Memoire Online - The Union for the Mediterranean: a rescue plan for Europe an opportunity or an opportunity for the Maghreb

The Union for the Mediterranean: An opportunity for the Maghreb or a rescue plan for Europe?

Introduction:.............................................................................................p1

A/ The Poles of the Occidental Region of the Mediterranean Sea:..............................p3

-a- The Northern Shore: Europe.....................................................................p3

-b- The Southern Shore: The Maghreb..............................................................p4

1- The Steps Towards the Construction of the Union for the Mediterranean:..............p6

A/5+5Dialogue:.............................................................................................p6

B/Barcelona Process:.....................................................................................p6

2-The Union for the Mediterranean: a Philosophy of Partnership and Development:...p8

A/ The UfM a part of the European Neighborhood Policy:........................................p8

B/ The importance of the UfM for its Supporters:....................................................p8

C/ UfM: Strategies for Development:.................................................................p9

D/ Fields to Explore in the UfM:......................................................................p11

3- Factors urging the Union for the Mediterranean:...........................................p12

A/ European Reasons to join the UfM:...............................................................p12

-a- European Demographic Difficulties:.........................................................p12

-b- Safeguarding a Strong Europe:................................................................p13

B/ Reasons Urging Maghreb States to Join the UfM:..............................................p14

-a- The Socio-Economic Situation in the Maghreb:...........................................p15

A/ The Socio-Economic Stake:........................................................................p17

B/ The Industrial Stake:................................................................................p19

C/ The Stake of Natural Resources:..................................................................p23

Conclusion:..............................................................................................p26

Introduction

The Mediterranean basin witnessed the birth and the down fall of the most important civilizations that mankind had come across. Indeed, it is considered as a propitious setting of interactions for the civilizations of the region. Hence, the geographical position of the Mediterranean Sea imposed spontaneous interactions that came to print the relations among the old Mediterranean civilizations. So far, the empires surrounding the Mediterranean basin lived in a perpetual interdependence. Consequently, trade exchanges were a daily routine. Therefore, «Mare Nostrum,»^1(*), as called in Antiquity, had been for centuries a center of interest for different civilizations which targeted further influence and territorial expansion. As a result, the clash of interests revolved around the area, generated a climate of tension that led to the emergence of rivalry between the different entities of «Mare Nostrum». So far, the climate of rivalry grew more intense when Christianity and Islam, came to get involved into a domination race, in the Mediterranean basin. This resulted in the creation of a chasm that some believe it is the out come of the opposition of the religious forces. Nevertheless, culture and economic exchanges perpetrated the tradition of concord and interactions which characterized the region for centuries up to the contemporary era.

As far as the contemporary era is concerned a considerable gap came to be established between the states of the northern and southern shore of the Mediterranean. In fact, a great economic and political power flourished in the occidental region of Europe whereas in North Africa, as well as, in the rest of the Mediterranean states, peoples and rulers witnessed stagnation despite a glorious past. However, tough conjunctures that witnessed the Mediterranean states in the late of the 20^th C ,such as Oil crisis in 1983, pushed both shores of the Mediterranean basin to recognize that maintaining a solid partnership, would make out of the region an influential pole, capable to challenge other economic groupings and emerging powers.

Nonetheless, the success of a partnership in a given region is essentially based on the stability's degree of the states forming the partnership. However, the situations in the different regions of the Mediterranean are not all alike. In comparing the political situation in the occidental and the oriental basin of the Mediterranean, one can depict a clear imbalance. Indeed, the Palestinian issue, and the distorted relations between the states of the so called region of Middle East represent a wide range of impediments to a solid partnership in the oriental region the Mediterranean Sea. In contrast, the situation in the occidental region which namely includes the Maghreb and Europe is relatively stable, in such a way to provide a prosperous background to the establishment of a partnership such as the Union for the Mediterranean.

Thus, the study purports to explore the frame work of the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean which is the most recent project that tends to involve the whole Mediterranean region onto further partnership. Hence, there will be a special focus on the Euro-Maghreb partnership, since it represents the most advanced partnership that involves two groupings (i.e. European Union and the Arab Maghreb Union) in the Mediterranean region.

The Geopolitical Assessment of the Occidental Part of the Med-region

The occidental part of the Mediterranean region includes Western Europe and the Maghreb. These two entities experienced a gloomy recent past in their relations since Italy, France and Spain represent the former colonizers of the Maghreb region. This recent past, established a kind of discord that came to stamp the relations among these two entities. Furthermore, this disparity especially deepened in the aftermath of decolonization when Western Europe got integrated in a solid Community (i.e. the European Community).

A/ The Poles of the Occidental Region of the Mediterranean Sea:2(*)

The occidental part of the Mediterranean region is characterized by a structured northern shore with solid institutions and a strong economy. However, the Mediterranean southern shore is stamped with a lack of integration and a weak economy.

Today, Europe is a well organized continent with structured institutions and a strong economy. The establishment of strong supranational institutions (i.e. EU institutions) brings prosperity and stability to a region that formerly represented an arena for two destructive World Wars. Actually, European institutions target to foster peace, political dialogue, economy and social welfare in the continent, in order to strengthen the European position as an influential pole in the region, as well as in the world. The European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank...are among the Community's mechanisms at the source of prosperity in the European continent. Moreover, the European Union relies on a policy to protect its interests and to ensure its security. This policy is known as The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), it is based on a policy that enables Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Hence, it represents a key strategy that allows Europe to get more influence on the region immediately neighboring the European Union. Thus, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is an instance that demonstrates the application of this policy.

Geographically speaking, the Maghreb region is situated in North Africa. This entity includes Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. De jure, the region represents a grouping known as «The
Arab Maghreb Union» (AMU). Accordingly, the states of the Maghreb are supposed to be fully integrated, so to face the different problems threatening the shared interests of the regional states. Moreover, the Maghreb region is a part of the» League of Arab States» as well as of «the Africa Union». Each of these institutions is in place in order to respond more or less to the same objectives. Therefore, to be part of different institutions does not necessarily reflect integrity in the region. Furthermore, no efficiency and no integration stamps Maghreb interstate relations, since each state aspires to different targets and adopts non-consensual points of view which consequently generate repercussions on the local economies in a way to make out of the grouping a weak entity, unable to compete with its well organized neighbors of the northern shore. Hence, the partnership with the northern neighbors became an inevitable alternative for the Maghreb states since it represents a considerable solution to overcome a gap which does not cease to get wider. Thus, «The Union for the Mediterranean» (UfM) represents an ultimate opportunity that the Maghreb states should not neglect.

The Union for the Mediterranean

«The Union for the Mediterranean» was suggested by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy during the French presidential campaign of February 2007. The project tends to take precedence over «Barcelona Process", which was admitted as a failure by the French president. The proposal of the UfM raised mixed reactions from economic and political analysts, since it does not include all European states. In fact, initially the project included only countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. However, the plan was modified when Germany stressed on the need to include all EU members. Finally, the project came to encompass 39 states and includes 700 Million people. Indeed, the UfM is mainly revolved around socio-economic and environmental plans of development. Furthermore, it targets to develop the whole region, with a focus on the states that witness economic backwardness, so as to make out of the Mediterranean zone an influential pole at the global scale. Moreover, the UfM is a geostrategic plan that aims to up-grade logistics (i.e. ports, highways, sea routes), in order to ease the flow of trade and economic exchanges between the two shores of the Mediterranean. However, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership is not a revolutionary idea, in the sense that similar plans of partnership were in place before N.Sarkozy's suggestion. Indeed, since the establishment of the European Economic Community in the late 50s, European leaders have always viewed the development of trade and economic ties as a vital instrument to improve bilateral relations with the neighbours of the southern shore of the Mediterranean and especially with Maghreb countries.

1- The Steps Towards the Construction of the Union for the Mediterranean:3(*)

The Cooperation Process in the Western Mediterranean, known as "Dialogue 5+5" was launched during a ministerial meeting, held in Rome on October 10, 1990. A constitutive declaration emanated from this meeting, which is known as the «Rome Constitutive Declaration». The document stipulates the necessity of holding regular meetings to discuss issues of common interest. Indeed, «Dialogue 5+5» includes 10 countries of the western Mediterranean basin (Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain). Since 2001, ordinary ministerial meetings have been regularly held, to foster the process of cooperation and to strengthen principles adopted in the different declarations (i.e. Algiers declaration, Barcelona declaration, Tripoli Declaration, Saint Maxime Declaration and Tunis Declaration).

«Barcelona process» was established in 1995 in order to foster the relations between the states of the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, the process gathered the states of the European Union (15 states at that time) and 12 states of the south Mediterranean region. It aimed at settling the disputes in the Mediterranean region (i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflict), assuring security in the area (i.e. radicalism in Algeria) and achieving economic development. Moreover, the process forecasted the establishment of a free trade area between the two shores of the Mediterranean by 2010. Hence, under the umbrella of «Barcelona Process», the EU has entered into bilateral trade agreements with Tunisia (1995), Morocco (1996), and Algeria (2002). Agreements with Tunisia and Morocco had come into force in early 2005, while agreements' ratification process was ongoing for Algeria. Indeed, post-Barcelona «Association agreements» offered states parties the opportunity to deal simultaneously with regional (inter-Maghreb cooperation) and global economic issues (trade and investments) in the sense that it would give the Maghreb region more important role in the international economic scene. Indeed, the most important aspect of these agreements is the fact that they focus on a wide range of key economic issues (i.e. Industry, agriculture, foreign trade, financial assistance, transport and communication). However, for some analysts, «Barcelona process» represented a failure, since it did not fulfill its targets. Indeed, ten years after the process' creation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was still persisting and the bilateral economic exchanges remained more or less, at the same level before the process. In deed, Francis Wurtz a French Member of the «European Parliament» believes that the failure of the process was mainly due to the divergence in points of view among the European leaders and most importantly because of the «policy of enlargement» that the EU had undertaken concerning the admission of new members to the EU from East European states^4(*). Therefore, the rapid integration of new states in the European Union produced a phenomenon of transfer of weight, from the West to the East of the European continent. Thereby, influential European states such as Germany privileged economic exchanges with newly joining states. Consequently, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Barcelona Process) became a project of secondary importance and did not match initial expectations.

2- The Union for the Mediterranean: a Philosophy of Partnership and Development:

The UfM represents a concrete instance of The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In fact, the ENP was developed in 2004. According to the European Commission; it was established «with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned.»^5(*) In such a way, «The EU offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, built upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). Moreover, «The ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and economic integration.»^6(*) Therefore, The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aims to forge closer ties with countries to the South and East of the EU without offering them a membership perspective. Thus, the EU seeks to promote greater economic stability and better governance in its neighborhood, through instating a project such as the UfM.

The UfM represents for the European supporters a great initiative since it will launch both shores of the Mediterranean onto a further partnership that would generate benefits. Indeed, it also represents an opportunity to bridge the gap between two neighbor entities. Furthermore, it will be a new opportunity to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In addition, the project forecasts the promotion of peace in the whole region (i.e. the Palestinian issue), also cultural and social comprehension within the people of the region and additionally, it represents a new step towards the protection of the environment, since the UfM lays importance on environmental issues.

For those who support the UfM on the Maghreb side, the project represents an opportunity for the region since it aims to strengthen the links of cooperation between Europe and the Maghreb. For instance, the Tunisian government affirms its acceptance of the project especially because 80% of the economic exchanges in this country are with the European Union. Hence, the UfM would represent an additional opportunity for Tunisia to get further involved in a partnership with Europe, in a way to be able to face different problems such as unemployment. Moreover, The Moroccan government joins Tunisia in its stand and affirms its effective readiness to get involved in the project. However, the project left many questions unanswered for some leaders in the Maghreb region. In fact, the Algerian leader A. Boutaflika was not very enthusiastic in the beginning. In fact he depicted the project as an

Embiguous initiative from the European neighbor, that's why he asked for further details. Nevertheless, he decided to join because he acknowledged that the UfM represents an important deal especially that its immediate neighbors joined the project. So far, the UfM seems not to convince the Libyan leader M. Kadhafi. In fact, he totally discarded the initiative and did not hesitate to depict it as a conspiracy revolved around the natural resources of the region.

The UfM needs effective strategies to achieve a successful process of development. Therefore, joint efforts should be undertaken in order to make the plan of partnership as concrete as possible. Indeed, the Mediterranean states should adopt a consensual vision to be able to pull-out the region from a climate of economic backwardness and most importantly, to give to the southern states the opportunity to bridge the gap that separates them from the northern neighbor. Accordingly, the EU seems to be engaged in a trend of support towards the southern shore especially for the Maghreb region. In fact, different agencies and institutions are involved in this process of development by providing important amounts of money in order to enhance the situation in the region. Among the provided supports there are Official Development Aid (ODA), Subsidies and loans.

Area	Subsidies	Loans	Guaranties	Budget aids	Total	Percentage of the budget
Maghreb	27.7 M€	702.3M€	12.5 M€	375.0 M€	1127.6 M€	41.72%

In the table above, some data demonstrate the importance of the contribution of the French Development Agency (FDA). Accordingly, 41.72% of the development budget of the FDA is absorbed by the Maghreb region, which make out of the French agency among the most important supporters of development in the region. However, the FDA does not represent the only contributor in the process of development in the Maghreb region.
In fact, other important institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are considered as important contributors to the development in the Maghreb. Although denounced by different associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), international institutions remain the dominant funds suppliers for developing states. Moreover, some denounce the proceedings of IGOs and depict their behavior as inequitable. In this context, Jaroslava Colajacomo pledges that «the EIB is not playing the role of a development bank. For instance, in Latin America, the EIB is offering 90% of its subsidies to the huge European companies.»^7(*) In other words they are supporting the huge Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) at the expense of the local industry. In addition to funds' provision, the WB, IMF and the European Commission are likely dictating plans and road map for development for South Mediterranean states and especially the Maghreb region.

As for any project, the UfM needs define the fields of exploration so to act in a coherent approach in order to draw benefits from the initiative. Hence, a report of the French parliamentary assembly (Report N: 449) on the project of the Union for the Mediterranean,^8(*) stresses three axes namely; «the problems of water resources in the region, the necessity to safeguard the common natural heritage through the protection of the environment and the management of environmental risks and finally the establishment of a cultural dialogue in order to avoid the «clash of civilizations». However, other analysts depict different axes of cooperation. In a recent piece of work entitled «5+5=32: A road map for the Mediterranean,»^9(*) a circle of French economists, headed by Hubert Védrine,^10(*) distinguished four axes of cooperation on which a Euro-Mediterranean partnership should be based; first, the establishment of an agrarian cooperation, an energetic cooperation, instating competitiveness in textile industry and building capacities in the southern states of the Mediterranean. Indeed, the divergence in defining the fields of cooperation revolves questions around some controversial issues, such as, immigration and most importantly the issue of exploiting natural resources in the Maghreb region. Despite some Maghreb leaders' skepticism, the French president pledges for a «win-win»^11(*) partnership. Accordingly, the UfM would be beneficial for any state that tends to get involved into this Union. In fact, N.Sarkozy thinks that Europe and Maghreb states have complementary needs and the UfM is the way out from all the problems. Moreover, he stipulates that there are numerous stakes and challenges that urge the two shores of the Mediterranean, to get into further complementarities despite the considerable socio-political and economic gap dividing the entities of the region.

Thus a range of ideas mentioned in the frame work of «Barcelona process» remained unfortunately behind high initial European expectations. So, it is up to this new alternative (i.e. UfM) to reboot the old initiative, and so far to make the partnership a reality so to permit all the states of the region to draw benefits and to strengthen the tradition of concord.

3- Factors urging the Union for the Mediterranean:

Several factors are urging the European Union to get onto effective partnership with its southern neighbors. In fact, the world is no longer that of a hegemonic G7, The European continent should face new realities and cope with new emerging powers (i.e. BRIC states^12(*)). Therefore, analysts foreshadow emerging powers to overtake actual superpowers in the next couple of decades. Thus, Europe should handle the situation since it would clearly endanger its position as a world influential power especially in a world of drastic rapid changes.

The European continent faces a considerable demographic challenge namely aging society. In terms of demography, the European Union encompasses the world's third largest population after China and India. In fact, the EU makes up only 7% of the world's population.^13(*) Today, most of the EU's total population growth is due to migration which somehow is considered as a blessing for Europe, since it tends to recover the up coming demographic crisis. Indeed, this phenomenon is due to, the decrease in birth rates and the rise in life expectancy. The situation in some states in Europe is crucial. Indeed, these trends would generate important implications in the near future, namely an aged society which implies economically dependent and unproductive community. Consequently, immigration imposes itself as a way out from this situation, since it brings much-needed young people into the EU workforce.

Since the post Second World War era, states of the European
Union (EU) place economy at the top of their agenda. Therefore, the EU's main aim is economic development. In fact, over the last fifty years, and especially during the 1980s and 1990s, much has been done to break down the boundaries that hamper the development of the Euro-zone. Consequently, a coherent single market took shape and provided further space wherein goods, people and capital were able to move freely. Moreover, the EU's Gross Domestic Product^14(*) (GDP) sustainably grew from the first enlargement, up to the fifth in 2004, in a way that it came to surpass the United States' GDP.^15(*) Today, Europe gathers 27 members which make the old continent a major economic power in the world. However, Europe should face the economic conjuncture of the 21^st. Indeed, new emerging powers are today achieving a fast economic development and GDP improvement, in a way that it would surpass those of the actual superpowers by the year 2040-2050. In fact, Goldman Sachs argues that «the economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China is such that they may become among the four most dominant economies by the year 2050.»^16(*) Moreover, Goldman Sachs predicts China and India, respectively, to be the dominant global suppliers of manufactured goods and services while Brazil and Russia would become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. Moreover, other factors come to challenge the EU. In fact, in addition to the internal socio-economic situation and the shadow of BRIC states, the United States aims to establish a free trade zone with the Mediterranean region. This new challenger would represent an additional threat to face for Europe. Thus, establishing a sold partnership with the Mediterranean states starting with Maghreb area would be the only way to counter the emerging powers and the aspiration of other superpowers to dominate the area. Accordingly, «the future of Europe seems to be in the South». Thus, the UfM would enable Europe to limit its alienation in world economy.

Unlike the European economy, The Maghreb economy is vulnerable and likely in need for a back up in order to sustain its economic development. Nevertheless, different attempts were undertaken in order to pull out the region from critical situations. However, some states showed inability to face up difficulties partly because of the lack of natural resources. Hence, economic fragility led some states of the Maghreb to be dependent on foreign aids.

The socio-economic situation in the Maghreb represents a significant impediment to the economic fulfillment in the region. According to the political science Professor Gregory white^17(*); «The Political economy in the Maghreb experienced sharp asymmetry and imbalance as early as the area decolonized». In fact, the different countries of the Maghreb adopted different approaches and ways in redefining the national economic path. Unlike Europe, the Maghreb states did not adopt a consensual vision in rebuilding the region. Therefore, the lack of coherence in economic orientation drove the region to experience a relative stagnation in comparison with the European neighbor. Nonetheless, it is worthy to mention that the Maghreb political economy had changed significantly from the early years of independence. Despite the difficulties faced during the 1970s and the 1980s, namely because of the oil crisis and other natural disasters such as drought and locust, some Maghreb states knew how to cope with the difficulties and got out of the situation thanks to international organization's support namely those of the World Bank and the IMF.

Despite incoherence in economic orientations and political visions, the Maghreb states managed to act as a single body in the framework of a supranational institution on the image of the European Union. Accordingly, in 1989 the Maghreb countries decided to shape the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which aims thoroughly to concentrate the regional states' efforts, in a way to out pace economic hazards. However, despite several meetings and concluded accords benefits took much time to overwhelm the states of the region with concrete outcomes. So far, there were seemingly numerous predicaments to instate an effective integration of Maghreb states. For instance, political issues such the tension between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara added difficulty to achieve integrity in the whole region. Meanwhile, the Tunisian state as well as the Moroccan kept with their tradition of openness to Europe. Unlike the Algerian heavy industry orientation, a small and middle size industry based on export took shape in these countries and made out of Morocco and Tunisia a model of development to follow in the region. Furthermore, a strong cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) provided these states with plans for development that significantly helped them to consolidate their economy.

In the realm of the political economy, many states of the Maghreb embraced a policy of economic openness to Europe in the late 20^thC. However, there might be a considerable work to implement, in order to overcome the issue of unemployment. Despite a more diversified economy than at the outset of independence, there are no obvious changes on the level of employment. Hence, the increasing rate of unemployment is becoming difficult to manage especially that the number of population is not ceasing to increase since the 1960's. Although Maghreb states' implemented efforts (i.e. adjustment programs), the problem of unemployment is likely persisting. For instance in Tunisia, where the service sector (construction, communications, banking and tourism) represents the first employer in the state, the average level of unemployment is around 14% which is tremendous for a population that accounts around 10 million people largely young and educated.

Socially speaking, Maghreb countries are facing more or less the same social problems. In fact, the number of population is important. In fact, Morocco encompasses the bulk of the population (26 million). The region also has a high demographic growth rate, although measures have been taken to reduce this phenomenon. Indeed, the greater part of the population is under 25, with 50% being under the age of 15. Consequently, it presents a serious economic impediment for the region and its development since it fuels unemployment. Moreover, this situation engendered other serious problems such as illegal immigration and late marriage which is responsible for the sharp fall in fertility rates.

The Stakes of a Euro-Maghreb Partnership

A/ The Socio-Economic Stake:

The Euro-Maghreb partnership deals mainly with issues of common interests, namely socio-economic problems. Therefore, the establishment of a solid partnership represents a way to contain problems and to draw benefits from the stakes that face both sides. Indeed, both entities suffer from socio-economic problems. In one hand, Maghreb countries witness a tremendous unemployment which represents for a certain extent an impediment for economic improvement. On the other hand, Europe endures demographic problems and foreign economic concurrence. In fact, an aging society and a growing international economic competition represent threats for a sustainable economic progress in the old continent. However, some analysts put the blame on the meager cooperation between Maghreb and Europe and the absence of effective implementation of the formerly established plans (i.e. Barcelona Process) to make out of the region a pole of influence on the international stage.

It is admitted that unemployment represents the main impediment to economic prosperity in the Maghreb. But, demographic problems also represent an additional burden. In fact, the population in the Maghreb quadrupled since 1950. Therefore, economic improvement did not succeed to keep up with the demographic change which led the region to witness economic backwardness. Furthermore, Maghreb governments failed to implement plans in a way to absorb the important number of unemployed people. In fact, some unemployment figures of the region are representative of the gravity of the situation. For instance, according to 2004/2005 «CIA fact book» estimations, unemployment stands at 25.4 per cent in Algeria. The figures for Morocco and Tunisia are 11.6 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively. Nevertheless, some Maghreb states, especially Tunisia and Morocco opted for a policy of engagement with the EU, in order to minimize this phenomenon. So far, unemployment in the Maghreb indirectly affects at a certain extent the EU countries. Indeed, it is considered among the pushing factors for illegal immigration. Accordingly, helping Maghreb states to develop a solid economic infrastructure in a way to provide further jobs indirectly would be beneficial for Europe. In the light of this idea, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, stipulates; «the more we develop the southern region of the Mediterranean the less we will face illegal immigration». Obviously, the statement depicts the trend adopted by the European Union, in order to foster economy in the Maghreb. Thus, insuring welfare in the south (i.e Maghreb region) would indirectly outpace the issue of illegal immigration in EU.

As far as the Euro-Maghreb relations are concerned, an effective partnership would also help Europe to overcome its demographic challenge. Indeed, unlike Europe, the Maghreb region is filled with youth. For example, in both Algeria and Morocco, the median age is 23, in Tunisia it is 26. Roughly 30 per cent of the population in Algeria is under the age of 15. In Morocco it is 32 per cent and in Tunisia it is 25 per cent. However, «The EU is facing unprecedented demographic changes that will have a major impact on the whole of society. Figures in the Green Paper on Demographic Change launched by the Commission show that from now until 2030 the EU will lack 20.8 million (6.8 per cent) people of working age. In 2030 roughly two active people (15-65) will have to take care of one inactive person (65+).»^18(*) Furthermore, the ratio of dependent young and old people to people of working age will increase from 49 per cent in 2005 to 66 per cent in 2030. Hence, to offset the loss of working-age people, Europeans will need an employment rate of over 70 per cent. Therefore, the collaboration imposes itself as a crucial alternative to overcome respective socio-economic problems for Europe and the Maghreb as well. Thus, Maghreb states would be an important partner to sustain demography and economy in Europe.

B/ The Industrial Stake:

The most important feature of the working force in the Maghreb is the fact of being cheaper than in Europe. This represents an opportunity for Europe to consolidate its industry and a chance to sustain its economy. Therefore, the EU's manufactories tend to delocalize their production in low cost labor areas such as the Maghreb region. Hence, Maghreb countries would benefit from this phenomenon, in the sense that delocalization would create a considerable amount of jobs. Consequently, that would help the area to further resist to unemployment and to spare social unrest such depicted in Morocco and Tunisia in 2008.

A fair EU-Maghreb industrial collaboration would be beneficial for both parts of the partnership. Indeed, different industrial fields of collaboration could be explored in the frame work of the UfM. Moreover, it represents an opportunity for Maghreb states to attract further Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and to foster employment. However, Different analysts diverge when it comes to collaboration. Indeed, some advise the creation of a plan of work that includes fields and subfields, in order to maximize the benefit for the Maghreb and EU as well. For instance, a circle of economist headed by Paul Verdine focused in their book «5+5=32»^19(*)on the classical field to explore such as energetic cooperation, agrarian collaboration and the promotion of textile industry. This group of brain storming on the UfM seems to neglect the field of services which is mainly embodied on «Nearshoring-Offshoring» platforms. In fact, this field is experiencing an important expansion thanks to Maghreb government's commitment to upgrade telecommunication infrastructure in a way to promote ICTs, so to make out of the region a platform of off-shoring services. For instance, pursuant to the 11^th plan of development (2007/2011), the Tunisian government is focusing on the field of technology and the establishment of a modern infrastructure to attract foreign investors and FDI. Hence, ICTs require a special care from Maghreb authorities, in order to further promote these new technologies of communication, Tunisia held in November 2005, the second phase of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), in order to highlight the commitment of the Tunisian government to make out of ICTs a booster for socio-economic prosperity and technological progress. Consequently, some Maghreb countries such as Tunisia and Morocco are witnessing the creation of important number of platform of services namely call centers and customer services to serve immediate European neighbors (i.e. France, Italy and Spain). So far, development offices expanded in the fields of architecture, urbanism, translation and engineering in a way to create job opportunities for the increasing number of job seekers in the Maghreb.

The benefits of Euro-Maghreb collaboration goes beyond the availability of cheap labor and the limitation of unemployment or bridging North-South divide. Indeed, there are other important stakes with a global impact to take into consideration. Therefore, in a growing climate of world economic competition, Europe seems to be in a crucial need to maintain its position as a world economic leader since emerging states and economic groupings are increasing in power and influence. In line with a long term perspective, Europe tends to make out of the Maghreb an asset that would help it to face the Asian and American concurrence. This foreign concurrence represents a real challenge for Europe and Maghreb as well. Indeed, a strong Euro-Maghreb partnership would consolidate both entities to face these worries. For instance, on April 12, 2001, Tunisia and Morocco which represent the most important European suppliers in textile products, made a deposit of a memorandum to the European Commission on which they express their worry about the impressive Chinese economic growth. In the memorandum, both countries alarmed that the European share of export in textile products diminished, from 49.4% in 1980 to 34.2 % in 2001, for the profit of the Chinese industry. Meanwhile, the Chinese share of production has increased, from 4.6% to 13.5% in the same period. Accordingly, Morocco and Tunisia suggested the action as an integrated space of production with the EU, in order to counter the Asian competition through a solid partnership and to secure employment and foreign investments in the Maghreb. Moreover, another concurrent is seemingly interested in the region. In fact, the United States of America targets the establishment of a free trade zone with Maghreb states and the whole Mediterranean region by 2015. This does not represent an imminent threat over Maghreb states. However, it is a source of unease for Europe since it aims to preserve the Maghreb region as a European asset. Thus, one may understand the reason of the range of efforts implemented by EU in order to make the Maghreb embracing an advanced economic partnership.

The establishment of a solid industry based on Contract Manufacturers^20(*) (CM) in the Maghreb region would consolidate the position of Europe as a world economic leader. In fact, the Maghreb represents a market for production as well as for commercialization. Hence, developing projects in Maghreb states would indirectly maintain the European industry. For instance, in December 2008, the important plane manufacturer Airbus delocalized in December 2008, the production of some components in Tunisia which formerly produced in France. Thereby, Airbus projects the construction of a manufactory for 100 million Euros and targets the creation of 1.500 jobs. As a result, Europe succeeded to gain a market, insured a cheaper production and consolidated its industry. Meanwhile, the Tunisian government succeeded to attract an important FDI and insured the creation of job opportunities. Such advanced partnership does not represent an exception in the region. In fact, there are other fields to explore in the whole Maghreb region. According to the French manufacturer of trains and tramways Alstom, the demand on tramways and TGV will increase by 3.7% a year in the coming decade. Accordingly, the Maghreb represents an important market to supply since Morocco aims at building a railway network for TGV, Tunisia targets to enlarge tramways' network and Algeria aims to have a subway and a network of tramways. This represents an opportunity for EU to insure market shares and to resist international competition as well as a chance for Maghreb states to upgrade their infrastructure and transport network with lesser cost since infrastructure upgrading is backed by the European Investment Bank (IEB) loans at low rates.

In addition to the industrial stake The Euro-Maghreb partnership tends to bridge the technological divide that separates the two entities. Indeed, effective partnership represents a further opportunity for technological transfer. Accordingly, Maghreb countries are trying to make out of the region a platform for industry and services designed for export to Europe. Moreover, the Euro-Maghreb partnership would launch these two entities into further interdependence. So far, to insure a better quality, Europe is urged to step its technological transfer in a way to develop technological infrastructure in the Maghreb. Thus, it would benefit for both sides, namely by overcoming the technological gap and foster quality in industry and services. Moreover, the establishment of a strong Euro-Maghreb partnership to stand against concurrence would significantly foster «South-South cooperation.»^21(*) In other words, the increasing in climate of world economic concurrence would help the Maghreb countries to overcome the lack of integration from which they suffer despite the creation of AMU in 1989. According to Abdellatif Jwahri, the governor of the Moroccan central bank, «the absence of «South-South cooperation» and a full integration, prevent the Maghreb region from 2 points in economic growth». In the same context, Pascal Lamy the Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) adds; «the Maghreb should implement further integration to overcome different difficulties, namely the concurrence».

B/ The Stake of Natural Resources:

The Union for the Mediterranean would make out of the Maghreb a reliable natural resources supplier for Europe. Indeed, in an attempt to secure energetic resources, the European Commission has moved in the last five years to deepen energy cooperation and to put in place important new external energy partnership. In fact, «Energy security clearly forms part of the foreign policy calculus in a way that it did not ten years ago»^22(*). Accordingly, the Maghreb states represent strategic allies in terms of energetic security. So far, Maghreb states are considered among the richest states when it comes to fossil resources. For instance, Algeria and Libya represent the most important producers of oil and gas in North Africa. As far as natural resources are concerned, the Maghreb region also encompasses important Minerals' producers. In fact, Tunisia and Morocco respectively constitute the third and fifth world larger producers of phosphate which adds a further strategic reason for Europe to go through an effective partnership with Maghreb states.

The stakes involved in the collaboration between Europe and Maghreb in the field of energy are revolved around different benefits for Europe and Maghreb as well. The main goals in this energetic alliance are likely to create a stable and regulatory market framework capable to attract investment, to create a single regulatory space for trade and to enhance security of supply. In one hand, gas and oil exportations represent a real chance for Algeria and Libya to outpace their economic backwardness in comparison to other states of the region. The increase of oil prices and the gas crisis in Europe gave these two states an impetus to go forward in economic emergence. On the other hand, Europe would secure the supply of fossil energy in a way to prevent additional gas crisis in Europe such as the one that happened in January 2009 (i.e. Russian gas crisis). Furthermore, the March 2006 «Green paper on energy» argues that energy security can best be achieved through a «pan-European energy community». Accordingly, the European Commission asserts that energy security can be achieved when «EU extends its own energy market to include its neighbors within a common regulatory area with shared trade, transit and environmental rules". That is why the European commission «needs to convince non EU-consumer countries that world energy markets can for them if they were to conclude that the only route to security lay in bilateral deals.»^23(*) On this regard, the Commission developed a «Mediterranean aid program 2007-2013»^24(*) which targets to foster cooperation and specially to secure natural resources' supply. Thus, pursuant to this idea, the European Commission identifies as a priority the Euro-Maghreb collaboration.

The EU-Maghreb collaboration in the field of energy and natural resources supply extends to the field clean energy export. In fact, Europeans as well as Maghreb leaders are committed to develop new clean sources of energy. Therefore, the European Union targets the establishment of an important field of solar energy in the Sahara of the Maghreb region. Known as the solar plan, the project would make out of the region an important supplier of clean energy to Europe. This kind of sustainable development project is not revolutionary in the region. In fact, Tunisia has already established connections with Italy to supply the latter with Wind power.

All these collaboration projects are engulfed in the logic of European energy security. Indeed, the European continent is very dependent on his neighbors in terms of energy and natural resources. Hence, sometimes Europe finds itself in a critical position concerning energy supply. This could be exemplified by the crisis that witnessed Europe in winter 2009 when Russia stopped the flow of gas. Thereby, Europe reconsidered the Euro-Maghreb partnership and energy collaboration in order to make out of the Maghreb a strategic ally.

Conclusion

In a time when states gather into groupings to face economic and financial hazards, partnerships and alliances are crucial especially for developing states. However, the dilemma over partnership is always subject to skepticism when the partnership is held with an ex-colonizer or a former enemy. The Maghreb region seems to be in this situation. Indeed, this tendency got increasingly important when the European Union became the dominant power in the northern shore of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the European block's position of force cannot prevent people in the Maghreb to ruminate the colonial past. Consequently, the European initiative (i.e. UfM) is spontaneously depicted by some Maghreb leaders as a neocolonial attitude to keep the European dominion over the Maghreb region. Therefore, Maghreb states will get enrolled in a vicious circle of economic dependency in stead of with Europe and furthermore in an alliance which is supposed to overwhelm equal benefits over both entities.

It is true that Europe is for much in consolidating South-Mediterranean economies through up-grading and sustaining programs. However, certain measures, such as, the rapid integration of South Mediterranean economies in the European Market and the nullification of customs barriers, cannot be totally safe as a way to achieve economic development. In fact, each state should adopt its own way to develop.

Economically speaking, there are currently great pressures on developing countries to adopt a set of «good policies» and «good institutions» such as liberalization of trade and investment to foster their economic development. However, according to historical facts, the rich countries did not develop on the basis of the policies and the institutions that they now recommend to developing countries. Indeed, almost all of today's rich countries used tariff protection and subsidies to develop their industries. For instance, Britain and the USA, the two countries that are supposed to have reached the summit of the world economy through their free-market, free-trade policy, are actually (i.e. in crisis conjuncture) the ones that had most aggressively used protection and subsidies.

Personally I believe that each state should choose its own path towards improvement. So, either economically or politically, decisions should be sovereign. But, In the case of the Euro-Maghreb partnership disparities between the two entities are wide. This feature cannot be neglected since both entities aspire to instate an equitable partnership. If there will be no respect for disparities, the partnership could turn into a dominion of the stronger over the weaker. Therefore, instead to develop, Maghreb states would be enclosed in vicious circle of dependency, where the only respected voice is that of the stronger. Thus, the «win-win» partnership retorted by the French president would be translated into a neocolonial initiative that would make out of the Maghreb region an eternal dependent to the old continent.

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