The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

Theoretical framework

The word `theory' is used in a bewildering variety of ways in the study of IR. It is applied to propositions and arguments at varying levels of abstraction, and debates over its most appropriate meaning have proceeded apace with little consensus achieved. If there is no agreement on how best to understand the term, let alone how best to engage in developing and criticizing the existing stock of IR theory, there is much great consensus over the ways which the term is used. A theory explains patterns by elaborating on why they take place. In one (in)famous expression, a theory explains laws of behavior. According to this conception, theories are useful instruments. If we know why and how events relate to each other, we then may be able to intervene and perhaps change reality to suit our purposes. We will present below the IR theories through which we will read the place Cameroon occupies in post-9/11 US policy toward Central Africa. Three theoretical frames of international relations will be pertinent in this work; realism, idealism and interdependence. Realism shall be our main analytical frame, while idealism and interdependence will be subsidiary theories, supporting realism. This choice makes sense because it appears that realism is the main theory that explains US goals, while idealistic and interdependent talk only come to complement or justify the realist thinking. But to understand the theories, we need to start by explaining the levels of analysis as paradigms within which IR should be studied.

The most common taxonomy in the field of IR refers to three levels of analysis - international, domestic, and individual. This is a forum of the international arena in which states are the core actors. Yet the state is not necessarily the appropriate level at which to focus analysis. The behavior of states in the international arena may be best explained as the outcome of domestic political processes among groups or institutions within states, or by the behavior or specific individuals within those groups or institutions.
One possibility for theory [and methodology] is to focus exclusively on the international political system. Such an approach presumes that domestic politics can be safely ignored in explaining state behavior. For example, realists tend to focus on changes in the balance of power among states as a property of the system's anarchic structure. A second possibility for a theory of international relations is to treat the behavior of states as a consequence of domestic politics, the behaviors of domestic interest groups and/or domestic political institutions. States are the nominal actors in the international system, but national behavior is determined by the action and interaction of bureaucracies and legislatures, political parties, business and union lobbies, and other advocacy groups. Finally, the behavior of states in international affairs can be treated as the consequence of the actions and interactions of individuals, such as heads of state. In this conception of international relations, national behavior may reflect either the particular choices of powerful individuals or the collective consequences of numerous individual choices. In either case, however, understanding how states behave in international affairs requires attention to individual interests, habits of thought, or world views.^35(*)

Realism: a theory of international relations that emphasizes states' interest in accumulating power to ensure security in an anarchic world, based on the notion that humans are power-seeking and that states act in pursuit of their national interests. It should be noted that classical writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes are often cited as the "founding fathers" of realism by contemporary self-described realists such as Morgenthau, Aron, Kennan, E.H. Carr, J. Hertz, Niebuhr, M. Wight, N. Spykman, etc.

Realism, sometimes called the `power-politics' school of thought or political realism in one form or another, has dominated both academic thinking of international relations and the conceptions of policy-makers and diplomats. The ideas associated with it can be traced to the ancient Greeks and Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War is widely regarded as the first sustained attempt to explain the origins of international conflict in terms of the dynamics of power politics. Machiavelli in The Prince (1513) and Hobbes in Leviathan (1641) also provided crucial components of this tradition, especially in their conceptions of interests, prudence, and expediency as prime motivators in the essentially anarchic context of international relations.^36(*)

Realism came under challenge on essentially methodological grounds by the behavioral or social science approaches but it reappeared in the 1980s in the guise of neorealism. Despite criticisms on their methodology, a generation of distinguished scholars continued the power-oriented approach of their predecessors. Among these were: R. Aron, H. Bull, H. Kissinger, R.E. Osgood, R. Rosencrance, K.W. Thompson, R.W. Tucker, K.N. Waltz and Arnold Wolfers.^37(*) International politics, according to realists, indeed, all politics, is thus defined as `a struggle for power'. `Power' in this sense is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself, an ability to influence or change the behavior of others in a desired direction, or alternatively the ability to resist such influences on one's own behavior.^38(*) The idea of self-help is central as it expresses the notion of sovereignty, which emphasizes the distinction between the domestic and external realms. The addition of an `s' to the word `state' creates not just a plural, but involves crossing a conceptual boundary. States answer to no higher authority and so must look to themselves to protect their interests and to ensure survival.^39(*)

In this work, we will adopt the branch of realism called Peripheral Realism. This refers to a foreign policy theory arising from the special perspective of (Latin American) peripheral states and represented by the work of Carlos Escude, for example. This view of international relations regards the international system as having an incipient hierarchical structure based on perceived differences between states: those that give orders, those that obey, and those that rebel. The peripheral approach introduces a different way of understanding the international system: that is, from the unique viewpoint of states that do not impose 'rules of the game' and which suffer high costs when they confront them. Thus, the foreign policies of peripheral states are typically framed and implemented in such a way that the national interest is defined in terms of development while confrontation with great powers is avoided, and autonomy is not understood as freedom of action but rather in terms of the costs of using that freedom.^40(*) Both the US and Cameroon have interests and want to defend those interests. Curiously, both actors avoid confrontation, Cameroon, as a peripheral state, sometimes resist orders.

Idealism or liberalism is so widely defined that only certain basic tenets can be described here. Idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily on morality, and that the baser and more selfish impulses of humans can be muted in order to build national and international norms of behavior that foment peace, prosperity, cooperation, and justice. Idealism then is not only heavily reformist, but the tradition has often attracted those who feel that idealistic principles are the "next-step" in the evolution of the human character.^41(*) Idealists prescribe what could be - IR as a quest for law and morality. For liberals, IR are all sorts of relations that states, international governmental and non governmental organizations and individuals have either in a formal or informal, bilateral or multilateral setting. These relations are sure competitive; but they can be pacified if regulated by a system of international norms based on human rights and freedoms. However, only democratic and free-trade practicing states can bring about such liberties. Anarchy and war are the results of fundamentalisms. But the absorption of frontiers initiated by globalization and democracy will eliminate conflicts and bring peace.

Liberals or idealists see international relations as a potential realm of progress and purposive change. They value individual freedom above all else, and they believe that the state ought to be constrained from acting in ways that undermine that freedom. Domestically, the power of the liberal state is limited by its democratic accountability to its citizens, the need to respect the demands of the marketplace and the rule of law.^42(*) One of the most cited idealists of the 20^th century is US president, Woodrow Wilson. In efforts to secure support for the League of Nations, with idealistic undertones, he declared in 1919 to Congress,

America is believed in throughout the world because she's put spirit before material ambition. She is willing to sacrifice everything...that freedom may reign throughout the world...Let us bind ourselves in a solemn covenant that we will redeem this expectation...that the world shall follow us...and that in leading, we will not lead along the path of private advantage or national ambition, but we will lead along the paths of right, so that men shall always say...American soldiers saved Europe and American citizens saved the world . ^43(*)

In the 1920s and 1930s, liberalism was disparaged as a form of `idealism' or `utopianism' by the self-proclaimed `realists' of the time. This was a label that was indiscriminately applied to the work of Norman Angell, Woodrow Wilson and Alfred Zimmern<sup>44(*)</sup>. But liberalism is no longer marginalized in the study of international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore communism as a global competitor to capitalism, has provided an opportunity for contemporary liberals to assess the legacy of their intellectual tradition and its [current] relevance, although some contemporary trends may appear to vindicate the insights of the `idealists', liberalism must respond to new challenges as the forces of global capitalism undermine the apparent `victory' of liberal democracy in the Cold War. This triumph will be examined to see the extent to which it has influenced Cameroon US relations. We will therefore asses the implication of ideas, beliefs, and legal/moral issues such as democracy and the rule of law in Cameroon US relations.

In all, it is only the society that applies a capitalist economic system, guarantee human rights and adopt democratic political regime that is likely to apply idealist principles. It is when these principles are applied to the world that there could be perpetual world peace. In other words, if states give priority to individual rights instead of the rights of states they would become interdependent and equal.

Interdependence means mutual dependence: peoples and governments are affected by what happens elsewhere; by the actions of their counterparts in other countries. In this sense it can constitute an analytical framework for the reading of Cameroon US relations. Clemens has observed that

The concept of interdependence fits our complex world where high-low politics converge and domestic-external realms intertwine.... It acknowledges the continuing importance of states but also the rising tide of cross-border transactions by nongovernmental actors^45(*)

The movement of resources and persons, the necessity of understanding, the existence of common enemies and common friends makes interdependence a structuring concept of IR. In this regard, it is Clemens' belief that, «It signifies mutual dependence... mutual vulnerability. ...it is a relationship in which the well-being of two or more actors is vulnerable or at least sensitive to the changes in the conditions or policies of the other.»^46(*) In this sense, changes in Cameroonian politics will affect the US in as much as policy changes in the US will affect Cameroon.

We should however be careful in the circumscription of our concept because «Two countries share strategic interdependence if they cannot defend against one another.»^47(*) Interdependence in Cameroon US relations will not be studied in terms of strategic mutual dependence, but relative human and transnational interdependence. We will use this concept to understand trade relations between the two political entities, considering the extent to which that breeds confidence and reliability. But we will keep in mind Kupchan's observation that «Whether interdependence breeds trust or instills resentment depends entirely upon the political context in which economic integration takes place.»^48(*) This concept will help us not only to analyze present trends in Cameroon Us relations but also the future of such relations. Interdependence will be read here as a hybrid between realism and idealism. There are many varieties of realism and idealism. However, a third perspective focused on interdependence took place in the late 20th century. This theory posits an international stage where actors are linked so closely that they can both hurt and help one another. The key players are governments of countries (states), but other actors are gaining influence, from the World Trade Organization to General Motors, Amnesty International, MTV, and drug cartels. Our world (and consequently US - CA) can be said to be on an escalating interdependence.

We should note that these theories were greatly challenged by the 9/11 events. Different IR scholars have turned to read post 9/11 international studies as a triumph of one or another, but hardly all of these theories.^49(*) Our work however primes the role of states, for as Harris Owen noted, of all the issues of globalization and interdependence, «In the interim, states have shown themselves to be extremely tough, durable and adaptable institutions, still the only entities that most people are prepared to fight and die for.»^50(*)

* ³⁵ Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, 2002. p. 166.

* ³⁶ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newman, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations 1998. P. 44

* ³⁷ Ibid p. 98

* ³⁸ ibid. p. 99

* ³⁹ ibid. p. 137

* ⁴⁰ Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories, http://au.altavista.com/IRtheories.htlm , (Last up-dated on 5 August 2006)

* ⁴¹

* ⁴² Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, op. cit. p. 51.

* ⁴³ Quoted by Donald K. Steinberg, Foreign Policy Post-September 11: Learning the Right Lessons», State Department, electronic distribution, February 27, 2003.

* ⁴⁴ Idem.

* ⁴⁵ Clemens, Jr., Dynamics of international relations, 1998, p. 19.

* ⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 20.

* ⁴⁷ Idem.

* ⁴⁸Kupchan, op. cit, p. 104. He explains that global integration breeds so much interdependence that Americans have more say in Malaysia's economy than the country's tax-paying, voting citizens.

Beavis, IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories, http://au.altavista.com/, (Last up-dated on 5 August 2006).

* ⁴⁹ For further reading on post 9/11 theories in IR studies, see: Études internationals, Volume 35, No 4, December 2004. «La théorie internationale face au 11 septembre et ses conséquences. Perspectives libérales et critiques», online at http://www.erudit.org/revue/ei/2004/v35/n4/010483ar.html ; Dario Battistella, «Le réalisme refute», Études internationals, Volume 35, No 4, December 2004 ; Sean Kay «Globalization, Power, and Security», Security Dialogue vol. 35, no. 1, March 2004; Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Yale H. FERGUSON, «Illusions of Superpower», Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 11, n^o 2, December 2003, pp. 21-36 ; Yale H. FERGUSON et Richard MANSBACH, «Of Empires Old and New», Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Association of International studies, Birmingham, P 15-17 December 2003; John IKENBERRY, «Illusions of Empire. Defining the New American Order», Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, n^o 2, March/April 2004, pp. 144-154 and especially Niall FERGUSSON, «Hegemony or Empire», Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, n^o 5, September/October 2003, pp. 154-161; http://www.oup.co.uk/best.textbooks/politics/jacksonsorensen2e/; http://faculty.adams.edu/%7Elmcenteno/interrelreadings.htm;

* ⁵⁰ Owen Harris, «Civilisations and Cultures - Clashing or Merging?», Lecture 4: Boyer Lectures, 7 December 2003