......................................................................39

CHAPTER 2: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS...................................................40

A-Definition of variables...............................................................................40

i-Independent varible.....................................................................................40

1.Geopolitics...............................................................................................40

2.Interests..................................................................................................43

2.1Realists and the concept of interest in international relations theory...........................43

2.2The liberal conception of «interests» in international relations theory ........................45

ii-Dependent variable: Failure..........................................................................46

B-Other concepts.........................................................................................48

i-International regimes...................................................................................48

ii-Electoral crisis..........................................................................................50

Chapter 3: THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE APSA......................................................................................................51

A-Establishment of the APSA........................................................................52

i-The Historical evolution of the APSA...............................................................52

ii-Normative transformations...........................................................................54

B-Operationalisation of the APSA...................................................................55

i-The Peace and Security Council......................................................................56

ii-The Continental Early Warning System............................................................57

iii-The African Standby Force..........................................................................59

iv-The Panel of the Wise and corresponding structures at the RECS..............................61

V-The Peace Fund........................................................................................62

PART TWO: THE INTERVENTION OF THE APSA IN THE CONGOLESE ELECTORAL CRISIS.................................................................................64

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 2016 ELECTORAL CRISIS IN THE DRC.............................................................................................65

A-Congo before Kabila: The legacy of a fragmented state.....................................65

B-Congo under Joseph Kabila: Geopolitical interests and power struggle.................67

i-Four plus One Equals Zero: The Transitional Period (2003-2006)..............................67

ii-The third Republic.....................................................................................69

iii-National Elections 2006..............................................................................70

iv-The 2011 elections....................................................................................71

CHAPTER 5: THE AU LEAD FACILITATION.................................................73

A-Run up to facilitation....................................................................................73

i- Local actors in the Congolese electoral crisis.......................................................73

1. The National Episcopal Council.....................................................................73

2. The sitting President: Joseph Kabila................................................................73

3. The late veteran Etienne Tshisekedi................................................................74

4. The people's Favorite Moïse Katumbi..............................................................74

5.The Activists: Lucha...................................................................................75

6-The rest of the opposition.............................................................................75

ii-International actors....................................................................................75

1-Sub-regional powers...................................................................................76

1.1-The Republic of South Africa .....................................................................76

1.2-Uganda................................................................................................77

1.3Rwanda..................................................................................................78

2-The international support group......................................................................79

3-International powers...................................................................................79

iii- Chronology of the run-up to the facilitation......................................................80

B-The AU lead facilitation 26th April to 1st November..........................................81

i-Preparatory phase 26^th April to 30^th August.........................................................82

ii- Negotiations take place 1^st September to 18^th October............................................85

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS OF RESEARCH........................................................87

A-The Impact of Geopolitical interest on the AU lead facilitation.....................................87

i-first secondary hypothesis.............................................................................88

1. Foreign Policy dissonance induced by Geopolitical interests...................................88

2. limited support from the APSA member states...................................................89

2.1Structural limitations................................................................................89

2.2Political limitations.................................................................................89

3. The APSA intervention in Congo is not adapted to reach APSA goals........................90

ii-Second secondary hypothesis.........................................................................90

1. Some APSA states show preference to a party to the conflict...................................90

2.The other parties distrust the process and refuse to participate .................................92

iii-Results of doubly decisive test......................................................................92

B-Discussion of results.................................................................................93

i-Theoretical implications of research..................................................................93

ii- Considerations on the circular leopard state and the future of African mediation............94

1. The problem of anarchy..............................................................................95

2. The problem of the biased nature of regional powers.............................................96

General conclusion......................................................................................98

Bibliography............................................................................................100

Online references.......................................................................................104

Annexes .................................................................................................105

AMANI	African Military Exercise
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Electoral Support Mission in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CADSP CEN-SAD CEWS	Common African Defense and Security Policy Community of Sahel-Saharan States Continental Early Warning System
CMD	Conflict Management Division
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPX	Command Post Exercise
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FOC	Full Operation Capability
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FTX	Field Training Exercise
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PKF	Peace Keeping Force
PLANELM	Planning Element
PQ	Primary Question
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PW	Panel of the Wise
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
SADC	Southern African Development Community

ABSTRACT

The present Master's thesis is an inquiry into the failure of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the 2016 Congolese electoral crisis. The thesis investigates the impact geopolitical interests had on the functioning of the APSA. This topic is important in both practical and theoretical respects. Regarding theory, this topic is important because it is an unprecedented systematic verification of the relevance of the regime theory research agenda in an African context. On the other hand, this thesis is of practical importance because of the danger electoral crises present for peace in Africa. The central research question that guided this inquiry is: how did geopolitical interests limit the support of the APSA member states to the facilitation in the electoral crisis in the DRC? The first secondary research question is: how did geopolitical interests jeopardize the neutrality of the mediation and hence cause distrust between the parties in the conflict in the DRC? The second secondary research question is: how did geopolitical interests contribute to the failure of the African peace and security architecture in the 2016 Congolese electoral crisis? The central hypothesis of the research is Geopolitical interests act as an intervening variable leading primarily to limited support and creating mistrust ultimately leading to the failure of the APSA in the electoral crisis in the DRC. The first secondary hypothesis is: geopolitical interests made APSA member states undermine the action of the APSA by limiting support to the APSA intervention in the conflict. The second secondary hypothesis of the research is: geopolitical interests made the APSA member states support parties to the conflict causing distrust in the facilitation process. Using the single-case verification method known as process tracing, and through documentary research and open ended discussions have proceeded to verify our hypothesis. This research concludes that geopolitical interests perverted the action of the APSA member states in the DRC ultimately causing its failure.

RESUME

Le présent mémoire de maîtrise est une enquête sur l'échec de l'architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) dans la crise électorale congolaise de 2016. La thèse étudie l'impact des intérêts géostratégiques sur le fonctionnement de l'APSA. Ce sujet est important à la fois sur le plan pratique et théorique. En ce qui concerne la théorie, ce sujet est important car il s'agit d'une vérification systématique sans précédent de la pertinence du programme de recherche sur la théorie du régime dans un contexte africain. D'un autre côté, cette thèse est d'une importance pratique en raison du danger que représentent les crises électorales pour la paix en Afrique. La question centrale de recherche qui a guidé cette enquête est la suivante: comment les intérêts géostratégiques ont-ils limité le soutien des États membres de l'APSA à la facilitation de la crise électorale en RDC? La première question de recherche secondaire est la suivante: comment les intérêts géostratégiques ont-ils mis en péril la neutralité de la médiation et provoqué la méfiance entre les parties au conflit en RDC? La deuxième question de recherche secondaire est la suivante: comment les intérêts géostratégiques ont-ils contribué à l'échec de l'architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité dans la crise électorale congolaise de 2016? L'hypothèse centrale de la recherche est que les intérêts géostratégiques agissent comme une variable d'intervention menant principalement à un soutien limité et à créer une méfiance menant finalement à l'échec de l'APSA dans la crise électorale en RDC. La première hypothèse secondaire est la suivante: les intérêts géostratégiques des États membres de l'APSA sapent l'action de l'APSA en limitant le soutien à l'intervention de l'APSA dans le conflit. La deuxième hypothèse secondaire de la recherche est la suivante: les intérêts géostratégiques ont amené les États membres de l'APSA à soutenir les parties au conflit, causant ainsi de la méfiance dans le processus de facilitation. L'utilisation de la méthode de vérification à un seul cas connue sous le nom de traçage des processus, et à travers des recherches documentaires et des discussions ouvertes ont permis de vérifier notre hypothèse. Cette recherche conclut que les intérêts géostratégiques ont perverti l'action des États membres de l'APSA en RDC, causant finalement son échec.

The end of the cold war in 1989 heralded a new world order. This new order was based on the idea that man needed to be liberated from all of forms of domination be they political, economic or social^1(*). The neo-liberal wind that blew across the globe presided over major transformations not only in the configuration of global power relations but equally in the very substratum of social interactions. The importance given to the individual in liberal philosophy had manifold manifestations. Economically it implied that the state would have to limit itself to a regulatory role, letting individuals handle the functions of production and distribution. The economic mainstreaming of globalization needed political and judiciary security for the global mobility of capital and goods, and democracy on the one man one vote basis was the logical political embodiment of the liberal spirit.

Some 25 years after the arrival of liberal western democracy in Africa, it has had a nuanced outcome, though in countries like Botswana, Benin, Ghana and Senegal it has worked relatively well, in many other countries it has failed miserably to keep conflict in check and prevent violent escalation. Despite the fact that the practice of democracy has brought some significant contributions to the attainment of positive peace notably the liberalization of political practice and the reinforcement of civil rights such as freedom of expression, it has equally been at the center of repeated violent conflagrations around the continent causing political analysts such as George Nyongesa^2(*) to echo Jacques Chirac's ^3(*) claim that democracy was unsuitable for Africa. Moreover the particular point in democratic life where conflicts degenerate into violence is the election, particularly the presidential elections. The phenomenon of electoral crisis has become symptomatic to African democratic praxis, the mere evocation of a future election systematically setting up the stage for renewed tensions within the continent. In the realm of security governance, neo-liberalism sprouted a shift from the principle of non-intervention to that of non-indifference based of the neo-liberal stance that human security is more important than state security. This paradigmatic turn is embodied by the increasing importance of responsibility to protect (R2P), which has become the theoretical fundament of humanitarian intervention around the world.

The year 1994 marked a turning point in the history of African international relations in general and in the trajectory of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in particular. On the one hand, the fall of the apartheid regime in Southern Africa and the first multiracial elections that took place in April 1994 was widely celebrated not only as the victory over a heinous and racist regime but equally as the attainment of one of the main aims of the OAU, `to eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa'^4(*).On the other hand, the Rwandan genocide that took place from April to June 1994 was rightly seen as the moment when the OAU's security paradigm became completely obsolete. The Cairo dispositive adopted by the OAU in 1993 was supposed to ensure peace and security on the continent, but its failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide despite repeated signals that it was going to occur, and its subsequent failure to intervene decisively once it had begun, meant that there was a need for profound changes in the continental security mechanisms. It was in 2002 that the African heads of states and government decided to bring the necessary modifications to the OAU by replacing it with the African Union, an organization more centered on the need for development of the African peoples. The state centered approach of security was abandoned in favor of a more human centered approach; state sovereignty is no more an inviolable sacrosanct principle, since by virtue of the articles 4(h) and (j) of the AU's constitutive act the continental organization is allowed tointervene in member states. This shift would come to be known as the change from «non-interference» to «non-indifference». Nevertheless, the AU's constitutive act did not provide the institutional framework which would embody this paradigmatic shift. This shortcoming was quickly fixed by the protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a standing decision making organ of the AU, the protocol provides that it is to be supported by the AU commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and a special fund that would come to be known as the African Peace Fund. The protocol on the establishment of the PSC equally provides that in the sub regional economic communities of the continent, analogous bodies are set up; these organs are considered as the building blocks of the APSA and an integral part of the system. Since the beginning of the operationalization of the APSA in 2002, it has had to deal with a diverse number of threats on the continent.

The APSA has not had much success in weathering down conflict on the continent despite the fact that it has a comprehensive architecture explicitly in charge of dealing with conflict situations on the continent. The objective of this work is to investigate this failure based on the DRC electoral crisis.

International Relations theory since the mid 1970s and the introduction of the pluralist/complex interdependence model of analysis by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye^5(*), has steadily advanced in building a body of knowledge on international cooperation in general and regime theory in particular without devoting much attention to the validity of these theories in the African context. All this despite the fact that the insights from these theories are used indifferently to account for mutations within the African continent and the west. Regime theory has been poised to be the «most significant development in the study of international relations since Kenneth waltz's structural realism»^6(*), nevertheless the most important case studies to illustrate and verify the validity of regime theory come from the western world^7(*). The peculiarities of cooperation in the global south, in which cooperation is often the expression of global geopolitical interests instead of local national interest as is postulated in classical realism, might seriously undermine the validity of regime theory and many other western centered theorizations. From a theoretical perspective it is therefore extremely pressing to study the topic of the present research.

From a practical stance, the reoccurrence of unresolved political conflicts on the continent coupled with the virulence and high death toll of these conflicts, make the present study important. The rapidly changing phenomenon of electoral crisis and the conditions for the success of third party mediation have not yet been fully explored, despite the fact that lessons from the recent electoral history seem to indicate that this is one of the most pressing security problems faced by Africans. Conducting research on the means we have to respond to electoral crises is therefore of top importance.

The research has a dual heuristic and theory testing purpose. The Congolese case study, will allow us to introduce a new explanatory variable in the understanding we have of the determinants of the APSA's success/failure in situations of crisis management. «Geopolitical interests» is introduced as a variable to complement the approaches favored by analysts who seem insufficient in the light of the persistence of crises on the continent despite repeated AU interventions guided by these prevailing theoretical orientations. The present research equally aims at fulfilling a theory testing role, as we shall be able to verify the validity of regime theory (neoliberal institutionalism and specifically regime formation as theorized by Stephan D. Krasner^8(*) ) , particularly its explanatory power when it comes to regime formation in small to medium size powers.

Thematic: The thematic limitation of the study is the electoral crisis which is a subcategory of the political crisis. Electoral crises are deemed to have arisen when there is a

«major dissension between actors of the electoral process over the conditions, carrying out or outcome of the elections»^9(*)

Electoral crises are a recurrent phenomenon on the African continent^10(*) since the democratization process started in the 90s. The recurrence of electoral crises and the failure of democracy as a conflict prevention mechanism in many African countries is one of the most pressing intellectual puzzles of our time. Electoral crises therefore represent an important theoretical concern among African political scientists. As a thematic limitation, it constrains our research to the analysis of the APSA interventions in crises generated by electoral concerns.

Geographic: The demands of the structured-focused-comparison^11(*) methodology that has been opted for in the present study are such that the geographic and temporal delimitation of the study must obey certain strict rules. First of all, the global series of events which the case study is an instance of, must be on the one hand well indentified, to avoid excessive generalization of the results of the research and on the other hand the major defining features of the phenomenon must be homogenous within the global series of events, for the «generalizations to retain their explanatory power»^12(*). These demands have led us to define the «great lakes» region as the geographical limitation under which we consider our inferences to be valid. This is because the sub regional organizations which constitute the building blocks of the APSA have different internal dynamics and «hegemonic stability»^13(*) which prompt action from a regime theory perspective.

Structured-focused-comparison equally requires a rigorous temporal delimitation of the case study to avoid the spillover of data from one sequence of events to another, as this might blur the intra-case process tracking procedure. The temporal delimitation of the study is therefore the 26 th April 2016 when the first signs of visible engagement by the AU were demonstrated and the 1^st November 2016 when the AU managed to sign a partial agreement between some of the protagonists to the conflict

There are relatively few books dealing with the African Peace and Security Architecture. The literature in the field is very heteroclite and the topic is often tackled from different perspectives. The majority of the work published consists of scientific articles and research papers. This state of things has led to a high degree of segmentation within the field between three broad approaches of the APSA. The first approach of the APSA is from a legal perspective.This approach dwells upon the legal implications of the conventions and treaties behind APSA and analyses the legal framework of the APSA interventions on the continent. The second approach focuses on the APSA primarily as a group of organized institutions and applies sociological methods sprouting from organization studies to understand the rationale of the APSA and to shed light on the administrative procedures behind its functioning. Finally a third group of scholars approaches the APSA as an emerging security regime comparable to NATO or the Warsaw pact. This last category uses International Relations methodology to understand the implications this new security regime has on world security and infer the possible changes it will have on peace and security within the continent.

Legal specialists focus on the founding texts of the APSA such as the protocol for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council or the memorandum of understanding between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. They analyse these texts in order to determine their legal scope this strand of literature, there is an important emphasis on the effects of article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union whose line (h) provides the legal grounds for an intervention within other African states.

The first publication from the legal perspective is entitled «From Non-interference towards Non-indifference. An on-going paradigm shift within the African Union?»^14(*).It was written by Martin Welz and published in the book APSA the emerging Security Regime. This article is an attempt to decipher the underlying implications of article 4 (h) of the African Union's constitutive act. Welz claims that there is an undeniable progression in the union's attitude towards interventionism and that this shift is guided by the need to align with the demands of the responsibility to protect. In his own words,

«The normative evolution and gradual adoption by the African Union of the doctrine of non-indifference is a local expression of the globally emerging principle of the responsibility to protect»^15(*) .

Basing himself on an extensive literature review focused on the shift from the non-interference stance of the Organisation of African Unity to the more hands-on approach of the African Union, Martin Welz postulates that there is a real change in policy regarding foreign interventions within national affairs. The author supplements his analysis with empirical case studies that support the idea that the shift from non-interference to non-indifference is effective. The article offers a variety of insightful analyses on the new nature of the continental security mechanisms. The strength of the new system as identified by Welz is the voluntarism that characterises the AU, and the weakness on the other side is structural. The AU security mechanism according to Welz is excessively dependent on the sub-regional economic communities.

There are other legal specialists who instead dwell on the constitutional repercussions of the APSA's founding texts. This Is the case of Roland Adjovi^16(*) who explores how international constitutional norms agreed at the continental level have had an impact on the realization of civil peace within the continent's nations. Adjovi stresses that the norms agreed upon and adopted within the African Union, which are to be enforced by the APSA have a positive incidence on peace and development in Africa. Article 4 line p of the constitutive act of the African Union which condemns unconstitutional changes of government the declarations Harare, Alger and Lome are stated as some of the international constitutional norms that help to ensure peace.

Nadia Tabiou^17(*) focuses on the legitimacy of African Union interventions. After a thorough review of the powers conferred to the AU in the domain of peacekeeping and peace enforcement by its constitutive act, Tabiou raises the question of its legitimacy to send peacekeeping missions on the continent. She concludes that of all the international organizations, the AU is the most legitimate when it comes to maintaining peace in Africa, she further argues that the AU is less rigged by power politics and the need to instrumentalise African conflicts than its international peers. The fact that the very survival of the AU depends on peace within African countries is advanced as another argument legitimizing AU peacekeeping missions. Furthermore what the author regards as APSA's «African identity»^18(*) and cultural proximity with the countries within its zone of intervention is equally seen as an element legitimizing the APSA's peacekeeping operations.

Asides from these articles focusing on the pre-existing legal framework of the APSA, there are also some publications that call for new legislation to reinforce the institutionalization of peace keeping initiatives within the continent. It is in this perspective that Charles Zorgbibe^19(*)calls for a greater degree of institutionalization of preventive diplomacy initiatives by setting up an African charter for preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. Zorgbibe points towards what he sees as a legal gap in the actual legislation on preventive diplomacy, and pin pointing empirical case studies of more or less successful diplomatic interventions in crisis situations, he draws up the main issues the charter should address.

There is a strand of the literature dealing with the APSA that treats it primarily as an organization, this strand considers that by virtue of it being an organization it is dominated by what Max Weber calls «instrumental rationality» or «legal-rational» domination. These researchers generally have a common conceptual framework for their analysis, either American Organization studies as developed by March and Simons or French developed by Crosier and Friedberg. They use the conceptual tools provided by organization studies to analyze decision making, mobility and change dynamics within the APSA. A lot of the work using this methodology relies heavily on case studies.

Hassatou Balde^20(*) and Dominique Bangoura^21(*) have published articles which tackle two case studies wherein the AU has intervened to enforce peace and security. Hassatou Balde analyses the preventivediplomacy of the AU within the 2002 Malgache crisis.This analysis of the Malgache crisis by Hassatou Balde has revealed quite a few problems in the organization of the APSA. According to Balde the absence of a standard operating procedure has set up the stage for «amateurism»^22(*)and led to an incoherent response to the crisis. Whilst the head of the AU commission condemned Marc Ravalomanana's unconstitutional accession to power and refused to recognize him as president of Madagascar, many of the member states individually did. This undermined the organization's authority and jeopardized its peacemaking efforts. The failure to have a common stance in the face of a security threat is pinpointed as possibly one of the major coordination failures within the AU peace architecture. Dominique Bangoura's work on the African Union's Mobilization in the Ivorian rebellion of September 2002 on the other hand, offers a more positive view of the APSA bureaucracies' decision making capacities. The sound application of the principle of subsidiarity has allowed for the crisis to be handled by the more experienced^23(*) ECOWAS, ECOWAS who was equally presented as more akin to the problems of the region. Nevertheless the lack of coordination between the ECOWAS and Burkina Faso delayed the resolving of the conflict. The existence of a well-equipped and well organized regional force, the ECOMOG on the other hand facilitated the resolution of the crisis.

Though these analyses offer good insights as to the interior functioning of the APSA, they are too partial to draw any serious conclusions, the idiosyncrasies of each conflict situation and the development discrepancies between the different Regional Economic communities are not accounted for. Nevertheless, the organization studies strand of research on the APSA did not content itself with case studies, it equally systematically reviewed the functioning of the individual components of the APSA and isolated the weaknesses and strengths of the APSA bureaucracy.

Kathryn Sturman and Aissatou Hayatou^24(*) provide a review of the operations of the PSC since the election of its first members in March 2004 and its constitution on May 25^th 2004. The authors criticize membership dynamics, stressing that the eminent figures supposedly known for their work in the field of peace and Security, which are then elected to be members of the PSC sometimes prove to be singularly incompetent in the field. Sturman and Hayatou, highlight that the PSC is a young institution and it is still in the early stages of its development and that it needs to be given time to progress. Nevertheless they claim that the PSC has assumed an important position within the AU's peace architecture. Sturman and Hayatou state that the PSC has faced two major issues asides from the profile of its members. First of all, the PSC secretariat which is in charge of handling its relationships with other components of the AU peace and security architecture lacks personnel, this creates a communication hiatus within the APSA; Secondly the PSC often unduly refrains from intervening in given conflict situations, preferring that the permanent representatives of nation states to the AU or the ministers of external relations of AU member states take the political responsibility of issuing the AU's official stance in a conflict, this slows down the APSA and hampers its ability to respond to security threats.

Tim Murithi and Charles Mwaura^25(*) analyze the Panel of the Wise and its potential role as an agent in the AU's preventive diplomacy policies, but equally in the implementation of peace agreements and conflict resolution including good offices and dialogue facilitation, mediation and support to negotiations. The authors highlight that the role of the PSC has only recently been explicated by its modalities document, this document indicates that the Panel of the Wise can play a variety of roles asides advising the PSC and the AU chairperson. The Panel can: facilitate the establishment of channels of communication between the PSC/ Chairperson and parties engaged in a dispute, carry out fact finding missions when the panel deems that there may be a potential threat to peace and stability on the continent, encourage negotiations and dialogue, initiate reconciliation processes and help build confidence between conflicting parties. The author indicates that due to the extremely delicate nature of third-party action in a conflict situation, there is a dire need for specialized technical know-how within the Panel of the Wise.

The first time it was hinted that the APSA could be considered a security regime was perhaps when Ana Peyro Llopis^26(*) suggested that there is underlying structure to the APSA that in the long run will generate a `model' outcome to conflict situations on the continent, as such effectively producing the conditions for a security regime to exist. The possible ramifications of this new security regime were discussed by Benedikt Franke^27(*).She reflects on the implications the full implementation of the APSA's ideals will have on the Regional Economic Communities with which the AU concluded a memorandum of understanding^28(*). Franke indicates that APSA's nature as a continental architecture involves and indeed depends on the AU commission but equally on the regional economic communities which are to play an important role in its implementation. The full realization of the APSA, she stresses, will imply an effective mutation of the Regional Economic Communities into hybrid peace and development structures on the ECOWAS model.

The most advanced work on the APSA as a security regime was undoubtedly produced by Ulf Engel and Joao Gomes Porto^29(*). They elaborate on the conditions for the APSA to evolve as a security regime. The authors explore the internal conditions on the one hand, including the effective cooperation between the RECs and the APSA's continental coordination units based at the AU and on the other hand the ties the APSA has with the United Nations Organization, the authors indicate that there is a need to clarify the role of the AU organs in the global security system. Building upon the conceptual perspectives raised throughout the book, the authors conclude that at worst the APSA will become an organization where all the professions of good faith of African leaders can be buried and at best a well structures security regime.

What is gathered from the present literature review is that there is still inadequate proof of the validity of regime theory in Africa. The available literature has often been atheoretical or descriptive/configurative, doing a very good job at explaining what happens within the APSA but offering little answers as to why this happens. The only avenue for theory development based on the practices within the APSA was opened by Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto when they suggested that the APSA could be turning into a security regime, subsequently little to no research has been done to verify this claim. It is equally necessary to add additional explanatory variables to what appears as an excessively parsimonious theorization on the APSA. Though there is little work on the APSA, the work that has been done is too general in natrure to offer any concrete policy-making opportunities for decision makers, they do not identify sub category of interactions where specific determinants lead to specific outcomes, that is it objective of the present work.

In order to guide data collection within this study, we have coined the following central research question.

· How did geopolitical interests contribute to the failure of the African peace and security architecture in the 2016 Congolese electoral crisis?

We have further subdivided our central research question into two secondary research questions to facilitate data collection.

· How did geopolitical interests limit the support of the APSA member states to the facilitation in the electoral crisis in the DRC?

· How did geopolitical interests jeopardize the neutrality of the mediation and hence cause distrust between the parties in the conflict in the DRC?

Based on an extensive survey of the available research on the topic of our study, we have provided the following anticipated answers to our central and secondary research questions respectively:

Geopolitical interests act as an intervening variable leading primarily to limited support and creating mistrust ultimately leading to the failure of the APSA in the electoral crisis in the DRC.

Geopolitical interests made APSA member states undermine the action of the APSA by limiting support to the APSA intervention in the conflict.

Geopolitical interests made the APSA member states support parties to the conflict causing distrust in the facilitation process.

In order to reach our research objectives and to verify our hypothesis, we have come up with a research design The global method chosen is the case study method, and because we have chosen a single case, we have opted for within case verification techniques which are congruence testing and process tracking. Sources of data chosen are both primary and secondary, primary data through open ended interviews and questionnaires whilst secondary data will come from speeches, reports and policy papers. Treatment of information will be assured by triangulation of sources and longitudinal within case verification.

Case studies together with formal, statistical and game theoretic methods are the 4 main methods used in the political sciences and international relations to carry out research. The comparative advantages of case studies are that case studies offer an in depth account of the unfolding of a particular phenomenon. Case research is defined as «a method of intensively studying a phenomenon over time within its natural setting in one or few sites»^30(*). What justifies our choice of case study methods is its ability to offer rich and contextualized interpretations of particular phenomena. This strength of case studies is particularly useful in the present study because it provides for a profound explanation of a phenomenon with diverse and complex intervening variables as is the case now.

Method chosen

Verification of causal mechanisms

Collection of data

Treatment of data

v Case study

v Process tracking

v Doubly decisive test

v Interviews

v Questionnaires

v Speeches

v Reports

v Policy papers

v Triangulation of sources

v Longitudinal within case verification

The specific research method opted for in this study is process tracing. Process tracing is a longitudinal within-case verification method that permits a researcher to identify and verify causal chains, mechanisms and intervening variables between the independent and dependent variables of his study. As such, process tracing permits us to unequivocally determine the nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. This method is particularly well adapted for single-case study designs as it is the case here, because it helps untangles intricate causal patterns. The process tracing method will therefore be singularly instrumental in isolating the causal power of geopolitical interests in the context of our present study where equifinality and mutual causality distort causal chains.

· The prediction of the nature of the relationship between our variables, through an in-depth lecture of the relevant theoretical work. Here it is essential to go from general theoretical considerations to specific correlations that can be investigated.

· The thorough description of the sequence of events composing the phenomenon studied. In this part of the study, data collection is orientated by the theoretical predictions. It is important to dress static description of the unfolding of events in order to avoid confirmation bias and to be able to validate or invalidate predicted correlations.

· The final step in process tracing is crucial. It consists of the confrontation of the theoretical predictions with the data collected. This is done using one of the diagnostic tests process tracing consists of^31(*).

The theoretical framework of the study provides the theoretical guidelines for the analysis of the data collected. Theory does this by suggesting correlations between variables. As such the framework should give us a broad view of the scientific discourse on the topic of our study, present the main arguments developed by leading authors in the field and state the position adopted vis-à-vis these debates and why . Furthermore as noted by George and Bennett^32(*) and later independently reinforced by Verba, King and Keohane^33(*) on one hand and Burchill and Linklater^34(*) on the other hand, theories of international politics vary in two major ways: in their scope and in their function. Indeed, there are at least three types of theories of international politics if we take scope as our criterion for classification; we have large covering theories (ex. realism and idealism/liberalism etc), medium range theories (ex. Feminism and green politics etc) and low range theories (ex. Contractualism, new regionalism theory etc). Whilst all these levels of theory are useful to internationalists, they do not all provide testable hypothesis that can be subjected to scientific inquiry, the first two categories provide operational stances that are later specified by low range theories and framed into specific hypothesis that can be tested. For example it is one thing for realists to claim anarchy is a defining feature of the international scene or that states are the major actors on this same scene but it is a whole different issue to state how this will dictate the behavior of actors in a situation of deterrence, that task is the domain of low range theories. According to George and Bennett^35(*) this distinction in the range of theories means that in designing case study research we need to work with one covering theory and one or two low range theories that specify how these larger theories translate into detailed interpretations of international phenomena. To meet this demand we have opted to use 2 theories, structural realism specifically defensive structural realism as our covering theory and regime theory as the low range theory. Regarding the functions of theories of international politics Burchill and Linklater^36(*) support Brown's^37(*) claim that theories of international relations involve four dimensions: explanatory, interpretive, normative and prescriptive dimensions these dimensions are more or less intertwined in the core claims of the various theories used in our study, nevertheless following our research objectives (heuristic and theory testing) more emphasis shall be placed on the explanatory and interpretive dimensions of these theories. The normative and prescriptive dimensions are mainly outside of the scope of this study. After this presentation of the principles guiding the construction of our theoretical framework we shall proceed to present the various theories we have chosen to frame our analysis.

Over the years since Kenneth Waltz pioneered the structural realist approach to international politics, a dense web of arguments focusing on the implications a structural realist perception of global politics has on the way international phenomena should be interpreted has arisen. Gradually the participants in these debates have formed two groups, the defensive realists on one side and the offensive realists on the other. The main claims underlying defensive realism are the following^38(*):

· This is because of intervening variables between the security dilemma and action, in the form of military technology, geography and access to raw materials

· These intervening variables have a greater effect than the overall balance of power in the system because they create different contexts that influence the decisions states make

In addition to these four points raised by Taliaferro we shall complete the structural realist discourse with points raised by more recent debates between defensive structural realists and offensive structural realists, notably between John J. Mearsheimer^39(*) (the leading offensive structural realist in international relations theory) and defensive structural realists such as Robert Jervis^40(*) and Kenneth Waltz himself. These said points are the following:

· Perceptions of capabilities and intentions (belief systems, images of adversaries) among decision makers are important since they are equally mediating variables between the security dilemma and action. In fact these perceptions deeply modify the security dilemma itself.

· Domestic politics help shape foreign policies. Emphasis on leaders and their decisions as constrained by domestic structures are of capital importance to understand the evolution of the international stance of a given state. (but not institutions, norms, interest groups as is the case with liberal internationalists, constructivists and democratic peace theorists)

These 6 points put together constitute a solid account of the main arguments developed by defensive structural realism.

There has been a lot of controversy in the scientific community over the exact status of defensive structural realism. It has been claimed that defensive realism is too weakly grounded on core realist hypotheses to even qualify as a realist theory^41(*).Defensive structural realism has equally been judged too «amenable to a sophisticated understanding of psychology and politics in general»^42(*) and too close to cognitivist and liberal interpretations of international relations to constitute a part of the realist paradigm of international politics. I agree with most of these criticisms voiced against defensive structural realism but I argue that it is precisely these features of structural realism perceived as imperfections by the fundamentalist realist theories that make it an appropriate covering theory in our study.

According to Hans J Morgenthau, ^43(*)any theory of international politics should be judged upon two characteristics: first of all their internal coherence, a theory of international politics should not predict two distinct outcomes in one given situation; second of all a theory of international politics should be judged on its ability to account for reality. It is specifically an evaluation of defensive structural realism's ability to account for the reality of international politics that makes it an appropriate covering theory for our present study. Defensive structural realism seems to espouse the contours of international relations in Africa particularly well. Indeed the core theoretical insight of defensive structural realists is that the undermining nature of the condition of anarchy international politics is plunged in creates situations in which measures meant to create security for any given state (including aggression) increase the insecurity of others. This in turn leads to a more dangerous situation which encourages other states to balance against one another and to contemplate first strikes. Therefore to gain security in many instances, states are best served by signaling restraint rather than aggression. Stacking up this account of international relations against the empirical facts of African politics reveals that defensive realism is indeed an appropriate covering theory. African states have relatively few interstate wars though the majority of the continent is filled with «areas of limited statehood»^44(*) this means that African states generally prefer defensive rather than offensive behavior.

Regime theory in general and security regimes in particular have long been a topic of intellectual inquiry and debate in the fields of International Relations and security studies alike, especially since Robert Keohane^45(*) rekindled the idealist/realist antagonism on cooperation in anarchical systems by claiming that regimes make cooperation possible despite anarchy^46(*).A lot of these discussions centered around the definition of regimes itself, indeed in the early years of the debate on regime theory, deep dissentions existed among the leading scholars in the field on which international institutions qualify as a regime and on what makes it a valid analytical category. This lack of consensus made regime theorists look incoherent and left room for fierce critics such as Susan Strange^47(*) to demine the importance of the regime theory research agenda based on this perceived mayhem. The conventional definition of a regime finally emerged when Stephan D. Krasner published a seminal article in the domain.According to Krasner regimes are «a set of formal and informal norms, principles, values and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue area of international relations»^48(*).Subsequent Discussions on security regimes have focused on a wide array of issues including the prospects of peace in post-soviet territories and the possibility of establishing a new international security regime similar to the cold-war Warsaw pact, some analysts even discussed the `just war' tradition in western international relations history and the possibility of it being conceived as a security regime^49(*). An `international nuclear security regime'^50(*) has been evoked when the Organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons (OPCW) was created. Of late, specialists have begun to question whether the emerging APSA could be considered as a new security regime. Based on a dual theoretical heritage from the Grotian^51(*) and neo-Gramscian^52(*) perspective these theorists consider that looking at the APSA as an emerging security regime similar to NATO would offer crucial insights into contemporary African international relations.

Regime theory is strongly fragmented, based on the degree of institutionalism^53(*) and the explanatory variables favored we have three general tendencies. The first group of scholars favor power based explanations, these scholars are `weak institutionalists' as they consider that structure is more important than agency to comprehend international phenomena. The second group of scholars prefers interest based explanations and is sometimes also referred to as neo-liberal institutionalism, these scholars are moderate institutionalists. Finally the third group of scholars favor knowledge based accounts of international relations and are strong institutionalists, this group of scholars is composed of cognitivists and postmodernists. The theories we have singled out as most useful in our present case study research are the last two approaches: the interest based and cognitivist approaches to international regimes.

The neoliberal approach to international regimes has been pioneered by Robert Keohane, and other American internationalists such as Arthur Stein, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. This approach is alternatively referred to as contractualist or functionalist and has been the leading approach in regime theory. Its lead has been such that it has structured debates around its propositions forcing competing theorists to either refute or acknowledge its hypothesis. The strength of this theoretical stance rests on its use of established realist positions on world politics to favor its liberal agenda. The main arguments of neoliberal institutionalism as far as they can be resumed in point form are^54(*):

· International anarchy has important repercussions on their (state's) interactions and in particular their ability to cooperate;

· Distributions of power and wealth (material conditions) exert a strong influence on state behavior;

· States behave as rational egoists, acting only to further their own interest.

From these realist premises and based on an analysis of individual state behavior best represented by the prisoner's dilemma^55(*)Keohane draws liberal intuitionalist conclusions:

· Regimes help asses others' reputation by providing standards of behavior by which other's action can be measured;

· Regimes reduce mutual uncertainty -which is perceived by Keohane as the major impediment to international cooperation- and thus;

Analytically the various approaches to international regimes disagree about three fundamental things, regime creation, maintenance and regime change.

Keohane^56(*) opts for a functional explanation of regime emergence; he claims that international regimes come to existence because they are needed by the member states to fulfill certain foreign policy goals. Keohane nevertheless specifies that such a functionalist explanation cannot be taken in a Darwinian-evolutionary sense where the post hoc justification of the existence of given phenomena is explained by some sort of incompressible necessity fueled by the fight for survival. In fact he expressly refutes such an explanation claiming it is unfit for social science inquiry^57(*). From a neoliberal perspective understanding the functions a regime plays is at the same time understanding why it was created. Functionalists produce two distinct but interrelated arguments on the maintenance and creation of international regimes. They postulate as seen above that regimes reduce the cost of interaction on particular issues in the international scene, known in neoliberal terminology as «transaction costs»^58(*) or simply the costs associated to the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements. As such regimes themselves are not cost free since like the very agreements regimes are supposed to facilitate, involve negotiation, monitoring and enforcement. From a functional perspective this implies that states will weigh the cost of regime creation against the facilities it offers. For a regime to emerge in a given issue area of international regime, there must be a large amount of potential agreements that can be reached on that topic. Conversely the decision to maintain or terminate a given regime is equally motivated by a cost/benefit calculation. To have a full account of the neoliberal perspective on regime creation and maintenance it is necessary to mention the rational-choice perspective adopted by this paradigm.

Neoliberal institutionalists construe states as «rational egoists» that are preoccupied with maximizing their own benefit, this ontology of the state supposes that states care not about the fate of their peers and that therefore it is improbable that a pareto-efficient distribution of gains is produced.

In the neo-liberal account of international regimes, there are two variables that determine regime change: regime effectiveness and regime robustness^59(*). Regimes can be effective in two different ways. First of all regimes are deemed to be effective when they succeed in enforcing certain predetermined patterns of behavior within the community of their member states in other words a regime whose member states obey its rules is effective. The Conference of parties on the RIO climate agreement (COP21) if perceived as a regime would be deemed efficient if on the one side the parties to the agreement respected the engagements they made regarding the reduction of their green house gas emissions and if on the other side the developed countries effectively transferred funds towards the underdeveloped countries as provided for by the agreement. The second salient way in which in which regimes can be deemed effective is if the augment the capacity of its member states to cooperate in a particular issue area, as such a regime like the Organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons can be deemed efficient if there are a large number of agreements signed between member states. The word `large' referring here to a number that would justify the high transaction costs concerned in regime formation and regime maintenance. The second variable that determines regime change is the robustness or resilience of the regime. An international regime may be considered as robust if its existence is not threatened by conjuncture changes such as the arrival of a new president in one of the regimes hegemonic powers or changes in elements that constitute the agency of the structure like the replacement of the executives in charge of carrying out regime monitoring. The COP21 to use the same example is actually being tested for robustness, will the arrival of a new American president (Donald J. Trump) signal the death of the regime or will the regime prove to be more resilient than that. The two variables we have just seen i.e. effectiveness and robustness are seen as the ultimate indicators signaling or leading to regime change, neoliberal-institutionalism considers that an effective regime will have lower chances of dying away and of course the more robust a regime is the less likely it is to be submitted to a change in terms.

Neoliberal institutionalism as purported by Keohane is particularly instrumental for the analysis of the African Peace and Security Architecture because it offers a comprehensive discourse on the effects international regimes have on state behavior. The room given for the analysis of the role of non-state actors in liberal thought is especially useful in the African context in general and Congolese context in particular due to the large variety of non-state actors and the determinant role they play in the electoral crisis at hand. Furthermore In the book after hegemony^60(*) neoliberal institutionalists offer a solution to the post hoc ergo propter hoc conundrum^61(*) which strikes me as one of the most important problems in the analysis of contemporary African relations. According to Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger^62(*) neoliberal institutionalism as a rationalist theory assumes that actor's preferences over policy are relatively stable over time they suggest that:

«This assumption (actor's preferences are stable over time) is best understood as an epistemologically motivated rule of theory construction, the purpose of which is to discourage all too easy and therefore empty (pseudo-) explanations of social behavior»^63(*)

Indeed a close look at the literature produced by African scholars in the domain of security studies reveals a great deal of post hoc ergo propter fallacies. Analysts readily modify the preferences of actors following the situation at hand. Geopolitical interpretations of conflicts on the continent subsequently often look like an inventory of the interests various parties to a given conflict have. Neo-liberal institutionalism deals with this issue by constructing it's analysis of interest on the basis of rational-anticipation in Keohane's own words:

«The functional argument as applied to our subject-matter must rest on the premise of rational anticipation. Unless actors can be assumed to anticipate the effects of their behavior, effects cannot possibly explain causes, and understanding the functions of international regimes will not help to explain their occurrence»^64(*).

The cognitivist research agenda in regime theory is constructed upon a rethinking of the rational basis for analysis in international relations. Cognitivists consider that the realist/idealist debate is merely a fratricidal rationalist feud based on the skewed idea that state's identities and interest are given^65(*). The distinction made by Andrew Linklater and Scott Burchill^66(*) between constitutive and explanatory theories in international relations is particularly useful to understand the cognitivist/rationalist divide, as the main distinction between cognitivists and other scholars in the study of international relations is one of ontology^67(*) . Indeed, cognitivists consider that the process whereby actors in the international scene construct their perception of international problems is ipso facto anterior to their action on the international scene and that therefore any theory of international relations that attempts to explain an actor's behavior without constructing a comprehensive discourse on this cognitive process is incomplete. Such theories need to be supplemented or even replaced by a more holistic vision which comprises a discourse on the process of rationalization that takes place before actors engage in the international scene. Major cognitivist scholars include Nicholas Onuf, Alfred Schutz and Paul Haas the cognitivist approach to international regimes can be summed up in the following points:

· Between international structures and human volition lies interpretation^68(*)

· Because of complex interdependence and the increasing technical nature of international politics, decision makers experience enduring difficulties about their interests and how to realize them

· Depositaries of knowledge (such as experts and political strategists) are in an important position to influence international politics^69(*)

· An intersubjectively shared understanding of given problems is a necessary precondition for international regimes to emerge.

These summary points give a general idea of the intellectual inclination of cognitivist analysts. The mediating role played by interpretation or knowledge structures in international politics is heavily stressed and its causal strength is considered as central . The cognitivist approach as reflected in the above point builds on the complex interdependence/ pluralist rebuff of the realist doctrine proposed by Keohane and Nye^70(*), it is therefore taken for granted that «agenda setting»^71(*) is an important feature of international politics and that power relations are deconstructed/reconstructed according to the given issue area at hand. Whilst a given state may be seen to exert influence in the domain of say collective security it may me be the subject of another state's influence in the climate change darea or the cultural domain, with relative «spillover effects» of hegemony accounted for by knowledge discrepancies.

2-Utility of the cognitivist approach in the present research

In his Magnus opus «The state in Africa»^72(*) Jean Francois Bayard constructs a compelling argument on the unconventional relationship between state power and infra-national identities such as ethnic groups. Bayard uncovers a series of incongruous interactions between various power structures within the state that leads to what is perceived as an unconventional behavior of states in Africa. In the realm of security studies Bayard's assertions on the dismal performance of African states is reinforced by analysts such as Alain Fogue^73(*) who claim that the unusual conduct of African states has heavy implications on their behavior as actors in the international scene. Furthermore ambitious research projects are being carried out inside the academia notably at the University of Leipzig^74(*) and at Stanford universities' comparative politics centre to understand the nature of African states. In the absence of such a clear theory on African states it would be hazardous to interpret African international relations without paying special attention to the knowledge structures that inform the behavior of actors. As such the cognitivist approach to international regimes will permit us to guide against this pitfall.

This section of the work defines the central concepts of the study, in order to be clear about their meaning and to oblige to the necessity for rigor in scientific research. The most important concepts include: geopolitics, interest, failure, international regime, elections and crisis.

There are at least four types of variables: independent, dependent, control and confounding variables. Nevertheless the research design of our present study is built around independent (i) and dependent (ii) variables.

The independent variable in a research is the variable whose modification is anticipated to have a result of the other (dependant) variable. It is in terms of changes in the independent variables that the hypotheses are formulated. In the present study the independent variable is «geopolitical interests». The use of a variable made of two terms imposes to the researcher the imperative of defining each term separately and constructing a conjunction of the two terms before adopting a definitive operational definition. The operational definition of the variables can them be submitted to scientific testing to verify if the correlations anticipated in the hypothesis are valid or not. As such we have separated our independent variable «geopolitical interests» into its two intervening terms «geopolitics» and «interests».

An etymological decortication of the term «geopolitics» reveals its dual heritage from the realms of geography and politics. Indeed according to George Steinmetz^75(*):«The word geopolitics points to the interference between two distinct ontological realms and scientific disciplines, geography and politics». The fact that geopolitics is delimitated by the overlap between geography and politics is widely acknowledged among scholars. What constitutes the bone of contention is the nature of the relationship between these two realms based on this criterion for distinction we have two broad tendencies as to the definition of geopolitics. We shall review these tendencies and based on a synthesis of the most useful ideas proposed by each group, isolate an operational definition^76(*) of geopolitics in the context of our study.

Early western ,African and oriental philosophers including but not limited to Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Patanjali, Gaudapata, Imhotep and the Egyptian priests of Ra (in their «book of the dead») pondered upon the relationship between geographical and political factors in a given environment. At this very early period there was already a striking awareness of the influence geography had on the political organization of various societies. The Egyptian book of the dead for instance claims that: «the (political) plight of the various people of the globe flows from the shape of the ground»^77(*).At this time, tough there was a strong intuitive feeling that geography and politics were correlated, no clear definition of geopolitics had emerged. Dodds and Atkinson claim that:

«Geopolitical thought emerged at the close of the nineteenth century as geographers and other thinkers sought to analyze, explain and understand the transformations and finite spaces of the fin de siècle world»^78(*)

What appears from this quote and from an analysis of early works in the field of geopolitics is that the founding decades of geopolitical debates were characterized by a pronounced emphasis on geographical modes of explanation. This lead to a series of definitions of geopolitics which laid an excessive emphasis on geography.Some of these definitions are:

«Geopolitics is a doctrine of the state as a geographic organism or a spatial phenomenon»^79(*) Rudolf Kjellen^80(*)

«Geopolitics is the new science of the state, a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography especially political geography»^81(*) Karl Haushofer

«Geopolitics is the study of the natural environment as the physical basis for history»^82(*) Ellen Semple

What these three definitions of geopolitics have in common is as, previously indicated an excessive emphasis on the geographical determination of political structures, there is no consideration of the possible interplay of these factors. The second wave of geopolitical thinkers from the end of the cold war onwards generally produced more parsimonious definitions of geopolitics, attempting to include not only the interplay of geography and politics but a host of other features as well. This transformation of the concept of geopolitics was referred to by Peter Taylor as the «revival of geopolitics»^83(*) and according to him this revival was characterized by three things:

· Geopolitics became a popular term for describing global rivalries in world politics

· Academically we have witnessed the appearance of a new «critical geopolitics»^84(*) which Taylor refers to as a «geographer's geopolitics»^85(*).This new form of geopolitics consists in critical historiographical studies of past geopolitics.

· The third form he refers to is associated to neo-conservative, pro-military lobbies which have added geopolitics to their arguments on the cold war. Such studies are perceived by Taylor to talk of geography as «the permanent factor»^86(*) that all strategic thinking must revolve around.

Lets recapitulate, we have two strands of definitions of geopolitics, one that stresses geopolitics is the result of the impact geographical factors have on the political structures within a country, and another that uses geopolitics mainly as a term to designate global rivalries for power. The operational definition adopted for in the context of our study in a synthesis of these two conceptions of geopolitics proposed by Yves Lacoste:

«Le terme de géopolitique désigne tout ce qui concerne les rivalités de pouvoir ou d'influence sur des territoires et les populations qui y vivent»^87(*)

«Les rivalités de pouvoir et d'influence au quels renvoi la géopolitique ne concernent pas uniquement les états mais également les mouvements politiques ou des groupes armées plus ou moins clandestin, rivalités pour le contrôle ou la domination des territoires de grande ou de petite taille»^88(*).

The notion of interest in international relations has been one of the most contentious concepts, it has generated virulent debates^89(*). The crux of these debates was perhaps the ontological issue of who the concept of interests applies to, to this regards we have two branches .The first branch is of mainly realist tradition and consists of distinguished scholars such as Raymond Aaron^90(*) and Herbert Butterfield^91(*) they consider that the only type of interest that needs to be studied in international relations is «national interest». Whilst the second tradition is of a more liberal bent and is composed of internationalists such as Andrew Moravcsik^92(*) who consider that non-state interests are of more crucial importance.

The realist tradition in international relations generally equates the concept of interest to that of «national interest». A definition of interest in international relations is from a realist perspective necessarily an inquiry on national interest.

National interest is the most crucial factor in international politics^93(*)which shapes the actions of nation states in their inter actions with other states. Realists perceive national interest as a group of goals and aims towards which a nation moves, more specifically the national interest can be seen as the wide interests of the people of a nation. The 3 definitions of national interest which are the most widely used^94(*) were produced by Dyke, Frankel and Morgenthau separately, they are:

«National interest is an interest which the states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other»^95(*) Dyke

«National interest is the sum total of all national values»^96(*) Joseph Frankel

«National Interest is the political tradition and the total cultural content within which a nation formulates its foreign policy»^97(*) Hans Morgenthau

These definitions of national interest seem to indicate that national interest is a very idiosyncratic phenomenon states will seek to protect or achieve different goals following the perception they have of their own interests. According to Morgenthau^98(*) National interests ipso facto implies the protection of three things, the state's physical, cultural and political identities. The preservation of a state's physical identity implies protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a nation. The protection of a state's political identity means preserving the existing politico-economic regimes, for states in favor of the status quo in international politics (these are generally the most powerful states) or it may imply completely modifying the existing politico-economic regimes. The defense of a state's cultural identity implies the maintaining of the ethnic traditions and precedents of the nation-state at hand.

The consequences of such a broad definition of national interest is an interventionist state, that will seek to defend its interests in every corner of the world, during the 1950s- 1980s such a broad definition of national interest was favored by the United States leading to interventions in Korea or in Vietnam^99(*). To avoid this pitfall a less broad definition of national interest was proposed by John J. Mearsheimer he defines national interest as:

«Those crucial aspects of international politics that have a direct impact on the gains and losses of a state»^100(*)

Though the realist conceptions of interest differ on the scope of what constitutes national interest, they all agree on the fact that «the only significant form of interest on the international scene is national interest as this is a structuring force in international relations»^101(*). Liberals on the other hand have a broader definition of interests in international relations.

2.2 The liberal conception of «interests» in international relations theory

In his seminal book «liberalism working», Andrew Moravcsik attempts to construct what he fashions a «non-utopian liberal theory of international relations»^102(*). To achieve such a feat, Moravcsik attempts to move beyond utopianism and the «not realistic generalizations about human behavior»^103(*) that earned the liberal theories of international relations the reputation of being idealistic. The result of this cleansing act is a new refreshed liberalism centered on its main insight: the fact that «states are embedded in domestic and international civil society, which decisively constrains their (state's) actions». This rejuvenated liberal theory ofInternational relations' major task is to investigate these non-state actors «private interests»^104(*) and to determine how they modify state behavior. Therefore one of the most crucial duties of this liberal theory of international politics is to define the concept of interest in international relations there two major liberal definitions produced one by Moravcsik himself and another one proposed by Keohane and Nye.

Andrew Moravcsik uses the term «preference» in lieu of interest when he refers to non stateactors.He defines these preferences as:

«The self-indentified goals and values that aggregate the action of individuals and non-governmental actors in the internationals scene»^105(*)

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define interests as:«The principal objectives that motivate the action of actors in given issue areas of international politics»^106(*)

Both realist and liberal conceptions of interest on the international scene produce insightful lectures of international relations. Nevertheless in the context of our study that involves a mediation process between individual actors and a security regime with member states it appears necessary to opt for abroad definition of interest. Keohane and Nye's definition of interests seems to meet this requirement as, the subject in their definition is «actors» understood as both state and non-state actors.

The operational definition of our independent variable «geopolitical interests» as gathered from the above is:

«The principal objectives that motivate the action of actors in the rivalries they have to control territories and populations that live on these territories»^107(*)

The dependent variable is the variable being tested, in other words it is the variable who is maintained constant and whose change is scrutinized following the variation in the independent variable. In our present study the dependent variable is «failure».

The Collins dictionary defines failure as «the condition of not meeting a desirable or intended objective»^108(*) this simple definition of failure reflects on the wide spread use of the term failure in international relations theoretical debates. In the area of regime studies speaking of the failure of an international regime, analytically refers to two things: failure to be efficient or failure to be robust^109(*).

International regimes are deemed to be efficient in three respects. First of all a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its rules, this is sometimes referred to as «regime strength^110(*)» and simply reflects on the ability of a given regime to make their members adopt a behavioral code conform to the commitments (implicit and explicit) that they made to the other members of the regime. Secondly a regime is said to be effective to the extent that it «achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain purposes»^111(*). The most fundamental and arguably important of these purposes is the ability of the regime to enhance the ability of its members to cooperate in a given issue area. In addition to this somewhat official^112(*) measure of the efficiency of a regime, Susan Strange^113(*) points towards 3 other more covert reasons that may justify the existence of international institutions in general and regimes in particular. Strange claims regimes never actually play the official role they were created for at least from the state's perspective that is, in reality states play three roles:

· strategic :«serving as an element of the structural strategy and foreign policy of dominant states»^114(*)

· adaptive : «providing the necessary multilateral agreement on whatever arrangements are necessary to allow states to enjoy the political luxury of national autonomy without scarifying the economic dividends of world markets and production structures»^115(*)

· symbolic: «allowing everybody to declare themselves in favor of truth, beauty, goodness and world community, while leaving governments free to pursue national self-interests and to do exactly what they wish»^116(*)

The level of «strangeness»^117(*) in international regimes will determine which of the two dimensions (official or covert) is to privilege when measuring the effectiveness of international regimes. The preferred method to calculate regime effectiveness nevertheless remains the said «Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness»^118(*).

It is therefore possible to speak of the «failure of regimes» from the perspective of its effectiveness from two dimensions. Firstly the official dimension where a regime is deemed to have failed when it either does not augment the capacity of its member states to cooperate in a given issue area, or it fails to enforce a certain pattern of behavior among its members states. The pattern referred to being the «explicit and implicit rules»^119(*) Krasner brings up in his definition of international regimes. Secondly there is a covert dimension where regimes can be deemed to have failed if they do not fulfill the strategic, adaptive and symbolic roles_.

Whilst the effectiveness of regimes offers a more static perspective since the effectiveness of regimes can be measured for any given regime at any given time, regime robustness is a more dynamic measure of the significance of regimes. Indeed what is referred to as the robustness of regimes is its ability to resist to changes in the outside environment of regimes. A regime that disappears with an erosion of the political regimes that helped to set it up is deemed to be a regime of little robustness. Whilst the effectiveness of a regime can be an interesting indicator of its prospective robustness and it is not a necessary feature to determine it. A regime is deemed to have failed from the perspective of its robustness if it does not survive to changes in the political environment surrounding its initial establishment. It must nevertheless be noted that some regimes fail notoriously when it comes to being efficient by are notoriously robust and conversely some very efficient regimes prove to be ephemeral and of low robustness.

In the context of the present study the definition of failure is related to official failure in effectiveness, this means the «incapacity of a regime to enforce its self-defined rules of behavior within the community of its member states»^120(*)

The concepts important to our research that do not qualify as variables are: international regimes, electoral and crisis.

International regimes are a particular form of international institution, the term institution understood here as a form of «social institution»intermediating in social transactions. The consensus definition of international regimes was produced at an international conference convened by the journal of international relations International Organization and despite various critiques of this definition it has largely resisted scrutiny. This definition was proposed by Stephan D. Krasner and is:

«Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice»^121(*)

This definition of international regimes has come under scrutiny notably by Oran Young^122(*) who criticized this definition on three accounts:

· The definition is really a list of elements that would be hard to differentiate conceptually and often over-lap in real life situations.

· It exhibits a disconcerting elasticity when applied to the real world of international relations

· It is conceptually thin in the sense that it fails to tie the concept into some larger system of ideas that would help to solve the ambiguities inherent to the definition and that would offer guidance in formulating key questions and hypotheses regarding international regimes.

These criticisms from Oran Young and others lead Robert Keohane and others to propose alternative definitions to international regimes:

«Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations»^123(*) Robert Keohane

Kratochwill and Ruggie short of proposing an alternative definition to international regimes altogether nevertheless state that:

«International regimes are commonly defined as social institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas. The emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality. It follows that we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior. Hence, the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity»^124(*)

The latter understanding of international regimes pretty much abandons the ambition of coming to a discursive consensus on the definition of international regimes and prefers to rely on the intersubjective understanding of actors. Whilst such an approach of regimes dishes out the controversies that a rigid definition of regimes arouses in the scientific communities, it offers no clear guidance to researches on what to look for when studying international regimes. The variety of definitions that has emerged since the emergence of regime analysis as an important part of international relations have not replaced Krasner's standard definition, as his is still the single definition most referred to by regime scholars.

The basic definition of the term election is «the act or process of electing someone to fill an office or position»^125(*) whilst a crisis on the other hand is a concept whose definition has been more widely debated and disputed. Nevertheless the word (from the Greek êñßóéò - krisis; plural: "crises"; adjectival form: "critical") is any event that is going (or is expected) to lead to an unstable and dangerous situation affecting an individual, group, community, or whole society. ... More loosely, it is a term meaning "a testing time" or an "emergency event". The concept of electoral crisis can be tied to the different parts of the electoral process and as such we will be able to speak of pre- electoral or post-electoral crises. The concept of electoral crises therefore designates «a situation of deep disagreement over the means carrying out or results of an electoral process»^126(*).

The adoption of the Constitutive Act, which established the AU, marked a radical shift in Africa's international relations. Article 4(h) and ( j) of the Constitutive Act broke new ground by empowering AU member states to intervene in situations involving crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The shift from non-intervention to what is now commonly referred to as non-indifference was largely informed by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The Rwandan genocide demonstrated two things. First of all, it illustrated the absence of a normative and legal basis to intervene in the affairs of AU member states, and perhaps more crucially, the lack of capacity to do so. Driven by the «never again» principle, the AU dispensed with the old rules that had governed inter-African relations, especially with respect to intervention in internal affairs. In furtherance of its normative shift, the AU adopted the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which entered into force on 26 December, 2003. The Protocol embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security that includes conflict prevention, early warning, preventive diplomacy, peace-making , peace building, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices, intervention, humanitarian action and disaster management. The Protocol elaborated a far-reaching African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA is intended to give the AU the necessary instruments to fulfill the tasks set out in the Constitutive Act and the Protocol establishing the PSC.The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as the nerve centre of the APSA and to serve as a standing decision making Organ of the AU. It is to be supported by the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Fund. The functions of these as mandated in the Protocol underscore the importance of interdependence and synergy between and among the pillars. The RECs/RMs (regional economic communities/ Regional mechanisms)are the building blocks of the APSA. Hence, there is also a parallel process of setting up functioning systems in the RECs/RMs. Consequently, the success of the APSA is therefore largely contingent on a synergistic linkage between the various APSA components at one level, and the AU and the RECs/RMs at another. To fully grasp the dynamics at work during the operationalization (B) of the APSA it is necessary to take a look at the establishment of the APSA (A).

The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) is attributable to the changes in the political environment, the dynamics of peace and security on the continent as well as the socio-economic needs of Africa in the context of the broader global changes following the end of the Cold War. An important aspect of these changes which significantly shaped the normative and institutional framework of the Africa Union is the shift in the concept of security, both regionally and globally, from the traditional narrow, state-centered to the broad and comprehensive human- centered conceptualization of security. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the `operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations , as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction'^127(*), also embodies and constitutes an institutional reflection of the shift to human security which is widely accepted at the continental level.

At the core of the philosophy behind the APSA are the ideals of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism has been a compelling vision sustained by Africans on the continent and abroad which classically is a movement that brings peopleof African origins together^128(*). This expression of the spirit of solidarity and cooperation among leaders was not only to convene but rather to formulate a strategy for social, cultural, political and economic emancipation. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Ali Ben Bella of Algeria, among others, took the idea of Pan-Africanism to another level in 1963 when they created the OAU^129(*). The OAU, a coalition of twoIdeologies^130(*), was established on 25 May 1963, after the approval of a Charter creating it by all leaders of 32 then independent African States. The leaders agreed that as a continent, Africa had concerns and problems which had tobe addressed above the level of the individual states. These were reflected in what later became the aims, purpose and guiding principles of the OAU^131(*). With the creation of the OAU, a continental structure was created which supported liberation movements across the continent to get rid of colonialism and racial subjugation including apartheid in South Africa^132(*). Indeed, after the fall of the Apartheid regime in 1994, the OAU was applauded for having successfully achieved one of its primary aims; `to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.'^133(*).However, most observers believed that since the eradication of colonialism was not the only aim or purpose of the OAU, the measurement of success of OAU should go beyond that aspect. Observers note that while the OAU continued fighting colonialism and imperialism, civil wars in various African countries and disputes among members states intensified. Whenever the OAU was challenged to intervene in internal disputes and systematic violations of human rights, it declined, insisting that the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs (embodied in Article III of its Charter), forbid it from intervening.Furthermore, the optimism held when forming the OAU, that the continental body will help improve the economic welfare of its people, never measured up to expectations, as the african continent continued to lag behind in socio-economic development.

In view of this, by its 20th anniversary, no mention of the OAU was made without suggestion for its reformation. There was consensus among african leaders and experts that the OAU Charter needed revision or a total overhaul, especially as it relates to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.This finally led to the adoption of a Charter on Human and People's Rights, which was signed in1981 and came into effect in 1986. Furthermore, the Assembly of Heads of State and government proceeded to adopt a treaty establishing the African Economic Community on 3^rdJune, 1991.The OAU also created a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo, in 1993. This instrument was ineffective in resolving disputes on the continent. Tragically, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 took place while this Mechanism was operational. It was also during the last decade of the 20^thcentury that the conflict in Somalia led to the collapse of the state and the violence in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo led to the deaths and displacement of millions of Africans. These devastating events illustrated the limitations of the OAU as a framework for conflict resolution. There was a great need for normative and institutional innovations.

The creation of the AU introduced a number of normative changes whose reach and impact was not adequately appreciated at the time. These changes are most powerfully expressed in the areas of peace and security, human rights, democracy and intervention. Not surprisingly, peace and security constitutes the major agenda of the newly established AU. As enunciated in the preamble to the AU Constitutive Act, one of the factors underlying the establishment of the AU was the recognition of

«....The fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a pre-requisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.»^134(*)

In line with this, the Act provides that one of the objectives of the AU is to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.Probably one of the other interesting aspects of the AU Constitutive Act in this area, which marks a break from the OAU, is the ground-breaking principle of the right of the Union to intervene in Member States.Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act provides for the AU to `intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.'^135(*)This, more than the generic commitment for the promotion of peace and security, expresses the resolve of Africa to never let genocide reoccur. It creates not only the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent. As pointed out by Cilliers and Sturman, this is one of the provisions of the Act that `are the cornerstones of credibility'^136(*)for the AU. This provision together with the emphasis on ending conflicts and promoting peace and security reverses the primacy that the OAU accorded to the state-centric principles, especially as it relates to non-intervention. Most notably, it revises the understanding and scope of application of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. By narrowing down the scope of application of state sovereignty and non-interference, Article 4(h) elevates situationsinvolving war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide to matters of continental concern. To some extent, it helps to settle the controversy around intervention in situations involving the aforementioned crimes. This represents a paradigmatic shift from the OAU's exclusive focus on state security. Unlike the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act has strong human rights content. Indeed, one of its objectives is to `promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments'. As such, sovereignty and non-interference would no longer shield states from external scrutiny and even military intervention, not only where they endanger the lives of people on a massive scale, but also where they are unable to protect their citizens from grave threats.

Crucially, the Constitutive Act leaves no room for inaction on the part of the AU in the face of such threats. In this, the AU Act became a pioneer in leading what has come to be characterized as a systemic shift in international law, namely, a growing tendency to recognize that the principle of state sovereignty finds its limits in the protection of «human security». Clearly, the most notable feature of the AU Constitutive Act is its emphasis on protecting people from grave circumstances and the promotion of human and peoples' rights as well as democracy and good governance.

Alongside the historical and normative developments presented above, was the need to establish institutional structures for the implementation of these newly embraced norms. The AU Constitutive Act itself did not give enough details in this regard. It merely mentions that the AU Assembly shall `give directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and other emergency situations and the restoration of peace.' ^137(*)This gap was later on rectified with the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol). Adopted at the first ordinary session of the AU Heads of State and government in Durban, South Africa, the Protocol came into force in January 2004 following its ratification by simple majority of member states of the AU. The PSC was subsequently launched in May 2004.Through this protocol, the AU is endowed with a comprehensive peace and security architecture, which has come to be known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (the Protocol refers to them as Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution) and not RECs as its pillars. Central to the APSA is the Peace and Security Council. According to Article 2 of the Protocol, the PSC is

«a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts' which operates as `a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.»

· anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead

· undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to resolve conflicts where they have occurred; authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions;

· recommend to the assembly intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances as provided for in Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act; and

· support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters

Article 2 of the PSC Protocol defines the components of the APSA that support the work of the PSC. These are the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force and a Special Fund. Articles 8 and 16 provide for the Military Staff Committee and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as additional components of the APSA. We shall look at the PSC(i), the CEWS(ii),the Panel of the Wise(iii), the African Standby Force(iv), and the Special Fund(v) (also known as the Peace Fund) as pillars of the APSA.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, the nerve centre of the APSA, is composed of 15 Member States (10 elected for a term of two years and five for a term of three years). The Chairperson of the African Union is assisted by a Commissioner in charge of peace and security to provide operational support to the Peace and Security Council as well as deploy efforts and take the necessary steps to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The purpose of the PSC is to provide `a collective security and earlywarning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.' ^138(*)The PSC assesses potential crisis situations; sends fact-finding missions to trouble spots and authorises and legitimises the AU's intervention if and when necessary, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which affirms the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State with respect to crisis situations. Specifically, Article 7(e) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council, herein after referred to as the PSC Protocol states that the Council can `recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments'^139(*).

A cursory assessment of the existence of the council reveals that the PSC has convened more than 300 meetings^140(*) and issued as many communiqués and statements relating to crisis and conflict situations in Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe, among others. The Council has also authorized sanctions against several member states. The Council has authorized the deployment of four peace operations in Burundi (2003 to 2004), Sudan(2004 to the present now being jointly undertaken with the UN), the Comoros (2006 to present), and Somalia (2007 to present). Undoubtedly, the Council has demonstrated its ability to draw attention to crisis situations in Africa and will continue to function as one of the most important and powerful organs of the APSA.

The CEWS was originally envisaged to go fully operational by end of 2009. Since the 2003 Maputo Summit, the AU Commission has placed particular emphasis on the issue of conflict prevention and the anticipation of conflicts at an early stage. Article 12 (1) of the PSC Protocol specifically states that a `Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established'.Accordingly, CEWS is a key component of the APSA as well as the various organs of the Commission, through the provision of analysis and early reporting. The PSC Protocol introduced the concept of early warning and mechanisms of early response attaching high importance to the need for early detection of conflict. The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action.

these units collect and process data at the regional level and transmit this to the

1. A Framework for the Operationalisation of the system adopted in December 2006. The framework consists of three major components namely, data collection and analysis; engagement with decision makers; co-ordination and collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms, which was endorsed by the Executive Council meeting in January 2007.

2. A Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology Handbook has been prepared. The handbook guides analysts in monitoring and analysis and provides them with ideas of how to recommend possible response options on potential conflict situations.

3. Various data collection software applications have been developed in order to enhance the process of information gathering and analysis. These software applications include a number of IT based tools such as the Africa Media Monitor (AMM), the CEWS Portal, the Indicators and Profiles Modules, the Africa Reporter and an Africa Prospectus.

4. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the area of peace and security was signed between the AU and RECs and Regional Mechanisms in January 2008, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The MoU is expected to enhance cooperation between the CEWS and the regional early warning mechanisms in a number of fields including through coordination, regular reporting, and division of labour.

5. Refurbishment of the Situation Room. Infrastructure upgrade and installment of the necessary equipment, including the live monitoring software

6. Information collection and monitoring tools are operational and data can be accessed through a specifically developed CEWS information portal.

7. Between May 2008 and April 2012, 10 technical meetings have been held between the AU and RECs at the AU's initiative and the meetings are likely to continue. These meetings serve as the main forum in bringing both the AU and the RECs closer on the exchange of lessons learned as well as harmonization of data collection instruments.

8. Existing IT technology within the AU Conflict Management Situation Room has been upgraded. This facilitates the sharing of information in an effective and timely manner once the connectivity between the Situation Room and the RMs through an AU-VSAT is ensured.

Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union envisages the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is an integral component of the African Peace and Security Architecture and will play a critical function in enabling the PSC to fulfill its mandate. The ASF is organized into five regional standby forces, previously known as regional brigades. The formation of the regional forces includes a full time Planning Element (PLANELM); a Logistics Depot (LD); a Brigade Headquarters; and the Pledged Brigade Units. The various RECs and RMs are at various stages of establishing the aforementioned structures, although some regions like SADC have opted not to establish a standing Brigade Headquarters. There have been contentious discussions about membership of the ASF regional groupings. Ideally, the Regional Economic Communities could have been used as the formation for the ASF regional brigade. However, there are currently eight RECs and the ASF is designed on the basis of 5 regions. As a result there are some Member States that belong to more than one regional brigade. Therefore, the use of RECs as organizational units of the ASF brigades has turned out to be challenging. However, the five regional groupings are tentatively divided as follows:

· The Southern African grouping known as the Southern Africa Standby Force (SASF) includes: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) also belong to the Central grouping. Madagascar and Mauritius are also members of this group.

· The Eastern Africa grouping known as the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is composed of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, and Uganda.

· The Central African grouping known as the Central African Standby Force (CASF) iscomposed of Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,Republic of Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome Principe. Angola and the DRC belong to the central as well as the Southern grouping.

Composed of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

(NARC) is composed of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia and Western Sahara. However, this brigade is yet to make the expected progress.

According^141(*) to the 2003 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the 2005 Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF, subsequently supplemented by Roadmap II, the ASF was to be developed in two phases and inaugurated in 2010. At the end of Phase II in 2010, the ASF was supposed to be operationally ready for deployment including for complex peacekeeping operations and intervention in response to grave circumstances - war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide - as defined under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. However, following the AMANI Africa Exercise, the ASF was assessed to have reached only its Initial Operational Capability (IOC), Roadmap III was then developed to support the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the ASF by 2015. The deadline has come and gone with no additional measures made to enforce the operationalization.

The Panel of the Wise was established as a component of APSA. Besides the office of the Chairperson of the Commission (Chairperson), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force and a Special Fund, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) can call upon the assistance of the Panel of the Wise (Panel). Specifically, the Panel is an integral aspect of the AU's dedicated preventive diplomacy framework given its mandate to anticipate potential crisis situations and intervene in a timely fashion to prevent the escalation of a dispute or resolve existing tensions to reduce the likelihood of a return to violence.On 18 December 2007 the Panel of the Wise was formally inaugurated at a meeting which included representatives of Member States of the AU as well as the diplomatic community. On 20 February 2008, the Panel convened its first meeting at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and adopted a broad outline of its program of work. At its second meeting on 17 July 2008, the Panel further enumerated its work program and elected Ben Bella as the Chairperson of the Panel of the Wise. Panel members agreed to devote that year's thematic reflection on the prevention of conflict emerging from disputed elections, influenced by the post-electoral violence that had afflicted Kenya in January 2008.The second meeting of the Panel also addressed among other issues, the resources that would be needed to support the work of the Panel, including a dedicated Secretariat within the Conflict Management Division in the Peace and Security Department at the AU Commission. The Panel Modalities stipulate that `the Commission shall provide administrative, technical and logistical support as may be required to facilitate its work' and also provide `substantive services in support of the Panel's work, including information relating to specific situations, on mediation and negotiation processes^142(*)'. The Modalities also state that the Commission will provide the necessary research and advisory capacities to support the Panel's work. In this regard, the meeting of the Panel also discussed the issue of how to complement the work of the Panel with specialized expertise as well as an annual budget. It was agreed that in order to enhance its effectiveness, `if the Panel considers it necessary, it may invite resource persons, experts, institutions or individuals, to attend a meeting in order to assist the Panel in its deliberations on specific issues'.

The Panel also noted that it would receive support from `ad hoc specialized expertise'. In operational terms, the Panel can `facilitate the establishment of channels of communication between the Council and the Chairperson of the Commission, on the one hand, and parties engaged in a dispute, on the other hand, in order to prevent such dispute from escalating into conflict'. In addition, it can `carry out fact-finding missions as an instrument of conflict prevention conduct shuttle diplomacy.

The Peace Fund is established as one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture under Article 21 of the PSC Protocol.It is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The operations of the Peace Fund are to be governed by the relevant Financial Rules and Regulations of the AU.The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of AU, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the AU.There shall also be established, within the Peace Fund, a revolving Trust Fund. The appropriate amount of the revolving Trust Fund shall be determined by the relevant Policy Organs of the AU upon recommendation by the Peace and Security Council. When required, and following a decision by the relevant Policy Organs of the AU, the cost of the operations envisaged under the African Standby Force (Art.13.3) shall be assessed by Member States based on the scale of their contributions to the regular budget of the AU.

The high-level 2007 Audit of the African Union concluded that there is `cause for concern regarding the funding of peace operations in Africa. The Peace Fund remains small and precarious. On average, only 6 percent of the regular budget is allocated to the Peace Fund. This is a paltry sum viewed against the needs of peacekeeping activities of the continent. The assessed contributions to finance peacekeeping has not been done and the reimbursement within six months of States contributing contingents to peace support operations, as provided for in the Protocol, has not always been honored. The Peace Fund is envisaged as a standing reserve on which the AU can call upon in case of emergencies and unforeseen priorities. The AU Special Summit in Tripoli (2009) decided to gradually increase the reserve to a total of 12% by 2012, though this is yet to be realized as the member States contributions currently stand at 7%.The Tripoli Summit stated that `it is critical that AU Member States meet their financial obligations, so that the organization's dependency on external aid is reduced, and that sustainability and ownership is guaranteed. It is also true that the implementation of APSA is taking place at time when demands on the (AU) organization increases exponentially. In a context where capacities are stretched to the limit, and where organizational development, training and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions and sustainability of APSA are many'. The AU Commission was also charged with presenting a `comprehensive report on how best to mobilize increased resources from within the continent to support peace efforts.' Following this decision, the AU appointed Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, to head a team of prominent Africans with a mandate to explore alternative funding mechanisms for the AU.

PART TWO: THE INTERVENTION OF THE APSA IN THE CONGOLESE ELECTORAL CRISIS

It is commonplace among political scientists to propose a chronological account of the events studied. This proceeding is according to George and Benet^143(*) one of the essential components of process tracking. This is because it permits the researcher to trace the causal mechanism between variables. It is not our intention to derogate from this crucial part of the process tracking method. Nevertheless we have opted for a genealogical^144(*) account of the events preceding and composing the phenomenon at hand. The genealogical method according to Foucault^145(*) is «more an attitude of skepticism and critical inquiry than a preconceived set of rules which one must abide to»^146(*). Such an attitude is imposed upon us by the intricacies of the Congolese electoral crisis and the profound historical and international implications of the crisis. The genealogical method is deemed by us as a valid means of braking what AchilleMbembe refers to as «Pesanteursréglées»^147(*), a series of preconceptions and misjudgments about Africa that are perpetually reproduced by the classical scientific discourse. That notwithstanding, we shall proceed to present the events before the crisis evolved before dwelling on the particulars of the 2016 electoral crisis.

The DRC has experienced a series of domestic and international political crises and armed conflicts since the early 1990s that have contributed to widespread decay and the near complete collapse of the state apparatus and bureaucratic sector. The DRC ismerely a shadow of what it once was. What has been left in the wake of these ongoing crises iswhat has been called a «fragmented» state, an extremely fragile entity that has beencompletely gutted from top to bottom^148(*). The situation is in large part due to a deeply embedded political culture that was established through a set of formalized practices of political patronage and clientelism under the regime of Mobutu SeseSeko (1965-1997). These patronage practices acted as the glue for the Mobutu regime, by providing the financial means and political leverage to hold the state together, while a select class of political elites and publicofficials were able to systematically appropriate large sums of money and live off the state, ultimately at the expense of society. Mobutu and his political cronies were able to manipulate state laws and the formal institutions for their own political agendas, which ultimately led to the massive informalization of the formal and public sectors^149(*),while marginalizing the peripheral territories and provinces at the expense of the center^150(*).While denying the public's clamoring for democratic reforms, the Mobutu regime was initially able to weather the political changes taking place throughout Africa in the early 1990s.By the end of 1996 Zaire had become so bankruptand stale on the global stage that Mobutu rarely appeared publicly, let alone addressed the nation, a situation complicated by his secret battle with prostate cancer.

Simultaneous with the process of erosion of the Zairian formal public sector, regional events further aggravated the situation. The spillover from the 1993 assassination of the Burundian Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye led to the displacement of thousands of Burundian refugees into South Kivu province around placeslikeUvira and the Fizi-Baraka region, and specifically the Mulengeplateau.The assassination further amplified regional ethnic tensions between local Hutu and Banyamulenge Tutsi, further crystallizing the ethnic hatred and distrust between the Hutu and Tutsi in neighboring Rwanda, which was under threat of a military invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) operating out ofneighboring Uganda.

Taking into account the regional dimensionsand complexities of the early 1990s, the consequences and spillover from the1994 Rwandan genocide quickly led to the further militarization of the eastern regions of the country and eventually to two regional conflicts, one in 1996 and the second in 1998. In 1996 local Banyamulenge rose up against perceived discrimination and social injustices directed at them by local and national authorities, which quickly led to the formation of the dissident movement known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). The movement quickly gained popularity and the support of local Banyamulenge in South Kivu province and Tutsi in North Kivu. Along with international diplomatic support, large sums of cash, and military aid from the neighboringcountries of Angola, the RPF-led Rwandan regime, and YoweriMuseveni'sUganda, the AFDL rebels were able to quickly takecontrol of the Zairian territory and overthrow the Mobutu regime in seven short months.In May 1997 Laurent-Désiré Kabila marched into Kinshasa.. In the attempt of their take-over, high levels of violence and instability have reached nightmarish proportions and the most unthinkable acts have taken place in the fog of what has been called «Africa's First World War.»^151(*)

The situation today mightbe best described as a `theater of violence,' involving a wide variety of armed belligerents. The 1998-2003 conflict consisted of as many as seven africancountries and at least several hundred, (if perhaps even afew thousand), armed militias and «negative forces.»Conflict in this period has led to the death and displacement of an estimated five million people, or as many as 38,000 deaths were occurring per month as late as 2006.^152(*)

Beyond the large number of lives and families destroyed, «Africa's First World War» led to the complete destruction and collapse of most publicinstitutions. The state and its administrative and security apparatus have to be completely remade. This is the task that the Congo now faces at present. How does one remake something that has been completely destroyed where political transparency and goodwill are scarce? The challenges are vast and the potential solutions are terribly complicated. Trying to make sense of this situation presents perhaps overwhelming challenges to causal models of political violence and to social science explanations more broadly. Congo's political landscape is a complicated web spun by a terrible colonial political history that was then eventually mired in 32 years of despotic post-colonial rule as the state fed off and destroyed itself from within. In addition, a series of regional civil conflicts and a genocide in neighboring Rwandan have turned portions of the country upsidedown, ultimately fashioning a pathetic national psychosis where the post-conflict challenges could not be greater. To begin to understand these general statements about the Congolese predicament, it is important to highlight some of the more notable and important contemporary political developments taking place in Kinshasa.

On 16 December 2002 a «Global and All-Inclusive Agreement» was signed in Pretoria, South AfricaThis agreement established a transitional government between Joseph Kabila's government and the two larger more significant armed groups, the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma(Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma) and the Ugandan-backed MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo), along with the splinter factions the RCD-ML (Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement), and the RCD-N(Congolese Rally for Democracy-National).

1. The reunification and reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment of peace and the

restoration of territorial integrity and State authority in the whole ofthe national territory;

4. The organization of free and transparent elections at all levels allowing a constitutional and

In order to achieve these objectives the Kinshasa government agreed to the establishment of a government comprised of four vice presidents. AzariasRuberwa represented the Rwandanbacked RCD, while Jean-Pierre Bemba represented the Ugandan-backed MLC, Arthur Z'ahidiNgoma represented the RCD-ML, and AbdoulayeYerodiaMdombasi represented thegovernment and Kabila's PPRD (People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy).Joining Kabila, this transitional government became known as the «4 + 1» agreement. In addition, atransitional National Assembly composed of a mixture of parties and groups was agreed upon by all signatories, which was an attempt to givevoice to those groups that felt marginalized by the Kinshasa authorities as well as to provide a balance and harmony during the transitional period. Figure 1-2 provides a breakdown of the composition of the national assembly.In addition to the structure of the transitional government, the All Inclusive Agreement enshrined eight guiding principles that all participants agreed in theory to uphold and observe during the transition.

Despite the agreement and the constant pressure placed on the new transitional government by the international community, all the signatories to the agreement violated it at will. Political assassinations, graft, embezzlement of «missing» public funds, extortion andcharacter assassination continued to hinder the political transition inKinshasa. Of the five basic objectives guiding the political transition, it can only be said that two of the five objectives were accomplished. The 2006 elections were admirably well organized, and to the surprise of the majority of political observers and organizations were successfully held, (although a year late, which was a breach of The All Inclusive Agreement). In addition, there has been a new legislature elected and a new government formed. The democratic nature of the Kabila regime however is highly questionable, and the capability of the government led by Antoine Gizenga, long time follower of Patrice Lumumba, is also highly questionable.

In 2006 it was commonplace in Kinshasa to see spray painted graffiti on buildings and walls, which read, «4 + 1 = 0» and to hear orread local newspaperswhere Congolese would voice great frustration and displeasure with the transitional authorities. Many in Kinshasa were astounded that Kabila would allow the Rwandan-backed AzariasRuberwa, a Banyamulenge, to sit as a Vice President in Kinshasa. It was also common to hear the citizens ask, «what other country in the world has four vice presidents?» In addition, many kinois (the Kinshasa citizens) still viewed President Kabila asillegitimate due to his young age,32, and the fact that he was suddenly placed in the Presidency after the assassination of his late father, Laurent Désiré Kabila. Finally, Étienne TshisekediwaMulumba, the onepolitician who was perhaps perceived as the most legitimate choice in the eyesof some of the citizenry, because of his public disdain of Mobutu during the early 1990s, was a constant problematic obstacle by his objection toeverything the transitional government proposed. Kinshasa was thus in a constant turmoil, and each signatory to the All Inclusive Agreement violated the accord at will.

Despite the state's fragility and instability throughout the DRC and the capital of Kinshasa, the recent transitional Congolese government formally promulgated and ratified the Constitution of the Third Republic on February 18, 2006. The new constitution establishes the Congo as a «federal and unitary state»^153(*)with a broad separation of powers between the federal and provincial governments, and abolishes the former executive leadership positions^154(*).In terms of national institutional powers, the biggest structural changes from the transitional constitution to the new constitution are the abolishment of the fourformer Vice Presidential positions along with the Supreme Court, which has now become the CourConstitutionelle(Constitutional Court).Federally speaking, the constitution recognizes the subdivision of the national territory and expanding the former eleven provinces to twenty-six, including Kinshasaas the capital city. Each province will have its own governor and provincial legislature. The new provincial institutions have only recently been put in place, but were theoretically expected to be up and running in late 2009.

Despite the tragedy of the last 27 years of Congolese history, the transitional government, along with the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), has successfully, organized the first democratic national electionsin over 40 years.Originally scheduled to take place in 2005, national presidential and legislative elections were billed as not only the most expensive election in history (approximately three quarters of $1 billion) but also the most difficult to organize due to the geographic and logistical obstacles within the DRC. With the aid and full backing of the international community, along with the military support of the 17,500 strong MONUC (The Mission of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo) peacekeeping force, the CEI under the leadership of Abbé Apollinaire MaluMaluMuholonguaccomplished what most political analysts and observers believed was impossible. Thirty-three candidates were contesting the election at the presidential level, which represented a broad array of candidates from various parties, but in practice there was little to no variation in rhetoric and actual political substance.After two rounds of presidential contestation, widespread violence and killing throughout Kinshasa and the burning down of the SupremeCourt building, Joseph Kabila Kabange was eventually declared President and Head of State on 27 November 2006.The number of candidates contesting national parliamentary elections for the National Assembly and Senate was a staggering 9,584 candidate. The National Assembly houses 500 seats, while the Senate is composed of 120 Senators. Despite the large numbers of contestants and the complexities and concerns of national and international election observers, considering recent Congolese history it is truly a political miracle that these elections were organized and conducted as well as they were.One of the larger legislative concerns within the National Assembly now is the strategic party alliances between Joseph Kabila's PPRD (The People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy) majority and Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo).Kabila presently controlled the legislature through the alliance between the PPRD party and AMP majority (Alliance of the Presidential Majority),while theminority consists of Bemba's MLC and UPN alliance (Union For the Nation). Many questions revolved around Kabila's ability to maintain control of the legislature, despite his unpopularity in the western provinces of the DRC, and the shifting allegiances between the various parties in the National Assembly. Kabila's majority remained intact in the National Assembly, his support is predicated on the perception that he had the ability to steer the DRC in a new direction. However, certain events in the Senate directly challenged Kabila's ability to move the country in his vision, and more importantly highlighted the multi-layered challenges that face the Congolese state and society. The Senate was quite surprisingly placed under the leadership of the longtime Mobutistand former Prime Minister KengowaDondo on 11 May 2007.

In 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo on the 28^th November 2011 and a facultative run-off on the 26^th February 2012. In the run up to these elections, the ruling party attempted to change the electoral laws. Their intent was to move the electoral system from proportional to majority representation and to abolish the second round of votes. These changes where unwelcome in the eyes of the opposition and where seen as another attempt to jam the electoral process in the favor of Kabila and his cronies. International observers raised serious questions regarding the sincerity of the electoral process and later questioned the results. On the 8^th November 2011 opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi declared himself head of state claiming that a majority of Congolese people had turned against Kabila.

On the 28^th of November elections finally took place. These elections were marred by wide spread violence and bloodshed. Because of violence and delays in the delivery of ballots the elections were extended by one day.

First results of the elections were released on December 2^nd 2011 with merely 15 percent of the ballot counted. These results gave Kabila a narrow majority of 49percent, Tshisekedi obtained 32percent and Vital Kamerhe 4.9percent. On the 9^th of December the electoral commission confirmed these tendencies declaring Kabila the winner with 46 percent, Tshisekedi trailed behind with 36percent.

The AU led facilitation constitutes the phenomenon studied. It is therefore of crucial importance according to process-tracing methodology to constitute a static image of the important elements constituting the facilitation.

The local assembly of bishops is the National Episcopal Conference of Congo ( French: Episcopal ConférenceNationale du Congo). The episcopal conference of DRC is one of the only actors in the DRC that maintained its credibility admist widespread suspicions of corruption and dishonesty. The National Episcopal council will be charged of facilitating new talks a mere 1 month after the end of the AU led facilitation. These talks will have more success and shall widely be considered as the only credible way out of crisis.

The 46-year-old president took power in 2001 following the death of his father and predecessor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. Born in a rebel camp in eastern Congo on June 4 1971, Kabila has won two elections in 2006 and 2011, and also oversaw the country's emergence from a deadly and complex conflict known as the Second Congo War. Kabila is according to all reports determined to stay in power, and is currently maneuvering to keep the Presidency.

Nevertheless, the president's popularity has waned recently: a recent survey conducted by the New York-based Congo Research Group^155(*) found that people wanted Kabila to leave power by the end of 2016, and four in five would reject any change to the constitution that could see Kabila run for a third term. Kabila claims the election is delayed to enable some 10 million unregistered voters to participate, but his opponents warn that he is preparing--as the leaders of neighboring countries, such as Rwanda and Burundi, have done--to hold on to power.

A former prime minister under Congolese autocrat Mobutu Sese Seko, the 83-year-old Tshisekedi was defeated in controversial circumstances in the 2011 election, taking 32 percent of the vote behind Kabila's 49 percent. Several international organizations, including the European Union and the Carter Center, said that issues in vote-counting and lost ballots had marred the election. More recently, Tshisekedi has taken up the role of leader of a mainstream opposition coalition, called Rassemblement («Rally»),that has refused to participate in a national dialogue with Kabila's coalition as to the rescheduling of elections.

Despite Tshisekedi's vehement opposition to Kabila staying in power, his Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) party has indicated it would not call for mass protests on Monday 12/03/16. «We are not going to have a march to give these bandits the opportunity to fire on the population,» UDPS spokesman Félix Tshisekedi told Reuters, but added that he expected many Congolese would protest «each in his own way.» At an anti-Kabila protest in Kinshasa in September, security forces killed at least 50 people in clashes.

Etienne Tshisekedi died before the agreement reached with the Catholic church could be implemented, causing widespread havoc within the opposition and compromising the chances for peace.

The owner of one of Africa's most successful football teams TP Mazembe,Katumbi is a former Kabila ally who resigned his post as governor of one of Congo's most mineral-rich provinces Katanga in 2015, accusing the president of trying to stay in power. Katumbi is currently in exile from Congo having been convicted on a fraud charge earlier in 2016, which his supporters say is politically motivated. In the Congo Research Group survey^156(*), 33 percent of respondents said they would vote for Katumbi, making him the most popular politician in the country.

Ahead of the conclusion of Kabila's second mandate Katumbi has called upon the president to respect the constitution and step down, even if elections do not immediately follow. «[He] does not want the elections so I am advising him it is still possible to leave a legacy,»^157(*)Katumbi told The Guardian. «At midnight [on Monday] he will no longer be a legitimate president.»^158(*)

Civil society movements have taken on the baton of providing the foot soldiers in anti-Kabila protests. Prominent among these is a citizen movement called LUCHA (Lutte pour le Changement, or Struggle for Change), a non-violent group based in the eastern city of Goma that originally began protesting to demand basic services but has spearheaded an online anti-Kabila campaign. The group's prominence has come at a cost: prominent members of LUCHA, have been missing, and numerous members have been arrested in recent months.

Asides from Etienne Tshisekedi's Union for democracy and Social Progress, the opposition is constituted of relatively insular political parties often centered around the figure of the leader. The largest of these secondary opposition parties being VithalKhmere's Union for the Congolese Nation. Other parties include the Union of Forces for change lead by Len Kengo, the Union of Mobutist Democrats of Nzango Mobutu and the Union for the rebuilding of Congoof Oscar Kashala. All these opposition movements have varying levels of hostility to the government but they are generally perceived as being generically opposed to Kabila standing for a third term in office.

The international actors involved in the crisis are primarily states, be they sub regional powers with an interest in the Congo DRC or international powers with the will to exert hegemony in the mineral rich region. Nevertheless, the most visible actors are the international organizations that initiated and accompanied the facilitation.

South Africa's early engagements in the DRC were largely driven by political solidarity and President Mandela's and President Mbeki's efforts to establish peace and stability in the region. Following the 2006 democratic elections and early state-building efforts, South African and Congolese relations have started to exhibit more strategic and commercial features, including exploration of the DRC's hydro-electrical potential to supply South Africa and the rest of the sub-continent.The core economic sectors where South Africa is invested in the DRC are agriculture and retail, telecommunications, mining and construction, logistics and other services, electricity and infrastructure.

South Africa-DRC relations not only highlight the emerging moral bankruptcy of the African National Congress (ANC), but also serve as an embodiment of the malaise facing South African political life as a whole. In a recent report, Jason Stearns^159(*) of the Congo Research Institute ), and Stephanie Wolters of the Institute for Security Studies in the UK, emphasized that South African policy towards the DRC is increasingly monopolized in the South African presidency, while the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies are largely sidelined. This leads to a peculiar dynamic in which instead of pursuing South Africa's national interests in the DRC, Zuma legitimizes the DRC's government's poor explanations for delaying elections, and tolerates increasing instability in the DRC.

Following the end of Apartheid, South Africa had somewhat successfully cultivated a moral high ground in intra-African affairs, which made it a preferred mediator in intra-African peace accords. This especially applies to the Great Lakes Region. Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were heavily involved in the negotiation and signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000 and in the signature of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between Burundi and the CNDD-FDD in 2003. A useful footnote is that at that time Jacob Zuma was South Africa's Deputy President, and chief facilitator of the ceasefire negotiations. South Africa also played a key role in the facilitation of the Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which cumulated in the signature of the Sun City Agreement (named after the infamous South African luxury casino resort), and paved the way for the DRC's historic 2006 elections. Additionally, the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) has more than 1000 troops stationed in the eastern DRC as part of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which operates as part of MONUSCO. Given its legacy as mediator and contributor of peacekeeping troops, one would assume that South Africa has an immediate interest in promoting peaceful democratic transitions, and the rule of law. Yet, South Africa's foreign policy in the region has increasingly facilitated the opposite.

Following the discovery of mass graves and the displacement of 1.3 million people in the DRC's Kasai region, South Africa watered down a strong call by the United Nations Human Rights Commission for an «international investigation», and in effect legitimized the Congolese government's opposition to such an investigation. Similarly, South Africa has allowed the South African Development Community (SADC) to take a hands-off approach on the Congolese electoral delay, but given the SADC's poor track record in enforcing democratic accountability among member states, this should not come as a surprise.

With regards to the delay of elections in the DRC South Africa has given legitimacy to Kabila's instrumentalization of political dialogues to fracture political opposition and buy time. This coincides with other major partners, such as the US and the EU implementing targeted sanctions against Kabila's entourage, and key bilateral allies such as Angola openly criticizing the Kabila administration.

But similar to South Africa's domestic economic policy making, national economic welfare can take a backseat to cronyism. Six months after a bilateral summit between Kabila and Zuma in 2010, Kabila awarded Zuma's nephew Khulubuse Zuma two oilfield licenses in Lake Albert via a presidential decree. Though the extent to which Zuma personally benefitted from the arrangement is disputed, a City Press investigation^160(*) has suggested that Zuma played a crucial role in bringing about the presidential decree.

Uganda has long been active in the Congo. Between 1996 and 2003, Uganda twice intervened directly in the Congo, and it has supported a wide assortment of rebel groups there over the years. Kampala's interests in the eastern Congo are twofold. First, there are lingering security concerns about anti-Uganda rebels across the border. Less than 10 years ago, northern and western Uganda was under constant attack, but the threat today is not nearly as pressing. Second, Uganda profits off the Congo's extensive mineral wealth in various ways. For example, it allows pro-Uganda militant groups to smuggle Congolese natural resources into Uganda for export. Furthermore Uganda has mineral reserves on the Ugandan side of the Uganda/Congo boarder, the instability on the Congolese side therefore directly impacts on the capacity of Uganda to exploit its resources. Uganda has therefore developed a security policy consisting of the active support of military groups that defend their interests.

There are other economic reasons for Uganda's support of groups that are hostile to anti-Uganda militants. In the early 2000s, Uganda and Rwanda both supported various rebel groups in the Congo's Ituri province in an attempt to gain control of the province's extensive gold and other natural resources. The fighting has largely stopped since then, and gold, timber and other resources are now smuggled to Kampala before being sold to consumers, but the militias are still present.

Militias control this entire lucrative smuggling scheme. M23 (and before it the National Congress for the Defense of the People) taxes and profits from the charcoal trade; the Congo's national army taxes and overlooks illegal fishing permits; Hutu rebel groups smuggle and trade palm oil; Mai militia groups control minerals and tax mining production; and the Allied Democratic Forces profit from the trade of gold and other resources. With the exception of the Lord's Resistance Army, every rebel group in the region is involved in racketeering.

Kampala knows the Congolese army is not only unable to control the region but also takes part in the illicit economy. In this underground economy where everyone controls something, no one controls everything. In order to protect its varied interests, Uganda has thus decided to operate through rebel groups. At the same time, if Kinshasa could ever stabilize the eastern Congo through its military, it would probably attempt to consolidate control of the lucrative industry under itself, threatening Uganda's interests.

Historically Rwanda-DRC relations have always been tensed and centered on security and economic interests. The various Rwandan regimes since the 1990s and after the Rwandan genocide have sought to maintain the often fragile stability between the countries whilst vigorously defending Rwandan national interests.

Rwanda's security interests in Congo center on containing what the Rwandan government states is an existential threat posed by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, based in eastern Congo. The FDLR is an extremist Hutu armed group that helped lead the 1994 genocide against Rwandan Tutsis. The U.N. Group of Experts cites that the FDLR has at times been supported by elements of the Congolese army.^161(*)The FDLR has approximately 1,500 to 2,500 troops^162(*)--down from 100,000 troops in 1994^163(*)--and includes Congolese fighters. The current Rwandan government, which defeated the regime that committed the 1994 genocide and subsequently took power in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, believes that as long as any of these elements continue to operate in Congo with supporters in various countries around the world, they pose a threat greater than the sum of their current troop numbers, as they continue to be motivated by the ideology that fueled the genocide. The government is also worried that the FDLR may gain further external support, which would enable the group to quickly increase its threat level^164(*).

The international support group is a group of international organizations mobilized for the success of the AU lead mediation. They are the United Nations Organization, the African Union, the International Organization of Francophony, the South African development Community and the international Conference on the Great Lakes Region. These organizations coordinate their efforts to portray an image of unity.

The international powers which are referred to here are: Belgium and the United States of America. The USA has had a tumultuous past with the DRC initially supporting the Mobutu Regime then becoming a vocal advocate in favor of a more appeased great lakes region; the USA has varied greatly in its stances toward the DRC. Often seen as the protector of the Rwanda and Uganda, the USA was perceived as the main international endorsement of their destabilization campaign. This position among analysts was particularly reinforced by the USA's voting pattern in the UN Security Council when it came to Ugandan and Rwandan actions in the Congo. Belgium, as the former colonial power of Congo Kinshasa has retained a lot of symbolic power over the country. The dense Congolese Diaspora in Belgium and the widespread business interests Belgians have in Congo have made Belgium a potentially significant player in Congolese politics.

The period before the AU facilitation began was marked by deep unrest in the DRC. Asides from the continuing wars in the eastern part of the country, the political developments related to Kabila's «glissement»^165(*)of the electoral calendar gave rise to popular upheavals all around the country. These protests were met by massive repression by the police force and counter protests were held, quickly the situation in the DRC spiraled out of control. In an effort to present the various

January 17, 2015 - With about two years to the expiration to Kabila's mandate, the parliament passed a bill that allowed him to extend his mandate beyond 2016.

January 19-22 - There were clashes between anti-Kabila protesters and security forces in the capital Kinshasa and other towns. Dozens were reported dead and several others arrested.

Note: The government sought to justify the law allowing Kabila to continue in power with the excuse that a new voter's register was needed for general elections and that it would take time to compile. DRC is a country of an estimated 70 million people. A planned census for 2015 has yet to take place.

April 2016 - Darryl Lewis, an American security aide of MoïseKatumbi, a former governor and ally of Kabila was arrested during a street protest and detained together with three other members of Katumbi's entourage in the southern city of Lubumbashi.

May 2016 - Katumbi, the former governor of Katanga province declared hispresidential intentions. He was and is still seen as a strong opposition candidate. Katumbi joined opposition ranks in September 2015.

May 11, 2016 - The constitutional court ruled that Kabila can stay on when mandate expires till successor is elected.

Later in May - Katumbi, owner and bankroller of TP Mazembe football club, appeared before a prosecutor in Lubumbashi over charges of hiring mercenaries. His security aide was subsequently freed and ordered out of the DRC.

Katumbi left the DRC to South Africa before being flown to Europe to seek medical treatment after he inhaled tear gas fumes fired by police when he appeared before the prosecutor with his supporters to answer to the `mercenaries' charges.

June 2016 - Katumbi was jailed 36 months in absentia and fined $6m in a property appropriation case. His lawyers claimed the courts' ruling was part of a political distraction meant to derail his ambitions.

June 10, 2016 - Katumbi with leading opposition figure, Etienne Tshisekedi decide to set up an opposition coalition, the main objective of the coalition is to force the Kabila regime to swiftly organize the elections and to see to it that he doesn't stand for presidential office.

All these developments were punctuated by mass protests in Kinshasa and other major towns like Lubumbashi and Goma

The chairperson of the AU commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma appointed Edem Kodjo former Secretary General of the Organization for African Unity, former prime minister of the republic of Togo and sitting member of the AU panel of the wise as the AU facilitator in the Congolese crisis. This nomination made it clear the AU had decided to pursue dialogue as a means to ending the crisis at hand instead of resorting to the other mechanisms provided by the AU charter to respond to such situations. Furthermore it must be noted that the Chairperson only decided to appoint a facilitator after the contested Congolese president Joseph Kabila requested it from her. Hitherto the AU had not issued a single communiqué condemning the developments in the DRC or even calling for restraint on either sides of the political spectrum. This state of affairs made the opposition leaders question the neutrality of the AU facilitator from the offset. The task given to Edem Kodjo by the AU chairperson was therefore particularly difficult to execute, he was called upon to: facilitate the dialogue between the opposing parties in the DRC and to reach an inclusive agreement that would bring an end to the crisis in the DRC. In order to reach these goals and to ease the apprehensions the opposition parties had towards the facilitation, Kodjo had to break the negotiations into two parts. First the preparatory phase (a) which took place from the 26^th to the 30^th August where he attempted to raise all apprehensions the various parties had, and then the Negotiations per se (b) which were held in Kinshasa from the 1^st September to the 1^st November when the deal was signed. The aftermath of the signature was merely a direct consequence of the conditions in which the facilitation took place.

Once EdemKodjowas contacted by the AU commissioner for peace and security, and he received the proposition to act as facilitator for the AU, he went to meet President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo Brazzaville^166(*). This meeting took place in an informal capacity, the two men discussed the crisis and exchanged on the prospects of dealing with the situation through the AU lead facilitation process. According to Kodjo President Sassou gave him his full support and encouraged him on his mission, in fact this meeting was what incited him to accept the role of facilitator in the crisis. From then on Kodjo had to take contact with the relevant international organizations to form the mediation team and then contact the belligerent parties to obtain their agreement in principle to participate in the negotiations.

The first contacts between the mediation team and the various parties to the conflict were warm according to the various accounts we gathered from both parties and the declarations they issued at the time in local and international news outlets.The facilitator met with the leaders of the major opposition parties. On the 5^th of May in Belgium Kodjo meets with Etienne Tshisekedi and according to the facilitator the leader of the UDPS stated his intention to participate in the dialogue and he promised to send a list of representatives. The facilitator had repeated phone talks with Moïse Katumbi and the G7 movement (the G7 is a group of seven political parties formerly Kabila allies that defected in favor of Katumbi) they equally firmly stated their will to participate in the dialogue. At this point in time the facilitation process seems to be well engaged. Finally a meeting between the unified opposition forces and the facilitator is held on the 9^th of July. The meeting end with a general agreement on the fact that a facilitation process is necessary, the opposition, under the leadership of Etienne Tshisekedi nevertheless demanded the release of all opposition activists arrested.

The international mediation support group comprised of the UN, the EU, AU, SADC and ICGLC met in order to restate their support to the AU facilitation, they issued a joint communiqué on the 06^th of June 2016.

On the 23^rd of June 2016 the Congolese president traveled to the republic of Southern Africa with eight members of his cabinet. The traditional yearly bilateral summit between the two countries was particularly tense. Whilst the general expectation in the international public opinion was that President Zuma would mount pressure on the Congolese regime, the President decided otherwise. Zuma congratulated Kabila for the «advances in the democratic process»(sources) and called for the international community to let Africans handle their own problems. This move was widely criticized in the South African media and seen as an attempt made by Zuma to protect his families' mining interests in Congo. These developments were equally poorly received in the Congolese opposition. Zuma's comments were seen as an admission that the AU lead facilitation was a ploy to keep Kabila in power.

A few days before the scheduled beginning of the mediation the UDPS refuses to participate and raises doubts on the impartiality of the AU lead facilitation process. Etienne Tshisekedi claims that Kodjo is Kabila's puppet and he calls upon the United Nations to take over the process. This development took the mediation support team by surprise as they previously believed they had secured his participation to the process. The other major figures at the UDPS go further than simply pointing fingers at Kodjo and question the impartiality of the AU. They referred to the mining interests held by Dlamini Zuma and Jacob Zuma's nephew in Congo as proof that the AU leadership had a vested interest in Kabila keeping the presidency. Furthermore they compared the handling of the 2016 electoral crisis with the 2006 Malgache coup where the SADC had been swifter in its denunciation of anti-constitutional means of conquering or keeping power. It is obvious for the UDPS that Kodjo is partial.

At this point in time it is unclear when the negotiations will effectively start various representatives that traveled to Kinshasa for the facilitation have effectively traveled back to their home town. The denunciation of the process by the most important opposition party, the UDPS, causes mayhem within the negotiation process. The facilitator goes around meeting the remaining parties and manages to prevent them from desisting equally.

Amidst the persistent doubts raised by various opposition parties on the sincerity of the AU lead facilitation, the AU chairperson thought it necessary to restate her trust in Edem Kodjo. This move was done after persistent rumors of Kodjo's replacement were circulating in the Congolese capital. Dlamini Zuma issued a communiqué where she expressed her disappointment and surprise in the UDPS's behavior and congratulated the Congolese government for the release of all political prisoners.

The facilitator and the representatives decided to organize the mediation around three thematic committees: A committee on elections in charge of debating on the electoral calendar, the voter registrar and the budget of the elections. A committee on security in charge of debating on the security measures to be taken for the elections to take place smoothly. Finally there is a third committee in charge of trust and equity that will propose measures to restore trust between Congolese. These preparatory committees worked for two months before the plenary discussions began.

On the 1^st September 2016 the facilitation process effectively begins. The facilitator opens up the mediation with an extensive discourse stating the stakes of the facilitation and inviting all Congolese to unite in order to overcome the crisis. From then on the different thematic conditions take over and the negotiations are held in an appeased manner leading to a final agreement signed on the 18^th October 2016, by 12 representatives. The agreement was nevertheless open for new parties to endorse the deal.

Whilst the main negotiation process was taking place the international facilitation support group, through the auspices of the African Ambassadors in Kinshasa organized a series of meetings. The meetings were with the different parties to the mediation. These unofficial meetings had a deep influence on the facilitation process and it became too many a second negotiation platform. The facilitator aware of this issued a communiqué stating that the International facilitation support group does not act in the name of the facilitation.

· Negotiations are jeopardized by questions surrounding the electoral calendar:

On the 9^TH Of September all the opposition parties taking part in the facilitation process decided to suspend their participation. The bone of contention was the electoral calendar, whilst the presidential majority deemed that the elections should begin by the local elections, the opposition wanted to organize the presidential election in priority. Only after a few days of deadlock did the presidential majority agree to the calendar as proposed by the opposition. The negotiations resumed on the 15^th September.

On the 18^TH October 2016 the «inclusive» agreement was finally signed. The signed Agreement allows for the creation of a transitional coalition government whereby President Kabila will continue as the President, while the opposition that participated in the Political Dialogue will assume the position of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The presidential majority and the opposition will also see changes in the Senate. Parties to the Agreement agreed to ensure that the Voter's Register is finalized by 31^st July 2017. Finalization of the Register will lead to the call for election by the end of October 2017, and the elections to be held in April 2018. A Monitoring Group has been agreed comprising of seven (7) representatives from the Presidential majority, seven (7) Members from the Opposition that participated in the Dialogue, and four (4) Members from the Civil Society. The Agreement likewise enjoins the Support Group for the Facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, comprising of the UN, African Union, SADC, ICGLR, EU, and the International Organization of la Francophony (IOF) to meet regularly to evaluate progress.

We have seen the historical evolution of the AU security mechanisms from the early years of the Cairo mechanism to the mutations characteristic of the APSA. We have equally had a genealogical account of post-independence Congolese history, before a succinct presentation of the unfolding of the 2016 AU electoral crisis mediation. Building on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented in the first part, and the events composing the phenomenon studied, it is time to confront our hypothesis to the events presented and verify if there is congruence and if the causal relationship mechanisms we have postulated are correct.

This part of the study consists of the comparison of the data set presented in the second part of the work to the theoretical predictions condensed in the form of our hypothesis. As such this part of the work will consist of a diagnostic test of the two secondary hypotheses that will permit us to conclude on their validity and more generally on the validity of our central hypothesis. The most powerful of all the diagnostic tests offered by process tracing is the doubly-decisive test. This test is suggested by Mahoney^167(*) and later by Collier^168(*) as the most robust means to verify causal mechanisms in a single case study research design.

The research at hand is constructed around two secondary hypothesis, that suggest a specific causal chain of events leading from geopolitical interests to the failure of the AU lead facilitation in the 2016 electoral crisis mediation. The results of the research presented in chapter 5 suggest the following causal chain:

Figure 2.0 representing causal mechanisms and intervening variables hypothesized by research

To fully grasp the causal mechanism presented above, it is necessary to explicit the content of all the intervening variables composing the causal chain.

Geopolitical interests made APSA member states undermine the action of the APSA by limiting support to the APSA intervention in the conflict.

Due to the contradiction between the geopolitical interests of strategic sub regional powers and the norms and principles of the APSA, the member states are confronted with a form of dissonance between their engagements as members of the APSA and their foreign policy interests. To this regards we identify three of the states in the APSA/ SADC complex:

As far as South Africa is concerned, the foreign policy of the state with regards to Congo has been centralized at the level of the presidency of the republic. Zuma's nephew and Son both having important mining interests in the country the president has made it a point to show support to Kabila. During the facilitation process, this lead to the burlesque situation where the South African Ambassador to Congo as a member of the International Support Group was condemning Kinshasa on its handling of the electoral crisis, while Zuma was congratulating his Congolese homologue for the «democratic advances»^169(*) the country has made.

Rwanda and Uganda are in similar positions, deeply concerned by the situation in the east of Congo DRC^170(*) they have a vested interest in peace being maintained. Nevertheless, these countries over the years have profited from the disorder in the eastern regions of Congo to loot Congolese minerals. Rwanda even became a gold exporting country^171(*) despite that the country has no known gold reserves.

The implications of these geopolitical interests are that these countries are rationally incapable of defending their national policy interests and simultaneously upholding the norms and rules of the APSA. This is what we refer to as «Foreign policy dissonance». Foreign policy dissonance can therefore be defined as a situation where the international regime engagements of a given state contradict the interests of strategic groups in the state apparatus.

The APSA member states confronted with the contradictions between their foreign policy interests and APSA membership develop adaptation mechanisms. On the one hand they symbolically support the APSA by endorsing its intervention in the Congolese electoral crisis but in the other hand they limited the support to give to the APSA.

The APSA member states limited the means of their intervention in Congo by 2 ways:

The APSA member states limited support to the APSA intervention and specifically the facilitation process by imposing structural limitations to the intervention. Though the AU had the latitude to resort to other means, like sanctions or even military interventions, the APSA decided to rule out these options and headed for facilitation. Furthermore the structure of the facilitation process was equally limited to an «inclusive dialogue» format which left little room for surprise outcomes. The structural power exerted by the APSA member states was determining in the outcome of the mediation as it reduced the field of legitimate actions.

An important aspect of the support the APSA member states were supposed to give to the APSA intervention in the Congolese electoral crisis is diplomatic and political. What we refer to as political support is a public endorsement of all the facilitation efforts on the one hand and on the other hand issuing repeated calls for the norms and rules of the AU on democracy and governance to be supported. Whilst the APSA member states did in fact endorse the APSA lead facilitation, they did not issue calls for the respect of the AU rules and standards in Congo. The only country that did so was Eduardo Dos Santo's Angola, this cost Dos Santo's sun in law, Sindika Dokolo a series of investment deals in the Kasai region of Congo^172(*).

The consequence of the two previous failures is that the APSA intervention in the Congolese electoral crises was poorly adapted and out rightly incapable of reaching the objectives of the APSA. They installed an initial vice in the organization of the facilitation process, first by framing their intervention as a «facilitation process» and by furnishing insufficient diplomatic and political support to the AU intervention.

«Geopolitical interests made the APSA member states support parties to the conflict causing distrust in the facilitation process»

The sequence of events explicating this hypothesis in light of the research we have conducted is presented in figure 2.0 .The beginning of the sequence is the transition from geopolitical interests to foreign policy dissonance. This has already been presented as a part of the 1^st secondary hypothesis. We will therefore proceed to the second sequence

1. Some APSA states show preference for a party to the conflict (notably the RSA)

The principle culprit of this behavior is the Republic of South Africa and the mechanisms of this behavior have already been explicated sufficiently in the previous chapter and in the beginning of this chapter. Here to illustrate the position of the South African President we have selected declarations President Zuma during the bilateral summit in Pretoria of June 2016

President Jacob Zuma on Sunday 18^thcongratulated Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila on the relative stability and progress made in the vast central African nation.

«We gather here at a time when your country is going through a political transition following the December 2016 political agreement. This agreement charted a process that should lead to the next elections,» Zuma said in his opening remarks at the 10th session of the South Africa-DRC Bi-national Commission (BNC) in Pretoria.

«We congratulate you, Mr. President, on the progress achieved thus far and the manner with which you have handled the process. The people of the DRC need to determine and decide their internal political future. The best way to do so is through negotiations and dialogue. The people of the DRC have proven in the past their ability to dialogue.»

Zuma said that, given the close and strong collaboration between Kinshasa and Pretoria, the South African authorities were pleased to welcome Kabila on his official visit on Sunday.

«We have used the BNC mechanism to identify critical areas of co-operation. The first decade of our BNC was largely consumed by efforts in assisting the DRC in areas of institutional capacity building,» Zuma said.

This included training the DRC national army, police, and diplomats; providing technical electoral support; and conducting the public service census.

«It is clear to us that we have made substantial progress over the years. The DRC of 2017 is different from that of 2004 when we started our collaboration within the context of the BNC. The DRC is now politically stable and the security situation has improved.

«Where there are still challenges, the government of the DRC, with the assistance of the region, continent, and international community, is addressing those. In this regard, we encourage you, Mr. President, and your government to continue on this path,» he said.^173(*)

These assertions were widely interpreted as an open endorsement of the Congolese regime and a clear sign that the republic of South Africa was vouching for Kabila.

The consequence of the encouragements Zuma issued to Kabila was that the main opposition parties in Congo took this as a sign that the APSA lead mediation would be partial. The proof of this is that the UDPS refused to participate in the AU lead facilitation but did not rule out the idea ofa mediation process in general. In fact the UDPS called for a UN lead facilitation and just one month after the signature of the AU lead facilitation deal, the UDPS took part in the facilitation lead by the Conference National Episcopale of Congo, CENCO. This illustrates the fact that it is specifically the AU lead facilitation that they did not adhere to

The analysis of the APSA intervention in the Congolese 2016 electoral crisis helps us to highlight a certain number of inconsistencies between the theoretical framework provided for by regime theory and that which has occurred in Congo. Indeed if the APSA was incapable of handling the Congolese electoral crisis it is because geopolitical interests acted as an intervening variable causing the member states of the SADC to adopt a different policy on the bilateral level^174(*) than they did at the multilateral level. Theoretically such a situation is not possible since following the functionalist explanation for regime formation a regime only emerges when there is a convergence of foreign policy interests between states. The regime simply aggregates these interests and acts on behalf of the founding member states as a way to rationalize the use of political, economic and even cultural resources in the pursuit of these goals. To put it simply regimes help states pursue their immediate interests. With such an understanding of the role of regimes the dichotomy between the behavior of a regime and that of its member states should not exist. One could not imagine for instance the members of NATO collectively and actively seeking to undermine the action they undertake within NATO. The anomalous behavior of APSA member states can be explained by two reasons according to us.

1. The first possible explanation is of a general institutionalist nature. The APSA instead of maintaining its role as an instrument of member state's foreign policy has become an actor of regional politics in its own right. The APSA to a certain extent pursues its own agenda and this explains at least in part the lack of harmony between the bilateral behavior of member states and the behavior of the APSA.

2. The second explanation we propose is more idiosyncratic as it is related to the specific conditions surrounding the creation and the functioning of the APSA. The theoretical framework on international security regimes, stipulates that the only reason why states can overcome anarchy and cooperate is because a hegemonic power emerges that enforces the rules underlining cooperation and pays what is referred to as «transaction costs». This hegemonic power is faced with the same problems the other members are faced with and must by virtue of this have an interest in the establishment of such a regime. Whilst this statement is verified in the western context^175(*) in the case of the APSA this is clearly not true. This is because the main actor paying the transaction costs within the APSA is not even a member of the APSA. The EU is the single biggest donor of the APSA through its African Peace Fund in years like 2012 it financed around 99percent of the APSA activities^176(*). In the APSA we have a clear case of dissimulated hegemony or proxy hegemony where a foreign power with foreign policy interests spearheads action. Since the debacle in Somalia in 1994 western powers have been very weary of intervening directly in African conflicts, to effectively discharge them of this responsibility they needed to establish a network of initial respondents to crisis. This was done through the regionalization of peace operations initiated by Boutros Ghali as SG of the UNO. The consequence of this is that local powers are obliged to find other outlets than these regional peace institutions to pursue their policy interests. Leading to the situation in the Congolese 2016 electoral crisis where local states sabotaged the APSA intervention.

ii- Considerations on the circular leopard state and the future of African mediation

The success of the APSA depends on its ability to tackle the issues we have raised above. In order to do this the APSA needs to make its self less vulnerable to dissimulated hegemony on the one hand and to geopolitical interests on the other. Based on the lessons learned in the present study we propose a few paths for further research on the APSA. On the one hand, the APSA has been created to deal with the problem of anarchy in international relations. In other words it was created to permit states to cooperate peacefully. On the other hand, the APSA is an African solution to African problems, based on the realization that Africans need to manage their own affairs. These two imperatives are clearly not realized in the light of the present study, in this part of our work, we shall propose new research paths for the APSA to fully realize these missions.

The science of international relations has crafted a scientific discourse on the interactions between states. This discourse has come to be centered on the contention that there is no order in the international society. This assertion is based on the Hobbes domestic analogy. Hobbes demonstrates that unlike national society where there is a central state, the international society has no central state and therefore no order. The condition for the pacific co-existence of states in the international sceneis therefore the emergence ofa state like leviathan. This state like entitywill impose respect and discipline the egoistic drives of individual states. This state-like leviathan has come to be known in international relations jargon as the «hegemon», from there on a whole strand of international relations theories study what is known as «hegemonic stability theory»^177(*)

This presentation of the international scene however is in our opinion incorrect. Whilst we acknowledge the fact that there is a problem of authority in the international scene, we do not believe that the only way around this is the emergence of a hegemon. Indeed a deep look in African traditional societies reveals a social-technology^178(*) of conflict management that functions without hierarchical western-styled hegemonic rule. In fact some African societies have been so notorious for their lack of ostentatious forms of power that they were fashioned acephalous and anarchies, much like the international scene. Nevertheless, these anarchies never degenerated to war, because they developed mechanisms to solve conflicts. The most famous of these social technologies is certainly the «leopard skin chief». The leopard skin chief is a social institution in the anarchical Nuer society first described by Evans Prichard this is how he characterizes his role:

«The political system operates largely, we think, through the institution of the feud which is regulated by a mechanism known as the 'leopard-skin chief', a title we retain, although the appellation of 'chief' is misleading. This person is one of those specialists who are concerned, in a ritual capacity, with various departments of Nuer social life and of nature. Leopard-skin chiefs belong to certain lineages only, though not all members of these lineages utilize their hereditary ritual powers. In most of Nuerland, the lineages are not branches of dominant clans.
When a man has killed another, he must at once go to a chief, who cuts his arm so that the blood may flow. Until this mark of Cain has been made, the slayer may neither eat nor drink. If he fears vengeance, as is normally the case, he remains at the chief's home, for it is sanctuary. Within the next few months the chief elicits from the slayer's kin that they are prepared to pay compensation to avoid a feud and he persuades the dead man's kin that they ought to accept compensation. During this period neither party may eat or drink from the same vessels as the other and they may not, therefore, eat in the home of the same third person. The chief then collects the cattle -till recently some forty to fifty beasts- and takes them to the dead man's home, where he performs various sacrifices of cleansing and atonement. Such is the procedure of settling a feud, and before the present administration it had often to be used, for the Nuer are a turbulent people who esteem courage the highest virtue and skill in fighting the most necessary accomplishment.»^179(*)

If we put aside the gruesome nature of the descriptions, we quickly realize how the Nuer manage to overcome anarchy and solve conflicts. The Leopard skin chief acts as a social institution, respected by all that can impose respect to the entire community. The APSA can institute a similar mechanism in order to deal with the issue of anarchy and the problems of facilitation like those of distrust and limited support that aroused in the Congolese case study.Nevertheless the conditions surrounding such an endeavor including the specific role and competencies of the leopard state have to be thoroughly studied.

In the Congolese 2016 electoral crisis we have seen that one of the major issues that has risen in the facilitation process was the incapacity of certain regional actors to look beyond their own geopolitical interests and to favor thecontinental agreed upon norms of the APSA. This problem is more likely to reoccur in other similar cases if the initial respondent to the crisis is the sub-regional economic community. Indeed the members of the sub regional economic community being more prone to having strategic interests in the country in conflict, the problem of foreign policy dissonance and inadequate mediation solutions is likely to be raised again. Furthermore a cursory look at the different APSA interventions in various countries reveals that crises where APSA member states have limited economic interests are more swiftly handled than crises where the economic interest of APSA states are involved. Take for instance the Gambian post electoral crisis. The countries of the Economic Community of West African States have very little business interests in the country, this meant that they would not be faced with foreign policy dissonance when handling the crisis. The ECOWAS countries handled the crisis in conformity with the rules of the APSA and they managed to solve the crisis. The biased nature of APSA interventions induced by geopolitical foreign policy dissonance is a major problem the APSA will increasingly face.

In order to prevent this from durably installing itself as an important issue in all future African lead facilitations, there needs to be a delocalization within the continent of the leadership role in crises situation. This will at the very least reinstall trust in APSA interventions and prevent proxy-hegemonic^180(*) interventions of exterior states. What is proposed here is a continental corollary to Tagou's democratic rotation^181(*). The idea is to circumvent the limitations of the sub-regional hegemonic rule.

To conclude this research it is necessary to state the contributions this thesis has made and to suggest future avenues for research.

The present thesis has made contributions to two bodies of knowledge in political science: Methodology and international relations.

Regarding political science methodology, the principle contribution of the thesis is a modification in the classical process tracing procedure. The classical three step procedure proposed by Collier^182(*).The contribution this thesis brings to the process tracing method is twofold: First of all we have integrated the description of the sequence of events preceding the phenomenon studied as a useful addition to the process tracing method. This has permitted us to illuminate the context in which the APSA lead facilitation process took place. We have opted for a chronological presentation of the events preceding the phenomenon. This fulfilled the «static description» prescription made by Mahoney^183(*) and widens the specter of the central process observations^184(*). Secondly we have introduced the Foucaldian genealogical method of historical inquiry to understand the historical underpinning of the crisis. Foucault introduces the method of genealogy as an amelioration of the archeological method he introduced in his seminal book, «the order of things»^185(*).In the context of the present study, genealogy was employed to unearth the historical roots of the 2016 electoral crisis. Instead of offering a tradition chronological and purportedly «unbiased» version of the historical roots of the conflict, we have chosen to highlight the institutional legacy of corruption.

In the realm of international relations the thesis has two main contributions one to theory and another to empirics.

· Regarding international relations theory the thesis has proposed various new variations to classical regime theory. First of all we have constructed one of the few research models based on the combined use of cognitivist and interest based approaches to regimes. Though this has been long called for this has only very seldom happened. Furthermore this study is the first study to empirically verify the underpinnings and possible validity of regime theory in the African context as far as the APSA is concerned, whilst it has from time to time been suggested that the APSA constituted an international security regime, absolutely no work prior to this study has proceeded to empirically verify this claim. We have done so by comparing the expected theoretical behavior of actors to their real-life behavior.

· In the field of empirics within international relations we have constructed a new data set that can potentially be used to construct a new research agenda in regime theory. Furthermore we have proposed a new explanation for regime theory and we have forged a new concept in IR theory «foreign policy dissonance».

The following are a few strands of research that can be pursued pursuant of the present study:

· The verification of the hypothesis of the present research can be done using a multiple case design. That is to say that one can employ structured-focused-comparison to construct a more empirically grounded theory on the correlation between geopolitical interests and the failure of the APSA.

· Foreign policy dissonance can be studies more in depth within the AU as a whole. A study can be undertaken to unearth all the various cases of foreign policy dissonance that have emerged in different organs of the African Union and how the member states have reacted to them.

· Forms of hegemony in the APSA can be studied in a greater detail. The objective of such an undertaking would be to understand how the dissilulated proxy hegemony of the EU has impacted on the AU.

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Moravcsik, Andrew: Liberal Theory of international politics, Belfer center press, Massachusetts, 2017

Morgenthau, Hans J: Politics among nation, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1999

Morgenthau, Hans J: In defense of national interest, Stanford University press, Stanford, 2002

Ndaywel e Nziem, Isidore: Congo, de l'heritage ancient a la Republique democratique du Congo/Zaire, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1998

Nest, Michael &al.: The Democratic Republic of Congo:Economic Dimensions of War and Peace Boulder; Lynne Reiner,London,2006.

Prichard, Evans : The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People, Oxford university Press, Oxford, 1940

Semple, Ellen Churchill: Influences of Geographic environment on the Basis of Ratzel's system of Anthropo-geography, Holt, New York, 1911

Stearns, Wolters: what happens in the Congo, Chicago university press, Chicago, 2011

Tagou, Célestin : Démocratie Rotative, Transcendance et transformation politique des identités ethno-régionales dans l'état-nation du 21eme siècle, Presses des Universités Protestantes d'Afrique, Yaoundé, 2017

Young, Crawford: The Rise & Decline of the Zairian State. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin,1985

ANNEXES

II- COMMUNIQUE ANOUNCING THE END OF THE FACILITATION PROCESS

* ¹Cf. Hoang-Ngoc , Liêm in : Refermons la parenthèse libérale, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2005

* ²Cf. Nyongesa, George : Democracy is unsuitable for Africa, Academia eddo, Boston,2009

* ⁴ Mbeki, Thabo: opening address :38^thAssembly of heads of states and government of the OAU, AU online free library, Addis Ababa, 2002

* ⁵Cf. Robert O. Keohane & al in: Power and Interdependence, Little Brown, Boston,1977

* ⁶ Brown, Chris in: Understanding International relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p.89

* ⁸Cf. Krasner, Stephan: «Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables» in: Journal of Political research, No986/2/1982, p.185-232

* ¹¹Cf.Alexander, George & al: Case studies and Theory development in the Social Sciences, BCIA, Cambridge, 2005

* ¹³Krasner,Stephan D: Regimes and the limits of realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1977p.33

* ¹⁴Welz,Martin: From Non-interference towards Non-indifference, an on-going paradigm shift within the African Union? In: Towards an African Peace and Security Regime, Routledge, London, 2011, P39 -56

* ¹⁶ Adjovi, Roland : Union Africaine et Démocratie : Aspects constitutionnels internes et internationaux in : Bangoura, Dominique : L'union Africaine face aux enjeux de paix, sécurité et de défense, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2002pp.32-65

* ¹⁷ Tabiou, Nadia : Légalité et légitimité des actions de maintien de la paix de l'Union Africaine : Approches prospectives in : Bangoura, Dominique :L'union Africaine face aux enjeux de paix, sécurité et de défense, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2002, p.80-112

* ¹⁹ Zorgbibe, Charles : Pour une charte Africaine de la diplomatie préventive et du maintien de la paix in :Bangoura, Dominique :L'union Africaine face aux enjeux de paix, sécurité et de défense, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2002, p.13-36

* ²⁰ Balde,Hassatou : la diplomatie préventive de l'Union Africaine à l'épreuve de la crise malgache in :Bangoura,Dominique : L'union Africaine face aux enjeux de paix, de sécurité et de défense, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2002 p.37-46

* ²¹ Bangoura,Dominique : L'union Africaine face à la crise Ivoirienne in : Bangoura,Dominique : L'union Africaine face aux enjeux de paix, de sécurité et de défense, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2002 p.165-201

* ²³ ECOWAS has a sub- regional conflict management mechanism, which is operational since 1999

* ²⁴Kathryn ,Sturman & al: The peace and security council of the African Union from design to reality in: Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto: Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture, Routledge,London,2011 pp.65-89

* ²⁵Tim, Murithi & al : The Panel of the wise in:Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto: Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture, Routledge,London,2011 pp.112-135

* ²⁶ Llopis, Anna Peyro:L'Union Africaine: Un système de sécurité régionale pour la paix civile in Bangoura, Dominique : L'union Africaine face aux enjeux de paix, de sécurité et de défense, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2002 p.150-178

* ²⁷Franke, Benedikt:Africa's Regional Economic Communities and the Multi-Level Logic of Security Cooperation on the Continent in: Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto:Towards an African peace and security regime, continental embeddedness, transnational linkages, strategic relevance, Routledge, London,2012pp.180-198

* ²⁸Memorandum of Understanding, singed in 2008 between the AU commission and the 6 Regional economic communities around the continent

* ²⁹ Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto: The African Peace and Security Architecture: An Evolving Security Regime? In:Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto:Towards an African peace and security regime, continental embeddedness, transnational linkages, strategic relevance, Routledge, London,2012pp.200-236

* ³⁰ Bhattacherjee, Anol :Social science research :Principles, Methods and Practices, USF Tampa Library Open Access collections, Tampa,2012

* ³¹C.F Collier, David: Understanding Process tracing in social sciences, world politics 456, n045 p 125- 168

* ³²Cf. Alexander George & al: Case studies and Theory development in the Social Sciences, BCIA, Cambridge, 2005

* ³³Gary King, & al: Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton university Press, New Jersey, 1994

* ³⁴Scott Burchill & al::Theories of International Relations, Palgrave/Macmillan, London,2001

* ³⁷ Brown, Christopher: International Political theory today. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, N/3652 2012,PP 193-200

* ³⁸Taliaferro, Jeffery W : Seeking security under anarchy, International Security, Vol.25 No3 (Winter 2000/01),pp. 128-161

* ³⁹Mearsheimer, John: The tragedy of great power politics, Norton, New York,2002

* ⁴⁰Jervis, Robert: Cooperation under a security dilemma in , International Security, Vol.25 No3 (Winter 2000/01),pp. 110-126

* ⁴¹Mearsheimer, John: The tragedy of great power politics, Norton, New York,2002 P312

* ⁴³C.F Morgenthau, Hans J: Politics among nation, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1999

* ⁴⁴Risse, Thomas & al : disorder again in , International Organization, vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 1982, Pg.379-410

* ⁴⁵Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984

* ⁴⁷ Strange, Susan: Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, International Organization, vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 1982, Pg.479-496

* ⁴⁸Krasner, Stephan D.: Structural Causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, International Organization vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 1982, Pg.400-435

* ⁴⁹Heinze, Edward A. : The just war tradition, an international regime?, E-International relations, vol.132, 2014,

* ⁵⁰C.fFelini, Frederico : Sustaining a nuclear security regime, , International Organization, vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 2002, Pg.119-196

* ⁵¹Hugo Grotius, the Dutch medieval lawyer has produced a body of work, on the virtues of institutions in the international system, these have produced a large portion of the arguments behind regime analysis especially in the early years

* ⁵² Antonio Gramsci's work on hegemony was the main idea behind Keohane's hegemonic stability theory, which constitutes an essential part of regime theory. For discussions on the overall contribution Gramsci's theories made to the study of international relations see Malo, «Antonio Gramsci's role in Marxian thought and the contribution made to international relations by those using his ideas», on the relevance of these theories in African states see Kendie, Daniel: How relevant are the theories of Gramsci to the study of African states.

* ⁵³ According to the definitions given to institutionalism by Burchill, Linklater and al institutionalism is the degree to which one believes that institutions make a difference on the international scene, as such we may find varying levels of institutionalism between adherents of the same theory

* ⁵⁴Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984

* ⁵⁵ The prisoner's dilemma is a hypothetical situation often used by internationalists to depict the logic governing cooperation in International Relations. It was notably used by Robert Jervis in 1978 to construct his renowned security dilemma in the article «cooperation under a security dilemma». The prisoner's dilemma is a symmetrical game, where each player is better off when he can benefit from the unrequited cooperation of his partner. On the one hand, ending up as the one who behaves cooperatively without a response in kind is the outcome least desirable from either player's point of view. On the other hand mutual cooperation is the most desirable outcome but hypothetically the least probable without any intermeddling (social) institution to ensure cooperation. Married couples for instance are more likely to succeed.

* ⁵⁶ Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984

* ⁶¹ From Latin meaning «after this,therefore because of this » or simply «since event Y followed event X, event Y must have been caused by event X»

* ⁶²Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger: Theories of international regimes, Cambridge university press, Cambridge, 2012 pp82

* ⁶⁴Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984

* ⁶⁵ Onuf, Nicolas : World of our making, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2004

* ⁶⁷ Anne-Marie Slaughter even suggests that cognitivist approaches do not form a coherent theory but instead an «ontological continuum» c.f Slaughter, Anne-Marie: Theories of international relations

* ⁶⁸ This point refers to intersubjectivity in Husserlian terms ( 5^th Cartesian meditations, not the Solipsist reflections), and builds upon the work done by Jorgen Habermas c.f RISSE, Thomas: «let's Argue!»:Communicative action in world politics

* ⁷⁰ Onuf, Nicolas : World of our making, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2004

* ⁷³ Fogue, Alain : Enjeux Geostrategiques et conflits politiques en Afrique noire, Harmattan, Yaoundé, 2008

* ⁷⁴ Area studies project on reterritotializing the state in Africa initiated by the university of Leipzig

* ⁷⁵ Steinmetz, George : Geopolitics in : Ritzer, George :Encyclopedia of Globalization, Routledge, New York, 2012 p313

* ⁷⁶Considering «geopolitical interests» is our independent variable it is imperative that we construct an operational definition of this concept for specifications on the use of operational definitions in the political sciences see George, Bennet in Op.citt. pp.313

* ⁷⁸Dodds, Klaus a& al in: Geopolitical Transitions, Routledge, New York, 2000.

* ⁷⁹Kjellen, Rudolf : Der Staat ALS Lebensform , scholar's choice edition, social science collection, Routledge, New York, 1987

* ⁸⁰ Rudolf Kjellen is a Swedish political scientist, he is the first to have coined the term «geopolitics» and he was deeply influenced by the work of Friedrich Ratzel.

* ⁸¹Haushofer , Karl: The Bavarian highlands and the Salzkammergut ,Oxford university press, classics of social science, Oxford, 1993

* ⁸²Semple, Ellen Churchill : Influences of Geographic environment on the Basis of Ratzel's system of Anthropo-geography, Holt, New York, 1911

* ⁸⁷ Lacoste, Yves : l'état dans tous ses états, L'harmattan, Paris, 2003 pp.38

* ⁸⁹ During the second and third great debates in international relations opposing behavioralists headed by Morton Kaplan and English school scholars headed by Hedley Bull on the one side and realists headed by Hans J Morgenthau and E H Carr on the other side, the concept of interest was fiercely debated. For more on these discussions see Wilson, Pete: The myth on the great debates, LSE working papers, London, JSTOR, 2012.

* ⁹⁰ Aaron, Raymond : The century of total war, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1954 (revised version 2002)

* ⁹¹ Butterfield, Herbert : The Whig interpretation of history, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1933(revised version 2002)

* ⁹²Moravcsik, Andrew : Liberalism and international relations theory, Belfer center press, Massachusetts, 2014

* ⁹³ Morgenthau, Hans J : In defense of national interest, Stanford university press, Stanford, 2002

* ⁹⁴ According to Google scholar researches, these are the most referenced definitions of national interest

* ⁹⁵ Emmanuel, Dyke: changes in foreign policy, the red house press, New York, 2001

* ⁹⁷ Morgenthau, Hans J : In defense of national interest, Stanford, Stanford university press, 2002

* ⁹⁹ The theoretical basis for the American intervention in Vietnam was the domino theory and the infamous « domino effect » that posited that if one country fell into communist hands so would the rest of the region. Domino theory is in fact an off-shoot of the parsimonious definition of national interests favored by realists. For more discussions on the domino effect and national interest see Dwight D. Eisenhower's April 07 1954 speech.

* ¹⁰⁰Mearsheimer, John J. : The tragedy of great power politics, Norton, New York,2002

* ¹⁰²Moravcsik, Andrew : Liberalism working, Belfer center press, Massachusetts, 2003

* ¹⁰⁴Moravcsik, Andrew : Liberalism and international relations theory, Belfer center press, Massachusetts, 2014

* ¹⁰⁵Moravcsik, Andrew : Liberal Theory of international politics, Belfer center press, Massachusetts, 2017

* ¹⁰⁶Keohane and Nye : Power and Interdependence, Little Brown, Boston, 1977

* ¹⁰⁷This operational definition of geopolitical interests was first used by Mearsheimer in: Mearsheimer, John J. : The tragedy of great power politics, Norton, New York,2002

* ¹⁰⁹C.fHasenclever, Mayer& al:: Theories of international regimes, Stromberg, Den Haag, 2001

* ¹¹¹Keohane and Nye : Power and Interdependence, Little Brown, Boston, 1977 pp.362

* ¹¹³Strange, Susan: Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, International Organization, vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 1982, Pg.479-496

* ¹¹⁸Hovi, Sprinz & al:: The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness : Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead in Global Environmental politics, No 3:3, August 2003, 333- 369

* ¹¹⁹Krasner, Stephan D.: Structural Causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, International Organization vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 1982, Pg.400-435

* ¹²¹Krasner, Stephan D.: Structural Causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, International Organization vol.36, No2, International Regimes, 1982, Pg.433

* ¹²² Young, Oran :A Critique of Regime Analysis, International Organization, vol.36, No2,March 2014

* ¹²³Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984

* ¹²⁴Kratochwill, Ruggie & al :Structural Causes and regime consequences, again: regimes as intervening variables, International Organization vol.65, No4, International Regimes, 1999,pp 112- 136

* ¹²⁵ Election: in Miriam Webster dictionary , Collins Co-build, London, 2013

* ¹²⁷C.F. `OAU: A Brief History,' from www.oau-oua/history.htm; accessed 20th Jan. 2010

* ¹²⁸C.F Mathews, Kay: Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: the AU and the New Pan-Africanists, in The African

Union and Its Institutions, Centre for Conflict Resolution press, Cape town, 2008 P. 26.

* ¹³¹ To free the continent from colonialism, realize peace and security, improve the economic welfare of

the African people, guard the sovereignty and dignity of African states, promote unity and co-operation

among African states, to ensure human and natural resources development. Preamble, Art. II & III OAU Charter

* ¹³² The OAU established a Liberation Committee mandated to co-ordinate the liberation struggle. The

June 1972 `Heads of State and Government Summit' in Morocco, increased by 50% the financial aid to the

Committee. `History of the OAU- Founding May 1963,' in Brenda Mofya & al; what happened to the AU, Gostan, Dakar, 2008

* ¹³³ 7. Thabo Mbeki, `Opening address: 38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU,' 8th July,

* ¹³⁴C.F. Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001).on www.AU.org consultuted the 14/09/17

* ¹³⁶Jakkie, Cilliers & al `The Right Intervention; Enforcement Challenge for the African Union' 2002 VOL.11(3), African Security Review;

* ¹³⁸ C.F Article 2 protocole on the establishement of the peace ans security council from www.AU.org consulted on 08/09/17

* ¹⁴⁰ C.F 2016 Acitivity report on the PSC from www.AU.org consulted on 08/09/17

* ¹⁴²Addellaoui, Jamila El: the PSC of the African Union: A framework for evaluation, AU PRESS, Addis Ababa, March 2010

* ¹⁴³George, Bennet & al: understanding process tracing, Belfer Centre press, New Jersey, 2002 pp.36

* ¹⁴⁴This is a novel way of approaching process-tracking which we have developed for the specific needs of the study at hand but that can be emulated in various similar cases. The principle is to follow all the steps of the process tracking method as suggested by George. The hiatus arises when it comes to the historical explanation of events. where as in the classical method the explanation of events anterior to the phenomenon is principally chronological/historical, here we recognize a Foucaldian alternative based on genealogy as method.

* ¹⁴⁵ Foucault, Michel :Birth of the clinic, Chicago university press, Chicago, 1963

* ¹⁴⁷C.F Mbembe, Achille: A propos des discours Africains de soi, in African Journal of political science, JSTOR N365 pp.36-85

* ¹⁴⁸ Nest, Michael, &al. :. 2006. The Democratic Republic of Congo:Economic Dimensions of War and Peace ,Boulder; London, 2006

* ¹⁴⁹ Young, Crawford, & al.: The Rise& Decline of the Zairian State, The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin,1985

* ¹⁵³ The new Constitution of the Third Republic is ambiguous in its presentation and appears to be self-contradictory on many levels. It does not appear that the constitution reconciles the issue on whether the state is «unitary» or «federal.» Rather, the new constitution establishes the state as a central unitary state that is united and indivisible, but places a great deal of authority on the newly decentralized provinces and territories. In addition, the constitution recognizes that there will be one national gendarmerie, one hierarchically organized judicial system, and the president will install the elected governors and lieutenant governors of the provinces. The state is also considered federal because the constitution recognizes a separation of powers between the central and provincial governments. In addition, the provincial governments are expected to create an independent budget, maintain an independent provincial bureaucracy staffed by local citizens of the province, as well as rely upon local resources that are deemed necessary in carrying out the provincial government's business. The constitution can be accessed at: <http://www.presidentrdc.cd/constitution.html>.

* ¹⁵⁴ The four former vice presidential seats were held by: Azarias Ruberwa (RCD): Policy, Defense and Security

Commission, representing the Rwandan-backed rebel group; Arthur Z'ahidi Ngoma (formerly RCD and then UPC) Social and Cultural Commission representing the Congolese Union for Peace political opposition movement; Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (PPRD): Reconstruction and Development Commission, representing the Kabila government; and Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC): Economic and Financial Commission representing the Ugandan backed rebels.

* ¹⁵⁸www.theguardian.com/congo/news/TheDRC consulted on the 15/12/17 at 22h45

* ¹⁵⁹ Stearns , Wolters: What happens in the Congo, Chicago university press, Chicago , 2011

* ¹⁶¹U.N. Group of Experts, «Interim report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078» (2013), p. 155, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml, consulted in the 20/11/2017 at 23h00

* ¹⁶⁴This is according to the Rwandan defense minister at the time. Human Rights Watch, «Rwanda: Observing the Rules of War?» (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2/.Consulted on 20/11/2017 at 23h45

* ¹⁶⁵ C.F, Tagou, Célestin : Démocratie Rotative, Transcendance et transformation politique des identités ethno-régionales dans l'état-nation du 21eme siècle, Yaoundé, Presses des Universités Protestantes d'Afrique, 2017, p.123

* ¹⁶⁷ Mahoney, James. 2010. «After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research.» World Politics 62 (1): n120-47 :pp. 21-89

* ¹⁶⁸C.F Collier, David: Understanding Process tracing in social sciences, in World Politics 456, n045 pp. 125- 168

* ¹⁶⁹ Council on Foreign Relations, Yearly report on central Africa, consulted on wwww.CFR.com on the 21/12/17 at 22h00

* ¹⁷⁰They are thousands of Congolese refugees that flood the Rwandan and Ugandan boarders every time a crisis occurs. Furthermore the warring factions in the Congo sometimes adopt overtly anti-Rwandan or Ugandan positions, instigating rebellion and disorder in these countries. This had been at the root of repeated Rwandan or Ugandan interventions in the Congo.

* ¹⁷² Council on foreign relations: Policy paper: Angola in Congo, CFR PRESS, New York, 2016

* ¹⁷⁴ For instance one week after the SADC issued a communiqué condemning the undemocratic behavior of Kabila; the South African head of state Jacob Zuma hosted his Congolese homologue on a state visit and congratulated him for his handling of the electoral crisis.

* ¹⁷⁵ Take the EU for instance where we have a classic case of Bigemony with France and Germany acting as hegemonic powers. This is only possible because France and Germany themselves are faced with the economic issues the EU tackles, and therefore their interests are similar to that of the other less powerful EU member states.

* ¹⁷⁶ www.EUROPEANUNION.com, on the finance section; consulted on the 21/12/17 at 23h00

* ¹⁷⁷ Hegemonic stability theory is especially developed in American International Political Economics

* ¹⁷⁸Wim van Binsbergen, is the creator of this thesis for more see Van Binsbergen; Wim: The splendid technology of forgiveness in World politics, edition 653 no32 june 2006

* ¹⁷⁹ Prichard, Evans : The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People, Oxford university Press, Oxford, 1940

* ¹⁸⁰ Proxy hegemonies described by Muller in Mueller, Jams: The APSA and the future of African mediation in International Regimes N/456 March 2016

* ¹⁸¹Tagou proposes an intricate system of ethnic rotation within countries to quash the issue of ethnic-based voting. His system is an innovative solution to the problems faced by African democracies. For more see Tagou, Célestin : Démocratie Rotative, Transcendance et transformation politique des identités ethno-régionales dans l'état-nation du 21eme siècle, Presses des Universités Protestantes d'Afrique, Yaoundé, 2017

* ¹⁸²C.F Collier, David: Understanding Process tracing in social sciences, world politics 456, n045 p 125- 168

* ¹⁸³ Mahoney, James : After KKV, the New methodology of qualitative research in World Politics 62, no. 1 ( January 2010), 120-47

* ¹⁸⁴Central Process Observations an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference

* ¹⁸⁵ Foucault, Michel : The order of things, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 edition