The Place of Cameroon in US Policy toward Central Africa after the Events of September 11 2001

How can Cameroon tackle all these challenges? Cameroon must constitute think tanks or policy planning staffs (permanent or ad hoc), especially in relation to the US. In the US, Haas asserts that «The rise of modern think tanks parallels the rise of the United States to global leadership».311(*) Think tanks are a distinctively American phenomenon, operating as an independent policy research institutions shaping both domestic and foreign policies. According to Haass, «Of the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated.»312(*) This role can also apply to Cameroon, especially in its dealing with America, and in the prospects of greater Cameroon engagement in the sub-region. Haass identifies five ways by which think tanks affect US policy formulation:

by generating original ideas and options for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in government, by offering venues for high-level discussions, by educating U.S. citizens about the world, and by supplementing official efforts to mediate and resolve conflict.313(*)

Instituting think tanks for Cameroonian foreign policy in general and Cameroon Us policy in particular will provide the advantages Haass put forward above, though such institutions might to wield as much power and funds as US think tanks would do. A last convincing role and advantage of think tanks advanced by Haass is that, «Unencumbered by official positions, think tank scholars can afford to give candid assessments of pressing global challenges and the quality of government responses.»314(*) In other words, they play the role of autonomous foreign policy analysts.

Another pertinent issue is the formulation of a US foreign policy goal. Faced with an unavoidable, powerful and interesting partner, Cameroon must clearly define the goals of its policy in political, economic, social, cultural and strategic terms. Knowing the concept of selective engagement, Cameroon has to convince US policy-makers of the need to engage with Cameroon. The level of US investment in Cameroon today is quite high, but it needs to stand at its maximum. America must not perceived as a far away country, but as a strategic partner with whom formidable projects could be initiated. Engaging political dialogue, for instance through the many American corporations in Cameroon such as EXIM Bank, while presenting potential investment sectors, will largely boast US investment in Cameroon. Such a dialogue will define responsibilities for both the US and Cameroon, focused on three pillars. One is debt relief, or debt consolidation. Another is fair trade. And the third is an increase, a significant increase, of aid, exactly to tap into these changes which are coming, to tap resources which can make a huge impact in changing the conditions of people in Cameroon.^315(*)

GENERAL CONCLUSION

At the end of this paper, it is worth asking which came first for the Americans in their foreign policy towards Central Africa: promotion (imposition) of democracy or the protection of strategic (oil and military) interests. We now know that Americans of all political persuasions, Republicans or Democrats, believe profoundly that it is their right and duty, indeed their destiny, to promote freedom and democracy in the world. In fact, since independence, exporting democracy has always been their purpose. It is a noble and powerful impulse, one not casually to be ridiculed or dismissed. But their success requires that this impulse be balanced against, and where necessary, circumscribed by other interests that the United States must necessarily pursue, more mundane ones like security, order and prosperity. In fact, Owen Harries writes that «For these represent not merely legitimate competing claims but the preconditions for a lasting extension of democracy.»^316(*) It is another thing altogether if democracy is good for oil, if dictators are not better allies.

It is another question altogether if America is succeeding in implanting democracy in Central Africa. From the definition of democracy given in chapter 2, it will be difficult to say yes. To take just two of the elements of democracy - liberalism and political transition, it may be said that Central African states are still far from being democratic. There is no liberal democracy in the region, nor is there liberalism that could be a favourable environment for democracy. On the second element, democratic regime change, it remains that America still has to effect such a change in the region. In fact, the region has the longest presidents in power, have organized everything but free and fair elections. President Bongo of Gabon has been there for close to 40 years, President Biya for 25, President Obiang Ngeuma for 28, President Derby came in through a military coup and has been there for 18 years. The CAR has gone from one military regime to another, while the DR Congo is still coming out of war, as Burundi and Rwanda. Even President Dos Santos of Angola has been there for close to 20 years, having come in through a coup. At the US embassy in Yaoundé, officials affirm clearly that the US has done much for democracy in Cameroon, and that the advances today, including the relative stability, is thanks to the US.

However, US success in the region also requires an awareness of the intractability of a world that does not exist merely in order to satisfy American expectations, a world that, for the most part, cannot satisfy those expectations in the foreseeable future. The same questions that have been asked about the Middle East could be asked of Central Africa: is it possible to democratize Central Africa; is it even necessary to do so? As Owen noted, «While determination and purposefulness are important ingredients in any effective policy, the attempt to force history in the direction of democracy by an exercise of will is likely to produce more unintended than intended consequences.»^317(*) The organization of elections in all countries of the sub-region could be interpreted as an indication of the possibility of instituting democracy, but successful promotion of democracy calls for restraint and patience. The examples of `democratically elected' regimes in Iran and Palestine have lessons to teach on the dangers of what Fareed Zakaria calls the rise of `illiberal democracy'. It would be necessary for America to work towards liberalism as a precondition for democracy, for it is democracy that will justify and preserve strategic interests.

One of the difficulties encountered in this study is the complex nature of managing theories and methods in international relations. It has been clear that particular facts could be read from several theories, using different methods. The handling of three theories in the study of Cameroon US relations has been instrumental in enlarging the debate of whether Cameroon is at all important to the US and how the US policy maker sees such an importance, if any. At the end, it appears plausible that different departments in the US administration see Cameroon with particular lenses - interdependence, realism and/or liberalism. Or better still; they see Cameroon through the realist lens in association with either interdependence or liberalism. The National Security Council and the Department of Defense would be predominantly realists, while the State Department and Congress would be interdependent/liberalists.

As for our hypothetical assertion that the US has post 9/11 geopolitical and strategic interests in Cameroon, which have greatly modified their perception, it has been discovered that this is only true to some extent. First geopolitical interests are quite vast and inter-related with several other interests. Secondly, the geopolitical interests are potentially pre-9/11, only receiving new impulses after that date. In that sense, 9/11 as an event is not as important as the interpretation and especially the revelation thereof as far as US perception of Cameroon is concerned. From analysis of our data, it appears that the US had it as a project a long time before 9/11 to improve relations with Cameroon for strategic purposes. One could therefore think that the area became a geopolitical priority before 11 September 2001. At a meeting in 2000 on Africa's energy potential, oil companies told the Congress sub-committee on Africa just that. The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), a think-tank set up in Jerusalem in 1984, played an important part in the meeting.^318(*)

Our findings have been quite revealing of the depth of changes since the tragic events of 9/11. If the United States took a ten-year "holiday from history" from the end of the Cold War until the terrorist attack of September 11, as Charles Krauthammer observed,^319(*) post 9/11 was a time of grand strategy. In chapter one, we saw that the history of US-Cameroon relations and the geopolitical factors within Cameroon have largely influenced changes observable since 9/11. In chapter 2, it was clear, that the reasons for a greater US presence in Cameroon might be found more in the economic and strategic interests of the Gulf of Guinea and the leadership role Cameroon plays or can play there. To measure real increase in relations, we assessed practical and symbolic changes such as visits and public diplomacy in the third chapter with the result that there has been a net growth in the quality and quantity of such features. With that in mind, it was then our task to measure the implications of this intensification of Cameroon-US relations on other rival powers such as France and China, and on regional contesters to Cameroon's leadership such as Gabon and Angola. That gave us enough material to assess what Cameroon stand to gain and/or lose in this state of affairs.

The objectives of US Foreign policies in Cameroon are generally designed to help protect American national interests, national security, economic prosperity, and ideological goals (democracy). The fundamental purpose of America's foreign policy has not changed in more than two centuries. It is primarily to protect American citizens, territory, livelihood and values as well as American allies. But the making of American foreign policy has changed because the world has changed. Threats have changed, so have resources, friends, enemies and strategies. There is move towards mutual dependence and mutual vulnerability, such that hitherto regions of benign neglect such as Central Africa now have strategic importance.

1. Will the US produce a policy paper for Cameroon?

It keeps bothering us whether the US will produce a policy paper for Cameroon as it does for other regional hub-countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya. Following the growing importance of specific countries, the State Department formulate policies papers defining what the US intends to achieve in those countries. When no such papers exist, policy papers are formulated for entire regions. There is a Central African desk at the Department of State, but not a Cameroonian desk.

For the US to produce a policy paper for Cameroon, Cameroon must be ready to merit such a paper by playing a more assertive role in the sub-region. But what appears from our paper is that Cameroonian leadership potential in the sub-region is for the moment under-rated, under-exploited, under-asserted and unproductive. Cameroon has not made enough use of its military, economic, political, demographic and technological power to unite the region and spur development and stability. Cameroon has looked more like what John Quincy Adams famously described the US to be, «[America] ...goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.»^320(*)

However, it appears that though Cameroon is not doing enough in its leadership role in the sub-regions' integration, and that there are rival powers such as Gabon, Angola and DR Congo, none of these countries is likely to replace Cameroon in the foreseeable future. If the US is to produce a policy paper for any country in the sub-region, it is going to be Cameroon. The United States, with the United Nations and allies if and as feasible, should assume the role of the "nonpaternalistic nation builder," whose primary responsibility is to provide security, to prevent civil war or anarchy, and then fund development projects while increasing private investment.^321(*)

* ³¹¹ Richard N. Haass, «Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective», Policy Outlook, US State Department, November 1, 2002. This article was written for electronic distribution. Haass is Director, Policy Planning Staff at the State Department.

* ³¹² Idem.

* ³¹³ Haass, idem.

* ³¹⁴ Idem.

* ³¹⁵ These ideas were clearly expressed by Graca Machel, during the Darryl G. Behrman Lecture on Africa Policy: The African Agenda, op, cit.

* ³¹⁶ Owen Harries, «A World of Democracy» in Boyers Lectures, Lecture 3, 2003 at http://www.abc.net/rn/boyerlectures/stories/2003/987627.htm

* ³¹⁷ Owen, idem.

* ³¹⁸ IASPS has close links with the Likud party, a longstanding advocate of reducing dependence on Saudi oil, and US neo-conservative forces. See Jean-Christophe Servant, «The new Gulf oil states», op, cit.

* ³¹⁹ Quoted by Harris Owen, «Taking on Utopia», op, cit.

* ³²⁰ Quoted by Owen Harries, «Challengers», Lecture 5, Boyer Lectures, 14 December 2003

* ³²¹ Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building, New York: Princeton University Press, 2004.