The use of english modals by first-year students of the department of anglophone studies( Télécharger le fichier original )par Moussa Ouattara Université de Ouagadougou - Maîtrise 2009 |
I.5.1 - Defining modality
In modal logic, the branch of logic that deals with modality, the term «modality» is not clearly defined. However, scholars propose, implicitly or explicitly, some criteria for its definition. The criteria we shall propose here are to be found in Palmer (1986). Basing his discussion on Lyons (1977), Palmer identifies six criteria: proposition, subjectivity, factuality, epistemic and deontic, possibility and necessity, mood. Jespersen (1924) and Lyons (1977) insist on the distinction between proposition and modality. Proposition refers to the «contents of the sentence» while modality refers to the «speaker's attitude or opinion». Rescher (1968:24-6)11(*) makes the distinction between proposition and modality in the following way: «A proposition is presented by a complete, self-contained statement which, taken as a whole, will be true or false: `The cat is on the mat', for example». He goes on: «When such a proposition is itself made subject to some further qualification of such a kind that the entire resulting complex is itself once again a proposition, then this qualification is said to represent a modality to which the original proposition is subjected». Hence, we have: - The cat is on the mat (proposition) - The cat may be on the mat (modality) - Peter thought the cat was on the mat (modality) Thus Rescher's definition of modality includes negation, tense, aspect and clauses. Palmer concludes that it is «reasonable enough, in a study of modality to consider not only the ways speakers express their attitudes and opinions, but also the ways in which others may report their expressions of them». The second criterion in the definition of modality is subjectivity. Lhérété and Ploton's (1990:132) explanation of modality is worth noting: «When someone speaks, he can -whether try to be objective -or try to be subjective In the first case, the speaker relates the events as a historian, who has not participated in the achievement of these events. In the second case, the speaker/writer tells the hearer/reader how he perceives the events, through the filter of his sensibility. Modality is the use of this filtering by the speaker/writer12(*)» Subjectivity is then of paramount importance in modality. Palmer (1986:16) suggests that modality is essentially subjective because reference is made to the «speaker's opinion and attitude». He further argues that modality could be defined as «the grammaticalization of speaker's (subjective) attitudes and opinions». Thereby, the modal verb «can» cannot be considered as modal when it expresses the subject's ability - instead of the speaker's opinion. Palmer (1986:17) notes, «If modality is concerned with the attitudes and opinions of the speaker, subjectivity is clearly basic». Modality can then be expanded to adverbs such as frankly, fortunately, possibly; verbs such as appear, assume, think 13(*). The third criterion in the definition of modality is set by Lyons (1977)14(*). He suggests that we should consider the commitment of the speaker to the statement. Whenever the speaker commits himself to the truth of what he asserts, there is no modality. For Lyons, «straight forward statements of fact are non-modal» because there are propositions. He proposes some examples:
«- He may have gone to Paris - Perhaps he went to Paris - It is possible that he went to Paris» He notes that there is modality in the examples because they contain a modal verb, a modal adverb and a modal adjective respectively. The fourth criterion to be considered is the epistemic and deontic interpretations of modals. Most scholars agree that there are two types of modality. Jespersen (1924:320-1) 15(*)recognizes two sets of modality: modality `containing an element of will' and `not containing an element of will'. These sets correspond to Lyons' (1977:452)16(*) reference to `the speaker's opinion or attitude towards the proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition describes'. Von Wright (1977:93)17(*) uses `epistemic modality' versus `deontic modality' whereas Hofmann (1966)18(*) used `epistemic modality' and `root modality'. Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1983:83) use the terms `logical probability use' and `social interactional use' of modals. In this work we shall use Von Wright's terms. The following examples illustrate the different types of modality and interpretation between brackets. Epistemic interpretation: He may come tomorrow. (Perhaps he will) Deontic interpretation: He may come tomorrow. (He is permitted) The fifth criterion is possibility and necessity. Palmer (1986:20) notes, «Where epistemic and deontic modality are so clearly linked, the link depends upon possibility and necessity». Quoting Lyons (1977:787), he says that possibility and necessity are «the central notions of traditional modal logic». He argues that they are logically related in terms of negation, and this account for the fact that cannot as an expression of negative possibility appears to function as the negative of epistemic must. The issue lies on the use of may and must. Let us consider the sentences: (a) Epistemic: He may be there. (possibility) He may not be there. (it is possible that he is there) He can't be there. (it is not possible that he is there) (b) Deontic: He must be there. (necessity) He can't be there. (it is necessary that `he is not there') He may not be there. (it is not necessary that `he is there') Palmer (1986) remarks that in (a) may not corresponds to `possible' and cannot corresponds to `not possible' while in (b) cannot equates to `necessary' and may not corresponds to `not necessary'. He notes that in (a), may not expresses a positive fact and cannot a negative one whereas in (b) it is the reverse. To enlighten this point let's group the utterances: Epistemic: He may not be there Deontic: He may not be there It is then clear that epistemic and deontic modalities are linked in negation. The last criterion for the definition of modality is the distinction between mood and modality. Mood is a grammatical category whereas modality is a notional or semantic category. Mood is an element of modality19(*). All criteria considered, we admit that the English modal auxiliaries appertain to modality. Although some criteria are set to determine when an utterance is modalized, and though modality is not only made by grammatical devices but also by lexical items, McCarthy (1991:84) remarks that modality is often thought of as the province of the closed class of modal verb and treated as part of grammar of English. This account for the definitions English grammar books give to modality. Wardhaugh (2003:56) writes, «Modality refers to the possible world in which the state or event denoted by the verb is situated: the kinds of truth, possibility, necessity, etc. that must exit there. The modal verbs are can, may, will, shall and must». As for Huddleston (1984:165), modality is «a rather broad term for the kind of meaning characteristically expressed by modals». He interchangeably uses `modals', `modal auxiliary verbs' and `modal auxiliaries'. These authors limit modality to modals. Another grammar book which has the same viewpoint is the one by Feigenbaum (1985:115). The introduction to modals is as follows: «Time, status, and relevance are used to respect what happened, what is going to happen, etc. In addition to these three types o f information, it is possible to express an attitude or evaluation of a situation. For example we can indicate that an action is probable or that it is contrary-to-fact; we can indicate that there is permission or an obligation to do something. Modal auxiliaries and phrases are used in order to give the speaker's or writer's point of view about a situation.» Feigenbaum's `speaker's or writer's point of view about a situation' coincides with Lyons' (1977:452)20(*) `speaker's opinion or attitude towards the proposition' in his definition of modality. The most daring definition which confines modality to modal verbs is that of Wardhaugh (2003:275) in the glossary. It states that modality is «the meaning expressed by a modal verb». How does modality come to be confined to modals? To know this, let us look into modals.
* 11 Ibid. * 12 Lorsqu'on s'exprime on peut: Soit viser l'objectivité Soit laisser parler sa subjectivité Dans le premier cas, l'énonciateur rend compte des événementss à la manière d'un historien qui s'efface derriere la réalité Dans le deuxième cas, l'énonciateur raconte à l'auditeur ou au lecteur les faits tels qu'il les perçoit à travers le filtre de sa sensabikité. On appelle modalité la présence de ce filtrage exercé par l'énonciateur. * 13 McCarthy (1991:85) * 14 Palmer, op. cit. * 15 Ibid. * 16 Ibid. * 17 Ibid. * 18Celce-Murcia and .Larsen-Freeman (1983:83) * 19 See section I.2.0 * 20 Palmer, o.p. cit.p33 |
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