NIGER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH FRANCE (1974 -
1987)
BY
DOUKA ALASSANE MAHAMIDOU
REG NO: U00IS2002
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF
SCIENCE DEGREE, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (B.Sc), FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA.
JUNE, 2004
CERTIFICATION
This project has been read and approved as having satisfied the
requirement governing the Award of the International studies Department, (B.Sc.
Degree) Faculty of Social Sciences, A.B.U, Zaria.
___________________________ _____________
Coordinator Date
Dr. Ntim Gyakari Esew
___________________________ _____________
Supervisor Date
Mallam Umar Kaoje
___________________________ _____________
Head of Department Date
Dr. A. S. Mohammed
DEDICATION
To God Almighty, I dedicate this project work for his guidance
and protection throughout these turbulent years of my academic pursuit, and for
seeing me through successfully.
To my parents, Late Douka Alassane (May his soul rest in
peace) and my Mother, Hadjia Ramatou Oumarou a.k.a. Godi.
To my elder brother, Douka Sediko
To my younger and elder sisters, Hadidjatou Douka, Aichatou
Douka, Aminatou Douka and late Ramatou Douka. To my nieces and nephews,
Saratou Douka, Ramatou Douka a.k.a. wani, Fanata Douka, Fatchima Illa
Aboubacar, Ibrahim Haya Nomao.
To my aunts, Late Didjé, Attou, Halima, Fatchima,
Hadjara, Habiba, binta, Danmama.
To my uncles, Late Namata Alassane, Late Guebé
Alassane, Late Elhadj Bizo, Abarchi, Djibo, Oudou, Issa, Assoumane, Assoumane
Elhadj Alio.
More so, to the memory of all members of my family missed with
endless love. Although, you are no more with us physically but, your spirit and
good works still lingers in our lives, until we meet to part no more.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is universally acceptable fact that «no man is an
island». This simply implies that for the fulfillment of this noble task
of my studies, others have assisted me in various angles. It covers both
experience gained from people, moral support and financial contribution. Worthy
of mention is my elder brother, Douka Sédiko for the encouragement and
support he gave me throughout my stay in school, as well as preparing me for
the challenges ahead.
To my mother, Mrs Hadjia Ramatou Douka a.k.a. Godi, who due
to her love for me, took the pains amidst difficulties to bring me up in the
most qualitative manners as well as giving me that sense of belonging, `mum,
you mean more than just a mother to me», my 6thanks go to my
sister-in-law, Hadiza Djindjiri, to my brother, Zakou Yahaya, to my
brothers-in-law, Haya Nomaou. Illa Aboubacar, Adamou Salifou.
My thanks go to my brothers and sisters for our harmonious
stay together through these years and their steadfastness in prayers, which has
been my only shield in times of difficulties all through my stay in school.
Hence, my thanks go to Mallam Aminu Ladan (Matawalin Zazzau),
to Aliyu Kari (FCE, Zaria), Dr. Alisah (HOD of French Department, ABU Zaria),
Dr. Adebisi (Coordinator of PCEF). To Prof. Ayo Dunmoye for his role as my
academic adviser. To Dr Hudu Ayuba, Dr Yakubu A. Yusuf, Dr. Ntim Essew, Prof.
Paul Izah, Aliyu Yahaya, Lawal Rahanatu, Umar Tanko A, Dr. Chief Tagowa, Mal.
M.L. Tafida, Mallam Umar Kaoje, Kaode Omojuwa, Dr. P.A. Odofin, Mutftang as my
lecturers for their fatherly guidance and advice.
My special appreciation goes to my head of Department, Dr.
Abubakar Saddique Mohammed.
My regards go to Mallam Umar Kaoje, for he has been my
supervisor for engaging me in a task that brought the best of me and for
creating time to go through my work and for being my source of inspiration.
My appreciation goes to my roommates, Mamane Sani Brah Bololo
a.k.a. Seirra, Yahaya Rabiou Abdoulkader, Ibrahim Boukari Magagi, Sinny Sanda
Mahamane Oumarou, Omar Chétima for being my pals, and our understanding
while together.
I am also extending my profound gratitude to my bosom friends
in Niger Republic, Lawali Moussa Aichatou, Mehaou Halidou Bakary, Laouali Sani
Adamou, Moussa Salifou, Maliki Amadou Ibrahim, Mahamadou Idrissa, Djibo
Karimoun Hadiza, Moutari Bachir, Gado Sabo Laminou, Karimoun Balkissa. My
relationship with these people has influenced my life positively and spurred in
me desire to aspire greater heights in life.
More so, I wish to thank all my classmates from Niger
republic, Abdou Dan Gallou Adamou, Issa Garba Safia, Abdou Moustapha, Ousmane
Mamane Bassirou, Galadi Souleymane, Abdou Garba Issaka.
To my friends in the course of my study from Nigeria, Hassan
M. Mohammed, Rukaiyya Saidu Abubakar, Amina Kaoje, Omale T. Omale, Ahmed Ojoma,
Bakano Othman Rashida, Ahmadu Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo Bisoye, El-Kas, Saka
Ibrahim, Al-Hassan Musa,Madaki Alheri, Atodo Mercy, Fiaya Ajuma G. Jacob T.
Sarah, Umar M. Mohammed, Abba Najeeb, Adah Obah Daniel, Ahmed Garba, Kpanja
Mercy, Bawa Joel, Sanda Umaru, Gayis Tsan, Sanni O. Ouindasoia, Akintunde
Adebukola Z., Osunsanya Busola A, Boma O, Benjamin, Olu Majek, Bimbo Olalemi,
Sarah T. Tapchi, Shikson Lugards Lonftonf, Olufemi Odedele, Hassana Danda,
Vandi Comfort, Bashir M. Zailani, Hamman J. I say thank you all and pray for
God to continue to keep us all together.
My appreciation goes to Paraiso Zara, Saidou Abdoul Karim, Dan
Mallam Aichatou, Paraiso Safia, Moussa Chétima Razina, Kabiru Nasir,
Abdoul Nasser Maigachi, Bachir Ahmadou, Elhadji Sani Saboutou, Timi Kaoura
Malari, Beti Mariama, Hanni Ouma, Laouali Laouali a.k.a. Mam, Laouali Abdoul
Aziz, Ibrahim Mamane Sani a.k.a. Platini, Bawa Aicha, Abdoulaye Barkire a.k.a.
Doul, Gambodje Idjiri, Abdoul Razak Tanimoune a.k.a. Yellow Guy. I deserve no
pardon if I do not extend my humble appreciation to the ECOWAS Secretariat
(Abuja), to Niger's Embassy (Abuja), to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
African Integration of Niger Republic especially the DAJC (Direction des
Affaires Juridiques et du Contentieux, Niamey), to the French Embassy and
consulate in Niamey, to the AFVP (Association Française des Volontaires
du Progrès, Niamey), to IFRA (Ibadan).
My special appreciation to Ary Tanimoune (Director of DAJC,
Niamey) and for those whose names I could not mention, it should not be taken
as an oversight. I love you all and God bless.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.B.U. Ahmadu Bello University
a.k.a. Also known as
AFN Association des Femmes du Niger
AFVP Association Française des Volontaires du
Progrès
AID Agence Internationale pour le Développement
ANDP Alliance Nigérienne pour la Démocratie et
le Progrès
AU African Union
BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CDS Convention Démocratique et Sociale
CEA Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique
CEDEAO Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest
CENI Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante
CEN-SAD The Community of Sahel Saharan States
CFA Communauté Financière en Afrique (UEMOA)
CFMU Compagnie Française des Minerais
d'Uranium
CMS Conseil Militaire Suprême
CND Conseil National de Développement
COGEMA Compagnie Générale des Matières
Nucléaires
COMINAK Compagnie Minière d'Akouta
DAJC Direction des Affaires Juridiques et du Contentieux
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
f.o.b. Free on board
FAN Forces Armées Nigériennes
FIDES Economic and social Investment Fund
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GIP Groupe d'Intervention de la Police
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IFRA Institut Français des Recherches en Afrique
IMF International Monetary Funds
ISPs Internet Service Providers
LDCs Less Developed Countries
MNSD Mouvement National pour la
Société de Développement
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU Organisation of African Union
OCAM Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne
OIC Organization of Islamic Conference
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PNDS Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le
Socialisme
PPN-RDA Parti Progressiste Nigérien - Rassemblement
Démocratique Africain
RDP Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Peuple
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SOMAÏR Société des Mines de l'Aïr
U.S.A.I.D. United States Agency for International
Development
UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
TABLE OF CONTENT
CERTIFICATION
2
DEDICATION
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
8
TABLE OF CONTENT
11
CHAPTER ONE
15
1.1 INTRODUCTION
15
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM
18
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
19
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
STUDY
19
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
20
1.6 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
21
1.7 HYPOTHESIS
21
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
22
1.9 CHAPTERIZATION
22
1.10 REFERENCES
23
REFERENCES
23
CHAPTER TWO
25
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
25
REFERENCE
30
CHAPTER THREE
32
3.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
32
3.1 COUNTRY: NIGER
32
3.2 DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS OF NIGER
33
3.3 LANGUAGES OF NIGER
35
3.4 RELIGIONS
36
3.5 BORDERLANDS
36
3.6 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND COLONIALISM
36
3.7 POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENTS OF NIGER
37
3.8 GEOGRAPHY
39
3.9 POLITICAL PARTIES
41
LIST OF IMPORTANT PARTIES IN NIGER
41
3.10 NIGER MILITARY
41
3.11 FOREIGN RELATIONS
42
3.12 NIGER'S ECONOMY (FACTS)
43
3.13 TRANSPORTATION
45
3.14 COMMUNICATION
46
REFERENCE
46
WEBSITES
47
CHAPTER FOUR
48
4.0 NIGER'S FOREIGN POLICY TO FRANCE (1974 -
1987)
48
4.1 INTRODUCTION
48
4.2 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN
POLICY
50
4.3 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED NIGER'S FOREIGN
POLICY
53
4.3.1 LAND-LOCKED STATE
53
4.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL
UNDERDEVELOPMENT
54
4.3.3 NIGER'S DEPENDENCY
59
4.4 AREA OF DISCORD WITH FRANCE
64
4.5 ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
67
4.5.1 FRENCH AID TO NIGER
69
4.5.2 NIGER'S URANIUM
70
4.6 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
71
4.6.1 EXCHANGE OF VISIT OF HEAD OF STATES
71
4.6.2 THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT FRANÇOIS
MITTERAND IN NIGER (MAY 19TH TO 21ST, 1982).
73
4.6.2.1 FRANCE MAKES HONOR TO NIGER
73
4.6.2.2 FRANCO-NIGERIEN DECLARATION OF NIAMEY
75
4.6.2.3 IN THE FIELD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS
76
4.6.2.4 IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD
77
4.7 MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTERACTIONS
78
REFERENCES
79
CHAPTER FIVE
84
5.1 SUMMARY
84
5.2 CONCLUSION
85
5.3 RECOMMENDATION
88
BIBLIOGRAPHY
90
PERIODICALS
91
NEWSPAPERS
91
PAMPHLETS
91
ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES
91
WEBSITES
92
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Niger gained its independence on August 3rd, 1960
from France. President Hamani Diori ruled the country. The foreign policy of
Niger was highly conducted and personalized by President Hamani Diori, and
because foreign policy debates in the national Assembly were indeed very rare,
one is, therefore, obliged to look into the statements or communiqués
issued after the meetings of these multinational organizations in which the
president himself participated. Relations with France started since before
Niger's independence and continued after independence.
On April 15th, 1974, a shadowy group of twelve
(12) military officers led by Lt. Col. (later General) Seyni Kountché,
who had become chief of staff of the FAN (Nigerien Armed forces) a year before,
seized power from civilians. He became the new head of state under
«Conseil Militaire Suprême». The coup d' État occurred
when a combination of devastating drought and accusations of rampant corruption
ruined the country under Hamani Diori's regime. After overthrowing Hamani Diori
in an almost bloodless coup (the only casualty reported was Madam Diori,
Aissa), Lt. Col. Seyni Kountché went on the air on the April
15th, 1974 and announced his government's domestic and external
policies. Referring to the foreign policy of Niger, he said,
We will continue to belong to all African and International
Organizations and will respect our undertakings to them on the condition that
they take account of the interest of our people1.
In fact, he mentioned no significant departure in the foreign
policy principles of the previous regime. The new regime's immediate
occupations were to tackle the drought situation, to modify the former
agreement with France to suit Niger's interest and to obtain a better deal for
uranium exploitation . . .
Niger's connection with France has been its most important
relationship by far since independence. For France, a new factor had entered
into its interest with Niger: Nigerien uranium for French weapons and nuclear
power plants. By 1974, Niger was considered to be one of France's closest
allies in Africa, and France had decided to increase its level of economic
assistance to Niger by nearly one -third2.
One of the cardinal principles of Niger's foreign policy is
her special relation with France. This aspect has assumed so much importance
that it has overshadowed and influenced Niger's relations with other nations in
Africa and the world. Relations with France continued to be friendly since much
of the aid came from her. As mentioned earlier, because of the poor economic
conditions of Niger, the country could not afford to offend the leaders of
France; particularly when France has been continuously providing cash and
technical aid to make up Niger's deficit budgets3.
The «Conseil Militaire Suprême» coup of April
1974 changed very little in the basic relationship apart from style. After an
initial period of unsettled relations, France supported the Kountché
regime by renegotiating the price of uranium and by increasing Niger's share in
the SOMAIR mine. In February 1977, it officially instituted a new more
bilateral process of granting foreign assistance to Niger, leading
Kountché to state that the new deal «eradicated all traces of
paternalism» in Franco-Nigerien relations4. Despite
Kountché's forays into pro-Arab and Pro-southern foreign policy in the
late 1970s, relations with France remained good, dominated by continuing French
interest in Nigerien uranium. When Nigerien concerns over Libyan threats to its
uranium fields grew in 1981, new Franco-Nigerien military agreements ostensibly
designed to protect French nationals in the desert mining communities, were
promulgated.
Franco-Nigerien relations were expected to improve still
further with the election of French President, François Mitterrand in
1981, owing to the new socialist Party President's long-standing personal
interest in African affairs, his personal relationship with a number of African
leaders and the historic commitment of his party to «socialist
solidarity». He and his new foreign aid minister, Jean Pierre Cot,
promised to base France's relationship with its former colonies on a «
more sincere and just policy» and pledged support without intervention and
understanding for policies of Non-alignment, such as those espoused by the
government of Niger5. In 1981, Francois Mitterrand promised a new
deal for the third world, pledging to double French aid overall, to 0.7 percent
of the French GNP by 1988, and committing France to undertake longer-term
assistance programmes to be defined by national leaders, such as the
Kountché government6. In May 1982, he visited Niger and
tackled a long-standing issue in uranium politics, Franc's failure to help
Niger obtain a cheap, usable source of domestic power for its own
industrialization. Reaffirming a 1979 promise, he committed French financing to
help build the Kandaji dam, which was to be Niger's first domestic source of
hydroelectric power. The Kountché government warmly welcomed these
changes.
From its very inception, Niger has been dependent on France
for military protection, codified by a set of agreements, «The Accords de
Coopération» which provide for French military assistance against
both external and internal threats7. Not even the Kountché
regime, however which came to power committed to reducing foreign military
presence renounced these agreements. France removed its troops, but its
military advisers remained, and it promised more extensive military support if
requested.
Overall, Niger's relationship with France under General Seyni
Kountché has depended on a considerable element of mutuality of
interests. The key to understanding the evolution of this relationship,
however, lies much more in shifting French interests than in changes in
Nigerien priorities.
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM
Our concern on this work is centered on the relationship
between Niger as a colony and France as colonial master during Seyni
Kountché's regime. We are going to look at the following:
Political relations
Economic relations
Diplomatic relations
Military relations
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In a project of this nature, the fundamental questions are
those of consistency and validity. These questions are important because
without making the research meet the required standard, the effort could not be
said to have made possible the growth of knowledge. It is against this
background that content analysis will be used in this work. Secondary data
resources are used from libraries; relevant literature in the form of
textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers and articles will be used. Internet
(websites) and speeches will be also used. They will ask specific questions
about political, economic, diplomatic and military interactions between the two
(2) countries.
However, due to the biased nature of these journals, effort
will be made to bring out the salient truth in such issues.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION
FOR THE STUDY
The significance of this study stems not only from the
difference of factors between the two (2) states, but also from the
non-divergence and diversity. Through our study cannot be meaningful without
mentioning the importance of the difference of factors, yet our emphasis would
be to study the achievements and the failures towards the aspects in their
bilateral relations in diverse directions and policies. The period of the study
commences from General Seyni Kountché's regime, which was from 1974 to
1987 in its relations with France.
Moreover, it is a study of very friendly partners. It will
also explain why future foreign policies need to be formulated.
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For the purpose of fostering proper understanding and critical
analysis in relations to the foreign policy of Niger to France under General
Seyni Kountché (1974-1987), it is deemed necessary to use the
underdevelopment and Dependency Theory. This could be attributed to the fact
that the theory explains better the nature of the Nigerien relations with
France as it metropolis as well as other developing countries in the
contemporary international system.
This further explains the fact that an economy to the extent
is dependent that it's position and relation to other economies in the global
system, makes it incapable of auto centric development. All the post-colonial
economies and all its relations in general were heavily dependent by the
criteria of this definition8.
The concept of «dependency» coined by Brazilian
sociologist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, (later President of Brazil) helps to
link those who are beneficiaries of development with those who make the
decision. Dependency simply states that crucial economic decisions are made not
by countries that are being ?developed» but by foreigners whose interests
are carefully safeguarded. Foreigners (westerners) use their economic powers to
buy political power in the countries that they penetrate. This could mean
political pressure by the imperialist metropolis or even military intervention.
This collusion between alien economic and political power distorts both the
economy and the policy of the dependent countries9. In terms of
underdevelopment, the theoretical postulation b Walter Rodney has it that
underdevelopment is not the absence of development but it makes sense only as a
way of comparing levels of development. Underdevelopment is very much tied to
the fact that human social development has been uneven and from a strictly
economic viewpoint some human groups have advanced further producing more and
becoming more wealthy10.
1.6 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The objectives and aims of this study are to find the
following:
The impact of Niger's foreign policy to France during General
Seyni Kountché.
The importance of the relationship between the two (2)
countries.
1.7 HYPOTHESIS
We have to look at:
The historical ties of French colonialism and its impact on
Niger as a colony influenced Niger's foreign policy.
France's neo-colonial interests in Niger played an important
role in shaping Niger's relationship with France under Genera Seyni
Kountché's regime.
If there is continuity and change in Niger's foreign policy
during Kountché's era.
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of this work covers the Niger's foreign policy to
France (1974 - 1987). Special emphasis would be made to reflect on the
activities of Seyni Kountché's regime with France. More so, the period
of this research work is going to run between 1974 till 1987.
1.9 CHAPTERIZATION
The write-up will take this form:
Chapter one as usual introduces the topic and shed light on
the research problem, the research methodology, the significance and
justification of the study, the theoretical framework, the aims and objectives,
the hypothesis and the scope and limitations.
Chapter two will contain the literature review while
Chapter three will be the background to the study.
Chapter four will discuss on Niger's foreign policy to France
under General Seyni Kountché (1974 -1987).
Chapter five will be the summary, the conclusion and
recommendation.
1.10 REFERENCES
Endnotes will be used.
REFERENCES
1. African Contemporary Record, Vol. 6, 1974, P. 726
2. African Contemporary Record, 1974 - 1975, P. 1717
3. For example in 1961 the budget had its biggest deficit
expenditure. Revenue was only $7million while the expenditure was $9.5 million.
France covered most of this deficit.
4. Europa Yearbook, 1988 (London: Europa Publications, 1988).
P. 2003.
5. Le Sahel, March 17th, 1982; Jean Pierre Cot, A
L'Epreuve du pouvoir; le tiers mondisme pour quoi faire? (Paris: Edition du
Seuil, 1984); Jean Pierre Cot, «what's change? Africa reports 28:3 (May -
June 1983). PP. 13 - 14.
6. Jean Touscoz, « Le Parti Socialiste Français et
la Coopération avec le Tiers Monde», «Politique
Etrangère» 46:4 (Dec. 1981), P. 879, and Cot «what's
change?» P.13.
7. Stephen Baier, «Economic History and Development;
Drought and the Sahelian Economy», African Economic History 1 (1976), P.
5, based on the work of Paul Lovejoy.
8. Rodney, W. How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Washington D.
C. Howard University Press, (1974, P. 21)
9. Offiong, D. A, imperialism and Dependency, Enugu Fourth
Dimension Publishers, (1980, P. 15)
10. Rodney, W. How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Washington
D.C. Haward University Press, (1974, P. 21).
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Underdevelopment and dependency theorists, as well as
enlightened political analysts had persistently argued in their published
books, seminar presentations and newspaper articles on the Niger's foreign
policy to France (1974 - 1987). In reviewing this work, one is able to depict
the negative and positive impacts of Niger's foreign policy to France under
General Seyni Kountché (1974 - 1987); thereby giving the general
populace of developing countries on awareness growth and development,
especially in Niger.
Walter Rodney, clearly pointed this out, in his book «How
Europe underdeveloped Africa» in it, he made us understand that
underdevelopment is not the absence of development, because every people have
developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. He went
further to give the following explanation:
«Underdevelopment is very much tied to the fact that
human social development has been uneven and a strictly economic view-point
some human groups have advanced further by producing more and becoming more
wealthy1.
These excepts explain better French's development ahead of the
rest of Europe in the 18th century which Michel Roger to look into
the causes behind the «Wealth of Nations».
In the contemporary International economic system, the major
pre-occupation is on the differences in wealth between on the one hand, Europe
and North America and on the other hand, Africa, Asia and Latin America and
even in politics, military and diplomatic, there are some differences.
In comparison, as earlier stated, the second group, which has
formerly, and until present being characterized as dependent on most secondary
production of Eastern capitalist countries, as underdeveloped.
Rodney in the bid to sort out the paradox which
underdevelopment possesses centered his analysis by considering the fact
that;
«Many parts of the world that are naturally rich are
actually poor and parts that are not so well of in wealth of soil and sub-soil
are enjoying the highest standard to living»2.
This statement could be further explained, considering the
fact that the western countries are in possession of military, economic,
political and diplomatic power knows how. In this regard, this world, western
countries or western capitalist countries are controlling countries that are
endowed with abundant resources. As a result of the uneven feature of
developing and developed countries, therefore, one of the ideas behind
underdevelopment is a comparative one. More so, it is also attributed to the
fact that it expresses a particular relation of exploitation: hence
underdevelopment today is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonial
exploitation3.
Walter Rodney's conclusion, on the presence of metropolitan
powers in the sort of Africa answered the question as to who and what is
responsible for African (Niger) underdevelopment. Its answer was given at two
(2) levels: firstly, the operation of the imperialist system bears major
responsibility for Africa's (Niger's) economic retardation by draining African
wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the
continent. Secondly, deals with those who manipulate the system and those who
are whether agents of French or unwitting accomplices of the said
system4.
The concept of «Dependency» coined by Brazilian
sociologist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, helps to link those who are
beneficiaries of development with those who make the decision. Dependency
simply states that crucial economic decisions are made not by countries that
are being «developed» but by foreigners whose interests are carefully
safeguarded. Foreigners use their economic, military, political powers to buy
political power in the countries that they penetrate. This could mean political
pressure by the imperialist metropolis or even military intervention. This
collusion between alien economic and political power distorts both the economy
and the policy of the dependent countries5.
Daniel Offiong in his book «Imperialism and
Dependency» also throws some lights on the dependence nature of African
states. This regard, he defined dependency as «the situation that the
history colonial imperialism has left and that modern imperialism creates in
undeveloped countries»6.
In order to develop his argument, he started by quitting the
suggestion of Stratchery: «the backward region assumed a dependency status
the last step before outright control in relation to the metropolitan power
chiefly because the former were in debt to the latter. What was significant
about the shift from consumer goods in world trade was that the colony-to-be
neared long-term credit or leans to pay for the capital goods, and that
finally, the relationship between the backward country and the metropolitan
country is one of the debtor and creditor. And from this, it was but a small
step to dependence domination»7.
Offiong, after examining the dependent nature of African
socio-economic and political system he also went further to explain that the
false decolonization which has resulted in the phenomenon of neo-colonialism
have never been able to solve this problem of underdevelopment. «False
colonialism» could be further explained by the role of the United States
towards colonization in the post second (2nd) world war
era8.
Joseph Wayas quoted the words: «that the problem were not
and have not been that Africa was brought into the world market and political
system but rather, the manner it was introduced to it; having an economic and
political relationship with Europe were not in itself a bad idea, what was bad
the manner of the relationship. The fight which African countries are waging
today is therefore a fight not to eliminate the relationship but to change it
so that Africans can move away from their present situation of economic,
military, political, diplomatic dependence and subordination».
He concluded by agreeing with some of the postulations of
Walter Rodney. He put it that the relationship has resulted in a great
imbalance or disequilibrium, which has remained a fundamental problem in
African underdevelopment. As a result of this, it is deemed necessary to
proffer easy of liberation from economic, political, military dependence.
Dr. Ali Bouzou contributed extensively in these analyses of
foreign policy of Niger with France. His argument was drawn from the
proposition of renowned dependency theorist as it relates to the role of France
in its relations with Niger. He was of the view that, «the global
maximization of accumulation by French» «profit hyenas» is
typically ached through the domination of the key sectors of its colony as in
the case of uranium and out sector.
In his comment on the impact of Niger's relationship with
France on national development, he reflected that:
«The collective impact of the French interests in Niger
is the generation and perpetuation of the underdevelopment nature of French
companies caused and their exploitative profit motive constitute the heart of
this problem»9
It is the gap which this concept of dependency has
created n Nigerien socio-economic and political system that this work intend to
fill the dependent nature of he Nigerien state has created room for the direct
relations with France especially in economic, political, diplomatic and
military domains during Seyni Kountché's regime. The presence of France
in Niger reflects its role towards those relations. On the other hand, due to
the dependent nature of the Nigerien state, most of these developmental
projects are not positively realized.
In view of these reasons, this work intend to highlight
extensively on the situation that, the economic, political, diplomatic and
military relationship which is existing between Niger and France during Seyni
Kountché's era, has not been the problem; the problem remains in the
manner of the relationship. Our pre-occupation centers on not he eliminating of
the relationship but, to change it so that, the Nigerien state amidst the
presence of France can move from present situation of economic, political,
diplomatic and military dependence and subordination.
REFERENCE
1. Rodney, W. How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Washington D.
C. Howard University Press, (1974, p. 21).
2. Ibid. (P. 29)
3. Ibid. (p. 21)
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Offiong, D. A. Imperialism and Dependency, Enugu, Fourth
Dimension Publisher, (1980, P. 73).
7. Ibid. (P. 66)
8. Ibid.
9. Bouzou, A. «la politique du Niger», P. 44.
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
3.1 COUNTRY: NIGER
LOCATION: Western Africa Southeast of Algeria between
Longitude 0° 6'E and 15° 36'E and Latitude 11° 43'N and 23° 32' N
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 16° 00'N, 8°00'E
MAP REFERNCES: AFRICA (Especially West Africa).
AREA: Total: 1,267 million sq km
Water: 300sq km
Land: 1, 266,700 sq km
POPULATION: 11, 250,000 inhabitants (2002 est. census)
CAPITAL: NIAMEY (400,000 inhabitants)
IMPORTANT CITIES: Zinder, Maradi, Tahoua, Agades
CURRENCY: CFA Francs (UEMOA)
MOTTO: Fraternity - Work-Progress
FLAG: Tricolor composes of three (3) rectangular horizontal
bands and equal, of which the colors are from top to bottom disposed in the
order: Orange, white, green. The white band carrying an orange disc symbolizing
the sun.
NATIONAL ANTHEM: La Nigérienne
INDEPENDENCE DAY: August 3rd, 1960
Constitution: Adopted on November, 1960 and modified on July
12th, 1961, the constitution of Niger which established a
presidential regime with an elected president of Republic by universal suffrage
directly for five (5) years and even the National Assembly (the deputies) was
abrogated on April 15th, 1974 after the coup d'État. A new
constitution is approved by referendum in 1992. Another one was approved in
1999 but there's no change.
Administration: The country is divided into seven (7)
«départements» (Zinder, Maradi, Tahoua, Agades, Dosso,
Tillabéry, and Diffa) and Niamey as political capital of the country.
Maradi is the economical capital of the country. There are thirty-six (36)
Arrondissements».
There is a project of «Decentralization» in the
country (a form of federalism).
3.2 DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS OF
NIGER
The Hausa: the Hausa constitute 56% of the total population,
or about 6 million people. They live predominantly in south-central Niger and
tend to be farmers, petty traders and merchants (commerçants). Hausa is
one of the most important languages in West Africa, largely because Hausa
traders - well known for their entrepreneurial spirit - have established a
commercial network that stretches across the subcontinent. The Hausa population
in Niger represents a northern extension of a larger Hausa population; the
heartland of this ethnic group is located across border in Nigeria, where there
are over 30 million Hausa.
The Zarma-Songhai: the Zarma are an ethnic subgroup of the
Songhai people, whose great kingdom in the 14th and 15th
centuries embraced what is now Mali and western Niger. They represent 2.5
million people or 28% of the total population. They live in the southwestern
part of the country along the river (Niger) and because Niamey, the capital, is
in their homeland, the Zarma constitute the majority of Niamey's 400,000
inhabitants. Traditionally, farmers and fishermen, the Zarma-Songhai was the
first to benefit from the French education system, established in the
ate1940's. As a result of education opportunities, the Zarma have had a strong
influence in the central government with members of its ethnic group tending to
become civil servants (functionaries) as the public sector rapidly expand after
independence.
The Fulani (Peul, Foulbé, Pulaar): the Fulani
constitute 8.5% of the Nigerian total population, (800,000) and like the Hausa,
are part of a broader ethno-linguistic group that extends Niger's boarder. Most
of the Fulani live in the south-central part of the country and combine
agriculture with livestock rising. A second, smaller group of the Fulani, known
as Wodaabe, consists of nomadic cattle herders who live in the pastoral zone
and subsist entirely from livestock raising. Preferring to maintain their
nomadic heritage and lifestyle, the Wodaabe are the sector of the population
least integrated into modern Niger.
The Tuareg: the Tuareg represent another 8% (750,000 people)
of the population and are also largely nomadic. Of North-African origin,
traditional Tuareg society was quite hierarchical and oriented towards war and
raiding. However, the French largely dismantled the old social order after they
crushed a series of Tuareg revolts against colonial rule in the 1910's. The
slaves of the Tuareg, known as Bouzou or Bella, were liberated by the French
and are now sedentary farmers. The devastating drought of the early 1970's that
wiped out one half of the national herd, forced many Tuareg to abandon nomadic
livestock raising and go to urban centers in search of work. Though literate in
their own script (TIFINAR), most Tuareg have not had «modern
education». In Niamey, one can find many example of their skill as
silversmith and leather craftsmen.
The Kanuri (Beri Beri): the Kanuri or beri beri, represent
about 4.3% of the population, or about 400,000 people. They live in the
southeastern part of the country between Zinder and Lake Chad. Of diverse
ethnic origin, the Kanuri's main economic activities include farming, livestock
raising and salt processing.
3.3 LANGUAGES OF NIGER
French is the official language, but only about 10% of
Nigerien speaks it. Many can speak Hausa (80%), which is used for communication
and trade between ethnic groups. Ten (10) languages have official recognition
in Niger; Arabic, Boudouma, djerma, Fulfulde, Gourmantchema, Hausa, Kanuri,
Tamachek, Tasawak and Toubou. Many people are multilingual.
3.4 RELIGIONS
Islam is the most dominant religion (95%). The rest is
between indigenous beliefs (Animism) (4%) and Christianity (1%). Islam is an
important factor for National unity in Niger.
3.5 BORDERLANDS
East: Chad
West: Mali and Burkina Faso,
North: Libya and Algeria
South: Nigeria and Benin Republic
3.6 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
COLONIALISM
Numerous Neolithic remains of early pastoralism have been
found in the desert area of Niger. Ptolemy Diaz wrote of Roman expeditions to
the Air Massif. In the 11th century A.D., Tuareg migrated from the
desert to the Air region, where they later (C. 1300) established a stat
centered at Agadez. Agadez was situated on a major Trans-Saharan caravan route
that connected North Africa with present day- north Nigeria.
In the 14th century, the Hausa (most of whom lived
in what is now Northern Nigeria) founded several cities - states in southern
Niger. In the early 16th century, much of western and central Niger
came under the Songhai Empire (centered at GAO on the Niger River in present
day Mali), and after the fall of Songhai at the end of the 16th
century, eastern and central Niger passed to Bornu.
In the 17th century, the Djerma (Zarma) people
settled in southwest Niger near the Niger River. In the early 19th
century, Fulani gained control of southern Niger as a result of the Holy war
waged against the Hausa by the Muslim reformer Usman Dan Fodio.
At the conference of Berlin (184-85), the territory of Niger
was placed within the French sphere of influence. The French established
several military posts in southern Niger in the late 1890's, but did not occupy
Agadez until 1904 because of concerted Tuareg resistance. In 1900, Niger was
made a military territory within Upper Senegal - Niger, and in 1922, it was
constituted a separate colony within French West Africa. Zinder was the
colony's capital until 1926, when it was replaced by Niamey. The French
generally governed through existing political structures and did not alte4r
substantially the institutions of the country; they undertook little economic
development and provided few new educational opportunities.
3.7 POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL GOVERNMENTS OF NIGER
National political activity began when Niger received its own
assembly under French constitution of 1946, which established the French union.
The first important political organization was the Niger progressive Party
(PPN-RDA), a part of the «Rassemblement Démocratique Africain»
(which had branches in most French West African territories). In the mid 1950's
a Leftist party (later called Sawaba) headed by Bakary Djibo became predominant
in the colony. However, when it unsuccessfully campaigned for complete
independence in a 1958 referendum, the PPN (which favored autonomy for Niger
within the French community) regained power.
Niger achieved full independence from France on August
3rd, 1960, and Hamani Diori, the leader of the PPN, became its first
president, he was reelected in 1965 and 1970. In the early 1960s, sporadic
campaigns of rebel warfare were waged by the outlawed Sawaba party (most of
whose members lived in exile). Otherwise, Niger enjoyed political stability,
despite its weak economy and occasional ethnic conflicts, the PPN maintained
firm control of the government. Close tiers were retained with France, which
gave Niger considerable aid.
The country as severely affected by the Sahelian drought 0of
1968-1975, much of its livestock died and crop production fell drastically. In
1974, Hamani Diori was overthrown in a military coup led by Lt. Colonel Seyni
Kountché, who cultivated ties with member of the European community
neighboring African nations and Arab nations.
The Uranium boom of the early 1980s caused disparities in
wealth that led to civil unrest. The government in 1983 quickly put down a coup
attempt, and fear of opposition prompted frequent cabinet changes to ensure
that officials were loyal.
Kountché died in 1987 and was succeeded by General Ali
Seybou as Head of State. Seybou vowed to dismantle the ruling CMS and introduce
civilian rule. In 1991, a 1,204 member of National conference suspended the
constitution and dissolved the government. A transitional civilian government
led by Cheffou Amadou ruled until 1993, when Mahamane Ousamane was elected
president in free elections. However, an opposition coalition subsequently won
control of the legislature, leading to a protracted stalemate. Conflict between
the government and the Tuareg in the early 1990s with the signing of a peace
accord in 1995.
In January 1996, the government was ousted in a coup led by
colonel (later General) Ibrahim Baré Mainassara. Presidential election
held in July 1996, were won by Mainassara, who replaced the Independent
Electoral National Commission (CENI) with a handpicked one during the two-day
poll. The members of his presidential Guard assassinated Mainassara in April
1999, and Major Daouda Malam Wanké became the Head of State. France, the
country's major aid donor, suspended aid following the Coup de tat. In November
1999, elections were held for a new president and parliament, a retired
Colonel, Tandja Mamadou, was elected president.
3.8 GEOGRAPHY
Area-Comparative: Slightly less than twice the size of
Texas.
Land Boundaries: Total - 5,697 Km
Border countries: Algeria 956km, Benin Rep. 266km, Burkina
Faso 628km, Libya 354km, Mali 821km, Nigeria 1,500km
Coastland: 0km (Land-locked)
Terrain: Predominantly desert plains and sand dunes, flat to
rolling plains
Elevation Extremes: Lowest point: Niger River 200m
Highest Point: Mont Bagazane 2,022m
Natural Resources: Uranium, Coal, Iron Ore, Tin, Phosphates,
gold, petroleum
Land Use: Arable land: 3.94%
Permanent Crop: 0%
Others: 96.06% (1998 est.)
Irrigated Land: 660 sq km (1998 est.)
Natural Hazards: Recurring droughts
Environment Current: Overgrazing, soil erosion, deforestation,
desertification, wildlife population
Issues: Elephant, hippopotamus, giraffe and lion threatened
because of population destruction.
Environment: pat to: Biodiversity, climate change,
desertification, Endangered.
International: Environmental modification, hazardous wastes,
nuclear test-ban
Agreements: Protection, wetlands signed, but not ratified,
climate change - Kyoto protocol, law of the sea.
Geography-Note: Land-locked, one of the hottest countries in
the world, northern four, southern one-fifth, is savanna, suitable for
livestock and limited agriculture.
3.9 POLITICAL PARTIES
LIST OF IMPORTANT PARTIES IN NIGER
Democratic and social convention (CDS RAHAMA)
National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD
NASSARA)
Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS TARRAYYA)
Democratic Rally for the People (RDP JAMA'A)
Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Social Progress (ANDP
ZAMAN LAHIYA)
3.10 NIGER MILITARY
Military Branches: Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, national
Intervention and Security Force (GIP-NINJA), Police, Republican Guard
Total: 11,470 men
Land: 7,470
Gendarmes: 1,650
Policemen: 2,000
Military Manpower-Military Age: 18 Years of age (2003 est.)
Military Manpower Availability: Males age: 15 - 49, 2, 379,
485 (2003 est.)
Military Manpower Fit for Military Service: Male age: 15 - 49:
1,288,326 (2000 est.).
Military Manpower Reaching Military Age Annually: Males:
119,367 (2000 est.).
Military Expenditures (Dollar figures) $20.54million (FY02)
Military Expenditures (Percent of GDP) 1.1% (FY02)
3.11 FOREIGN RELATIONS
Niger pursues a moderate foreign policy and maintains friendly
relations with the west and the Islamic world as well as non-aligned countries.
It belongs to the United Nations and its main specialized agencies and in 1980-
81 served on the UN Security Council.
Niger maintains a special relationship with France and enjoys
close relations with its West African neighbors. It is a charter member of the
African Union and the west African monetary Union (UEMOA) and also belongs to
the Niger river and Lake Chad Basin Commissions, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS - CEDEAO), the Non aligned Movement, the organization of
the Islamic conference (OIC), The Entente Council (Conseil de l'Entente), the
community of Sahel Saharan states (CEN-SAD) and the New Partnership for
Africa's Development (NEPAD).
3.12 NIGER'S ECONOMY (FACTS)
ECONOMY OVERVIEW: Niger is a poor,
land-locked sub-Saharan nation, whose economy, agriculture, animal husbandry
and re export trade, and increasingly because of declining world demand. The
50% devaluation of CFA Francs in January 1994 boosted exports of livestock,
cowpeas, onions and the small cotton industry. The government relies on
bilateral and multilateral relations suspended following the Aril 1999 coup
d'État - for operating expenditures investment. In 2000-01, the World
Bank approves a structural adjustment program to help support fiscal reforms.
However, reforms could provoke government's bleak financial situation. The IMF
approved a $73 million and growth facility for Niger in 2000 and announced $115
million in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives. Further,
disbursen in 2002. Future growth may be sustained by exploration of oil, gold
mineral resources.
GDP: Purchasing power Parity - $8713 billion (2002 est.)
GDP: Real Growth Rate; 2.9% (2002 est.)
GDP: Per capital: Purchasing power Parity - $800 (2002
est.)
GDP: Composition by sector
Agriculture - 39%
Industry - 17%
Services - 44% (2001 est.)
Population below poverty line: 63% (1993 est.)
House Below poverty line: 63% (1993 est.)
Lowest 10%: 0.8%
Highest 10%: 35.4 (1995)
Inflation Rate (Consumer Prices) - 3% (2002 est.).
Labour force: 70,000 Receive regular wages or salaries
Labour force - by occupation: Agriculture 90%, industry and
commerce 6%, Government 4%.
Unemployment Rate: NA
Budget: Revenues: $320 million - including capital
expenditures of $178 million
Industries: Uranium mining, cement, brick, textile, food
processing, chemicals
Industrial production by source: Fossil fuel - 100%, Hydro -
0%, Nuclear - 0%
Electricity - Consumption: 325.1 million kwh (2001)
Electricity - Export: 0 kwh (2001)
Electricity - imports 100million kwh (2001)
Agriculture products: Cowpeas, Cotton, peanuts, millet,
sorghum, cassava (Tapioca), rice, camels, donkeys, horses and poultry.
Exports: $293 million f.o.b. (2002 est.)
Exports-Commodities: Uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions
Exports-partners: France 39%, Nigeria 33.2%, Japan 17.1%,
(2002)
Imports; $368 million f.o.b. (2002 est.)
Imports-Commodities: Foodstuffs, Machinery, Vehicles and parts
petroleum and cereals
Imports partners: France 16.8%, Cote d'Ivoire 14.9%, China
9.8%, Nigeria 7.4%, U.S. 5.4%, and India 4.4% (2002).
Debt - External: $1.6 million (1999 est.)
ECONOMIC aid recipient: $341milion (1997)
Currency: Communauté Financière en Afrique
Francs (XOF), Responsible at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)
Currency Code: XOF
Exchange Rate: Communauté Financière en Afrique
Francs (XOF) per dollars - 696.9 (2001), 711.98 (2000), 615.7 (1999), 589.95
(1998).
Fiscal Year: Calendar year
3.13 TRANSPORTATION
Railways: 0km
Highways: Total 10,100km, paved: 798km, unpaved 9,302km, (1999
est.)
Waterways: 300kmnote: the Niger River is navigable from Niamey
to Gaya on the Benin frontier from mid December through March
Ports and Habours: None
Airports; 27 (2002) Airports - with pave runways: Total,
92,438 to 3,047m, 2,914 to 1,523m; 14 under 914m 2002)
3.14 COMMUNICATION
Telephone Main Line in Use: 25,000 (2003)
Telephone - Mobile/Cellular: 8,000 (2003)
Telephone System; general assessment - small system of wire,
radio telephone communication, microwave radio relay links, concentrated in the
southeastern area of the country, domestic, wire, radiotelephone
communications. And microwave radio satellite system with 3 earth stations and
1 planned.
International satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1
Atlantic Ocean area).
Radio Broadcast Stations: AMS, FM6, Short-wave, 4 (2001)
Radio: 1,000,000 (2002)
Television Broadcast Stations: 3 (plus seven low power
repeaters) (2002).
Televisions: 250,000 (2002)
Internet Country code: .ne
Internet Service Providers (ISPs): 2 (2003)
Internet Users: 20,000 (2003)
REFERENCE
1. World Atlas - Africa - Niger
2. Coopération Française au Niger (Dossier du
Niger)
3. Secrétariat d'État à la
Présidence du Niger (Service de l'Information)
4. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, De
la cooperation et de l'intégration Africaine
5. Minstère des Finances et de l'Economie du Niger
6. Ministère de la Défense de la Republique du
Niger
7. Le Niger d'Aujourd' hui, No. 002, P. 4-7 (Editions Jeune
Afrique)
8. Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent, No. 2129 - 2130, p. 10
9. Economia No14 - 15, Mensuel, Dec 2001, Jan 2002, pp.. 22 -
23
10. Sahel Dimanche, No 242, pp 14 - 20
11. Le Sahel, No 447, pp. 4-6
12. The Colombia Encyclopedia, Six Editions, 2001, Niger,
Country Africa
WEBSITES
www.geographyiq.com/countries/ng/niger_relations_summary.htm
www.bartleby.com/65/ni//niger.html
www.usask.ca/nursing/internation/niger/people.htm
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 NIGER'S FOREIGN POLICY TO
FRANCE (1974 - 1987)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
As soon as a state gains independence, it faces the problems
of relation with other states, its neighbors with whom it may share common
values, with the world bodies, with big powers and with its former metropolitan
powers. It has to formulate and define the concepts of national interest and
goals. National interests and goals have been defined as objectives, which a
state ought to achieve, maintain, defend, and propagate.
Another set of problems usually faced by the newly
independent states, is the recognition of the old boundaries created by the
former colonial powers and matters incidental thereto, as well as raising and
maintaining an army capable of defending the present boundaries and quashing
any internal disorder or rebellion. Equally important to them, is aid and
grants from them, and trade with other states including their former rulers.
The colonial powers may have provided them with a pattern of behaviour.
But this pattern of behaviour served the interest of the
colonial powers more then the interest of the colonies.
As regards aid, grants and trade, the newly independent
states may have to look towards potential or ideological enemies of their
former colonial masters. Thus, foreign relations of the newly independent
states may be drastically different and diametrically opposed to those of the
former colonial powers.
Niger gained independence on August 3rd, 1960 from
France. Since the conduct of foreign policy of Niger was highly personalized by
President Hamani Diori (1960 - 1974) and because foreign policy debates in the
National Assembly were indeed very rare, one is therefore, obliged to look into
the statements or communiqués issued after the president himself (Hamani
Diori) participated.
Niger's foreign policy pronouncements when summarized
emphasize the following principles:
- An endeavor to improve the economic and social conditions of
Niger's people.
- To defend and maintain territorial integrity
- To express solidarity with Francophone Africa countries
- To promote Pan Africanism and to strengthen mutual
functional cooperation with its neighbors.
- To make efforts for the emancipation of Africa from
racialism and colonialism
- To ensure a non-alignment policy in world politics with
emphasis on special relations with France.
Niger's foreign policy pronouncement and practice have been
guided by the above-mentioned principles.
When the military took over power from Hamani Diori on April
15th, 1974, the status quo did not witness any fundamental shift. The new head
of state, Lt. Colonel (Later General) Seyni Kountché could not change
government's foreign policy stance as he was occupied with the huge task of
resolving the domestic problems such as the drought situation, to modify the
former agreement with France to suit Niger's interest, and to obtain a better
deal for Uranium exploitation.
In France, President Georges Pompidou died on April 2nd, 1974.
On May 19th, 1974; Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's election to the presidency
brought an end to the Gaullist era. The special secretariat for Africa and
Malagasy Affairs in the «champs Elysées» palace was abolished.
Gaullist inspired special relations with Francophone Africa ceased. A new era
was ushered in.
4.2 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
FOREIGN POLICY
Lt Colonel Seyni Kountché's regime has continued the
foreign policy of the previous regime towards Africa and Arab countries. Niger
remained an active member of the OCAM, the Chad Basin commission, The River
Niger Commission, and the O.A.U.
Relations with Libya were maintained as before. It will be
recalled that immediately after the coup, Libyan Prime Minister Jalloud flew to
Niamey but he was refused entry. Three days later, he was allowed to enter.
After the meeting of the two leaders, Kountché announced that:
Relations (between them) would be stronger as long as the
movement continues to work for the development and progress of Niger, the
freedom and unity of the African continent and the promotion of the eternal
values of Islam.2
Keeping in line with the civilian government's pro-Arab and
pro Muslim policy, Niger supported the candidature of Somali foreign minister,
Omar Arteh, for the post of administrative Secretary General of the O.A.U. in
June 1974, and in November 1974, Somali President, Said Barre was welcomed in
Niamey on an official tour.
Niger continued to play a major role among Francophone
countries. Lt. Colonel Seyni Kountché was appointed one of the mediators
(the other was Eyadéma of Togo) in the «little» war between
Mali and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
Relations with France did not remain as cordial as they were
during the civilian era because the new government had demanded the withdrawal
of the French troops from Niger. French assistance towards the drought relief
continued unabated. There was no cessation of French development aid.
Furthermore, three (3) new agreements were signed with France in September that
year, totaling a sum of 2,500 million CFA francs, as French aid. France even
donated aircraft carriers and ambulances for the Nigerian army.
Military regime in Niger has not changed any foreign policy
principles laid down by the previous civilian government. However, there are
some changes in the practice of Niger's foreign policy. The military government
is pursuing a more neutral and positive approach. The new regime is more
sensitive to the issue to sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is trying
to avoid too much reliance of French aid. The coup d'État in Niger on
April 15th, 1974, was soon followed by the dismissal of the French
military unit stationed in the country, whose commander had been accused of
hindering the change of regime. The present regime, significantly has
repudiated the defense agreement with France. The French military was asked to
leave the country. Their presence it was argued, impugned on the sovereignty of
the country. The military government also recognized North Korea and secured a
Chinese interest-free loan of 12,000 million CFA francs.
A significance departure from the past practice was the new
regime's recognition of Guinea and the exchange of ambassadors. Guinea had
denounced Hanami Diori as a neo-colonialist; Diori in retaliation had refused
to recognize Guinea's independence.
Another character of the present regime is its boldness and
the ability to extract maximum benefits for Niger in international
negotiations. A government spokesman bluntly said, «Niger produces enough
uranium, more than ten times of its need, yet people were dying from hunger,
Niger would re-examine the whole uranium question». Niger successfully
negotiated to increase its share of uranium production and also got the liberty
to fix its price.
4.3 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED NIGER'S
FOREIGN POLICY
4.3.1 LAND-LOCKED STATE
The study of land-locked states elaborates the importance of
direct access to the sea. Twenty-six of the total world states are land-locked.
Twelve of them are in Africa. Niger is one of them.
In attempting to develop theories about land-locked states,
East looked for common factors other than their lack of sea frontage and
selected fairly common denominators of weakness and buffer state status.
4
Austria, Afghanistan and Mongolia provide example of buffer
states status. Surrounding maritime states are advantageous because of the
absence of the boundaries of powerful neighbors. If a land-locked state is
internationally self-sufficient, then it needs not rely on coastal states for
its external trade. The common concern of land-locked states involves the
securing of access to the sea. Tit has long been argued that access to the sea
and the internal usage of navigable waterways accessible to the ocean going
vessels is a natural right.5Another concern of land-locked states is
the securing of free movement of goods across the territories of coastal states
free of tax.
Niger is an economically weak and land-locked state and
therefore, she is inevitably dependent on the will of Nigeria, Benin republic,
Cote d' Ivoire, Togo and Ghana. Much of Niger's trade to Europe passes thought
the ports of Lagos, Cotonou, Abidjan, Lomé and Tema. In fact, the route
through the port of Cotonou has been used as an alternative, although it is
costly, in case, the Nigerian route is not available. The Nigerian civil war
alarmed the leaders of Niger and made them explore other routes.
«Much of the good neighborly relationship between Niger
and Nigeria could be explained in terms of the formers dependence on the
facilities of the latter for a great part of her trade with the rest of the
world». 6
Since the bulk of African trade is with extra African
countries, an easy and reliable access to the coast is of paramount importance.
Consequently, most if not all-African land-locked states have tried to maintain
a cordial relationship with countries through whose territories the bulk of
their exports and imports must pass.
4.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL
UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Thus, the authorities in charge in Niger, both before and
after independence, pursued a policy, which resulted in making the Nigerien
economy dependent upon a single primary commodity.
To be fair, attempts were made to try and diversify the
economy, for instance, the introduction of cotton in 1956 in the center proved
quite successful. 7 Furthermore, Governor Ramadier had a second look
at the by now notorious naturally irrigated basins of the Niger River valley.
But once it was realized that the development scheme devised in the 1930s had
come to nothing, not just because of official neglect but also because the
peasants of the west simply had no experience of irrigated cultivation,
whatever plans existed were apparently abandoned.8
Another attempt, profitable and successful to a degree, was to
encourage the exportation of goatskins from the Maradi region to Europe, where
they were able to compete with the better-known goatskins variety from
Sokoto.9 It was followed by a general expansion in the exportation
of hides and skins.10
Finally, some of the credit for the establishment of Niger's
second (small) groundnut oil mill (at Matameye in 1954) must go to the
administration (French). 11 However, all this amounted to very
little in the long run, and neither cotton nor skins nor hides were of much
importance compared with groundnuts. Above all, the administration seems to
have neglected the subsistence sector completely.
Why then this emphasis on groundnuts and especially why the
heavy tax burden? The answer, in our opinion, is to be found in the fact that
the process of decolonization had been set in motion by the early 1950s. The
French were (by virtue, one could argue, of the myth of the «white man's
burden») under a moral obligation to provide Niger with what we could call
the prerequisite of a modern state, state machinery according to the European
model. This meant equipping Niger with a (modest) infrastructure of
institutions and services; a parliament, a government, a civil service etc. it
also entailed the building of roads, airports, hospitals, schools and the
like.
We have in short, a policy of «modernization»
designed to implement as fully as possible the principle implicit in the FIDES
programme. This required funding, and since the funds granted by the FIDES
proved inadequate, the immediate source of new revenue was perceived to be the
expansion of groundnuts exports. The caution advocated by Governor Toby having
thus been brushed aside, the end result is neatly illustrated by the budgets
between 1958 and 1961. External funds represented one-third of revenue in 1958,
a huge 57 percent in 1959 and slightly less than 50 percent in 1961. The rest
originated for the most part, directly or indirectly, from the
commercialization of groundnuts at (and the point is worth repeating) prices
subsidized by the French. Geographically, one «subdivision»
(«Cercle» after 1956), that of Magaria, provided close to 50 percent
of the revenue not originated from external funds. As far as expenditure is
concerned, the «budget de fonctionnement», designed to cover
operating and maintenance costs, continued to absorb some 90 percent of the
budget 12
We may now conclude that the administration after 1954, in
sharp contrast to the administration under Governor Toby was now particularly
concerned with laying the foundations of a balanced although modest economy. It
was a spendthrift administration which sacrificed the future for the present
and the basic for the spectacular; an administration which thus contributed to
accentuate the fragility and disequilibrium of the Nigerien economy, and so to
accelerate the process of structural underdevelopment. Furthermore, as the
study of budget indicates, the very burden of modern state machinery, however
modest, became so heavy that it seemed to rule out any possibilities of real
economic development. The price of modernization and independence, on the terms
dictated by the French and the «evolves» was so high that the average
Nigerien could barely afford it, if at all.
If we consider the politicians and the «evolves» as
a corporate group, the least we can say is that, after the transfer of the
reins of power between 1957 and 1960, they did not try to reverse the policy
inaugurated by the French. Indeed, it was in their interest to maintain this
policy since it guaranteed their standard of living. This they certainly did.
For instance, between 1958 and 1961, the civil service multiplied rapidly and
salaries raised steeply both in absolute and relative terms. 13 As
J. Delpy has remarked, the budget became «exclusivement un instrument de
distribution de pouvoir d'achat». 14
The fact that the final stage of the process of decolonization
took place during a period of very favourable climatic conditions locally (in
sharp contrast with the period of colonial conquest at the turn of the
century), and also a period of rapid economic growth in the world at large,
probably had the effect of concealing some of the potentially damaging effects
of the economic policy summarized above. No one asked in 1960 what would happen
if, or rather when, drought struck again (as it did after 1968, and especially
between 1972 - 1974. 15 in conformity with J. Tilho's prediction in
1928); 16 if the French should decide one day to discontinue the
programme of subsidizing groundnut prices as they did in 1967); 17
if the price of groundnut oil on the world market should drop drastically (as
it did in the 1970s); and if Ghana should decide to close its borders to
seasonal laborer (as it did under the Busia administration). All these factors
came together during the early 1970s. The result was a disaster of some
magnitude known as the Great West African Drought and Famine of 1972 - 1974.
(Naturally, in 1972 - 1974 as in 1913 - 1915 and in 1931 - 1932, «there
was an incredible lack of a sense of urgency to start with», personal tax
was not suspended and tax collection remained much better organized than
relief.) 18
Even 1980 look reasonably bright because of revenues from a
new and unexpected source; a source that has quadrupled in value since the
steep rise in oil prices after 1973. We are referring to the uranium mine at
Arlit in Air from which in 1978, the Government of Niger collected an estimated
12 billion CFA francs in royalties. 19 It remains to be seen,
however, how far the consequences of the Harrisburg incident will affect the
external trade of Niger. But the future of Niger lies in its subsoil, rich in
minerals and probably also in oil. 20
The French strategy is best understood as combining several
motives. The most powerful of these was to minimize the cost of maintaining
French presence and control by promoting cash crops and by re-orientating
preexisting monetary systems and patterns of trade so that the colonial
administration cold capture more of the surplus. The French also wanted to
avoid the civil unrest that might result if the Nigerien people were brought to
the point of starvation, and to this end, they instituted programs of improved
livestock production and food storage. They did not have little motivation to
invest enough to make the rural economy more productive, nor did they seem
concerned about the long-term environmental impacts of their agricultural and
pastoral policies. As a result, the French left Niger with a minimal technology
and research base on which to build future economic development.
4.3.3 NIGER'S DEPENDENCY
Food aid is only the tip of the iceberg of Niger's dependency.
The Nigerien economy has also become more dependent on foreign capital,
economic assistance, and credit, and the forms these dependencies have taken
have given foreign actors an extraordinary degree of influence in the Nigerian
policy process foreign aid to Niger has constituted a substantial but widely
fluctuating portion of the country's national budget. Initially, the government
of Niger was highly dependent on the French for aid, and overall aid averaged
60 percent of total budget expenditures between 1960 and 1967. This level of
aid fell in the late 1960s, only to rise dramatically in the 1970s as a result
of the drought relief effort. During the period 1975-1981, the level of aid
fluctuated between 45 percent and 75 percent of the national budget. It then
fell, only to jump sharply as the combined effects of the threat from Libya,
international debt recovery policies known as «structural
readjustment», and renewe3d drought pressed the regime to the wall. In
1985, aid exceeded the total value of the national budget by 135 percent.
21
Even the normal types of foreign assistance technical
assistance and investments for specific development projects pose problems for
autonomy. In Niger, such aid is usually accounted for in the «investment
budget». With the exception of the period from 1977 to 1982, the
government of Niger has had to rely heavily on foreign aid to carry out its
economic development program. Although, it has viewed this aid as vitally
important, aid dependency has limited the Nigerien government options in a
number of ways. Nearly, all aid to Niger from its principal donors, France and
other European community countries, is tied to the purchase of commodities from
those countries. U.S. aid has followed generally this pattern as well. This
condition obviously limits Niger's choice of suppliers and affects its patterns
of trade. Foreign actors have also played a major part in defining Niger's
development policies, and his influence has carried serious future budgetary
implications. For example, the recurrent costs of rural development projects
designed and financed by just one secondary donor, the U. S., equal the entire
budget of Niger's ministry of Rural Development.
Other types of foreign aid, particularly direct budget
subsidies, create much more obvious sources of foreign influence and control.
In the years immediately following independence nearly 10 percent of the
Nigerien government's direct operating budget came from French foreign aid.
This type of aid was phased out by 1970, but it was resumed in 1973 - 1974 and
1985. Recently, Niger has received «sector grants», or no project
aid, from the U.S government. U.S.A.I.D's $29 million Agriculture and Rural
Development Sector Grants had as their explicit goal producing major changes in
the Nigerien government's farm subsidy, credit, price, and marketing policies.
In exchange for this budgetary support, Niger was expected to liberalize and
privatize its rural economy.23 Clearly, Niger's financial was have
made its government highly susceptible to foreign policy prescriptions at
various points in its history since independence.
The only way in which the government of Niger has been able to
mitigate its aid dependence somewhat has been to diversify its donors. Niger
still remains highly dependent on France, but beginning in the late 1960s a
larger proportion of its aid began to come from such multilateral donors as the
European Community's Fund for Economic Development, the World Bank, the United
Nations, the African Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development,
and the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) special fund.
Niger has also been able to attract several significant new bilateral donors,
the most important of which are Canada, West Germany, U.S, the Peoples Republic
of China and Saudi Arabia.24
Although, diversification of aid has reduced Niger's
dependency on any single donor, its effects should not be overstated. France
continues to be the largest single bilateral donor, consistently contributing
between 27 percent (1977) and 47 percent (1981) of all such aid, and annual aid
negotiations with France remain a critical event in Niger's political and
economic life. Other western donors while less important individually, are
usually associated in groups, such as the Development Assistance Committee of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and the friends of the
Sahel, and these groups have brought effective pressure on the Nigerien
government to adopt major changes in rural development policy, as was very
evident at the 1982 national seminar in Zinder.
A second problem with Niger's trade has been its dependence on
a single buyer, France. In the 1960s, Niger sold 60 - 70 percent of its exports
to France; France in turn supplied about half of Niger's total imports. Through
the 1970s, France continued to buy nearly 60 percent of Niger's exports and to
sell it 35 - 45 percent of its imports. Niger has attracted only two additional
major buyers for its goods, Nigeria and Libya. Most of Niger's exports to
Nigeria have been agricultural commodities and livestock, and Nigeria has
become a significant regional supplier of energy and manufactured goods to
Niger as well. Trade with both Nigeria and Libya, however, has been interrupted
periodically for political reasons, which has contributed to the weakness and
dependency of the Nigerien economy.
Direct foreign private investment has been a less obvious
source both of growth and of dependency in Niger, largely because, with the
exception of investment in the uranium mines, there has been so little of it.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, private and publicly guaranteed
capital did partially replace aid as a source of capital. During the uranium
boom years in the second half of the 1970s, the government of Niger borrowed
heavily, mainly to finance investments in mining and infrastructure. When
uranium revenues tumbled and imports to develop these investments continued the
debt skyrocketed. In the early years of the republic, foreign debt had been
kept to a low level, and debt service, or the amount of money needed simply to
keep loan repayments current, never exceeded 4 percent of export earnings. From
1970 to 1987, the outstanding long-term public grew from 5 to 72. 6 percent of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and by 1986, the government owed or had
guaranteed nearly $1.68 billion in long-term and short-term indebtedness - when
Niger's total GDP was only $2.16 billion.25
In the mid 1980s, Niger's debt service approached one-third of
the value of its exports, or about half of the government total revenue, an
unrealistic level of burden for such a slowly growing economy. The level of
dependency on foreign lenders, coupled with Niger's inability to pay,
precipitated a debt and foreign exchange crisis, which opened the way for
lenders to virtually dictate Niger's internal economic policies.
During the boom years, president Kountché had expressed
his disdain for the International Monetary Fund,26 but faced with a
critical shortage of foreign exchange, he was forced to negotiate a series of
«standby agreement» totaling $62 million in IMF currency units
(Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs). In addition, Niger was obliged to obtain new
loans from the World Bank and to secure agreements for rescheduling existing
debt with groups of its creditors in the Paris and London club. These
arrangements made it possible for the country to continue importing vital
commodities and to reduce debt payment to one-third, the level of government
revenues. They also, however, came with conditions, which require reduction in
government spending, comprehensive changing in tax law, and a liberalization of
the economy by reducing the number of state -owned and mixed public-private
enterprises. Although, in the long run, they imply political risks and
represent new sources of dependency. Furthermore, unless these changes
stimulate a major recovery in the value of Niger's exports, they will only buy
time, since Niger's debt has not been forgiven. It has merely been stretched
out into the future.
4.4 AREA OF DISCORD WITH FRANCE
In 1970, French monopoly of uranium exploitation was broken
and Japan was included in the venture with 30% of financing, and France having
70% of exploit uranium at Akokan, 12 miles south of Arlit (Agadez). The first
signs of discount appear in 1972 when President Hamani Diori confronted France
and demanded more clear independence with the existing realities. The uranium
exploitation by French companies was painfully slow. Te government of Niger
complained that it was intentional while the French denied it and argued that
the demand for uranium was declining.
A request by Niger that trade with Nigeria be helped by
allowing certain transactions of frozen CFA payments for cattle and beef
through French firms based in Nigeria was not accepted by
France.27
The president of National Assembly, Boubou Hama, openly
accused the French of being behind the students' unrest and this elicited a
strong protest from the French Ambassador.28 Relations between the
two countries had become so stained that when President Hamani Diori went to a
summer vacation in Paris suburb the same year, the French made it clear that
the President will not be invited to luncheon at the «Champs
Elysées» Palace.29 On the occasion of President
Pompidou's visit to the country in January 1973, President Diori spoke of his
country's desire to diversify its trade partners. He criticized the
«out-dated methods of aid, which were unresponsive to the changing needs
of African countries.30
Since 1973, Niger government had been trying hard to
renegotiate the uranium agreement so that Niger's participation in the profit
could be raised. Te French apparently were not willing to grant this
concession. A government spokesman disclosed in a very pessimistic tone the
real situation. He said,
Niger produces enough uranium to supply more than ten times
its own energy needs and yet, only a few miles from the mine, people were dying
from hunger. Niger would have to re-examine the whole uranium question with its
partners to that, each side received a fair share of the profits. Uranium is an
inherited source of wealth, just like oil; either it allows us to finance
economic development or we will leave it where it is, so as not to dissipate
this inheritance uselessly. We don't want one day to have to show the holes of
our children and say «there was uranium here but, it's
finished.31
After the overthrow of President Hamani Diori's regime,
relations between the two countries further deteriorated. The Head of the
French military mission in Niamey, Major Langlois d'Estai was expelled. The
Niger government charged that the Major had to many subversive contacts.
Lieutenant Colonel Seyni Kountché even refused to see a senior French
Army officer. Kountché said,
This decision, (the withdrawal of French troops from Niamey),
we took it far from all evident obvious or latent with respect to the French
Republic; far from any arrogance with respect to these people of France from
which we share the culture and humanism, and of which we appreciate his right
value the contest how much beneficial our efforts of development. We took it,
to put an end as well as anarchism for France as for France and for us. And,
has especially, we took it, because having choosing our national independence
since this historical date of the year of grace, 1960, it is for us who it
falls without damage, has the concluding of agreements in conformity with the
international practices, to ensure only the safety of our borders if as well is
as they are likely external threats.
The people of Niger are not people of beggars. This is not
because Niger counts only 4 million inhabitants and that its one of the poorest
countries which one should not respect us as a sovereign state.32
Finally, in December 1974, the French companies agreed in
principle on increased Nigerien participation. Previous to that, Niger's
participation in SOMAIR was only 15%. France is the main buyer of Niger's
uranium. In 1973, France took 93.6 % of Niger's uranium export.
33
By April 1975, new agreement was signed with France,
according to which, Niger's share was increased to 33% in the uranium company,
SOMAIR.
In August 1972, President Hamani Diori asked for a division
of bilateral agreement called «Accords de Cooperation» which had
existed since 1961. He demanded that these, be revised to favor Niger.
Unfortunately, it did not materialize before the overthrow of his
government.
The crucial change in foreign relations was the ending of
Defense Agreement with France. On May 16th, 1974, the new government
(under General Seyni Kountché) of Niger ordered the 270 strong French
Detachment to leave the country as soon as possible. The communiqué
issued said a foreign military presence impugned on the country's sovereignty.
Yet, so anxious was the government of Niger to maintain friendly relations with
France that the Head of State announced that the move was not motivated by
hostility to France.34
4.5 ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
FRANCE
Niger is one of the poorest nations of the world. At least, by
African standard, is growing to be a rich nation. The Gross Domestic Product of
Niger in the early seventies was 90,000 CFA francs (at that time, one U.S
dollar equals 250.00 CFA francs). But it declined during the drought years.
According to IMF, statistics in 1975, the Gross National Product for Niger in
1975, stood at 380 million dollars. Niger's main export trade comprises of
livestock, hides and skins, groundnuts and uranium. Niger produces the largest
number of livestock in West Africa, perhaps in the world. The production of
uranium increased by 50% in 1975.
Owing to the large geographical size but, very small
population and lack of capital and technical know-how it was considered
necessary for Niger to request foreign aid and investment. Niger is determined
to cooperate with all states willing to bring her the investment capital and
technical aid needed for development. This policy has been pursued vigorously
both by the former civilian regime and the present military regime (General
Seyni Kountché) Niger's relations with France are thus oriented towards
economic development than other areas of interaction. The question is how best
this objective could be achieved? The policy makers of Niger found the answer
in bilateral relations.
Niger's pattern of trade during the military era (1974 - 1987)
remained predominantly western (France). France remained the major trading
partner. From 1975 to 1977, France's share of Niger's import constantly
remained more than 50% of Niger's total world trade. Export increased with
France due to the uranium.
From 1974 to 1987, two thirds of all financial and technical
aid received by Niger came from France. France still subsidizes Niger's
development budget. In 1974, she increased her subsidy from 9% of the total
budget to 13.5%. France is not only the major trading partner but also major
source of private investment and aid. French aid to Niger in 1975 alone
amounted to 70,200 million CFA francs. The aid is multipurpose. It includes
educational, medical, technical research, communication and transport sector
(see table). France's assistance to Niger in the struggle against drought was
much more than any single country. France also donated aircraft, lorries, and
ambulances to Niger's Armed Forces (FAN) .35
In 1976, three agreements totaling nearly 2,800 million CFA
francs had been signed between Niger and France. This amount included 1,000
million CFA francs of annual aid to National Investment Fund.60
4.5.1 FRENCH AID TO NIGER
YEAR
|
AMOUNT
|
PURPOSE
|
1974
|
100 million CFA f.
|
1. Niamey Air Terminal
|
1974
|
320 million CFA f.
|
Zinder's Teachers College
Niamey oral Traditional Research Center.
Child and mother protection center and hospital equipment.
|
1974
|
27.5 million CFA f.
|
Hydraulic studies
|
1974
|
102 million CFA f.
|
Tsernaoua-Tahoua road
|
1974
|
142.5 million CFA f.
|
Educational Television
|
1975
|
1,000 million CFA f.
|
Multipurpose
|
Sept. 1975
|
217.95 million CFA f.
|
Technical, medical and library project
|
1975
|
1,000 million CFA f.
|
National Investment Fund
|
1975
|
515 million CFA f.
|
Schools TV program
|
1976
|
907 million CFA f.
|
Secom project, including Tahoua road construction
|
1976
|
100,000 million CFA f.
|
Purchase of medical equipment.
|
Source: Figures and dates have been collected from various
issues of the following:
Africa Research bulletin, Africa contemporary record, Africa
confidential and West Africa.
4.5.2 NIGER'S URANIUM
Nigerien soils contain about 10 percent of the world's uranium
reserves. Commercial export of «Yellow cake uranium ore concentrated to 70
percent, began in 1971, and by 1974, revenue from the sale of this commodity
exceeded earnings from all other exports combined. Nigerien uranium was
developed principally to meet French needs for nuclear energy and weapons. With
2,200 tons exported a year. The reserves were estimated at 100,000 tons. France
jointly developed two surfaces mine in the air desert, at Arlit (SOMAIR) and at
Akouta (Cominak). These mines have a total capacity of 4,500 tons of yellow
cake per year and additional mines, which would have raised the total capacity
to 9,000 tons a year, were also planned. Two French companies have shares in
SOMAIR: COGEMA (26.961%), CFMU (11,796%). France has 34% (CEA) in COMINAK and
MINATOME S.A. 8%.
Until the early 1980s, Niger's leaders hoped that substantial
and growing revenues from uranium sales would fuel rapid growth and
industrialization, but the uranium boom was short-lived. Production peaked at
about 4,360 tons in 1981 and has fallen since to about 3,200 toms owing to the
slack in world demand following the nuclear reactor accidents at three miles
Island and Chernobyl and to competition from Canadian and Australian producers.
Since 1981, the Nigerien firms that run the mines and export the uranium have
been unable to find market even from this reduced level of production.
Typically, France has purchased about 2,500 tons a year at contract price well
above the world marker. Some of the rest of the production has been sold to a
variety of small purchasers, mainly from the Arab world, usually at spot market
prices as much as 30 - 40 percent below the French contract price. As a result,
Uranium export revenue has fallen dramatically from a high of nearly half a
billion dollar in 1980 to about $200 million.
This decline in sales and revenue discouraged investors from
proceeding with plans to develop additional mines in the Air North and west of
Agadez, specifically and an underground mine at Afasto, and the slowdown has
had particularly severe consequences for the Nigerien economy given the fact
that uranium sales accounted for between 15-20 percent of Niger's Gross
domestic Product and yielded 10-12 percent of total government revenues in the
late 2970s. At its peak of production, the uranium industry employed about 7
percent of all modern-sector workers, but additional wage and salaried workers,
both in government and in private firms, depended on the revenue from Uranium
sales for their lively hood as well. The decrease in Uranium revenue also
quickly led to a foreign debt crisis, further reducing the size of the
government work force.
4.6 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH
FRANCE
4.6.1 EXCHANGE OF VISIT OF HEAD OF
STATES
Exchange of visit by the Heads of State, Ambassadors,
Ministers and other officials indicates the depth of the relationship of the
countries concerned. These visits take place either for strengthening existing
relations or for normalizing relations, which hitherto have been strained.
Other reasons for the exchange of visit may be to solicit favors or support on
any national or international issues affecting the country or countries
involved. Yet, another reason may be to participate in the signing of any
treaty, agreement or pacts. Last, but not the least, visits may also take place
to seek financial assistance or aid for development programs.
Frequency of visits of the leaders of one country to the
other serves as a barometer to measure the strength and weakness of the
relationship. One thing, however, is clear: that frequent visits of the leaders
of one country to the other for economic reasons do not necessarily mean that
the former follows the policy of the donor except where the donor's national
interest is directly involved.37
Geographical distance of the two countries provides more
opportunities for the exchange of visit.
Exchange of visit of the leaders, minister of Niger's and
France have been frequent and for multiple purpose. These visits have no doubt
immensely contributed towards the development f the special relationship
between the two.
After eight (8) years of the breakdown between Niger and
France, which occurred after the military coup in 1974 when the new Head of
State, Lt. Colonel Seyni Kountché ordered the withdrawal of French
troops from Niamey, Jacques Chirac as a conservative Prime Minister and his
minister of cooperation, Jacques Foucart helped Franco-Nigerien relations to
return normal.
4.6.2 THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT
FRANÇOIS MITTERAND IN NIGER (MAY 19TH TO 21ST, 1982).
In this Wednesday, May 19th, 1982, it was hot, very
hot. May is the month more brilliant of the year in the Sahelian countries and
particularly in Niger. However, at the occasion of the arrival of French
President, François Mitterrand this May 19th,
Niamey and its suburbs came out on the main road caring out from the
airport to the president of Niger's republic president Seyni Kountché
whom the qualities of organizing as it direction of the capacity is known, was
personally imposing reception of which he told us that at constitutes
«most imposing of style of the CMS. And it is the enthusiastic applause of
a population in «Kalangou» punctuated by the «Bororo
songs», and of the professional singers of the capital that the train
Kountché-Mitterrand arrives at the presidency.
4.6.2.1 FRANCE MAKES HONOR TO
NIGER
The doubt is not allowed. The visit of work and friendship of
three days (from May 19th to 21sr, 1982) that carried out President
François Mitterrand in Niger is beyond its political character, a sign
of consideration, has the place of the mode and to the Nigerien people. Only
one fact is enough to corroborate the assertion. Niger constitutes indeed, the
first state in Black Africa the French president since his brilliant election
in May 1982.
And this choice of the first socialist president of the
5th French republic is not translated differently than by the
strategic poison that Niger occupies in West Africa or they seem to play the
leadership role and by reinforcing the diplomatic ties between Niger and
France. Besides, during a lunch at the Gaweye Hotel organized in its honor on
May 20, the French president, he said, «the Nigerien people and French
people must be the builders of a new economic order between the north and the
south?» And to add» «Our people must be the carriers and the
friends of the hope».
«I could note after long conversation with the minister
of external relations that Niger which faced of the difficulties except, had
known to proceed, has the installation of rigorous management and to arrive
then at a certain moments has a rare success». For its part, Seyni
Kountché stated you chose for this first visit that you rendered in a
country classified among the LDCs (Less Developed Countries). This terrible
short-cut as you said it, for designing powers among the poor countries... I
then to say to you how much these LDCs of Africa are grateful to follow French
policies. After greeting and thanking his host for honoring us for his first
visit, President Kountché is worried about the permanent tension between
the east and the west. This is why he said why. Our world needs more men of
good character and with good will. And the realist approach and the dynamic
perception that you have relationship between the north and the south makes it
possible to you to tackle these problems in peace, with the spirit, the
courtesy and necessary patience to find the mean founding and to reinforce the
bases of co-operation of each profit for all...
During his visit, President François Mitterrand
accompanied by his wife (who met the Association of the women of Niger (AFN)
and of an important delegation attended to one official reception at the
«Palais des Congrès», reception during which he appreciated
the riches of our cultural patrimony. He also visited the National Museum
following by an imposing demonstration of camels and horses before meeting the
French colony living in Niger.
He appropriates to note also that it had a maintenance in
swing right round with president Kountché and met the members of the
National Council of Development (CND) body which played a legislative rule.
While flying away from Niamey to Ivory Coast of Houphouet Boigny, the French
president has addressed a long message on the FRANCO-Nigerien relations:
«I am convinced that my visit and our exchange of sight as well on the
essential problems of international relations as on those interesting your area
and your country would not be able to consolidate the solidarity between France
and the African countries particularly Niger».
4.6.2.2 FRANCO-NIGEREIEN
DECLARATION OF NIAMEY
The official visit of three days of President François
Mitterrand from France in Niger has been focused on a joint official statement
called «Franco Nigerien De ration of Niamey» in which the two (2)
countries have appreciated the exception quality o their relations. In the
bilateral field, the official statement said: «the co-operation between
France and Niger done in the respect of the independences, sovereignties and
the values that they have in common responds to the aspirations of the French
people and the Nigerien people. This positive co-operation made it possible to
record beneficial results for the two partners who enjoy in particular some
results that it reached in Niger in the principal domains of the rural
development, the health or telecommunications.
The new orientation done to the French policy since one year,
and the changes which are accompanied in Niger with the installation of the
company of development, open advantages perspectives in its development. In
this context, the two countries affirm that will to work with the reinforcement
of a mutually advantageous co-operation in solidarity, comprehension and
equality.
4.6.2.3 IN THE FIELD OF THE
INTERNATION POLITICS
France and Niger fasten red or the persistence of hearts of
tensions in the world and particularly in Africa, affirms that determination to
ensure their own safety and their opposition to the founded policies on the use
of force or the threat, the attempts of domination and overall the non-respect
of the principle in the UN character.
They consider that such policies endanger peace and
international security.
They denounce the enterprise of subversion and destabilization
let against the sovereign states and independent and the foreign interference
in the internal affairs.
They confirm their attachment with the principle of the
peaceful judgment of the breakdown among states; to the respect of the
independence, of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each state
and the right of each people to feel free and to choose freely his political
regime, economic and social.
They underline their will to adopt and to apply within the
best times by the whole countries of the world their common measure to ensure
arms reduction in order to keep the international community in peace.
4.6.2.4 IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD
France and Niger recognize the inadequacies to the world
exigencies today of economic structures financial and technical international
structures current.
They express their serious preoccupations in front of the
persistence of the world economic crisis and its disastrous efforts
particularly on the fragi8le economies of the developing countries and on those
of the less developed countries (LDCs).
They are worried about the reticence on which express on the
necessity to keep out the necessary resources to the financing of the
development and enjoy the retained measures by certain countries, the first of
which France to mitigate the reduction in the put credit on the hands of AID
(Agence Internationale pour le Développement).
They engage to continue and to diversify their efforts at the
international level for the revival of the global negotiations within the
framework of the system of the UN for the stabilization of the prices of the
raw-materials in order to promote a new international economic order in
particular ensuring a reduction of the interval between the countries of the
North and those of the South and an economic revival.
France and Niger, more than ever, after themselves and decided
to work together in all the sectors such as immediately or have term, depends
on peace in the world. 33
4.7 MILITARY AND POLITICAL
INTERACTIONS
After eight (8) years of the French troops withdrawal from
Niamey, Franco-Nigerien military relations returned to normal. General Seyni
Kountché signed again the new Libyan Defense pact. France promised more
extensive military support if requested. During Niger's conflict with Libya in
1981, France quietly moved several battalions of combat troops into an area
claimed by Muammar Qaddafi, signaling its willingness to protect its interests
along Niger's Saharan border and in the country's mining areas.
During Seyni Kountché era, there was no French Military
base in Niger. Yet up till now, Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) are trained and
equipped by the French Army and Armaments Many French officers had served in
Niger' Army training such as the «Tondibia Military Camp, close to the
capital. And even the «Gendarmerie», the police and Republican Guard
forces are concerned. In France, many young Nigerien officers received training
such as «Commando Training».
In the organisation of African Union (Later AU), France
seemed to follow the Nigerien lead. Idé Oumarou became the Secretary
General of O.A.U. (1984 - 1985) with the French support. Because France behaved
that an African from any Francophone countries might take control of the
Organization. The French Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac said: «French's
support in the Nigerien lead of the O.A.U. indicates that national interest was
the determining factor and not eh solidarity of the African countries.»
France demanded to all francophone African countries to vote in favor of
Idé Oumarou. 39
REFERENCES
1. The Sahara, 30 Août 1961
2. African Contemporary Record, Vol. 7 (1974 - 1975), P.
725
3. West Africa, 2nd Sept., 1974, p 1085
4. W. G. East, «The Geography of Land-locked
states», Trano Institute of British Geographers, 28 (1960) Pp, 1 - 22.
East has divided land-locked states into four groups. (1) African groups with
weak neighbors, (2) Buffer states e.g. Afghanistan and Nepal, (3) Land-locked
states dominated by powerful neighbors e.g. Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Lesotho,
(4) Land -locked states respected for their neutrality, e.g. Switzerland.
5. Thirty-two (32) states ratified the convention of the
Freedom of transit Trade at the Barcelona Conference of 1921. Another
Conference convened by the U.N. in 1964 reaffirmed the principles of the
Barcelona conference.
6. Olajide Aluko, «Determinants of the Foreign Policy of
African states», in Aluko (d.), The foreign policy of African States, Pp.
1 - 18.
7. Nichole Echard, Etude Socio-economique dans les
vallées de l'Ader-Doutchi - Maggia (Paris/Niamey, n.d.), 46 - 7, P.
Falgueirettes, C. de Birnin Konni, «R. ann. 1957», February 20, 1958
(ASP Birnin Konni).
8. Letter from Gov. Ramadier to Professor Gourou, Niamey, Dec.
28, 1955 (AP Maradi); oral sources.
9. JO. AOF, Mo. 249, July 26, 1900, 313
10. Sere de Rivières (1965), 234-5.
11. Ibid. 205
12. Capt. Granderye (Resident say) to «Commandant
Supérieur», Say, February 27, 1900; «Commandant
Supérieur (Col. Combes)», to Resident say, St. Louis, March 2, 1900
(both 14 MI 293); «Commandant Nord-Est au Lieut. Gouv. A Kayes», m.d.
(1899), (SOM Soudan IV, 8); Rash (1972a), 80; P. Urfer, «R. Tournée
Canton de Loga», Dosso, April 20, 1947.
13. Léopold Kaziendé, «Un episode de
l'Histoire de Filingué Procès-Verbal d'une conversation avec
Chekou Mayaki», Mss. Niamey. 1937 (consulted by courtesy of the
author).
14. Capt. Angeli to Lieut. Gov. Soudan, Dosso, June 14, 1899
(14 MI 855).
15. «Région Ouest à Comandant, 3e territ.
May 13, 1901; Lieut. Col. Noe, «Rapp. Sur la situation pol. Du 3e territ.
Mil. 3e trim. 1902» Niamey, November, 1902 (both ANN).
16. P. Cambon (French Ambassador in London) to Minister of
Foreign Affairs, London, March 12 & May 1, 1902 (SOM Tchad I 2bis)
17. Destenave (n.d.), 86.
18. See for instance, two (2) reports by Major Gouraud, Oct.
4, 1901 and June 28, 1902 (ANN & SOM Tchad I, 2bis); Lugard to Secr.
State-Colonies, January 2, 1902 (Co 446/30); Noel, «R. sit, 3e trim
1902»; Lieut. Gov. Upper Sen. Niger to Gov., March 26, 1906 (14MI294).
19. Ibid, Sellier, «Note sur Le peuplement . . . du
cercle de Niamey», Rash 91972a), 284; and the reports and works cited in
note 148.
20. Report by Noel cited in Gov. Gal. To Minister, March 13,
1904 (SOM TChad I, 2 bis).
21. French and Nigerien Military of Foreign Affairs reports,
issues of Bulletin de l' Afrique Noire, and Banque Centrale des Etats de
Afrique de L' Ouest publications.
22. Toh, «Recent Macroeconomic Development», Pp. 26,
42.
23. U.S.A.I.D., «Agricultural sector and the Agricultural
Development Office of USAID/Niger» (Niamey, November 1984).
24. In 1981, for example, Chinese and Arab bilateral aid
amounted to nearly 30 percent of total aid received.
25. World Development Report 1989, Pp. 208, 168, 204. Debt
includes disbursed IMF credits and private non-guaranteed loans.
26. Le Sahel, April 15, 1980.
27. Africa Confidential, Vol. 13. No. 4,
February 18th, 1972, P. 4.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 5 (1972
- 1973), P. 675.
31. Major Sani Souna Sido, Vice-chairman of
the Supreme Military Council, interview, reported in `Le Sahel' see
West Africa, 2nd Sept. 1974, P. 1085.
32. Ibid, 6th May, 1974, P. 546
33. Ibid,
34. Ibid, P. 728
35. West Africa, July 15th, 1975,
P. 873
36. West Africa, Sept. 16th, 1975,
P. 1148
37. Country situation (Niger) (Niamey: U.S.A.I.D, January
1986), Tables A. 7 and A. 10.
38. Pakistan provides a good illustration: its leaders
frequently visit Iran, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia for economic reasons but its
relations with China, North Korea and Vietnam are also friendly.
39. Le Niger d'Aujourd' hui, No. 002, P. 11
(2004) (Editions JA )
CHAPTER FIVE
5.1 SUMMARY
This work is divided into five (5) chapters, which would be
summarized in this chapter in order to bring out the linkage towards the
development of this course of study.
The first chapter centered on the methodology. It introduced
the research work, which explores on the attempt to positively utilize the
foreign policy of Niger to France under General Seyni Kountché (1974 -
1987) for rapid economic growth and development because of the uranium boom at
that time in Niger. It also highlighted on the former regime's foreign policy,
on the political breakdown between the new military regime (under General Seyni
Kountché) and France as colonial master, and on the normal period of
relationship between the two counties. There is the provision for the research
problem, research methodology, significance and justification of the study, the
theoretical framework was based on the dependency and underdevelopment theory
whi9ch picture on the socio-economic and political terrain of most their world
countries especially Niger Republic aims and objectives of this study, the
hypothesis was based on the impact and historical ties of French colonialism in
Niger and the role of France's neo-colonial interest in Niger in shaping
Niger's relationship with France under Kountché's and scope and
limitation covered the period of 1974-1987.
The second chapter is centered on the review of literature.
This stressed on the general argument of depended and underdevelopment theory
as well as other school o thoughts. It went further to drawing a concluding
statement on the gap, which this work intends to fill.
The third chapter reflects Niger republic in all aspects
(government, economy, political background, historical background, economy and
geography, the different ethnic groups, etc). This is the background to the
study.
The forth chapter elaborate extensively on the project topic
(Niger's foreign policy to France under Foreign policy pronouncement since the
first republic (under Hamani Diori). In addition, the continuity and change in
Niger's foreign policy, the economic, diplomatic, political and military
relations with France under Kountché were highlighted with reference.
5.2 CONCLUSION
We have studied the bilateral relations between Niger as
former colony and France as a colonial master on the basis of specified indices
of interaction such as political, military, diplomatic and economic.
Niger's foreign policy was also personality-centered.
President Hamani Diori was the principal formulator of Niger's foreign policy.
Niger publicly acknowledges the economic and financial contribution of its
former colonial master, France. President Hamani Diori wanted to retain Niger's
special relationship with France. A larger number of French administrators
continued to play an important role in the central administration of Niger long
after independence. In 1962, the French Ambassador to Niger was its former
governor. Niger found it convenient to employ former French officials since
their salaries were paid by the French technical assistance budget. It has been
also criticized hat president Hamani Diori as being pro-west and
conservative.
The military rulers led by Lt. Colonel (later General) Seyni
Kountché who overthrew the Hamani regime while maintaining cordial
relationship with France, have been able to obtain the withdrawal of French
troops from Niger. Niger has begun to assert herself whenever questions of
national interest arise. Again, this has been possible because of two major
elements, i.e. change of the leadership and the uranium exploitation.
Despite the discovery of uranium by French companies, Niger is
still one of the poorest nations in the world. Niger always looks toward
Europe, USA and Japan for foreign investment in her projects. The new head of
state has seen this attitude as exploitation by France.
The French military was asked to leave the country but has not
affected the special relation existing between the countries. The new military
regime didn't change the previous regime's Foreign policy principles and
objectives. The noticeable change in the foreign policy practice of Niger
during the military regime is the method of pursuing foreign policy objectives.
It is now vigorously pursued. Secondly, decision seemed to be taken
collectively rather than personally, as was the practice during Hamani Diori's
regime. Seyni Kountché said to the French government that «Niger
would re-examine the whole uranium question and Niger would increase its share
of uranium production and also Niger is free to fix its price».
Niger's economy was and to a large extent still is a
subsistence economy. It's predominantly livestock. Mining was due to start in
1971 with 750 tons to increase gradually up to 1,500 by 1974.The production
target has not been achieved due to political reasons. Even them mining
company, SOMAIR is controlled by French interest. The Niger government has only
invested 20% while French public and private sectors have shared the remaining
80% has been shared by French public and private sector. After the mining
agreements, the Seyni Kountché's regime has been able to increase its
share to 33%.
Much of the close relationship, which existed between Niger
and France during Seyni Kountché's era, can be explained by the French
interest in uranium for their nuclear energy and weapons.
Many factors pushed Niger's relationship to France during
Seyni Kountché's regime. The geographical land locked situation of the
country implies the growing relationship. The stains and imitation on the
foreign policy of Niger emanated from the nature of poor economic and
geographical position of the country, but much of the close relationship that
exists between Niger and France is because France is the major trading partner,
donor and investor in Niger.
The diplomatic relations became normal after a period of
breakdown. The French president, Francois Mitterrand visited Niger in 1982 and
French officers of Army provided training facilities to the cadets of Niger.
And France even supported Niger when Idè Oumarou (1984-1985) contested
in O.A.U.
Overall, Niger and France relations during Seyni
Kountché's regime, even if strained at the first time, the relations are
mutual. And France still remained the major supplier of Niger (about 50%). In
1975, France increased her aid to Niger by one third.
5.3 RECOMMENDATION
This should be given a special priority in that, it would help
the government of general Seyni Kountché' to properly carry our policies
and for effective implementation. It will go a long way in correcting some
economic its inherent in the Nigerien state due to the boom of uranium in the
years 1980s.
For the purpose of fostering economic growth and development.
IT ranges from the following suggestions:
There should be effective policies and implementation in
elation to the industrial sector. This would help remove the reliance on
foreign (French) Industrial facility.
There should be an effective link between the agriculture and
livestock and uranium sector by diversifying the economy.
There should be negotiation with France in order to build the
Kandadji dam, which can supply Niger hydroelectric power to be free from
acquiring electricity in Nigeria and which can help for the irrigated cultures
and maybe Niger will supply other countries electricity.
France might encourage Niger to produce nuclear energy from
its uranium.
Government of Niger should increase the revenue allocation to
the producing communities, where uranium is located.
There should be a «Uranium Trust Fund», which can
help the population in improving education, having good water supply, health
care delivery, roads construction, etc.
Government should pursue a policy aimed at securing a fair
deal for the country from the uranium companies, since the major players are
French foreigners.
There should be non-personal rule in Niger during
Kountché's era (dictatorship), which based on personal decision-making
(only CMS members were allowed in the decision making).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Offiong, D. A., Imperialism and Dependency Enugu Fourth
Dimension Publishers, 1980
2. Rodney, W., How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Washington D.
C. Howard University Press, (1974, p. 21).
3. Charlick, B.R., Niger Personal Rule and Survival in the
Sahel, Boulder and San Francisco, Westview Press, 1991
4. Fuglestad, F., History of Niger (1850 - 1960), Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
5. Edmond, R.S., Histoire du Niger, Paris, Berger Levrault,
1965
6. Edmond, J., Du Niger de Diori Hamani au Gouvernement des
militaires (1974 - 1977), Paris, Revue Française d' Etudes Politiques
Africanes 148 (1978, May), pp 19 - 44
7. Olatunde O., regional Co-operation and Integration, London
and New York, Longman, 1985
8. Klotchkoff, J.C., Le Niger d' Aujourd' hui, Paris, Editions
Jeune Afrique. 1982
9. Morgenthau, Ruth S., Political parties in French Speaking
West Africa, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964
10. Thiam D., The Foreign Policy of African States, London
Phoenix House, 1965
11. Bouzou A., Niger's Foreign Policy, Dakar, NEA, 1984
PERIODICALS
1. Africa Confidential, 1967 - 1975, London, Miramoor
Publications Ltd.
2. Africa Diary, 1961 - 1977, Delhi, Africa's Publications
3. Jeune Afrique, 1965 - 1976, Paris, Publications
Elysées
4. West Africa (London)
5. Africa Contemporary Record (London)
NEWSPAPERS
1. Le Sahel
2. Sahel Dimanche
3. Le Soleil
PAMPHLETS
1. La Coopération Française au Niger
2. Niger and France, March Forward Towards a greater Tomorrow,
Pamphlet. Niamey: December 1983
ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES
1. Discours et messages du General Kountché, Le Sahel,
Vol. 20, No 244, 1980, pp 48 - 54
2. La mort de Kountché, Jeune Afrique, no 66, p 8,
1987
3. East W.G., «The Geography of land-locked states»,
Trano Institute of British geographies, 28, 1960.
WEBSITES
www.baobabinfo.net
www.intnet.ne
www.historyiq.com/countries/ng/niger_relations_smmary.htm
www.lintelligent.com
www.bbchausa.com
www.rfi.fr
www.allafrica.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATION
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DÉFINI.
DEDICATION
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DÉFINI.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ERREUR! SIGNET NON
DÉFINI.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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TABLE OF CONTENT
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DÉFINI.-XIII
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
15-4
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM
4
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
STUDY 5-6
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
6-7
1.6 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
7
1.7 HYPOTHESIS 7
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
8
1.9 CHAPTERIZATION
8
1.10 REFERENCES 8
REFERENCES 8-9
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
10-15
REFERENCE 15
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
16
3.1 COUNTRY: NIGER
16-17
3.2 DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS OF NIGER
17-19
3.3 LANGUAGES OF NIGER
19
3.4 RELIGIONS 19
3.5 BORDERLANDS
20
3.6 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND COLONIALISM
20-21
3.7 POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENTS OF NIGER 21-23
3.8 GEOGRAPHY
23-24
3.9 POLITICAL PARTIES
24-25
3.10 NIGER MILITARY
25
3.11 FOREIGN RELATIONS
25-26
3.12 NIGER'S ECONOMY (FACTS)
26-29
3.13 TRANSPORTATION
29
3.14 COMMUNICATION
29-30
REFERENCE 30
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 NIGER'S FOREIGN POLICY TO FRANCE (1974 -
1987) 31
4.1 INTRODUCTION
31-33
4.2 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN
POLICY 33-35
4.3 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED NIGER'S FOREIGN
POLICY 36
4.3.1 LAND-LOCKED STATE
36-37
4.3.2 THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 37-41
4.3.3 NIGER'S DEPENDENCY
42-47
4.4 AREA OF DISCORD WITH FRANCE
47-50
4.5 ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
50-51
4.5.1 FRENCH AID TO NIGER
52
4.5.2 NIGER'S URANIUM
52-54
4.6 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
54
4.6.1 EXCHANGE OF VISIT OF HEAD OF STATES
54-55
4.6.2 THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT FRANÇOIS
MITTERAND IN NIGER (MAY 19TH TO 21ST, 1982).
55-56
4.6.2.1 FRANCE MAKES HONOR TO NIGER
56-58
4.6.2.2 FRANCO-NIGEREIEN DECLARATION OF NIAMEY
58
4.6.2.3 IN THE FIELD OF THE INTERNATION POLITICS
59
4.6.2.4 IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD
60
4.7 MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTERACTIONS
61-62
REFERENCES 62-65
CHAPTER FIVE
5.1 SUMMARY
66-67
5.2 CONCLUSION
67-70
5.3 RECOMMENDATION
70-71
BIBLIOGRAPHY
72-74