2.2. Planning and Forced Migration
According to Friedmann, «for the city of Johannesburg to be
able to address the problems that resulted from the apartheid era, the thrust
of thinking has to change from traditional planning
to equity planning» (Cebekhulu, 2004: 26) so that greater
equity may be achieved. Planning in Johannesburg, should move beyond
the mere preparation of physical plans towards integrating physical
planning with social, economic, and participation planning» (Cebekhulu,
2004: 26). The same logic can be applied to the issue of
forced migration. The movement of foreigners to Johannesburg is not a new
phenomenon, in the sense that, since the apartheid era, Johannesburg has
always attracted foreign migrants, especially those from neighbouring
countries, who have come here seeking economic opportunities in the mining
sector (Kok et al., 2005). Shifting from physical planning to
social, economic, and participative planning should not only concern South
African citizens, but also migrants who live legally within the country,
particularly refugees who share some of the same rights contained in
the Bill of Rights with South Africans.
In accordance with the equity planning model, Krumholz
(1982) states that equity planning requires local government institutions
to give priority attention to the goal of promoting a wider range of
choices for people who have few, if any, choices (Krumholz cited by
Fainstein, 2005). The main goal of Krumholz then speaks not only of
participatory or deliberative democracy but also of social inclusion:
«inclusion not necessary in the discussion
of what to do but inclusion in having access to the benefits
of the city» (Fainstein, 2005: 124). Having access to the benefits of
the city is one of the elements that Friedmann emphasises when inviting
South African planners to shift from physical planning towards equity planning
(see Cebekhulku, 2004).
The aim of this section is to establish a link between forced
migration and urban planning by focusing on the concept of equity planning and
the just city as proposed by Friedmann (see Cebehkulu, 2004), Krumholz
(1982), and Fainstein (2005), as well as political economy theorists,
such as Harvey (1973) and Young (1990). This section will be divided
into two broad parts: the first part will deal with social justice based on
the thoughts of some thinkers, such as Harvey (1973), and Rawls (1971); while
the second part will focus on the idea of the
just city.
2.2.1. An Overview of the concepts of `Social Justice'
In Social Justice and the City, Harvey (1973)
affirms that social justice is a normative
concept. It is usually linked to some values, including equity,
equality, democracy and respect
of difference. This section aims to provide some definitions of
social justice based on some of
the work of Rawls, Harvey, Oelofse and others, before
focusing on the `just city' planning approach aimed at achieving the
normative values of social justice. These works will serve both as
analytical lenses to review civil society and state actions in the
inner-city of Johannesburg, as well as to provide recommendations in Chapter
Five of this report.
a) Justice as Fairness.
«Justice as Fairness» is the principal theme
that has been developed by Rawls in his book Theory of
Justice, published in 1971 (Campbell, 1988: 72). According to the
Rawlsian conceptualisation of justice, fairness refers to equity or
social justice (Wikipedia, 2006), which is one of the main themes of this
study. Rawls' Theory of Justice, therefore, serves as a reference to
civil society and other organisations that are engaged in equity
projects. The starting point for Rawls is the idea of «original
position». According to him, in order to achieve fairness or equity,
people must be free and equal in the original position (Campbell,
1988: 75). At the original position, said Rawls, people (or
parties) are not self-centred since they do not seek to harm anyone, and in the
pursuit of their claims civil society organisations
are free to propose and argue for the principles of justice that
they believe would be of greater benefit to social cooperation (Campbell, 1988:
76).
It is important to note that the nature of Rawlsian
equality is grounded in the equality of a person as a `moral agent'. Rawls
defines `good' as «a set of convictions about what personal goals are
worth pursuing», and he defines the `sense of justice' as «a set of
beliefs about the terms of fair social cooperation» (ibid, 1988).
Another important component of Rawls' conception of social
justice is what he calls the «veil
of ignorance», which emphasises that at the original
position all parties are entirely ignorant
of any particular fact about themselves which might lead
them to favour themselves at the expense of those with different
qualities (ibid, 1988). In other words, Rawls' «veil of
ignorance» spares parties from any possibility of
unfairness in the decision to be made by
rendering them entirely ignorant of their own interests.
At the original position, persons have the conception
of good, but they ignore entirely its specific content and, cannot,
therefore, «slant the principles of social justice to suit their
particular goals». Parties know other general facts about human
nature and the society in which they live «but not their own
particular nature, their sex, their social class, their size or intelligence,
or talents». They come together to `sign' a kind of `social
contract' that can facilitate social cooperation (ibid, 1988).
There are two principles of Rawlsian social justice, which
are both related to equality and difference. The principle of equality
states that «each person has the same indefeasible claim
to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which
scheme is compatible with the same liberties for all» (Rawls, 2001: 42).
The principle of difference, in turn, announces that «social and economic
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and secondly, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the
least-advantaged of society» (ibid, 2001).
The first principle of difference is considered as the
principle of equality that gives equal rights to all. The second
principle of difference, which «is concerned with the distribution of
income and wealth» (Oelofse, 2003: 90), recognises inequalities among
people. The principle
of difference is linked to the equality of opportunity, which
should allow people, having the same capacities, to gain access to diverse
functions of society. For example, people having the same degrees in medicine
should be given equal job opportunities.
According to Rawls, inequalities can be justified only if
society can benefit from them, in the sense that a person with more talent
should gain a higher salary than the one with less. This argument may be
legitimated only if society can also gain some profit from inequalities, for
example, in terms of taxes.
b) Justice as efficiency.
In Social Justice and the City, Harvey (1973)
states that social justice and efficiency are interrelated. According to
him, social justice should be thought of as a principle, or a set of
principles, that may resolve conflicting claims in any society,
which arise out of the necessit y
for social cooperation in seeking individual advancement (Harvey,
1973: 97).
To illustrate the relevance of the principles of
social justice based on a Rawlsian model, Harvey talks about the
division of labour. He believes that, through labour division, it is
possible to increase production, but the main question is how the
fruits of production are distributed among those who cooperate in the
process. Like Rawls, Harvey's conception of social justice also refers to
the division of benefits and the allocation of burdens arising out of
the process of undertaking joint labour (ibid, 1973).
In other words, justice as efficiency should be applied to the division of
benefits and the allocation of burdens in a way that can allow people to share
equally the benefits and burdens of society.
The principle of social justice that Harvey explores is what he
calls the skeletal conception of
a just distribution. To explain this skeletal conception, he asks
two main questions: «what are
we distributing?» and «among whom?» The
answer to the first question has been already given, it is about the
benefits of people's cooperation, but Harvey recognises that it is difficult
to specify what those benefits are, as they relate to
individual preferences and values. The second question concerns the
individual, but Harvey prefers to talk about distribution as it occurs
among groups, organisations, territories, and so on (Harvey, 1988: 98-99). He
assumes that «justice achieved at a territorial level of analysis
implies justice achieved for the individual, even though I am aware that
this is not necessarily the case» (Harvey, 2003: 99). Thus, to achieve
individual as well as territorial social justice, it is important to make sure
of
the elements discussed below.
- The distribution of income should meet the needs of an
individual or the population of the entire territory.
- It is necessary to make sure that resources are
allocated to maximise interterritorial multiplier effects; and that extra
resources are allocated to help overcome special difficulties emerging from the
physical and social environment.
- Institutional, organisational, political, and economic
mechanisms are presented in such a way that the prospects of the
least advantaged individual or territory are as great as they
possibly can be (Harvey, 1973: 117). It is only if distribution
is made in such way that one can
talk about social justice.
c) Justice as equality.
In his article on Social Justice, Social Integration, and
the Compact City, Oelofse (2003) talks about social justice as equality in
the context of the Inner city of Johannesburg. Analysing the process of
racial and spatial integration in the inner city, in the light of
the Rawlsian conceptualisation of equality and liberal integration
strategies, Oelofse concludes that these processes failed because they did
not necessarily improved the lives of the least advantaged people (Oelfse,
2003: 103).
Oelofse's conceptualisation of justice is based on
normative values such as non- discrimination, fairness,
integration, protection of people's rights (taken from the liberal
social justice theorists), empowerment of the disadvantaged people, and
equality of treatment among all the inhabitants of the inner city. The type of
social justice that he fights for is one that may contribute to an urban
context that constitutes a place «within which individuals may create and
exploit the opportunities they choose» (Oelofse, 2003: 197). To
conclude, he recommends that planners formulate appropriate policy responses
«to make sure that no one is discriminated against or unfairly
treated» (Oelofse, 2003: 197).
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