Memoire Online - The role of the african union in the resolution of the conflict in mali

Figure 1: Summary of some key Timelines of the Mali Conflict from 2011 to October 2015 71

Abstract

In the final decade of the 20th century, the mounting need for greater continental integration resulted in the transformation of OAU in to AU (African Union) in 2002. Among the priority agendas of the new organization are issues of peace and security on the continent. Despite the commitment and efforts to build institutional capacity to confront problems, objective realities on the ground reflect that situations of political instabilities and armed conflict in the continent are far from significantly resolved. The Malian crisis which unfolded from 2012 is one of the examples of the limits of the new organization in preventing and addressing effectively crisis.

The study identified the Malian crisis with issues of political and economic marginalization, poor governance leading to ethnic dissatisfaction and rebellions, and expressions of some form of religious radicalism and criminal networks that involves actors respective to each of the factors.

Moreover, the researcher has explored the intervention of the AU and its RECs/RMs on the one hand, and on the other hand, portrayed the challenges these regional organizations are facing in the maintenance of continental Peace and Security in light of the Malian political crisis with regard to their lack of capacity to conduct peace operations including insufficient financial and logistic support, lack of cooperation and tensions within the organizations and with the UN. Finally the researcher has suggested some solutions for the way forward.

Introduction

Africa has been a theater of armed conflicts in a manner that it is typical continental experience. Roughly thirty percent of conflicts over the past five decades have occurred in Africa causing twice as many fatalities as conflicts in other regions (Hoeffler, 2014). These conflicts, mainly intra-state conflicts, have brought many of African economies to the brink of collapse along with the loss of millions of lives, widespread displacement and a wide array of human rights abuses (Ndiho, 2010). For instance, for decades, countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea- Bissau, etc, were crippled by conflicts and civil strife in which violence and incessant killings were prevalent. Alao (2000) argues that these violent conflicts are very often characterized by the following patterns:

It was with the aim to address such conflicts that arose since the independence that the first continental organization by the name the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963 so that problems of Africa could be solved by the Africans themselves. However, while OAU was supposed to be praised for its achievement in supporting efforts to eradicate colonialism from the continent, it failed to effectively address issues related with its legacies. Particularly crisis related with ethnicity and the quest for democracy are said to be challenges that the organization failed to tackle in its capacity. For instance, the organization had been blamed for inaction to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and in not finding lasting solutions to the conflict in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, among others. The drawback in this respect is to some extent attributed to the provisions within the charter that

established OAU which hampered its operation significantly. Particularly the concern for respecting sovereignty of member states was supposed to be obstacles that curtailed most of its aspiration.

Consequently there arose a need for more effective organizational framework to address the practical political, economic, social, etc issues in order for a bright continental future. This resulted in the transformation of OAU into AU (African Union) in 2002 with a lot of hopes and expectations. Among the agendas with due concern in the new organization was the issue of peace and security. In line with this, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which was ratified by the requisite number of member States in December 2003, commits the AU to work towards the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development. Furthermore, it calls for the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by member States (PSC, art 2). The Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol gives the AU the power to create the structures and processes necessary for the establishment of a comprehensive peace and security architecture for the Continent. This architecture includes the PSC, the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The PSC Protocol also provides for closer collaboration between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (AU, 2002).

With these norms, values, and principles, the AU since 2004 have taken initiatives with significant success. According to (Ndiho, 2010), in 1990, there were about 20 wars going on simultaneously in Africa but by 2010, there were only four ongoing wars and this is a big success story for AU. For example effective measures were taken against States with unconstitutional changes of government, particularly the coup d'état in the Central African Republic (2003), Guinea Bissau (2003 and 2012), Sao Tome and Principe (2003), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), and Niger (2010) (Col. Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare, 2015). The council has also been able to authorize peace operations in Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, and the Comoros. AU's first mission was deployed in Burundi where transition to self-rule was characterized by ethnic violence between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. The mission was described as one of the AU's biggest success stories as it made concerted efforts to prevent genocides in the Great Lakes region, and played a crucial role in the ceasefire negotiations.

Besides, the AU Commission also provided strategic, political, technical, and planning support to operations authorized by the Peace and Security Council and carried out by regional coalitions of Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs). Such support includes the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) and the operation against Boko Haram undertaken by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin - the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

Despite the forthright initiatives of the AU in conflict resolution, Africa Briefing Report (2011), says there remains a discrepancy between the AU capacity on paper and its actual impact in crisis situations as incidents of violent conflicts have persisted in Africa. Old conflicts have continued in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, and Sudan, as well as in the Central African Republic (CAR). To this are added emerging conflicts including a wave emanating from uprising against sit-tight and despotic leaders which covered North Africa, from Tunisia, Egypt to Libya in 2011, which culminated by the eruption in 2012 of the devastating armed conflict in Mali with imposing new challenges in the Sahelo-Saharan region.

To respond to this last crisis, the African Union along with its Regional Economic community (REC), ECOWAS engaged very early in the conflict through preventive and peacekeeping measures to bring African solutions to African problems. Unfortunately, once again, the continental body was not successful as expected. Neither the diplomatic nor the military initiatives could prevent the crisis from escalating. The Western solutions were therefore called upon to help stabilize Mali. This resulted in the deployment of the «operation Serval» by French, the change of AFISMA by MINUSMA. Furthermore, even if the AU was part of the Algerian peace process, it was not the main actor.

This issue is worth studying given the fact that peace and security are necessary precondition for sustainable growth and development any nation aspires to bring about. Besides, for continents like Africa where there exist a great deal of records of conflicts and in fact still a political reality today, researches aimed at searching for alternative ways to deal with issue of peace and security are by far important. Specifically this study is claimed to be significant in two dimensions. In the first place, it tries to unfold the continental potential and practical capacity at the disposal of the continental organization (AU) to address peace and security. Secondly it tries to explore the Malian problem in light of the continental initiative to deal with the challenge of peace and security, so that it is possible to

understand the gaps between potentials and practical capacities of Africans in solving African problems and suggest ways forward.

The dissertation is structured around three (03) chapters. The first chapter deals with the theoretical and methodological frameworks including on the one hand the definition of concepts and the relevant

theories developed in the analysis of armed conflicts along with the literature review and the AU framework in dealing with conflict prevention and resolution, and on the other hand the methodology used for this study as well as the description of the study area.

The second chapter deals with the analysis of the Malian armed conflict including an overview of the conflict, the impact, the root causes as well as the actors of the conflict.

The third chapter provides, the practical conflict resolution efforts undertaken by the sub-regional (ECOWAS) and regional (AU) actors in the Malian conflict. This includes the political and diplomatic efforts as well as the military efforts deployed in support of diplomatic ones. Finally, some observations related to the challenges and limits of the initiatives resulting from the gap existing between the theoretical provisions and the practical aspects of AU peace intervention lead to the formulation of some recommendations on the way forward.

The word "conflict" remains a very ambiguous word and is therefore taken as an umbrella term that can be used to refer to diverse situations. Scholars such as Rubin et al. (1994), Lewicki et al. (1997) consider conflict to be «the interaction of interdependent people who perceived incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals». Barki and Hartwick (2004) elaborated upon these efforts by defining conflict as «a dynamic process that occurs between interdependent parties as they experience negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreements and interference with the attainment of their goals». According to the Responding to Conflict (RTC)¹, conflict is «a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think they have, incompatible goals.» From this definition, there is no conflict as long as parties or actors do not recognize that the situation is problematic and conflictual. However, it is not because a situation is not recognized as a conflict that there is no latent problem slowly growing and dividing parties.

Conflict can therefore be described as a disagreement among groups or individuals characterized by antagonism. This is usually fueled by the opposition of one party to another, in an attempt to reach an objective different from that of the other party. Defined this way, conflict can be seen as an inevitable part of life. Each of us possesses our own opinions, ideas and sets of beliefs. We have our own ways of looking at things and we act according to what we think is proper. As such conflicts are daily occurrences with family members, friends, strangers, colleagues, etc.

Experience in human society has shown that there are degrees of variation in conflicts. Conflicts are classified in types. Psychology as a discipline has espoused on intra-personal conflict. Sociology identifies inter-personal and intra-group or intra-unit conflict, as well as inter-group conflict.

Conflict should normally be an opportunity for growth and can be an effective means of opening up among groups or individuals. But when the conflict is unsolved or not transformed properly, it takes more complex dimensions with polarizations yielding to hostility, violence and armed conflict.

¹ RTC is a non-governmental organization that works to transform conflict and build peace by working alongside people living in situations of conflict and violence to develop the skills, knowledge and confidence to create and implement strategies for peace.

According to Dan Smith (2001), violent or armed conflict is defined as open, armed clashes between two or more centrally organized parties, with continuity between the clashes, in disputes about power over government and territory. In international relations, this type of conflict can be interstate or intrastrate. While Interstate armed conflict is a conflict between two or more states who use their respective national forces in the conflict, intrastate violent conflict is describes as sustained political violence that takes place between armed groups representing the state, and one or more non-state groups. Violence of this sort usually is confined within the borders of a single state, but can have significant international dimensions and holds the risk of spilling over into bordering states.

Before and during the Cold War, interstates armed conflicts were predominant in the world, but since the end of the Cold War, the most common form of conflict is the intrastate violence. Smith says that of the 118 armed conflicts which ensued from 1990, only ten can be strictly defined as interstate conflicts, more than hundred are intrastate conflicts. With the increasing number of intrastate armed conflicts, more attention is given by scholars who develop different theories to help understand the new trends.

1.2- Theories of intrastate conflicts

For the purpose of coming up with a comprehensive understanding of the Malian complex armed conflict, two types of theories of conflict are used in this study. The first ones are theories put forward to explain causes of conflict and the second ones are theories for conflict pacification or resolution.

1.2.1- Theories of the causes of intrastate conflicts

There are several theories developed by scholars to explain the causes of conflict. However, for the sake of this study, we shall deal with structural theory of conflict, Marxist theory, international capitalist theory and the economic theory of conflict, as they account better for the conflict in Mali.

1.2.1.1- The structural theory of conflict

The structural theory attempts to explain conflict as a product of the tension that arises when groups compete for scarce recourses. The central argument in this sociological theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured or organized. It describes the condition of the society and how such condition or environment can create conflict. The proponents of the structural conflict theory among who Oakland (2005) identifies such conditions as social exclusion, deprivation, class inequalities, injustice, political marginalization, gender imbalances, racial segregation, economic exploitation and the likes, all of which often lead to conflict. Earlier in 1835, de Tocqueville had the same analysis of the main causes of the conflicts when he said «Remove the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the world and you will almost always find the principle of inequality

at the bottom. Either the poor have attempted to plunder the rich, or the rich to enslave the poor....» (quote from quote from 1954 edition,: 266). Seema Khan (2012) points out that «there are close links

between social exclusion and conflict and insecurity, both in terms of causes and consequences. There are now convincing arguments that some forms of social exclusion generate the conditions in which conflict can arise. This can range from civil unrest to violent armed conflict and terrorist activity. Severely disadvantaged groups with shared characteristics (such as ethnicity or religion) may resort to violent conflict in order to claim their rights and redress inequalities. ... Social exclusion and horizontal inequalities provide fertile ground for violent mobilization.»

According to several scholars, many armed conflicts in Africa fall within this theory. For example, Clionadh Raleigh (2010) says that the critical factor leading to violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa

is the extent of political and economic marginalization. In an article² Douma (2006) has examined how the partiality of some state policies regarding resource distribution promotes inter-group inequality and contributes to violence sub-Saharan Africa.

Talking of the causes of the conflict in Mali, Sidibé (2012), says that the attempts since 1960s to challenge state authority relate to the marginalization of Tuareg and Arab nomadic communities living

in the north of Mali. The ICCT (International center for Counter-terrorism) in the publication «Is all

about terrorism?» also mentions that the conflictual dynamics of the Malian conflict are partially linked to the historical marginalization of the North by the central government of Bamako as the Tuareg groups

were perceived as an obstacle towards the country's unity, and therefore have often been marginalized and discriminated by the national institutions. For Nizeimana & al (2015), decades of marginalization, discrimination and exclusion from the political and economic processes by the successive Bamako based governments remained the major uniting force that led the Tuareg to take arms fighting for a separatist state and the rights of the Tuareg minorities in Northern Mali.

In view of the above, it can be said that the structuralism theory accounts to some extent to the causes of conflicts emergence. The theory is however deficient in its one-sidedness of looking at causes of

conflict. For instance, it does not see the bright sides of racial or ethnic diversity and the strength that a society may derive from pluralism. The structural theory thus makes sense only when conflicts are viewed from the broadest possible perspective, and only if the observer opts to ignore alternate causes of the conflict. Many conflicts including the conflict in Mali are determined by other major factors.

1.2.1.2- International Capitalism Theory of conflict

This theory captures the historical import of colonialism and imperialism. According to Hobson (2006), the external drive of western nations propelled by the Industrial Revolution created numerous platforms for conflict. The search for raw materials, need to invest surplus capital and search for new markets

² Douma, P. (2006). Poverty, Relative Deprivation and Political Exclusion as Drivers of Violent Conflict in Sub Saharan Africa. Journal on Science and World Affairs, 2(2), 59-69

outside Europe compelled an imperialist pathway as the western countries desperately sought such markets, raw materials and investment climates at the expense of the peace and prosperity of the locals in what is now known as the Global South. This led to colonization, as well as collision of cultures and civilizations and ultimately conflict. Hyde (2016) in his «Are colonial-era borders drawn by Europeans holding Africa back?» reports that African scholars have long maintained that the national borders in Africa, most of which date back to the period in the late 1800s when European powers divided up most of the continent in a flurry of diplomatic agreements and colonial wars now known as the «Scramble for Africa,» are actually one of the biggest sources of its present-day strife and violence. In his study «The political and economic legacy of colonialism in the post-independence African States», Bayeh (2015) shares the same view noting that colonialism has impacted the political and economic conditions of the contemporary Africa. He argues that post-independence African political system is characterized by ethnic based exclusion and marginalization. Moreover, he supports that corrupt behavior of the contemporary leaders of Africa is also a contribution of the colonial experience. The author also puts forward that African resources are extensively exploited by colonizers, thereby rendering Africa economically weak and looser in its interaction with the global economy. Supporting the same idea, Ylönen (2009) says that the colonizers constructed the states in Africa around a small, ruling elite, demarcating borders according to colonial territorial holdings, not along ethnic communities, and tended to practice the strategy of 'divide and rule' to minimize local challenges against the colonial authority. For him, the attempt to create sufficient political order to maximize the extraction of resources with minimum investment, the colonial policies encouraged demographic and regional marginalization of state peripheries and promoted economic, political, and social inequalities and imbalances.

In another article entitled «The legacy of colonialism in the contemporary Africa: a cause for intrastate and interstate conflicts», Bayeh (2015) stresses on the contribution of colonial legacy in the contemporary African problems. The study show that the arbitrary colonial division of African borders contributed a lot for the contemporary African problems. He explained that blind partition of African borders caused the disintegration of some ethnic groups into different countries and the merging together of different ethnic groups into some countries. This, in turn, resulted in several intrastate and interstate conflicts. Rwanda, Nigeria and Sudan are taken as typical examples for the first case while Kenya-Somalia and Ethio-Somalia conflicts for the second case.

As for the conflict in Mali, Amadou Sy³ argues that «to understand the ethnic roots of the conflict, it's useful to go back to the colonial period. ... At the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, imperialist European powers carved up North African territory, creating a variety of artificial territories before forcing the indigenous populations into labor.... When Mali became independent, you had nomadic tribes [namely the Tuareg] who were really by nature not residents of one particular region; they were migrating from one country to another. Thus, in Mali, the Tuareg were politically excluded, and their nomadic lifestyle

³ Amadou Sy, a senior fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution.

was threatened by the dictates of the post-imperialist borders.» In his «Mali: Tuareg problem, a baby of French colonialism», Murava (2016) also argues that the conflict in Mali has its roots in colonialism. He explains that before the colonial period the Tuareg controlled the inter-Saharan trade routes and saw themselves as `masters of the desert'. But during colonial era, the French found Tuareg dominance incompatible with their goal of expanding the French empire, and therefore sought to weaken the Tuareg stronghold. Suddenly Tuareg became minorities in several new states, and in Mali in particular, a minority ruled by the population they previously had viewed as `inferior' and historically had directed slave raids towards.

1.2.1.3- Economic theory of conflict

The economic theory of conflict explicates the economic undercurrents in conflict causation. All other theories have a link with the economic theory as the latter includes all the impacts of these theories. There is considerable interface between politics (power, resources or value) and scarcity. People seek power because it is a means to an end, more often, economic ends. Communities feud over farmlands, grazing fields, water resource, etc, and groups fight government over allocation of resources or revenue. Scarcity, wants, needs, or the fear of scarcity is often a driving force for political power, contention for resource control, and so forth. Conflict is thus not far-fetched in the course of such palpable fear or threat of scarcity. Just as the fear of poverty and deprivation could lead to fraud or corruption; so is threat of or real famine, deprivation, mismanagement of scarce resources, could propel conflict over resource control.

Nizeimana & Nhema (2015) underline that the exclusionary political systems in Africa have created an environment in which various groups contending for power are excluded from the political and economic processes through various repressive measures and the 2012 crisis is an event that testifies to this assertion. In the view of Francis (2013), poverty, poor governance, marginalization, the exclusion of a large section of the Malian populace from the political and the economic process and the failure to address fundamental grievances by the ruling class in Mali created a breeding ground for the Tuareg people to gain a foothold and organize themselves.

While the above discussed theories are meant to show explanations for the outbreak of intra-state conflicts, there are other theories used to analyze the steps that need to be taken to pacify states failed into civil conflict. They are Democratic Peace (idealists) and Realist Theories.

Democratic peace theory (idealists) see the intrastate armed conflicts as a result of lack of democracy. For the proponents of this theory, the priority step that should be taken to stabilize states failed into armed conflict is to build institution of democracy (Carothers, 2007). They claim that a state suffering from turmoil of armed conflict needs to deal with the question of attaining popular legitimacy to end the state of political instability. Siegle & al (2004) holds that it is essential to restore trust in any divided society following civil war, by first building regimes enjoying popular legitimacy based on the institutional foundations of representative democracy, exemplified by holding competitive multiparty elections, building power sharing arrangements into constitutional settlements, strengthening legislatures and independent judiciary, expanding civil society, and decentralizing governance.

Accounting for the above arguments, Michael (2010) states that, first, democracy provides opportunities for expression of discontent in an open manner that reduces the possibilities of emergence of extreme violence and at the same time it helps to build trust among the people. They also consider that democratic type of regime constrains governments from repressive acts against their own citizens and thus reduces the causes of home-grown conflict. Democracy curtails the repressive acts against citizens through the mechanism of voice, since elected governments can be voted out of office, and through the mechanism of veto, since institutions check executive power (Christian, 2007).

Generally the idealist theory while having logic and rationale arguments, its implementation in the real world seems far from practical since the condition of instability by itself that characterizes states fall in to civil conflict, is not permissive to undertake the necessary steps to build institutions of democracy. Nevertheless, there are instances in which attempts are being made to set up institutional framework for states emerging out of civil war including the elections held as part of democratic reconstruction to end the Malian crisis in mid-2013. But this was possible and successful, as military intervention for enforcement advocated by the realists was associated to the process.

1.2.2.2- The realist theory

Contrary to the idealists, the realists argue that democratic institutions are identified with limited capacity to deal with risk of conflict recurrence in a divided society since they are vulnerable to lingering disagreements about power sharing arrangements and hence rendering opportunities for continued insurgency to take place (Hegre & Fjeld, 2010). They hold the view that the first priority in the peace building and reconstruction process following an internal conflict is state-building designed to expand governance capacity and establish conditions of social cohesion, order and stability, national unity, the rule of law, and the exercise of effective authority. For the proponents of the theory, «State-building» is understood as an essential pre-condition for subsequent developments towards democracy, through the

usual mechanisms of holding competitive elections, strengthening legislatures, and establishing independent checks and balances upon the executive. Proponents of the realist view were motivated by the political experiences of states beginning from the post-colonial African nations up to the recent cases of civil unrest in states like Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and some states in Africa. Fukuyama (2004) emphasizes that state building specially in multicultural societies require authorities to use force to disarm the militia and establish legitimate control over national territories. If elections are held prior to accomplishing such processes, internal conflicts may be frozen prolonging instability. More over Toft (2010) argues even to the extent of the fact that civil wars ending with military victories, where one side maintains control of the military and police, generate more durable order and stability. Particularly they claim that elections are especially dangerous if held early in any transition process, before the mechanisms of political accountability, institutional checks and balances, and a democratic culture have had time to develop (Edward & Jack, 2007).

Finally with regard to the current Malian crisis, there is fair deal of practical experiences representing the realist view as most of the initiatives to deal with the turmoil were inclined to the military option as priority measure in state reconstruction. The government with the support of forces from the French and the African led Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and later on MINUSMA, the G5 forces perused a military campaign to curb the rebel forces.

As a conclusion, each theory offer useful tools and insights in the study of intra-state conflict analysis and conflict settlement. Yet, with regard to the complexities of armed conflicts, in particular the armed conflict in Mali, no single theory exits that can comprehensively explain them by itself. So, this accounts for why I have integrated all these theories that I consider to be complementary for a better understanding and settlement of the armed conflict in Mali.

Prior to the birth of the AU, the OAU Heads of State and government recognized in their declaration in 1990 that the prevalence of conflicts in Africa was seriously impeding their collective and individual efforts to deal with the continent's economic problems. Consequently, they resolved to work together toward the peaceful and rapid resolution of conflicts. During the OAU Summit held in Cairo in 1993, African leaders established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). In doing so, they recognized that the resolution of conflicts is a precondition for the creation of peace and stability, and a necessary precondition for social and economic development (UN, 2004:1). However, while this initiative thrust the OAU into the center of conflict management efforts in Africa, the reality is that the pan-African organization never became a principal player in the peace processes

in Africa (CSIS, 2004:2). This is why it was found necessary to transform the OAU in African Union with new policies and perspectives.

1.3.1- The African Union

The Sirte Declaration led to the establishment of the AU (African Union) in 2002 replacing the former OAU (Organization of African union). The AU's Constitutive Act places a premium on the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa (Article 3 (f)). Also enshrined in its principles are the peaceful resolution of conflicts; prohibition of the use of force or threats to use force; and, unlike the OAU, rights to intervene in the affairs of member states in «grave circumstances» related to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Articles 4 (c ), (f) and (h)). It was also intended to avoid over-reliance on UN PKOs (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations) by seeking `African solutions to African problems'.

The Constitutive Act provides for several institutions to carry out the operations of the AU. These include the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the African Court of Justice, The Commission, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Specialized Technical Committee, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council. The AU has a number of special programs to facilitate its vision and quicken the realization of its goals. These are NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Conference on Security Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).

1.3.2- AU conflict intervention framework: the African Peace and Security Architecture

The main AU mechanism for promoting peace and security is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It consists of evolved instruments or elements for conflict prevention, management and resolution in the continent. The architecture is comprehensively outlined in the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is the hub of the APSA was established pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, as a collective security and early warning arrangements to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

The Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol gives the AU the power to create the structures and processes necessary for the establishment of a comprehensive Peace and Security Architecture for the Continent. The institutional structures of APSA include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Union Commission, the Common African Defense and Security Policy, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Peace Fund (PF), and the African Standby Force (ASF). However, six of these - the PSC, AUC, PoW, CEWS, PF and the ASF - constitute the main pillars of APSA as explained below.

The PSC is the AU's standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (PSC Protocol, Art. 2(1)) and the cornerstone of the APSA. The Council is composed of 15 members elected on the basis of equal rights, 10 members elected for a term of 2 years, and 5 members elected for a term of 3 years in order to ensure continuity. With this regard, article 7 of the PSC Protocol, stipulates that the PSC, in consultation with the chairperson of the AU Commission, is mandated precisely to:

- Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;

- Undertake peace making and peace building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred;

- Intervene on behalf of the AU in a member state's conflict under grave circumstances, namely those involving war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments;

- Institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration;

- Follow-up on the progress made towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life, and the upholding of international humanitarian law by member states; and

- Support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters (PSC Protocol, 2003).

The PSC in conjunction with the Chairperson of the AU Commission may authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions.

The AUC is responsible for the implementation of PSC decisions and provides operational support. This happens mainly through the AU Commission Chairperson and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, who report to the PSC on the implementation of PSC decisions and their own initiatives. The Chairperson and Commissioner are supported by the Peace and Security Department (PSD).

The AU Commission also provides strategic, political, technical, and planning support to operations authorized by the Peace and Security Council and carried out by regional coalitions of Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs).

The PoW was constituted under the terms of Article 11 of the PSC Protocol, to support the efforts of the Council and those of the Chairperson of the commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. It comprises 5 members drawn from various segments of society of AU Member States.

The CEWS is to provide timely and reliable data to warn the PSC and the AU Commission of potential conflicts and outbreaks of violence to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts in Africa. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) compliments the CEWS. The Committee was established on 26 August 2004 in Abuja, Nigeria by Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa. The CEWS coordinates efforts where possible with similar structures in the RECs.

Established by the PSC Protocol, the PF provides financial resources for the AU mandated Peace Support Operations (PSO) as well as other operational activities related to peace and security. This is premised on Article 21 (2) of the Protocol. The Peace Fund is supposed to be funded through contributions from donors, member states, private sector, civil society and individuals. During its summit in Addis Ababa in 2010, the African Heads of State agreed to increase the Peace Fund from 6 per cent to 12 per cent of assessed contribution of member states on incremental basis of 1.5 per cent per annum until the 12 per cent is achieved. Other changes are to be implemented in the coming years.

The ASF was established by the provisions of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol. A Policy Framework establishing the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) was adopted in May 2003 by the 3rd Session of African Chiefs of Defense Staff. In March 2005, the AU Commission and RECs/RMs met in Addis Ababa and adopted a Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF. The force is organized into five multidisciplinary brigades (military, civilian and police elements) on the basis of the five AU regions, and the Regional Economic Communities or Mechanisms.

The Roadmap also emphasized the establishment of planning structures at the regional level: ASF Planning Elements (PLANELMS) and the formulation of key policy documents at the strategic level. The documents are on Doctrine, Logistics, Training and Evaluation, Standard Operational Procedures (SOP), Command, Control and Communication Systems. Collectively, the 5 Regional Brigades will provide the AU with a combined standby capacity of about 15,000 to 20,000 troops trained in peace operations ranging from low-intensity observer mission to full-blown military intervention. The RECs/RMs such as the SADC, the ECCAS, ECOWAS and IGAD are continuously involved in the process of establishing and running their respective brigades. For instance, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group Integral to this architecture also, is the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP)

and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). The CADSP adopted in 2004 is to ensure Africa's common defense and security interests and goals as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act. The MSC is an advisory organ of the PSC, and consists of 15 military experts from the PSC member states who are resident in Addis Ababa.

Moreover, in 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security was signed between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (hereafter the 2008 Memorandum). The 2008 Memorandum between the AU and REC/RMs is the legal basis of the coordination between the AU and REC/RMs in the operationalization of the APSA. Its objective is to «contribute to the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture» (Article II, para 2(i)).

1.3.3- AU principles in conflict intervention

There are certain minimum principles that guide these institutions and sub institutions of AU in conflict

resolution. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of AU outlined the basic principles of operation for the

- respect of borders existing on achievement of independence; establishment of a common

- peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate

- prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;

- the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in

respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;

- the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and

- respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;

- respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political

assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities and condemnation and rejection of

The AU and RECs in the frame of the APSA, consider four types of interventions including the diplomatic interventions, the mediation, the peace support operations (PSOs), and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) activities.

The diplomatic interventions include a wide array of activities and decisions ranging from holding meetings on the conflict situations at various political levels, to varying levels of diplomatic statements, to taking actions such as setting up high-level panels and adopting sanctions. Diplomatic interventions are undertaken by a whole range of actors by both the AU and REC/RMs.

As part of the mission of the PoW, mediation efforts are understood as ranging from establishing mediation teams, organizing consultations between parties, and reaching an intermediate or final peace agreement. The PoW also undertake all the efforts of preventive diplomacy in countries where violence has not erupted yet or might erupt in the near future. Preventive diplomacy presumably takes place before conflicts escalate, and before AU and REC/RMs become more visibly engaged (AU PoW retreat report, Ouagadougou 2012).

A third important set of activities center around PSOs including activities around the authorization, deployment and maintenance of PSOs. Activities analyzed under this type of instrument range from convening of a resource mobilization meeting, to authorizing or mandating the deployment of a peace support operation, deploying a peace support operations or extending a mandate. Moreover, in areas of deployment of AU Peace Support Operations, there are engagements geared towards developing and implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs).

The PCRD include all the initiatives and efforts of the AU and REC/RMs under the APSA to support countries weak or post conflict countries for their reconstruction and development to avoid them relapsing in conflicts. For instance, in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and support of countries, the AU Commission deploys mission to assess the priority needs of the country in need. These include identification of joint activities in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member States emerging from conflict; conducting needs assessment missions; consolidating and scaling up security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives; technical and

⁴ The methodology was developed by ECDPM and GIZ and reviewed in 2016 by IPSS in collaboration with AU Commission.

operational support to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sustained collaboration with RECs/RMs and civil society organizations.⁵

There is a substantial amount of literature dealing with the historical, socioeconomic, and political background of the conflict in Mali from various angles. Moreover, the intervention in 2012 by the AU and ECOWAS in Mali have been the subject of some publications by think tanks and have been also taken up in academic discussions to some extent.

All the scholars interested by Mali conflict admit that the crisis is the culmination of many interlinked factors and triggers out of which has emerged a very complex image in which many interests are at stake. However, there are different ways studies approach the conflict depending on which issues they focus more.

Not ignoring other factors, many studies lay more emphasis on the historical background of the Tuareg rebellions and the way they are believed of not having been well addressed by the Malian successive governments. For instance, as early as 2011, (Emerson, (2011) provided an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006-2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. He identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. From his analysis, it appears that while both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far less effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. The author was then able to forewarn about the risk of another insurgency in Mali in the near future.

Cline (2013) also views the conflict in Mali through the lens of the Tuareg ill addressed rebellions. In his study, he analyses the historical background of rebellions and argues that although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. This situation combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, led to the 2012 Tuareg rebellion which presented even more significant security threats marked by multiple armed groups - Tuareg rebels, Islamists, and local militias - with multiple competing agendas and with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict. The author warns that the intractable environment will be very difficult to resolve in the long term even with external intervention. He further fears that the focus on counterterrorism which is in reality a much more complicated security environment in northern Mali, may turn short.

Moreover, even if Zounmenou (2013) recognizes the role of the Libyan crisis as a factor which left the regional security environment depleted and created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and

attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, he stresses on the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). For him, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. He further recalls that while attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the `Tuareg Factor', as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The author adds that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratization process of the 1990s.

Thurston and Lebovich (2013) provide resources that help explain and contextualize the intersecting crises that destabilized Mali in 2012-2013. Part of their analyses are related to the rebellion by Tuareg separatists. They argue that the MNLA's rebellion, like other Tuareg-led uprisings before it, reflected long-held grievances and bitter historical memories among some Tuaregs. The study reveals that fighters in 2012 - in some cases the same men who had fought the Malian army in 1990 and 2006, or whose fathers had fought in 1963 - felt that postcolonial Mali had marginalized and victimized them. The MNLA dreamed of founding an independent state, «Azawad,» comprising the northern Malian regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. They further explain that even before the rebellion broke out, a confluence of problems, ranging from longstanding communal grievances to official corruption and complicity in drug smuggling and perhaps militant activity as well, had weakened the Malian state.

Furthermore, some other scholars view the conflict in a regional context characterized by the Arab Spring, the fall of Qaddafi and the rise of Islamism. This is the example of Shaw (2013) who examined the commonly-assumed notion that the Libyan Civil War generated the current conflict in Mali. The author applied the causal mechanisms from the theories of escalation and diffusion/contagion to the Libya-Mali case, to determine if such a link can be made. Using Lake and Rothchild's (1996) framework, the study found that, with some modifications to include non-state actors, mechanisms from both theories were at play in this case. He came to a conclusion that conflict in Mali did occur as the result of escalation and diffusion/contagion mechanisms from the Libyan Civil War. Arieff⁶ (2013) also outlines how the spread of state fragmentation amidst the Arab Spring, combined with «the spread of violent extremist ideology» facilitated the entrance of three violent extremist groups into Mali: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansare Dine (of Tuareg origin), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad

⁶ Alex Arieff, analyst in African Affairs for the US Congressional Research Service, in his January 14, 2013 report for Congress titled, «Crisis in Mali».

in West Africa (MUJAO); each of these groups having links between extremists, drug trafficking, and smuggling networks. She further to state that the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 created a vacuum with thousands of «core combatants . . . with relatively sophisticated equipment obtained from Libya» who moved southwards into Mali and «imposed harsh behavioral and dress codes on local residents in the north»

Another researcher with the same view is Yehudit (2013). His study examines the relatively unknown issue of the ethno-political and strategic partnership that existed between the Libyan regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi and the ethnic Tuareg minority of Sahelian origin, with an emphasis on the period during 1990-2011. The author argues that during that period many Tuareg for various reasons migrated to Lybia where they were mainly enrolled in the army. However, the ramifications of the `Arab Spring' and the subsequent fall of Qaddafi's regime put an end to the unique partnership. Many Tuareg then fled the chaos of post-Qaddafi Libya and returned to their native countries heavily armed, disrupting the sensitive ethnic and political balances in the Sahel belt.

For Utas (2012), the events in Mali were the first major incidents in the post-Qaddafi political landscape and in the power vacuum in the Sahel region as positions in the Malian political game have shifted partly due to the return of «new recruits and military personnel from within a North Malian diaspora in Libya, typically from within the army». He also notes that an important aspect in the conflict is the drug route, an illicit business likely to involve actors from rebel movements, the army and the government in Bamako and unravelling the linkages among these actors could be informative.

Ellis (2013) goes further to link the crisis in Mali to the general context in the Sahel. His analysis touches on nomadism and mobile populations in connection with Islamism and political Islam. Ellis views the wider Sahel as a borderland with mobile populations. He argues that North Africa and Sahara by 2012 were «marked by a series of political transitions in which debates and struggles within Islam are central». Ellis believes that what happens in northern Mali is linked to what happened in Egypt. According to him these movements are trying to renew their societies through political Islam and that is why «many evolving disputes in north Africa and the Sahara fuse religious language and political impulse to powerful effect». For him, it is important to consider the spatial dimensions of the conflict as there is a connection to what happens in the wider Sahel region, particularly given the history of the nomadic people of the Sahara.

In the same line, Pejic (2017) thinks that although historical, social and economic issues have their impact in the perpetual cycles of rebellion in Mali, there are also other more important factors which caused the 2012 crisis in the country. He argues that the presence of radical groups in Sahel is a decade long issue for all regional governments and with the collapse of the Libyan state during the Arab Spring the Jihadists gained momentum in the region. The threat of radical Islamism was evident in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mali. In Mali most of these armed groups were stationed in the northern part of the country, and there are a couple of reasons behind including the harsh terrain of northern Mali limiting the region's accessibility thus allowing the groups to settle and establish camps and networks. Other

reason raised is the large and porous border with Algeria which makes it easy to smuggle weapons, drugs or other illicit goods. The last issue is the wide discontent among citizens in northern Mali which is often used by these organizations to recruit new members or spread their influence.

Besides, several other works see the conflict in Mali as a result of a whole State failure in different sectors that were not perceived or purposely hidden during years. For example, Bøas (2013) argue that the myth about Mali was that it was a democratic state. For him, while Mali was a poster child for democracy and governance reforms in West Africa, the war in the North, Islamists, the drug trade, a military coup, and a political crisis in Bamako illustrated the falsity of this story. He believes that the myth was created by international organizations, bilateral donors, NGOs and the Malian state, all having their own motives for portraying Mali as a success. He further argues that the reforms stemming from the National Pact in 1992 including political democratization, economic liberalization and administrative decentralization simultaneously operated in a very weak State, were doomed to failure, because these reforms were hijacked by an alliance of regional power-holders in the north and the political elite in Bamako, resulting in corruption and a blind eye being turned as long as profits could be made. Bøas adds that this context allowed AQIM and other Islamist groups to thrive in the north and to open the country to trade and trafficking in drugs and arms. For the author this situation also created a dysfunctional Malian army, which eventually staged the coup d'état and opened up the north to Islamist influence when Tuareg fighters returned after the fall of Qaddafi with plenty of weapons and ammunition.

In a report of Norwegian peacebuilding resource center (NOREF), Francis (2013), points out that even before the outbreak of the Malian crisis, northern Mali had become a breeding ground and safe haven for diverse groups of jihadists and militants led by AQIM. These groups not only exploited the fundamental grievances of the local population against the government of Mali and its repressive military and security forces, but also organized sophisticated criminal enterprises that involved drug and human trafficking, arms and cigarette smuggling, and the kidnapping of Western nationals for ransom. These criminal enterprises became valuable sources of funding and were profitable for all stakeholders, including corrupt Malian government officials, state security agencies, local leaders, separatist rebels and Islamist extremists. These Sahelian criminal enterprises and their profitable economic and financial opportunities made jihadi insurgency a lucrative economic activity. ⁷

Boukhars (2013) also discussed the political economy of war, power balances, and the regional political marketplace and came to the conclusion that weak and corrupt state institutions, ethnic tensions and competition over scarce resources are part of the main root causes of the conflict in Mali. He advises to

avoid a simplistic consideration of the conflict viewed solely through the lens of Islamic radicalization or as a north-south dispute.

In his analysis of the conflict, Marchal (2012) summed up that the crisis in Mali was born out of a combination of factors, including decayed state institutions and practices, a collapsed military force and a system of governance built on patronage, not democracy. He explores the background to the crisis and argues that while the war in Libya was the trigger, the crisis is long-term and several aspects lie behind it. He identifies four dynamics that led to the military coup of March 2012: «the debatable implementation of previous peace settlements with Tuareg insurgency; the growing economic importance of AQIM activities in the Sahelian region; the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya; and the inability or unwillingness of Algeria to play the role of regional hegemon now that its rival (Libya) has stopped doing so».

Lecocq et al. (2012), a group of eight scholars, gave a comprehensive background and analysis to the 2012 onward political crisis in Mali in two key points. First, with regard to the international and Saharan dimensions of the conflict, the scholars argue that even though via actions they took or refused to take, Mali's neighbors and other foreign powers made the crisis a regional one, all the roots of the crisis were first and foremost Malian. According to their analysis, the wounds of the North which re-opened in the 1990s, had long remained unhealed on the Malian body politic. For them, this sore had been further infected in recent years by passive or active participation in the drug trade by high-ranking military officers and political figures, by Bamako's laissez-faire attitude to those in the north it considered its political proxies, and by its failure to counter the presence of foreign Mujahideen and their local recruits. They also observe that while the problems plaguing the north have been relatively visible for several years, outside observers failed to diagnosis the hippo's (Mali) internal ailments, especially the degree of corruption pervading a political system in which many of them were deeply invested. The fall of the Touré government in just a few days in March - an event welcomed by many Malians - can only be explained by mounting dissatisfaction during Touré's second term in office, combined with a real lack of faith in the democratic process represented by the cancelled April elections.

Second, for any real understanding of the complex crisis, the scholars recommend to look simultaneously out from the Sahara and up from Bamako. For them, «any analysis should be concurrently attentive to regional and international factors at work in the Sahara and aware of the deeply local, even personal nature of the political crisis there, and in Kidal and Timbuktu in particular».

Apart from these works analyzing the Mali armed conflict, there have been some few academic discussions related to the African Union and ECOWAS intervention in the conflict.

For instance, Aning & Edu-Afful (2016) observed that both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been global leaders in embracing and operationalizing Responsibility To Protect (R2P). They argue that the adoption of the AU's Constitutive Act, Article 4 (h) in 2000, has transformed its old-fashioned principle of noninterference to one of

nonindifference. This authorizes the AU to intervene in Member States with respect to war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. As for ECOWAS, it has through its conflict prevention, management, and resolution protocol and its conflict prevention framework deepened and practicalized the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. These frameworks from both the AU and the ECOWAS have close similarities to the Responsibility To Protect (R2P) norms. But the authors regret that although these notions are captured in official documents, their actual operationalization faces challenges relating to sovereignty, limited institutional capacity, a restricted appetite for enforcement action, and a lack of explicit instruments to activate their intervention clauses in R2P-like situations. In spite of these challenges, the article argues that the initiatives of both the AU and the ECOWAS in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Libya demonstrated a positively active African agency in contributing to global peace processes.

Cocodia (2015) argues that the jihadists' actions prompted international intervention in the Malian crisis, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), France, the United States, and the European Union (EU) playing pivotal roles to stem the country's slide into civil war and anarchy. The author focuses on the AU who began playing an active role in June 2012, later upgrading the mission from a regional to a continental one and leading to the creation by the United Nations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). He observes that AFISMA was originally supposed to be drawn from the Western African Standby Brigade (WASB), which is the African Standby Force (ASF) brigade in West Africa. However, the AU since 2002 has been trying to get the ASF up and running. Yet it unfortunately exists more as a concept - a «paper tiger» - than a fully operational facility. Had it been operational during the crisis in Mali, it would have been deployed in Mali.

According to Gain (2018), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Union's (AU) set of tools for the maintenance of peace and security, would seem the obvious mechanism for resolving crises in countries beset by violence, such as Mali. The five main organs that comprise the AU peace and security architecture were intended to systematically address threats to peace and security at various levels, and to complement and reinforce one another. However, the author realizes that this has not been the case. He argues that though the AU and ECOWAS laid the groundwork for a UN Security Council Resolution in late 2012 which authorized a military intervention known as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), the swift deployment of the French military forces and its early military successes raised questions about the AU's and ECOWAS's capacity to manage such peace-support operations due to their lack of logistical readiness and financial resources.

Wyss (2014) thinks that the broad support received by the French Operation «Serval», launched in January 2013 to counter the offensive of the Northern armed groups, was illustrative of the absence of credible and timely alternatives to respond to the threat. He argues that such a situation, in turn, revealed the shortcomings of the existing security architecture at the level of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the UN, as well as weaknesses in their interactions.

Some other works are more concerned with the relationship prevailing between AU and other regional and global actors in the field of conflict interventions on the continent.

For instance, Weiss & Welz (2014) recall that the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) have collaborated in building a viable African Peace and Security Architecture and have worked together in a number of armed conflicts over the past decade. Examples include the peace operations in Burundi and Somalia, and the hybrid peace operation in Sudan's Darfur region which is perhaps the most prominent illustration of this collaboration. However, in the case of Mali these relations have grown colder as the UN snubbed the AU and its initial efforts to engage in post-conflict stabilization in Mali. They argue that while the AU sought to prove itself as a capable security provider and partner on the continent with its operation AFISMA, France's Opération Serval and the UN's peace operation for Mali, MINUSMA, bypassed the African Union.

Oluwadare (2015) submits that cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional African organizations should have been applied to the resolution of Mali's conflict. The author observes that even though African regional institutions lack the required expertise, logistics, diplomatic, and financial muscle to singularly mount a successful intervention without support from extra-Africa, a swift response from and the immediate engagement of the Western world in the form of willing partnership with regional African organizations would dramatically improve the outcome of peacekeeping operations in Africa. He therefore thinks that by failing to timely intervene until the troops of African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) were almost overrun, France is accused of stealing the show. Moreover, he believes that the same resources used by France could have been more effectively utilized if made available to Africa. In this case, cooperation not for this mission alone, but future missions, could have been achieved, thereby institutionalizing confidence-building measures.

The research design of this study is the documentary research design. The method of data collection is accordingly the documentary method of data collection. Both published and unpublished materials were utilized. Such materials had to do with the activities of international organizations; such as the United Nations (UN), the Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations, independent researchers, the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), and of course, the African Union (AU); particularly as such activities relate to conflict analysis and resolution including the conflict in Mali. These materials, which included newspapers, articles and unpublished academic works, were mainly sourced from public libraries. Internet sources, which in some instances also included official documents that were available

on the internet and various speeches and interviews that are relevant to the study, as also available on the internet, were utilized for the study.

My method of data analysis, entailed the examination of collected data, to review and analyze trends, problems and prospects. On the basis of the analyses of such trends, problems and prospects, findings of the study were arrived at and recommendations and conclusion, thereafter made.

Once home to several pre-colonial empires, the landlocked, arid West African country of Mali is one of the largest on the continent. After independence from France in 1960, Mali suffered droughts, rebellions, several coup d'état and 23 years of military dictatorship until democratic elections in 1992. In 2013, France intervened militarily upon the government's request following the capture of the town of Konna and its troops overran Islamist strongholds. Authorities agreed a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire with Tuareg separatists in 2015, but parts of the country remain tense, with Tuareg rebels sporadically active. Meanwhile, a jihadist insurgency in Mali's north and central regions continues, with al-Qaeda-linked militants carrying out terrorist attacks.

Mali is a landlocked nation in West Africa. With a total size of about 1,240,192 square kilometers, Mali shares a total of 7,243 kilometers of land boundaries with seven bordering states: North and northeast: Algeria- 1,376 km, East: Niger- 821 km, Southeast: Burkina Faso- 1,000 km, South: Ivory Coast- 532 km, Southwest: Guinea- 858 km, West: Senegal- 419 km and Mauritania- 2,237 km. Mali extends southwest from the southern Sahara (means "desert" in the Arabic language) through the Sahel (means the shore of a "sea of sand) to the Sudanian savanna zone (see Figure 2 : Map Mali climate). The country can be divided into three climatic zones--the Sudanic, the Sahelian, and the desert zones. Sudanic climate occurs in about one-third of the country, from the southern border to latitude 15° N. It is characterized by an annual rainfall of 20 to 55 inches (510 to 1,400 mm) and average temperatures of 75 to 86 °F (24 to 30 °C). The Sahel, or the area bordering the Sahara, receives between 8 and 20 inches (200 and 510 mm) of rain per year and has average temperatures between 73 and 97 °F (23 and 36 °C). In the desert (Sahara), temperatures during the day range from 117 to nearly 140 °F (47 to 60 °C), while at night the temperature drops to 39 to 41 °F (4 to 5 °C). During the hottest season of the year, temperatures are high throughout the country. Timbuktu, Taoudenni, Araouane, Gao, Kidal, Tessalit are some of the hottest spots on Earth during their warmest months. Kayes, with an average high temperature of about 44° (111.2°) in April is nicknamed "the pressure cooker of Africa" due to his extreme heat year-round. Sunshine duration is high in Mali, reaching the highest levels in the northern arid zone with about 3,600 - 3,700 h a year. Mali has overall a hot, sunny and dry climate dominated by the subtropical ridge.

According to estimates in 2011, 65% of Mali's land area is desert or semi-desert while only 5.63% of Mali's area can be classified as arable land and 0.1% was planted to permanent crops.

Environmental issues in Mali include desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, drought, and inadequate supplies of potable water. Deforestation is an especially serious and growing problem. According to the Ministry of the Environment, Mali's population consumes 6 million tons of wood per year for timber and fuel. To meet this demand, 4,000 square kilometers of tree cover are lost annually, virtually ensuring destruction of the country's savanna woodlands.

The land of Mali was once home to some of the great African Empires. Ghana Empire was the first to emerge around 700 AD. It ruled the area until 1075 and became an important trading state. In the 11th

century the Malinke Kingdom rose to power. It reached its height in 1325 when it conquered Timbuktu and Gao. In 1465 the Songhai Empire took control. It reached its peak under a ruler named Askia Mohammad I and its main city, Timbuktu, became a center of commerce and Islam led by the Tuareg. The Songhai Empire was destroyed by the Moroccans in 1591.

The French colonized the area in the late 1800s. They controlled the area until 1960 when the Sudanese Republic and Senegal formed the Mali Federation and became independent of France. Senegal withdrew from the federation after a few months and the Republic of Mali became its own independent country. The first president of Mali is an extremely experienced left-wing politician, Modibo Keita, who has been the first African vice president of the national assembly in Paris and has served in two French cabinets.

Keita imposed on Mali a rigorously communist and deeply unpopular regime. Keita's regime was met with the tuareg rebellion known as the Afellaga rebellion. The Tuareg were greatly oppressed by the

government of Modibo Keita, which came into power after the French had left, as they were singled out for particular discrimination, and were more neglected than others in the distribution of state benefits, which was due to the fact that «most of the senior leadership of post-colonial Mali were drawn from the southern ethnic groups who were not sympathetic to the pastoral culture of the northern desert nomads.»⁸ This first rebellion was met with a military repression.

Keita's regime lasted only until 1968 when he was ousted in a bloodless coup organized by a group of young army officers. At their head is Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, who became the dominant figure in the politics of Mali for the next twenty-three years.

From 1969 to 1979, Traoré rules through an appointed Military Committee of National Liberation. The military leaders renounced socialism and attempted to pursue economic reforms, but for several years

faced debilitating internal political struggles and the disastrous Sahelian drought. The efforts at consolidating the single-party government were challenged in 1980 by student-led anti-government

demonstrations, which were brutally put down, and by three coup attempts. The political situation stabilized during 1981 and 1982, and remained generally calm throughout the 1980s. During the Traoré years, the main external problem is a border conflict with Burkina Faso, which flares into war in 19756 and again in 1985. However it is peacefully resolved in 1986, when both sides accepted the arbitration of the International Court of Justice.

By 1990, cohesive opposition movements began to emerge. The increasingly turbulent political situation was complicated by the rise of ethnic violence in the north in mid-1990. The return to Mali of large numbers of Tuareg who had migrated to Algeria and Libya during the prolonged drought increased tensions in the region between the nomadic Tuareg and the sedentary population. Ostensibly fearing a Tuareg secessionist movement in the north, the Traoré regime imposed a state of emergency and harshly repressed Tuareg unrest. Despite the signing of a peace accord in January 1991, unrest and periodic armed clashes continued.

Traoré was finally toppled by Amadou Toumani Touré after pro-democracy riots in 1991. Under a new constitution, approved by referendum in 1992, democracy seems to arrive in profusion in Mali. On June 8, 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the candidate of ADEMA, was inaugurated as the president of Mali's Third Republic.

Konaré stepped down after his constitutionally mandated limit of two terms and did not run in the 2002 elections. Touré then reemerged, this time as a civilian. The 2002 election was a milestone, marking Mali's first successful transition from one democratically elected president to another, despite the persistence of electoral irregularities and low voter turnout. In the 2002 legislative elections, no party gained a majority; Touré then appointed a politically inclusive government and pledged to tackle Mali's pressing social and economic development problems. But from 2006 to 2009, he faced an insurgency when «a group of Tuareg army deserters attacked military barracks in Kidal region, seizing weapons and demanding greater autonomy and development assistance.»⁹ Until 2012, however, Mali was considered an example of democracy in West Africa.

Estimated by 2011 at about 14.2 millions, making it the twentieth most populous country in Africa¹⁰, Mali's population consists of diverse Sub-Saharan ethnic groups, sharing similar historic, cultural, and religious traditions. Exceptions are the Tuaregs and Maurs, desert nomads, related to the North African Berbers. The ethnic groups are represented as follows: Mande 50% (Bambara, Malinke, Soninke), Peul 17%, Voltaic 12%, Songhai 6%, Tuareg and Moor 10%, other 5% (See Figure 3: Map Mali spatial distribution of ethnic groups in Mali). Each ethnic group was traditionally tied to a specific occupation,

all working within close proximity. The Bambara, Malinke, Sarakole, and Dogon and Songhay are farmers; the Peul, Maur, and Tuareg are herders; while the Bozo are fishers. Historically, good interethnic relations throughout the rest of the country were facilitated by easy mobility on the Niger River and across the country's vast savannahs. In recent years, this linkage has shifted as ethnic groups seek diverse, non-traditional sources of income.

Although each ethnic group speaks a separate language, nearly 80% of Malians communicate in Bambara, the common language of the marketplace. The main religions are: Muslim 90%, indigenous beliefs 9%, Christian 1%.

Population densities are much higher in southern and central regions than in the three northern regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. The northern regions constitute a landmass of approximately 827,000 square kilometers, or around two-thirds of Mali's territory, yet northerners' combined 2009 population was only 1,284,836, or 8.8% of the total population. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that nearly 48% of Malians are younger than fifteen.

As explained above (3.2), since its 1960 independence until 1991, successive one-party regimes, de facto regimes, or emergency regimes ruled Mali. In 1991, the country started a political transition which led to a democratic constitution on February 25, 1992 and multi-party elections held afterward. From that time till the 2012 crisis, the country was regularly cited as the model of democracy in Africa.

Politically, Mali is a unitary state; however, in order to ensure better governance, it has opted for extensive decentralization. The country consists of 8 regions, 49 districts and 703 communes (with 36 Urban Communes and 667 Rural Communes).¹¹ Bamako, the capital, has a special status with similar powers to those of the regions. All these local authorities are legal entities believed to enjoy management autonomy. Decentralization was intended to endow the country an institutional framework suited to the expression of democratic freedoms and the conduct of sustainable development actions. However, in practice, the institutions have not functioned well. Gonin et al (2013) argue that this situation partly explains the political and security crisis experienced by the country since March 2012.

Mali is among the poorest countries in the world, with 65% of its land area desert or semidesert. Mali has a Human Development Index value of 0.359 and ranks 182 out of 186 on the United Nations Development Program's 2012 Human Development Index and a negative GDP growth rate.¹² According

to 2011 data from UNICEF¹³, Malians' life expectancy at birth stands at fifty-one years. 50% of Malians live below the international poverty line of $1.25 per day. In 2012, the CIA estimated Mali's per capita gross domestic product at $1,100, placing it 215th out of 229 countries. The very high annual demographic growth (3.6 %) affects the balance between the population and resources and represents one of the main social challenges for the country. The Malian economy is largely rural, and as such is very sensitive to climatic hazards, to variations in the price of raw materials and to political and security events which can hinder the circulation of goods and reduce the confidence of investors. Mali, is Africa's third-largest gold producer, exported over 50 tons of gold in 2012, but the country has heavily depended on foreign aid and vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices for cotton, its main export. The aid provided does not reach the target populations because of corruption. The country was ranked 105^th out of 182 countries profiled in Transparency International of 2012 corruption perception index.¹⁴ Mali is ranked as the last country (86 of 86) of all examined in the 2012 Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) ^15, following Sudan, DRC, Yemen, and Somalia. The country was also ranked category 3/3 (most severe) on the DG ECHO Vulnerability Index and category 2/3 on the Crisis Index in 2011/2012. Based on a composite measure of over 50 indicators, these point to high vulnerability (DG ECHO 2011/2012).¹⁶ The prevailing situation by 2011 as presented above constituted a favorable ground for the complex Malian conflict that arose early in 2012.

¹⁵ The SIGI measures gender inequality by looking at discriminatory social institutions, such as violence against women, restricted access to public space, and restricted access to land and credit etc. (SIGI 2012), http://genderindex.org/country/mali , accessed June 13, 2018

The current political crisis was sparked off on january17, 2012 when Tuareg rebels attacked towns in northern Mali, signaling the start of a new armed rebellion. The government of President Touré and the armed forces of Mali demonstrated their lack of capacity and ability to deal with the new Tuareg rebellion. Malian soldiers felt humiliated as they were under-resourced to respond to the new Tuareg insurgency against which they fared poorly. Alleged slaughter of Malian soldiers at Aguelhok and other military setbacks triggered protests by soldiers' families and a wave of unrest. As such, disgruntled soldiers turned a mutiny against President Touré for his ineffective response to the Tuareg rebellion into a military coup on March 22, 2012 that deposed the president and suspended constitutional rule, ahead of planned democratic presidential elections in April 2012. Touré was accused of not doing enough to tackle Islamist extremists, drug trafficking and the needs of the armed forces. The military junta led by Captain Amadou Sanogo promised to end the Tuareg rebellion in the north. As expected, the regional organization the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the continental organization the African Union (AU) mobilized the international community not to recognize the junta and expelled the military regime from their ranks. The military coup provided a strategic opportunity for the Tuareg rebels, who had by then formed an unholy alliance with the Islamist jihadist group Ansare Dine to tighten their military control over large parts of northern Mali. In April 2012 Tuareg separatist rebels, now formally constituted as the MNLA and in alliance with Ansare Dine, seized control of the whole of northern Mali and declared an independent Tuareg state of Azawad. This declaration only worsened the political crisis in Mali and showed the inability of the military junta to deal with and resolve the deepening conflict. Concerted international pressure forced the junta to hand over political power to a civilian interim government on April 12, 2012 led by President Dioncounda Traoré. Between May and July 2012 the deepening political and military crisis led to continued violent clashes between soldiers supporting the military junta (the so-called «Green Berets») and ousted president Touré's «Red Beret» soldiers. Despite the installation of civilian political authority, the junta leaders where still the key players and effectively the de facto leaders of Mali. Pro-junta supporters, unhappy with Traoré's handling of the crisis, stormed his office and beat him unconscious. In addition, the strategic military alliance between the Tuareg MNLA rebels and their Ansare Dine and al-Qaeda allies led to rapid military advances that saw the capture of the main northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. But Ansare Dine and its jihadist allies soon emerged as the main power in the alliance with the MNLA rebels and hijacked the Tuareg separatist rebellion to serve their jihadi and economic opportunism cause. The declaration of northern Mali as an independent Islamic state - the Islamic State of Azawad - was endorsed by AQIM and other jihadist groups in North Africa and the Sahel. Ansare Dine imposed sharia law in the world-renowned historic city of Timbuktu and other cities, which led to the amputation of

hands for stealing and stoning for adultery, as well as the destruction of ancient Muslim shrines in Timbuktu that offended the jihadists' puritanical Salafi Islamic views. A terrorist state under strict sharia law had emerged in the largely secular Muslim northern Mali.

The unstable political and military situation led to the formation of a transitional government of national unity headed by Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra in August 2012. This government included five close allies of the junta leader, Captain Sanogo. But this did not help the political and military situation on the ground and, if anything, only emboldened the rebels and their Islamist allies, who took advantage of the situation to further consolidate their military control over the whole of northern Mali. By September 2012, they had seized the strategically important town of Douentza and were poised to continue their advance on the government-controlled south-western part of the country and the seat of government in Bamako. This imminent advance on Bamako by the militarily strong and coordinated Islamist extremists forced the international community into action. In November 2012 ECOWAS, with the support of the AU and United Nations (UN), agreed on a coordinated military intervention force to recapture northern Mali, which was only scheduled for deployment in September 2013. Opposition to the ECOWAS military intervention plan by the transitional government of Mali, with pressure from the military junta, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Diarra in November 2012 and the appointment of a new prime minister, Django Sissoko. This led to threats of the imposition of sanctions against the government of Mali by both the UN and U.S. As the political crisis unravelled, the Islamist jihadists and their allies attacked and captured the central city of Konna on January 10, 2013 and planned to advance on Bamako. This military attack on Konna changed the direction of the Malian crisis because events on the ground now dictated the nature and urgency of the response to it, shifting the focus from political dialogue to military action. The imminent attack on and possible capture of Bamako and the potential consequences for Mali, its neighbors and the volatile region, as well as for French national interests, led to the dramatic French military intervention¹⁷ in Mali on January 11, 2013. This intervention, supported by Malian troops, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces and other Western countries, in less than three weeks ended the Tuareg separatist rebellion, recaptured all the major cities in northern Mali, and dispersed the Islamist rebels, most of whom melted into the civilian population and tactically retreated into the mountains, caves and inhospitable desert terrain that they are familiar with. By all indications, France achieved the immediate and short-term objectives of the intervention, i.e. prevented the takeover of Bamako by Islamist extremist and the emergence of a terrorist state; ended the secessionist rebellion in northern Mali; and helped the government of Mali to reestablish its control and sovereignty over its territories. This putative short-term success of the French intervention led to calls by France for the deployment of a robust African troop presence and UN peacekeeping force to replace French forces in Mali. The UN peacekeeping force MINUSMA took over

AFISMA on July 1, 2013 and a year later on August 1, 2014, Serval gave way to Barkhane,¹⁸ as part of a Sahel-wide counterterrorism new strategy. The improving security situation led to the announcement by the government of Mali, under pressure from the international community, of a return to civilian democratic and constitutional rule by holding nation-wide presidential elections in July 2013 and brought into power Ibahim Boubacar Kéita.

With the help of the international community, «Algers Peace Process» was engaged and a peace agreement named «Bamako agreement» was signed by the warring parties on two different dates: 15th May and 20th June 2015. Since then, the implementation of the peace process is ongoing with its ups and downs.

Indeed, more than two years after the signing of the «Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali» supposed to usher in a new era of peace and stability, not only has there been little progress in implementing the agreement, but insecurity has grown and spread to the center of the country. The terrorist threat has also reached the capital through different attacks. Most observers are of the view that the implementation of the peace agreement has lagged. This situation is also illustrated by some official facts: for example on February 27, 2016, President Keïta and the leaders of the signatory armed groups already committed to agree on a new timeline for implementing the key institutional and security provisions of the peace agreement. In his May 2016 report on Mali, the UN secretary-general interpreted this commitment as «an acknowledgement that the challenges for the implementation of the agreement are daunting, and that progress made so far has been uneven.»¹⁹ Since the beginning of 2018, the Human Rights and Protection Division of MINUSMA has documented 99 incidents of intercommunal violence resulting in at least 289 civilian deaths, 750 schools closed with a million of children out of school.²⁰ This illustrates sufficiently that Mali is still facing serious security challenges. Even when full territorial integrity is regained, many serious security risks remain, including terrorist attacks, ethnic and community tensions, weapons proliferation, drug smuggling, and other related criminal activities, which are likely to continue to undermine governance and development in Mali for the foreseeable future. The conflict is currently listed as "unchanging" by the Global Conflict Tracker²¹. The interrelated security challenges Mali but also the whole Sahel is facing are summed up as «a toxic cocktail of rebels, weapons, refugees, drought, smugglers, and violent Islamic militants.»²² The need to restore the integrity of Mali's territory and ensure the physical security of communities in the north continues to be a central priority.

¹⁹ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/498, May 31, 2016, para. 78

²¹ The Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States,

²² David Lewis, «Analysis: Mali Coup Shakes Cocktail of Instability in Sahel,» Reuters, March 24, 2012

Up to the outbreak of the 2012 crisis, Mali was touted by the international community as a beacon of democratic example in a West African region torn by civil wars and authoritarian regimes. The reality

cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf , accessed on June 18, 2018

was that Mali was nothing more than a superficial democracy and a fragile state. According to the European University Institute (2009), fragile states are characterized among others by «...service entitlements and legitimacy failures ..., poor governance and political instability..., economic and social exclusion, ethnically and socially heterogeneous and polarized,... and weak state institutions that cannot manage the very real grievances caused by, for example, inequitable distribution of resources or unequal access to formal institutions. Essentially, this means that in fragile states political institutions are not strong enough to effectively manage the natural conflicts that occur in society». This was the situation prevailing in Mali where the state was unable to address its fundamental political, governance, security and socio-development challenges. So, the eruption of the complex crisis, involving a separatist insurgency, a military coup, an extremist insurgency is the result of multiple factors including structural and proximate causes or drivers:

The renewed instability from 2012 after the rebellions of 1963, 1991 and 2006, illustrates that structural problems in Mali have yet to be resolved. According to Humphreys and Ag Mohamed (2005), whilst each new conflict has its own proximate drivers, they are related to unresolved issues spilling over from previous conflicts. They argue that the motivations of rebel groups in northern Mali relate to the regional exceptionalism of the north and to grievances arising from entrenched economic and political marginalization. Furthermore, a history of ineffective governance, weak state structures and corruption have all contributed to insecurity in northern Mali.

Northern Mali is marked by extreme poverty and few viable livelihoods. One of the few means of livelihood is linked to trade, and increasingly, the smuggling of contraband (cigarettes, weapons, irregular migrants and drugs). The desert environment in which the Tuareg and Arab tribes live is one where movement, widespread networks of support and interaction are critical elements of survival and of daily life.²⁵

Moreover, climate change has rendered the north an even more inhospitable and conflict-prone environment; a reduction of Mali's average rainfall by 30% since 1998 and the more frequent occurrence of droughts have resulted in high rates of chronic hunger. The Sahara desert is expanding by 48km per year, reducing grazing land and forcing communities to migrate into areas that are already occupied by other groups, creating further inter-communal conflicts. Water shortages have long been a problem, and are a factor underpinning insecurity and political conflicts. For several scholars, the situation of agricultural and food vulnerability in 2012 is itself the echo of the droughts of 1973-1974, 1984-1985

²⁵ Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 14.

and 2004-2005 which at the time profoundly changed the societies in the north and the socio-economic, human and environmental balance which is the source of some of the major political crises.

Most of the northern populations' grievances against the central government in Bamako result among others from historical considerations, economic and political marginalization; and the use of violent military repression to which is added the failure of successive governments to implement provisions made in peace agreements creating a favorable ground for new rebellions.

In historical perspective, the grievances of Malian Tuareg and other northern Malian communities date to the colonial period. Armed resistance greeted French colonial incursions into present-day northern Mali in the 1890s. Tuareg-led revolts, partly triggered by periods of drought, challenged colonial authority in present-day Mali and Niger in the 1910s. In the transition to independence in the late 1950s, some Tuareg were disappointed not to receive their own state, particularly when France's Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes, OCRS), a territorial unit created in 1957 and dissolved in 1963, failed to realize such aspirations. The Tuareg rebellion of 1963-1964 (see The First Wave: 1963 1964) reflected dissatisfaction with the early postcolonial state and a desire for independence.

As noted by Nhema (2004), in Africa, one of the major sources of conflict in countries facing political instability challenges is the prevalence of exclusionary political systems that have created an environment in which various groups contending for power are excluded from the political and economic processes through various repressive measures thereby creating instability in the continent. In Mali, people from the North including the Tuareg claim to have been marginalized since independence and before. This grievance dates back to French colonial rule that excluded them from the centers of power during the colonial era. Historically, the Tuareg are nomadic pastoralists and traders who have lived in the Sahel and the Sahara region. Up until the colonial period, the Tuareg had political and military control over large parts of the Sahara and over neighboring territories to the south. They are spread across the states of Mali, Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya as a result of the international boundaries that emerged from the decolonization of French West Africa in 1960. The drawing of national boundaries interrupted caravan routes and formally prevented access to traditional pasture grounds.

Since independence in 1960, northerners have suffered proportionately more than the rest of Mali from economic neglect and marginalization. For instance, during General Moussa Traoré's reign, the military

regime proved incompetent as economic managers and subsequent governments have increasingly failed to deliver public services (Melly, 2012). Economic marginalization has continued into recent times, manifesting in a lack of an effective economic strategy, high youth unemployment amongst nomadic populations and a perception of unequal access to health and education provision. Socioeconomic data (measuring school attendance, malnutrition and vulnerability to food security) for the period 1995 - 1997 suggests that in the north these conditions were exceptionally poor compared to other regions of the country (Humphreys & Ag Mohamed, 2005, p. 46).

Tuareg rebels also argue that they have suffered political marginalization, which was exceptionally harsh in response to the Tuareg uprising of 1963 (Keita, 1998). There was a gross under-representation of Tuareg and Arabs in post-independence cabinets, the army and in senior civil service positions (Humphreys & Ag Mohamed, 2005).

The Tuareg claim therefore that they are excluded when it comes to access to political power, economic resources and public services. They interpret the government's policy as a conscious attempt to deprive the north of possibilities for development, creating a deep resentment of the central government among the populations of the north.

Other scholars argue that Tuaregs were not able to secure roles in the newly independent Malian State because they are nomadic and they had resisted French assimilation, but also because they were not educated in colonial schools or part of the elite. Thus, they became excluded from political institutions.

In any case and whatever the cause, this issue of marginalization is therefore considered by many analysts as one of the forces that motivated the Tuareg to engage in successive military conflict with the Malian government.

3.1.2.3- Violent repression of rebellions and failure to implement peace agreements

The process of social, economic and political marginalization in the north of the country resulted among other things, in the recurring Tuareg rebellions. The latter were met through military repression by successive Malian regimes. Between 1963 and 1964, Modibo Keïta dealt with the rebellion through military repression, as did the regime of Moussa Traoré in response to the rebellion in 1990 (Lecocq, 2010; Sidibé, 2012). Moreover, the peace agreements which resulted from the negotiations were never fully implemented creating sources for other rebellions. Today, no analysis of the Malian armed conflict can gloss over the fact that the 2012 armed uprising was the fourth rebellion to end with a negotiation process and result in an agreement between the government of Mali and armed groups in the north. Since the country gained independence in 1960, there have been three waves of rebellion in the North before the one of 2012: 1963-1964, 1990-1996, and 2006-2009. They mainly known as Tuareg

rebellions in reference to the fact that they originated from Tuareg-dominated areas and have been composed mainly, but not exclusively of elements of Tuareg origin.²⁶

The first rebellion began in 1963, only three years after Mali gained independence. The armed groups demanded political recognition of the specificities of northern Mali and a special status for the region. Instead, the first post-colonial regime of President Modibo Keïta chose repression. The northern regions were subjected to martial law and military administration. The military repression and droughts after the fall of Keïta, pushed thousands of northerners to leave Mali. They sought refuge in Algeria and Niger, where they connected with both countries' own Tuareg rebel movements, and in Libya, where Muammar Qaddafi integrated them into the Islamic Legion, a Libyan-sponsored mercenary force. Boutellis and Zahar (2017) argue that the brutality of the repression by the mainly southern Malian army «left painful traces in the collective memory, in particular in the region of Kidal, and fueled deep resentment within many families in this zone who were affected by the massacres.» The fathers of some present-day rebel commanders, such as the MNLA's Mohamed Ag Najem and Ansare Dine's Iyad Ag Ghali, died in that conflict. The shadow of the repression is believed to have tainted relations between the north and the south ever since. About this crisis, Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita of the Malian Army later noted: «While the government had succeeded in ending the rebellion, its coercive measures alienated many Tuareg who had not supported the insurgents. Atrocities and human rights abuses on both sides contributed to a climate of fear and distrust in the north. .... As a result, Tuareg grievances remained largely unaddressed, and a seething resentment continued in many Tuareg communities after 1964.»²⁷

The 1990-1991 rebellion was led and fought by Tuareg and Arab exiles. Launched in June 1990. Spearheaded by the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA of its French acronym) and the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA), the demands of the rebels echoed those of the first wave including better living conditions and recognition of a northern political identity. They further asked that Tuareg be allowed to integrate into the Malian army. Referring to the rebels as «highway thugs,» General Traoré once again chose repression over negotiations. The resulting abuses have been blamed for aggravating the grievances of the north. The regime then chose Algeria to mediate the crisis. Algeria tried to negotiate a peace agreement in Tamanrasset in Algeria, but the violence continued.

²⁶ The Strangest Invasion in History? Was the Assault on Anjouan Island Really Necessary or Was It a Convenient and Easy Face-Saving Victory for AU Peacekeepers? http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-179112825.html , accessed on June 28, 2018

²⁷ Kalifa Keita, «Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,» Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998; pp 10-11

In April 1992, the Tuareg rebels signed a peace agreement - Le Pacte Nationale - with the then transitional Malian government after Traoré was chased from power. Despite the agreement, the violence persisted and escalated into a civil war with the establishment of the Songhai self-defence militia Ganda Koy (Masters of the Earth) in 1994. In March 1996, after a four-year-long civil war and major reconciliation efforts, 10,000 people took part in the Flames of Peace (Flamme de la Paix) ceremony in Timbuktu, where thousands of weapons were burned.

Since 1996, northern Mali had continued to lag behind the south in terms of development, while southerners continued to distrust northerners, who they felt were being rewarded for taking up weapons.²⁸ The Malian government, for its part, failed to implement the promises made in 1992, which, according to some experts «deepened national divisions and the rift between the northern and southern territories».²⁹ Things worsened from 2002 with the election of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The non-implementation, coupled with periods of drought and discontent among integrated Tuareg soliders, provoked the rebellion in 2006. Fighters united under the banner of the Alliance for Democracy and Change took up arms and were able to control the cities of Kidal and Ménaka. New accords, again sponsored by Algeria in 2006, attempted to revive some of the National Pact provisions, particularly the creation of a northern security force, named the Saharan Security Units. The Algiers Accord, signed on July 4, 2006, also granted northern Mali further political autonomy and more development funds.

However, this and subsequent agreements have not been observed, and consequently the Tuareg have never felt that their demands for greater autonomy, social-economic development and cultural freedom have actually been fulfilled by the Malian state. As Keita observed «Clearly the problem of instability had been deferred, not resolved.» So, it must be understood that although the armed conflict that broke out in 2012 has some new dynamics, the Tuareg rebellion and proclamation of an independent state, Azawad, in April 2012, should be understood as a continuum of 50 years of unresolved conflict.

3.1.3- Weak state institutions, poor governance and state collusion with criminal networks

According to Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2005), the central element of fragility is weak state institutions. All other factors associated with fragility are in themselves linked to weak state institutions as a driving force. In the case of Mali, even before the rebellion broke out, a confluence of problems, ranging from longstanding communal grievances to official corruption and complicity in drug smuggling and perhaps militant activity as well, had weakened the Malian state. Despite a much-lauded

²⁸ For a good overview of inequalities between northern and southern Mali, see Macartan Humphreys and Habaye Ag Mohamed, «Senegal and Mali,» January 2003, www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/sen_mali.pdf , accessed on June 28, 2018

democratic transition in 1992 and two decades of multiparty elections, many Malians viewed the state and the political class with apathy or disdain.

In fact, since the last peace agreements, Mali which was considered to be a model of development has allowed itself to be infected by corruption at every level, notably in the administration, the police, the legal system and the army. When ATT came on power in 2002, he was an independent and «was not aligned with any party,» for he sought unity, or «consensus politics.» What resulted, however, was patronage politics as the spoils of government were dished out to all political parties. The «fruits of government were too sweet to resist . . . and while Mali held elections regularly, the political class appeared to be doing little more than enriching themselves at the expense of average citizens» and Mali became one of the most corrupt regimes in West Africa (Wing, 2013).

The problems faced at every level of government (national, regional, local) have got worse, which has significantly increased the loss of confidence between the state and potential partners from civil society. For example, a major corruption scandal came to light in 2010 when the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria suspended its support for Mali because public service employees had embezzled millions of dollars to which the government, if not directly involved, had turned a blind eye (Whitehouse 2012a). The country was ranked 105^th out of 182 countries profiled in Transparency International of 2012 corruption perception index.

Furthermore, the legal system had fallen into a poor state under Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), as both the judiciary and law enforcement were open to bribery, and they provided little protection for the people. Bamako's political class and its associates had also earned enormous sums of money from the illegal economy and the government and parts of the military had accepted or directly participated in trafficking.

Specially, for the peoples in the north, poor governance and weak political institutions have generally meant the absence of the state, security and, not least, development in the form of infrastructure, investment in water, sanitation and education. Government failure in these areas has served to undermine state legitimacy in the north, heightened ethnic conflicts and caused structural poverty. Despite the extensive democratic decentralization process that was launched in the 1990s, the state has failed to consolidate itself and build up the capacity to perform its main tasks in the north. Unequal access to public services has reinforced the perception of injustice and exclusion. Chauzal and van Damme (2015) mentioned that as a result of ineffective corrupt institutions and unequal access to political power and economic resources, the social contract between the Malian state and citizens in the north had disintegrated.

In addition, since the 2000s, a systematic laisser-faire strategy has been adopted in northern Mali and it is in this context of the declining presence of the state that the big networks of the illicit economy have been put in place and the camps of international jihadist movements have been established. ATT's regime allowed its local allies in the north to engage in criminal activity as a means of exploiting tensions

between competing networks and retaining influence in the north. Some analysts argue that, during ATT's presidency, a tacit agreement existed between the Malian state and AQIM, `under which the government did not vigorously pursue AQIM while, in return, AQIM did not directly threaten Bamako' (Arieff, 2013a). These groups have therefore managed to achieve considerable local integration in certain places and among certain communities, skillfully appropriating local grievances and thus, filling up the vacuum left by the central government. Andy Morgan quotes Hama Ag Sid'Ahmed, a source in the Tuareg community, who states that «AQIM was parachuted in and installed in our territory by the Malian government ... It was the initiative of certain drugs barons, who are advisors to the President, in the shadows of the Koulouba Palace [The Presidential palace in Bamako]. They brought them into the Timbuktu region and then to Kidal. In return for the release of the 32 hostages in 2003, a pact of non-aggression was signed between Bamako and Al Qaeda, who then progressively occupied this territory. Those contacts became permanent and it's clear that since then all the operations led by the terrorist groups have originated in Mali, and the terrorist have always fallen back to Mali. It's their safe haven. Everyone knows that the terrorists are in communication with military leaders, and that politicians from Bamako meet the terrorist emirs quite regularly.»³⁰

Konaté et al (2013) sum up the Mali armed conflict structural causes as vulnerabilities including, among others, drought, food insecurity, economic crises, poor governance (corruption, weak state institution, economic and political marginalization), lack of development prospects and incapacity of the elites since independence to unify the communities into a national project. As illustrated in the previous points, these vulnerabilities serve to justify the claims of the rebel movements which have popped up in northern Mali at different times (1963, 1991, 2006 and 2012).

Regarding their nature, the majority of the conflicts usually have a triggering cause and in Mali's case, it's no doubt that the fall of colonel Muammar Qaddafi combined with the military 2012 uprising represented the main key events that ultimately made the Malian conflict burst open.

A report³¹ of the International Crisis Group points out that though many of the underlying causes of Mali's complex security challenge have existed for decades, the overthrow of Qaddafi's regime and the return of heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya upset the precarious balance of power in northern Mali. The wave of change, often referred to as the Arab Spring, which swept through North Africa also

reenergized the Tuareg's long-standing quest for greater autonomy in a geographic area that includes much of northern Mali.

In fact, as mentioned previously, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi had long employed Tuaregs in his military, utilizing them in his frequent wars on the African continent, including in Chad, Niger, Sudan, Mali, even Lebanon but finally, in the fight of Libya. . Poulton and ag.Youssouf (1998) reported that in 1980, he even declared Libya the natural homeland of all Tuareg and offered them Libyan nationality. When Gaddafi lost power in September 2011, an estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Malian Tuareg fighters returned home. An article of Dailykos says that these fighters came home from the fight in Libya heavily armed and along with other logistical resources. Amidst warnings of the dangers of the mass inflow of former Libyan mercenaries and military equipment, Malian authorities were unable to control the mass transfer of arms from Libya. As an example, unlike Niger, Malian authorities had made little effort if any to disarm the returnees.

Moreover, the Malian authorities proving unable to provide suitable and substantive answers to the issues at stake, there appeared continued dissatisfaction which eventually led to the creation of the Tuareg separatist National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA) on October 11, 2011 with the support of these heavily armed troops who also wanted to have a place in the society.

Equipped with heavy weapons and vehicles, the MNLA launched an armed insurgency against the Malian military in January 2012, pushing the Malian army south and taking control over two-thirds of the Malian territory. Warner (2012) explains that while the MLNA claimed to have 1,000 well-armed fighters, the poor equipped government forces, prior to the 2012 coup, were estimated at 7,350. The Tuaregs who accumulated over a number of years of planning with extensive experience in implementing long-range guerrilla tactics over distances of hundreds of miles, were now fortified by heavy weaponry brought by fighters returned from Libya. Thus, while such armed uprisings have occurred several times since Mali's independence from France, the return of well-trained and well-equipped fighters to northern Mali, gave the separatist groups an unprecedented opportunity to contest the government.

The inadequate response by the government to the Tuareg uprisings, in combination with insufficient resources within the army, led to a demonstration of discontent by a group of army officers who, by the end of March the same year, took power in a military coup.

In fact, the Tuareg-led offensive, backed by various national and foreign Jihadist groups, forced government troops to cede several strongholds. These defeats showed the weaknesses of the Malian army, in particular the blatant lack of equipment, corruption and incompetence of part of the military hierarchy, as well as the poor organization and lack of motivation of the soldiers. The strong sentiment of frustration within the troops was the reason for the mutiny of the soldiers and junior officers of the

Kati camp, who called for equipment and improvement in their conditions. Noting the lack of resistance, the mutineers set up a National Committee of Democratic Reform and State Restoration (CNRDRE) and deposed president Amadou Toumani Touré on 22 March 2012, transforming their mutiny into a coup d'état (Kéita, 2013). The coup d'état led to a wave of arrests of key figures of the former regime, politicians and economic operators. Several military leaders were deposed. This situation created further confusion within the army and contributed to the rapid occupation of the cities of the North by separatists, Jihadists, and drug traffickers. The MNLA unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the vast northern regions of Mali under the name of Azawad on 6 April 2012.

The crisis in Mali should be understood in terms of the multilayered nature of conflict, which includes a panoply of actors, both internal and external, who act on behalf of various sets of ideological affiliation, ethnic identity, interpersonal tension and networks.

The field of national actors in the armed conflict in Mali is admittedly complex and changing. Nevertheless, there are some main types of armed groupings and main interests driving the armed conflict. The most critical ones are:

Mali is a recent state formation, from 1960; the construction of a national identity has been the project of every government since. Another important interest of the Malian government is the integrity of the Malian territory and the secular character of the state. These objectives are also what puts the government into political and ideological conflicts with other actors including the rebels in the north who refuse the kind of national identity and unity that the government promotes, and the armed Islamists, who challenge the secularity of the state.

The Government was represented in the battle field by Malian Armed Forces - the Malian army numbers approximately 6,000-7,000 troops, consisting of land forces, air forces, a small navy, a paramilitary Gendarmerie, and a Republican Guard that is underpaid, poorly equipped and in need of rationalization. The Malian army suffered heavy losses at the beginning of the rebellion in 2012; the campaign in the north left them fragmented and demoralized. Malians were split into camps and a political disunity was installed at a national level after the coup organized by Captain Amadou Hya Sanogo, which hindered central control and prevented the formation of a cohesive military force.

The self-defense militias brought together under the CMFPR-I umbrella first emerged in the 1990s to protect Songhay and Fulani populations against the insecurity caused by Tuareg and Arab rebels. This

also meant protecting sedentary populations against rebelling nomad populations, and meant the introduction of an intercommunal armed conflict between riverine farming and desert populations.

Following MNLA uprisings and Islamic occupation in 2012, several civilian forces have sprung up, including but not limited to, the Patriotic Resistance Front (PRF) and the Northern Mali Liberation Front (FLNM). With an estimating fighting capacity of hundreds or low thousands, PRF consists of six armed groups banded together, whose goal is to drive the Islamic occupants outside the country. The Northern Mali Liberation Front (FLNM) is made of three other important groups in the region: two Songhai militias, the Ganda Koy and the Ganda Izo, and fighters under the command of a Tuareg army colonel El Hadji Gamou. Created to oppose the nomadic rebels who seized control of north Mali in the March 2012 coup, FLNM embers supposedly received training from Malian soldiers, although their training level seemed limited. The strength of these groups grew gradually as new volunteers, tired of the Islamic occupation, joined their ranks, planning to remain active as long as the northern Malian territory remained occupied.

During the Algiers peace process, these groups merged into a new coalition known as the Platform. The main interests of the Platform groups are primarily centered on protecting and strengthening their own communities, and they do not question the territorial integrity of Mali

4.1.3- The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad, MNLA)

In October 2011, in the oasis settlement of Zakak, Mali, near the border of Algeria, Tuareg youth, intellectuals, Malian Army defectors, and Libyan-trained Tuareg soldiers merged two earlier movements, the Mouvement National de l'Azawad (MNA) and the Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali (MTNM) to form The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), «Azawad» being the name of the Tuareg homeland. Ideologically, it is a secular, pro-democracy secessionist movement. Territorially, the MNLA is based in north-eastern Mali around the Adrar de Ifoghas Mountains because of group members' familiarity with bases there and the heavy Ansare Dine presence further west and south around Timbuktu.

The movement and its predecessors, have since Malian independence been in conflict with the government. The movement and its predecessors, have since Malian independence been in conflict with the government over the relationship between the state and the population in the north. The liberation from Malian rule and an independent state was launched in 2012, as the solution to the unequal distribution of resources within the Malian state (Bøås, 2015).

At the core of Tuareg opposition to the state is a deep sense of political and economic exclusion, inequality and marginalization. Tuareg groups perceive themselves as being excluded from representation in government and perceive the central government as indifferent to the living conditions and suffering of the Tuareg people. Also, the question of identity is essential to understanding the colliding interests of the rebels and the government. According to Harmon (2014), when Mali became

independent, due to deep-rooted notions of race and historical relationships between ethnic groups and castes, the Tuareg elites did not wish to belong to a Malian state led by black Africans, nor to a state of equal citizens.

Despite having launched the militarily strongest rebellion since Malian independence, the MNLA was evicted by the armed Islamists by June 2012. The French intervention, in January 2013, which retook the population centers in northern Mali from the armed Islamist groups, gave the MNLA an opportunity to regain a central role on the stage.

Since the early 2000s, the activity of armed Islamists has increased in Mali. The groups that controlled northern Mali during the territorial occupation, 2012-2013, were Ansare Dine, the Mouvement pour le l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest1 (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Ansare Dine or «defenders of the faith», in a rough English translation, is a rebel group that appeared in Mali in March 2012 and is considered by far the most strongest militant force operating in Mali, having a great deal of resources provided by multiple sources. Ansare Dine has its roots in the secular Tuareg separatist movement. Former rebel leader, Iyad ag Ghali, founded this Islamist group after being denied the leadership of the Tuareg Ifogha clans and the leadership of the MNLA, which he sought to reform towards jihadist goals. Apart from providing a leadership platform for ag Ghali himself, the aim of Ansare Dine is the establishment of an Islamic Azawad state, and implementing a strict interpretation of Islamic Law (Sharia) in Mali and control the Malian North. Another goal of the organization is to restore the authority of the religious elders (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015). Like AQIM, its members are not only Tuaregs and Malians, but also come from a range of other countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Algeria.

4.1.4.2- Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa / Mouvement pour le l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest1 (MUJAO)

The MUJAO, a local offshoot of AQIM, was founded in 2011 after breaking with the latter in order to concentrate on spreading the Sharia law to the areas of West Africa that were not within the scope of AQIM. An article reports that the reason MUJAO separated from AQIM was due to the marginalization of its black African members and the contempt in which AQIM's Arabs hold blacks. Nevertheless, the group remains close to Al-Qaeda ideologically. While the MUJAO is a militant Salafist movement, which seeks to establish a political system in Mali that is in line with Islamic principles, it is also highly integrated with organized crime, thereby representing interests of smuggling networks.

According to Stewart (2013), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) traces its roots back to the Algerian civil war and the group, GSPC. The name change and affiliation with Al-Qaida took place in 2006, and also brought with it a change in the goals and aims of the organization, complementing the internal Algerian agenda with a jihadist one. Since then, its main objectives are the fight against the Algerian state and the establishing of a global caliphate. From 2003 until present, AQIM gradually took advantage of Mali's weak security infrastructure to establish itself in the northern part of the country. Up to 2012, AQIM's specific goals and objectives in northern Mali were mainly financial, with the use of kidnappings of Western citizens as a way to finance the struggle in Algeria. Since the 2012 Tuareg uprising, though, AQIM has changed its focus to territorial control, with the aim of replacing governments, such as the one in Mali, with governments that adhere to a strict interpretation of Sharia, the Islamic law. Another objective is to free the region from foreign influence, which puts it in opposition to France and the United States. Furthermore, AQIM has an interest in keeping trafficking routes open and maintaining control over their bases in northern Mali, which are also used for finalizing negotiations for the hostage ransom payments.

Taking advantage of the chaos that the 2012 rebellion created in northern Mali, the Islamist groups effectively side-lined the secular MNLA, both politically and militarily and assumed a dominant role in northern Mali.

The armed Islamists' imposition of Sharia law by force, and an interpretation of Islam foreign to the local tradition, led to strong popular protests and a collapse of the local informal economy. Numerous violations of human rights were reported, with people being flogged, arbitrarily arrested and executed. An Islamic police force was created, to ensure the population's adherence to new religious rules that affected, among other things, clothing and prohibited, for example, music, television, football, alcohol, bars and smoking. Men and women were also separated in public spaces, such as buses.

The conflict involves a highly complex and ever-shifting network of alliances and rivalries among numerous armed groups where some of the actors constantly shift positions and interests following the evolution and dynamics of the conflict (Figure 9: Fragmentation and recomposition of compliant armed groups).

During the January 2012, Tuareg rebellion, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad, MNLA), a Tuareg faction, sought increased autonomy for three regions of northern Mali: Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Simultaneously, an opaque ad hoc alliance between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, MUJAO) and Ansare Dine mounted a military offensive whose aim was to implement their interpretation of Sharia law. In March

2012, in the wake of a coup d'état that deposed the Malian Government, these three groups gained control of Northern Mali, an area comprising more than half of the country's territory. But by June 2012, the MNLA had been expelled from all the major northern towns that were now at the hands of a synergic Islamist alliance. The Malian Army more or less collapsed after the coup and fled the principal cities in northern Mali as the rebels moved southward. After Ansare Dine captured the strategically situated town of Konna, in central Mali, Malian Interim President Dioncounda Traoré requested military assistance from France, which launched Opération Serval in January 2013 to regain control of the country with the support of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Six months later, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2100 which established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), effective as of July 1, 2013.

In June 2013 a preliminary peace agreement was signed between coalitions of actors including the Malian Government, the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad, HCUA) and the Arab Movement of Azawad (le Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad, MAA). This was the point of departure for the peace process, following the rebellion in northern Mali against the state, in January 2012. Since then, the field of armed actors has evolved and at present the MNLA and the HCUA form part of a broader coalition.

The Algiers peace process that began in 2014 with a peace agreement in mid-2015, gathered new coalitions of non-government actors including the Coordination or CMA and the Platform. The CMA is comprised of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), the Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), the Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad (MAA), a faction of the Coalition du Peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), and a splinter group of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance (CMFPR-II). The Platform is comprised of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance (CMFPR-I), the Groupe d'Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), and splinter groups of the CPA and the MAA (Figure 8 Implementation of Bamako Agreement). As for Ansare Dine, it gradually disappeared as some of its leading figures have joined the HCUA. AQIM also has lost important bases in northern Mali, and many of its troops are said to have fled to neighboring countries, such as Algeria and Libya.³²

As it can be noticed, the history of conflict between Tuareg-led rebel groups and the government of Mali is filled with coalitions and umbrella organizations uniting different groups, families and leaders, then splitting only to reunite in new constellations. The current coalitions are also changing as different factions either accept or refuse aspects of the peace process.

The Malian crisis and the advancement of Jihadi terrorism generated widespread concern among the international community, and gave rise to a series of actions and interventions of several states and other

international stakeholders. This section will deal with a brief review of the overall intervention process in Mali by the international community as a whole. The very intervention by the AU and its REC ECOWAS will be extensively discussed in the next chapter.

According to an article³³ of the Institute of Security Studies, ISS Africa, the response to the security situation in Mali by international actors has gone through several phases.

A two-pronged approach on the situation in Mali was considered by the international actors: giving priority to diplomatic and political efforts, while preparing for an eventual military intervention should the first option failed. This is what explains the preparations for a military deployment in parallel to diplomatic efforts.

As diplomatic and political efforts were languishing, ECOWAS initially took steps towards the deployment of a stabilization force in Mali (MICEMA) from early 2012. With an active involvement of

the AU, EU, UN and other partners, a number of planning meetings were convened for this. For example,

the regional organization dispatched technical assessment missions to Mali and convened a number of planning meetings. This force, MICEMA, was to be composed of ECOWAS member states and be

deployed within the framework of the West African component of the African Standby Force (WASF).

However, as time passed, and before MICEMA was deployed, it was decided to broaden the scope of the mission from the regional level to the continental one. Chad and other countries outside of West

Africa could then participate and it was also observed that the inclusion of countries such as Mauritania and Algeria, which are also outside of the ECOWAS space, was crucial for the success of the efforts in Mali. It was therefore decided to `continentalize' MICEMA through the establishment and deployment of AFISMA.

However, having been envisaged to be fully operational by September 2013, AFISMA was still in the planning and resource mobilization stages, when on 10 January 2013, the armed groups launched their offensive southward and were able to capture Konna on January17. This called for urgent action that the Malian army could not deliver by itself as its reorganization and formation by the EU had not yet started.

Malian authorities therefore appealed for France who immediately responded and launched Operation Serval. In a few weeks, Serval with the support of AFISMA troops finally deployed, broke the offensive

of the armed groups, regained control of the major northern cities and tracked the armed groups to their northern hideouts. Aimed at addressing the urgency of the crisis, this operation was not meant as a long-

term solution. Hence, the emergence of the idea of a UN mission with more secure funding to take over from AFISMA which was lacking resources.

Another phase of the international response is the ongoing United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), first established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 and officially launched on July 1, to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. Building on the stabilization efforts of AFISMA, the French army and the Malian authorities, MINUSMA was able to contribute to successful democratic elections held in August 2013 with the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita as new president. The Algeria peace talks began in 2014 and led to the Bamako Peace Agreement finally signed by all the warring parties in June 2015.

A year after the operationalization of MINUSMA, Serval forces retreated but as of August 1, 2014, France has replaced them by operation Barkhane which is a strong and wider counterterrorism force over the whole Sahel. The purpose of Operation Barkhane is to «regionalize» the counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, as well as bolster «cross-border and region-wide securitization efforts.»

Moreover, with the support of France, five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger formed an institutional framework for coordination of regional cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa known as the `G5 Sahel.' A joint force of G5 Sahel with its headquarters in Mopti (Mali) was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in April 2017 and was strengthened by the adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2359 in June and became effective as of July 2017. Among others, the joint force is mandated to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking, in order to create a secure environment by eradicating the actions of the terrorist armed groups and other organized criminal groups, with a view to restoring security and peace in accordance with international law.³⁴

As raised in previous sections, in spite of the Peace Agreement along with international community multiple initiatives to assist actors, the Peace implementation is meeting setbacks which are manifested by increasing clashes within and between coalitions, inter-community tensions, terrorist attacks and other criminal acts.

The role of regional and sub-regional organizations cannot be overstated in conflict resolution, especially in their sphere of influence. The African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have played prominent roles in places like Burundi, Darfur, Chad, Somalia, and Liberia. The concern of this chapter is to review the intervention by these institutions in the current Mali crisis. It will also highlight the challenges faced during the intervention, followed by some recommendations for the way forward.

The intervention by the two organizations will be discussed by first considering diplomatic and political efforts, and then move to the military endeavors (peace support operation), although there are some overlaps with regard to the chronology of events.

Diplomatic and political efforts in the Malian crisis began in early 2012 and even before, through the various summits of ECOWAS and meetings of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU.

According to a senior official of ECOWAS in Bamako quoted by Djiré et al (2017), «In December 2011, everything was on high alert in Mali.» Consequently, several warnings were issued to the Malian authorities without actually giving rise to any suitable action on their part. For instance on 17 December 2011, a warning mission was in Bamako to meet the authorities, civil society and political parties. Unfortunately this was not received favorably by the Head of State at that time. Besides, it does not fall within ECOWAS's remit to force a Head of State to take measures ( Djiré et al 2017).

Similarly, in anticipation of potential regional ramifications of the Libyan crisis, the AU Commission (AUC) and the UN Secretariat jointly undertook a multidisciplinary fact-finding mission in the Sahel region from December 7 to 23.

Moreover, the day after the eruption of rebellion in northern Mali, the AU Commission condemned the rebellion in the strongest terms and pledged to address the situation within the framework of the ongoing AU-UN efforts to deal with the crisis in the Sahel region (Dersso 2013, 64). Subsequently, on 29 January 2012 the AU Commission convened a ministerial-level consultation with the countries of the region and other stakeholders on the recommendations of the joint AU-UN assessment report on the situation in the Sahel.

On 20 March 2012, at its meeting held in Bamako, the AU PSC issued a communiqué in which it emphasized the gravity of the threat that the crisis in northern Mali presented to both Mali and the region

in general, expressed unwavering commitment to respect for the national unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali, and stressed the determination of the AU and its member states to guard against their violation (AU, 2012a). To resolve the crisis, the PSC demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and urged the various rebel groups to commit themselves, without delay, to the search for a peaceful solution within the strict framework of AU principles, particularly respect for and preservation of the national unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mali. To this end, the Council stipulated the establishment of a mediation process spearheaded by the countries immediately neighboring Mali, namely Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, and especially Algeria, as well as ECOWAS (AU, 2012a).

When the military coup was announced on 22 March 2012, the foreign ministers and other officials of some members of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU were still in Bamako, two days after the ministerial level meeting. Having concluded that the coup was in violation of some of their relevant instruments, ECOWAS and AU, along with other members of the international community, denounced it and urged the junta to `immediately relinquish power to the rightful Government so that the country could return to constitutional normality'. They also called for the MNLA to lay down its arms

Thus, to ensure a swift return to constitutional order, a number of measures were taken by the two institutions. For instance, on 30 March 2012, ECOWAS imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Mali, and ECOWAS member states bordering Mali, upon request, closed their borders, thereby blocking Mali's access to neighboring seaports. These measures were a devastating move given Mali's dependence on foreign trade with its neighbors.

AU also supported the measures of ECOWAS and in April the continental organization imposed sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans against the junta and others deemed to be involved in contributing to the «destabilization» of Mali' (CNN, 2013).

Thereafter, ECOWAS focused on political negotiations to remove the military junta. A mediation process began under the lead of Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré. On 6 April, with ECOWAS mediation, the junta leaders known as Comité National pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l'Etat (CNRDRE) signed a framework agreement agreeing to a timetable for the restoration of constitutional order in exchange for amnesty for the junta members and the lifting of sanctions.³⁵ In accordance with the Malian Constitution, a 10-point Agreement facilitated the transfer of power from the military junta to the Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Dioncounda Traoré. This transfer of power contributed to a greater coherence of the transitional process, even if the road proved bumpy at times, with a number of challenges to be overcome. For example, on 20 August 2012, the Malian

stakeholders established an inclusive national unity Government. This was a recommendation of the first meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on the crisis in Mali, co-chaired by the AU, ECOWAS and the UN, and the ECOWAS Summit held in Yamoussoukro, on 28 and 29 June 2012, all of which called for a more inclusive transitional framework.

This notwithstanding, the former military junta remained very active in the country's political life, albeit from behind curtains. Indeed, as Théroux-Bénoni (2013) noted, « despite the formal handover of power to civilian authorities, some elements of the junta continued to play a major role in the political scene, as shown by the conditions in which Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra was forced to resign in December 2012 »³⁶. But here again, the positions of the AU and ECOWAS, backed by other actors, prevented the potential spoilers from stalling the process, as they feared the sanctions threatened by the international community.

Building on the success of the Framework Agreement, Compaoré continued with efforts regarding negotiations with those armed groups in the north of Mali who were willing to engage in dialogue on the basis of the respect for the unity and territorial integrity of the country and the rejection of armed rebellion and terrorism. The ECOWAS Mediator held meetings with representatives of the MNLA and Ansare Dine in Ouagadougou, in June 2012, and dispatched his Foreign Minister to Gao and Kidal, in August 2012, to meet with representatives of Ansare Dine and MUJAO. The Burkinabe Foreign Minister, Djibril Bassolé, impressed upon his interlocutors the need to unequivocally disassociate themselves from terrorism and criminal acts. After these two groups had indicated their readiness to dialogue under the mediation of ECOWAS, the Mediator urged them to clearly articulate their demands for dialogue with the Malian authorities. Other meetings were held in early December 2012 and the parties agreed to suspend and resume talks in early January 2013. It is the January 2013 attacks on Konna by some armed groups, who were parties to this process, particularly Ansare Dine, which suspended these talks. The talks finally resumed only after military intervention.

As noted above in the discussion about the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion, the MNLA opposed the redeployment in Kidal of Malian state authority, including the army, following the French intervention. This situation necessitated the negotiations that led to the Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013. While Burkina Faso spearheaded the negotiation of this agreement, Nigeria, represented by its ambassadors in Bamako and Ouagadougou, served as associate mediator. Both Burkina Faso and Nigeria were designated in their respective roles by ECOWAS. The High Representative of the AU for Mali and the Sahel, former Burundian President Pierre Buyoya, and representatives of the UN and the

EU also played an active role in the mediation within what was called `the College of International Facilitators', while the AU and the UN had experts in the team that drafted the agreement. This agreement known as the `Preliminary Agreement to Presidential Elections and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali', allowed the holding of presidential and legislative elections throughout the country. Mr. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) emerged victorious in the runoff of the presidential poll held on 11 August 2013. The AU has also provided multiform support, including financial support, to the organization of the Presidential and Legislative elections in 2013 in Mali.³⁷

The Ouagadougou Agreement also permitted a timid and gradual redeployment of state authority in regions where it was absent because of the armed conflict in the north. It also called for the launch of inclusive peace talks sixty days after the formation of the new government following elections in order to address the root causes of the conflict. This brought about a lull in the conflict, as the armed movements awaited the launch of the inclusive talks.

However, with the delay in the launch of this process, a visit by the Malian Prime Minister to Kidal on 16 May 2014, to which the MNLA, still armed and present in the city, was opposed, triggered violent confrontations between rebel forces and the national army, resulting in great loses in the governmental camp, as well as among civilians. The opposition of the MNLA to this visit was clearly in contradiction to the Ouagadougou agreement. An attempted attack by government forces on 21 May 2014, aimed at regaining control of the situation, but ended in yet another rebel victory. However, this gave a renewed impetus to the peace process, leading to the Algiers process which started on 16 June 2014.

1.1.5- From Ouagadougou to Algiers: the Inter-Malian Inclusive Peace Talks, 2014-2015

The Algiers process of inter-Malian inclusive peace talks effectively started on 16 June 2014, in the Algerian capital. It was during a state visit of the Malian president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, in Algeria in early 2013 that he asked the Algerian authorities to spearhead the peace process. The efforts made by Algeria enabled the actual launching of this process with the support of a number of regional and international organizations including the AU. Algeria served as lead mediator, while five countries of the region (i.e. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria). Within the framework of the Inclusive Talks, the AU was one of five regional and international organizations that, around Algeria, constituted the college of Mediators / Facilitators. It provided, in this context, technical support, through advice, to the Government and the armed movements to encourage compromise and promote the spirit of dialogue and cooperation between the parties.

This inclusive approach helped to assuage concerns of some about what they called `relocation' of the process from Burkina Faso, and thus ECOWAS mediation, to Algeria. It also reassured some parties that wanted a strong international involvement in the process. After several weeks of preliminary works,

particularly with armed movements, the Algerian authorities assembled in Algiers from 7 to 14 July 2014, experts representing the afore-mentioned regional and international organizations and the countries of the region to prepare the inclusive talks through a `Draft Roadmap of Negotiations within the framework of the Algiers Process', which was signed by all the parties on 24 July 2014.

This Roadmap spelled out the basic principles and references of the Talks. It also determined the different issues to be discussed to resolve the Malian conflict. It did this by indicating the format of the Talks, the composition of the Mediation team led by Algeria, but which included the representatives of the abovementioned five regional and international organizations and the four countries of the region. It also identified the parties to the Talks and laid down a calendar for the Talks that provided for a process lasting about 100 days, divided into different phases marked by periods of suspension or consultation on the ground in Mali. Indeed, after a pause in the process from 26 July, the phase of the actual talks was launched on 1st September 2014, starting with week-long exchanges with civil society organizations identified by all the parties.

After five rounds of talks, the last one being held, still in Algiers, from 17 to 26 February 2015, the Mediation presented to the Parties the text of the «Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process». On 1^st March, the Malian government, and some armed groups referred to as the movements of the Platform and the Mediators initialed this document. Other groups assembled in what is called the Coordination of the movements of Azawad (CMA), including the MNLA, abstained from initialing the text, arguing that they needed more time to explain the agreement to their bases. It was only on 14 May 2015, after many efforts by the Mediation team that they initialed it. Still, others signed the agreement in the Malian capital, Bamako, on 15 May, in a grandiose ceremony attended by several African heads of states and high-level delegations from the AU and ECOWAS commissions. It took more efforts by the Mediation team to convince the movements of the CMA to finally sign the agreement on 20 June 2015, thereby completing the signing process of the Agreement and allowing the start of its «consensual» implementation.

First, ECOWAS took steps towards the deployment of a stabilization force in Mali (MICEMA) from early 2012. With an active involvement of the AU, UN and other partners, a number of planning meetings were convened for this. For example, the regional organization dispatched technical assessment missions to Mali and convened a number of planning meetings. In September 2012, the Malian authorities addressed formal requests to ECOWAS and the UN for military assistance to end the rebellion and dismantle the terrorist and criminal networks operating in the north.

This force, MICEMA, was to be composed of ECOWAS member states and be deployed within the framework of the West African component of the African Standby Force (ASF). However, this initiative

was met with resistance by the Junta and some neighboring countries not part of ECOWAS such as Algeria. The AU was able to overcome the differences with the Malian authorities by allowing the development of a harmonized concept of operations, which gave the Malian army the lead role in the envisaged military operation. Then the AU sought to overcome Algeria's reluctance by making it a continental initiative, transforming MICEMA into the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Such decisions were the results of a series of AU and ECOWAS deliberations including the communiqué of the 339^th and 341^st meetings of the PSC, held in Addis Ababa respectively on 24 October 2012 and 13 November 2012, the final communiqué of the Extraordinary Session of the authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Abuja on 11 November 2012, and the UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012.

AFISMA was mandated, among others, to support Mali in recovering its territories under the control of armed groups, and maintain security and consolidate State authority throughout the country. It was also tasked to support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees as well as to protect the civilian population. More specifically, the Mission was mandated, amongst others, to:

- Contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defense and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international multilateral and bilateral partners involved in the process;

- Support the Malian authorities in restoring the country's territorial integrity, securing and consolidating the areas in the north of its territory liberated from armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate measures to reduce the impact of military actions upon the civilian population.

- Support transition to stabilization activities by supporting the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidating State authority through appropriate capacities;

- Support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population;

- Support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, as requested, within its capabilities and in close coordination with humanitarian actors; and

- Protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and movement of its personnel. (2086 (2012): SC/10870 20 December 2012)

Mindful of a well-integrated African mission based on the principle of complementarity between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), it was decided that AU's High Representative for Mali and the Sahel be appointed as Head of AFISMA, while ECOWAS' Special Representative in Mali became his deputy. The civilian personnel of the Mission was deployed from both the AU and ECOWAS Commissions.

AFISMA was deployed from mid-January 2013 and continued serving until it was transformed into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on July 1, 2013, following the UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) of 25 April 2013. At the peak of its

deployment, AFISMA was composed of 53 civilian officers seconded from the AU and ECOWAS commissions, with a dozen locally recruited staff members, 367 individual and formed police personnel, and 6438 military personnel. Thus, at the time it was taken over by the UN, on 30 June 2013, AFISMA's military strength stood at 6 079 personnel.³⁸ MINUSMA was deployed with an authorized troop ceiling of 11 200 military and 1 440 police personnel, including formed units. It basically absorbed the military and police personnel of AFISMA before integrating new elements.

By the time AFISMA was transformed to MINUSMA, it was successful in many domains. With the French Serval, it destroyed the military capabilities and blocked the main supply routes of the AQIM and MUJAWO, depleted the armed elements of Ansare Dine, liberated many areas that were under control of Islamists. It also helped to stabilize and secure the liberated areas and state structures. AFISMA actively participated in creating an environment conducive to the organization of democratic elections.

In brief, AFISMA, a continental peace enforcement force contributed to create the conditions favorable for the deployment of MINUSMA, a UN peacekeeping force.

After the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA, AU created the African Union Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL) in order to maintain a presence of the AU and to support Mali and the Sahel countries in their stabilization and development efforts. MISAHEL manages the African Union (AU) Strategy for the Sahel region and aims to support Mali in the crisis recovery process and help the countries of the Sahel face security, governance and development challenges. The MISAHEL mandate comprises three (03) main components:

- the political component aimed at supporting the consolidation of peace gains; the promotion of the rule of law and contribution to the strengthening of democratic institutions in the Sahel region, including human rights protection, capacity building of national human rights institutions, the judicial system and civil society organizations. This component also concerns humanitarian matters, especially in the North of Mali.

- the second component of MISAHEL is devoted to security in Sahel. It is aimed at coordinating the efforts of the AU linked to security challenges, in particular conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, as well as different types of trafficking.

- the third and last component is related to development problems in the Sahel, and deals with matters concerning the environment, such as the deterioration of the environment, as well as under-development in general (Djiré et al, 2017).

Within the framework of capacity building of the Malian Defense and Security Forces, the AU High Representative handed over on 14 July 2014, to the Malian authorities the keys of twenty (20) vehicles offered by the AU. Of a market value of one million U.S. Dollars, the donation consists of thirteen (13) pick-ups, four (4) ambulances and three (3) trucks.³⁹

The AU also officially began in July 2014 what was the first humanitarian activity of MISAHEL in Mali entitled "Hampers from the Heart," launched with a symbolic budget of 40 000 USD. The initiative aimed at providing food and nutrition assistance to poor families, especially those most affected by the crisis that Mali has been going through since 2012, including the IDPs. The first hampers were distributed in Kidal in northern Mali, thanks to a Convention signed with the Malian Red Cross.⁴⁰ Moreover, the MISAHEL has been charged with the responsibility to prepare the mapping and harmonization of the multiple peacebuilding strategies/initiatives for the Sahel for an adequate coordination of international efforts in this domain.

AU's efforts towards peace and security have not been all smooth outing. The organization has faced a number of challenges in the pursuit of the continental agenda (Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017). Similarly, the intervention in the Mali crisis is not an exception. Many challenges were faced in the course f the intervention including the limitations of the APSA, the lack or insufficiency of finance and logistics, the operational challenges of AFISMA in the field, to which is added the lack of fair cooperation from UN and UN funders

First, the responses of ECOWAS and the AU demonstrated limitations of the. While ECOWAS was initially quick to respond to Mali's crisis, it was limited in what it could do, due to its membership (which did not include the key state of Algeria, and to a lesser extent Mauritania) and its resources (lacking the capacities and funding to mount an intervention without external means of support).

Next, when AU came in and decided to `continentalize' the intervention, it nonetheless had to balance competing priorities, including among the neighboring ECOWAS states, Algeria, and Chad. The question of which of the neighboring states should provide leadership to the peace process was a complex and sometimes fractious issue, as those neighbors had differing views on which Malian insurgent groups should be included in the peace process, and which excluded under the label «terrorist».⁴¹

Another issue is that though African Union's efforts to reframe the multilateral context for the African intervention from sub-regional to continental demonstrated how the AU could complement and collaborate with a REC in a conflict management initiative, AU-ECOWAS relations also suffered from lack of coordination and occasional tensions due to rivalry and competition on leadership which delayed arriving at a consensus.

In fact, one of the unique features of the peace and security landscape of Africa is that both the AU and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (regional mechanisms) are simultaneously mandated to maintain peace and security. So there rises the problem of who should take the lead when conflicts break out on the continent. In the Mali crisis, ECOWAS and the AU were in competition to take the lead in peacemaking. The problem comes from the fact that the RECs are independent entities, governed by their own charters and not formally subordinate to the AU (Nathan 2016). The 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation between the AU and RECs in the area of Peace and Security, which should have clarified the relationship between the RECs and the AU, suffers from two limitations pointed out by Nathan (2016): the agreement is between the AU Commission and the secretariats of the RECs rather than between the member state forums of these organizations, and it emphasizes cooperation between the AU and the RECs but does not offer sufficiently clear guidance on the nature of their relationship.

This raises substantive issues of coordination, synergy and policy coherence vis-à-vis the role of the AU. In the case of Mali for example, ECOWAS initially approached the UN Security Council directly and not through the AU. AU involvement came about in part because of UN concerns, alongside the demands of non-ECOWAS neighbors for a role. Another instance is that even though it was decided to broaden the mission at a continental level, there have been tensions between ECOWAS and AU regarding the consensus over the framework of the mission. A draft `Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali' was only agreed on by the AU and ECOWAS on 24 October, 2012. More disagreements between the AU and ECOWAS were witnessed when AFISMA was deployed in Mali in January 2013 with a mandate to retake the north from the Islamists. Whilst the mission start-up was a joint effort by the AU and ECOWAS, subsequent developments did not follow the same pattern. At the political level, the leadership role the AU assumed was not wholeheartedly accepted by ECOWAS, as an air of rivalry continued to affect their positions and the negotiation over operationalizing the force, including most notably the composition of the mission leadership (Dersso, 2014). The head of the mission represented the AU and the deputy represented ECOWAS, which led to lack of clarity about AFISMA's chain of command. Despite the fact that the special representative of the ECOWAS Chair was appointed as deputy to former President Buyoya, he never assumed this position and instead signed his contract with the AU (ibid.). ECOWAS also operated on the basis of its own preferred division of labor by controlling and heading the force headquarters, leaving the AU to take care of establishing and running the mission headquarters (ibid.).

The rivalry and mistrust between the two organizations was also reflected in the lack of consensus on the division of assets and liabilities accrued while managing AFISMA (ibid.). Much of the tension and rivalry was over the management of resources that had been received to support peacekeeping operations. For example, ECOWAS received 50 million euros from direct negotiation with the EU, which it used for setting up and operating the force headquarters of the mission, while the AU relied on the AU trust fund for AFISMA to which AU member states, among others, had pledged and made contributions.

The issue of the inexistence of an African Standby Force is also worth mentioning. The ASF, established in 2002, through Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, is meant to comprise a 25,000-man contingency force, organized in 5,000-men contingents roughly aligned to each of Africa's five regions - north, south, central, east, and west (Cilliers, 2013). It also describes the capabilities of the ASF as «multi-dimensional, including military, police and civilian on standby in their countries of origin...».⁴² While the ASF is supposed to be able to function in a variety of ways from observation to humanitarian assistance, it was intended to facilitate the rapid deployment of troops to conflict areas on the continent, avoiding the delays often experienced when waiting for countries to volunteer troops and deploy them. But the AU and its RECs have spent years trying since 2002 to get the ASF up and running. Yet it exists more as a concept than a fully operational facility. Had it been operational during the crisis in Mali, it would have been deployed there.

Another weak point is that the AU's AFISMA plan also ran into similar challenges of capacity and funding that ECOWAS' MICEMA had encountered as it was relying on the UN to provide financial and logistical support to sustain their planned deployments.⁴³ When it was finally deployed, AFISMA's total mission cost was $455.53 million USD. African countries contributed only 23% of the total cost with the US ($104 million), Japan ($120 million), EU ($75 million), France ($63 million), and Germany ($20 million) providing most of the rest. A part from this, the organization budget is financed by external actors for more than 75%. With this, how can «African solutions to African problems» be possible when Africans are not ready to finance their own organization and rely on external funders who have their own agenda? For example Because AFISMA received support from the UN, it also had to go through the often-bureaucratic process of UN mandate authorization, which, according to an ECOWAS official, partly explains the slow deployment of the mission (Avezov, 2015).

Due to its rather severe limitations, the AFISMA mission was received by the UN only lukewarmly, as reflected in Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's reports to the UN Security Council. He regarded AFISMA as an instrument of «last resort».⁴⁴ He continually warned that ill-conceived intervention by AFISMA could worsen the situation on the ground, and he noted that the deployment of such a force could result in human right abuses (The Namibian, 2012). Then, instead of providing AFISMA with logistics and funding, the UN was more concerned with human rights observance. While the UN Secretary-General was hesitant to provide the logistical support package that AFISMA was requesting, the provision of such support would have been in the interest of not just the West Africans but of the entire international community, including particularly powerful western states like France and the US (UNSC, 2013:4).

Furthermore, it can be realized that the same resources used by France, if made available to the African Union, could have been more effectively and efficiently utilized as it was mainly the lack of financial support that delayed the deployment of the AU forces. Perhaps there would not have been any need for the transformation if the funds were made available to AFISMA.

This is by no means a reproach to those who fund the UN mission for lack of fair cooperation, but it is an eye opener also to African countries that could have contributed more to a peacekeeping mission in another African country.

Though it was finally deployed with the support of the UN and other donators, AFISMA encountered a number of challenges, pertaining mainly to the lack of financial resources and inadequate and insufficient logistical support. Strategically, it encountered problems of coordination with the multiple actors involved in the resolution of the Malian crisis and as mentioned earlier there were also some internal challenges in the coordination on the ground between the AU and ECOWAS.

With regard to its core mandate of supporting «the Malian authorities in restoring the country's territorial integrity, securing and consolidating the areas in the north of its territory liberated from armed groups», the wide range of its «Area of Operations» was a practical challenge. This is because the area (northern Mali) covers more than 600 000 sq km, representing about two-thirds of the 1 240 172 sq km that is the landmass of Mali. This region is sparsely populated, and the population centers are linked by roads that are mainly in poor conditions. Deprived of any airlift capability, moving the military, police and civilian personnel of the mission between various duty stations was a daunting challenge. This was even more challenging to visits of the Mission's top leadership based in Bamako to the field, located more than 1, 200 km away, forcing them to rely on the French for all their travels to the field in the north.

Related to the challenge of logistics, AFISMA was set up with the understanding that contingents would be self-sustained for the first 90 days. However, owing to some problems, the mission could not take over the sustainment of troops within this timeframe, forcing it to rely on the support of some partners like the US Government, who assisted with supplying troops with petroleum products and food ration. While supplying these products to units located near Bamako was easy, the lack of airlift capabilities rendered the regular supply to far-away locations such as Gao and Tessalit very difficult (Souaré, 2016). Finally, the lack of funding affected all other aspects of the Mission's operations from its political mandate to the provision of humanitarian support. For example, given the context of the conflict, there was a strong need for the humanitarian unit of the Mission to constantly be in the field, but this was not possible given the lack of logistics and finances. Likewise, the deployment of human rights observers faced some challenges; not least of which was the lack of appropriate security and other related gear and unavailability of airlift facilities to take them to their respective locations of deployment.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the Mission performed generally well. For example, there was no single report about human rights violations on the part of any member of the personnel, military, police or civilian. Also, the troops contributed significantly to the security of their zones of deployment, at times playing mediation role between antagonistic communities. All this suggests that with adequate funding and logistical support, AFISMA could have done far better.

The crisis in Mali gave the AU another chance to translate its slogan «African solutions to African problems» into action. But the crisis rather demonstrated once more the inadequacy of the AU and its REC ECOWAS structural and normative frameworks to deal with crises of this kind and it is also emblematic of the long road that lies ahead before the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) can be fully operationalized. This weakness, recalls what was once confessed by Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security when he mentioned that the crisis `exposed a dangerous vacuum in the arsenal of the AU instruments that needs to be urgently filled by putting in place appropriate response mechanisms that will enable the continental body to timely respond to such phenomena with the required robustness and effectiveness' (Dersso 2012).

First, it is a matter of urgency that the African Standby Force be operationalized, including its rapid deployment capability, to provide the AU and the Regional Mechanisms with instruments adapted to the type of situation experienced by Mali and other countries before. It is important to recall that by establishing the ASF, the AU sought to improve the integration of the African defense forces and reduce the overall costs that individual African countries have to bear on many African peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the operationalization of the ASF has been lagging behind schedule. Its

establishment was first scheduled for between 2005 and 2008 but this was postponed to 2010 because of serious capability gaps identified during exercise AMANI AFRICA 2010. It was after said that the ASF would become fully operational in December 2015, after exercise AMANI AFRICA II (AU 2013a), but the date also could not be respected and the force is still to be built.

The African Union member States and the AU commission are mindful of this situation, this is why an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was mooted as a stop-gap before the final establishment of the ASF (Apuuli 2013). The AFISMA deployed in Mali was ACIRC-type. Announcing the establishment of ACIRC, the AU Chair observed that the Mali crisis highlighted the need to `accelerate the establishment of the ASF' (AU 2013b). It is known that the ACIRC is not an effective and lasting solution as the key problem remains the financial support.

As introduced above, the major challenge facing the African Union is the lack of funds. The financing challenges the AU is faced with has important unintended consequences. High levels of donor dependency have weakened ownership in this critical area of the AU's mandate and led to strategic drift, as the AU Commission increasingly focused on external donors notably the EU through its African Peace Facility (APF). In the case of AFISMA for example, only 23% of funding came from African countries, with international donors providing the rest. This makes clear that the AU's Peace Fund is under-resourced and does not allow the AU and the regional mechanisms to finance and have full ownership of their operations. That is why when the UN Security Council first rejected the requested support package, the deployment of AFISMA became hypothetical.

There is therefore a general acknowledgement that the current financing arrangements for peace support operations are neither reliable nor predictable. With regard to this, African actors must find viable sources of funding, including through assessed contributions, as provided for by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol.

To take up this challenge, some initiatives are being taken. In June 2015, the AU Assembly adopted a decision⁴⁵ on assessed contribution of member states, which targets funding the AU at 100% of the operations budget; 75% of the program budget; and 25% of the peace support operations budget to be phased over five years from 2016. The new formula showed commitment by the AU to finance 25% of AU-led peace operations out of its own budget. The AU also revived the Peace Fund as the main mechanism for the management and oversight of the financial aspects of AU peace support operations. At the 27^th AU Summit in Kigali, the AU Assembly decided to «institute and implement a 0.2% import levy on all eligible imported goods into the continent to finance the African Union Operational Program and Peace Support Operations Budgets starting from the year 2017.»⁴⁶ The AU Assembly also decided

⁴⁵ African Union Assembly, Decision on the Scale of Assessments and Financing of the African Union Assembly/AU/Dec.578(XXV), Twenty-fifth Ordinary Session, 14-15 June 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

⁴⁶ African Union Assembly, Decision on the Outcome of the Retreat of the Assembly of the African Union Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII), Twenty-seventh Ordinary Session, 17- 18 July 2016, Kigali, Rwanda.

that the Peace Fund is to be endowed with $325 million in 2017, rising to a total of $400 million by 2020 from the 0.2% import levy (AU, 2015). Even if the speed of the implementation is slow, there are encouraging signs. For example, 2018 AU summit in Nouakchott approved the 2019 budget for the Union at a total of $681.5 million, of which Member states will contribute 46% while the remaining balance of 54% is expected to be financed by development Partners, signaling a great shift from overreliance on external funding from about 70% in previous years.⁴⁷ About this, Ambassador Kwesi stated, «there is growing confidence in our ability to finance our agenda. The momentum in the implementation of the 0.2% levy decision is very positive and in fact, looking at the contributions to the peace fund using this mechanism, it is the highest we have had. With this trend, the percentage of member states contribution is expected to rise to a level where Africa takes full ownership of its development agenda. We are very optimistic.»⁴⁸

Moreover, the management of the crisis also brought to the fore the limited coordination, based 'on circumstances and comparative advantages, between the continental body and regional structures. There is a need for a shared understanding of the principles underlying the APSA, their effective implementation, and sustained dialogue between the AU and its RECs/RMs. In this framework of resolving this issue, the Commission published the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, a strategic document, which builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmaps (2011-2013). The Roadmap manifests the continued determination to ensure further progress, and paves the way for future collaboration between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to effectively address security issues and contribute to a more peaceful Africa. Let's hope that this will improve the relations for a better coordination and division of labor.

Finally, considering the difficulties encountered in deployment of AFISMA and its transformation into MINUSMA, strengthened partnership between the AU and UN is a crucial step in improving future peace operations in Africa. As the crisis in Mali continues to unfold, the AU and the UN have an opportunity and a responsibility to assess the major impediments to lasting peace in the country and continue to revise the mandate to be nimble enough to respond. Recognizing that the revision and eventual syncing of AU and UN doctrine is a process that takes a significant amount of time and resources, the AU and UN should focus on a short-term re-configuration of strategy as MINUSMA is at a critical juncture between implementing the peace agreement and disrupting the potential spread of violence farther south.

As illustrated in our argumentation, Mali and the international community including AU and RECs are struggling to build peace and achieve security after the another Tuareg armed rebellion, which broke out in Northern Mali in January 2012, turned into a violent extremist insurgency as a number of violent extremist groups joined in and took over several cities and territory in northern Mali. Though military the intervention (SERVAL, AFISMA, MINUSMA) and the 2015 peace agreement could be viewed as significant steps towards the stabilization and the resolution of the conflict, there are still peace setbacks and other security challenges out of control.

It should be recalled that since 1963, each Tuareg rebellion was followed by a peace agreement and a short-term security solutions which brought peace for only a short period. This means that to bring about a lasting sociopolitical reconstruction of the nation and achieve a sustainable peace that will entail the harmonious co-existence of different ethnic, religious and political groups, there is a need to implement alternative solutions beyond the one mentioned above. I have therefore come up with the following suggestions for a way forward:

First, as stated earlier, Mali is one of the world's poorest countries and suffers from a lack of economic development on many levels, but this is especially present in northern Mali. The combined impact of weak decentralization, corruption, and a lack of transparency regarding budget allocation and the distribution of aid led to a widely-held belief that the country's citizens (mainly in the north) are not receiving their fair share from the government. The northern regions of Mali need therefore an economic development in order to feel like the government truly responses to their needs. Neelakantan (2013) argues that «Unless this changes, real peace will not be found, no matter how many troops are sent to quell the violence in Mali». Generally speaking, rebuilding statehood on the basis of good governance and inclusive political framework will guarantee sustainable peace and security in Mali. To achieve this, government officials and state institutions will have to be held accountable by their own people as well as by aid donors. Without this, governance will always be weak, development assistance diverted, and genuine efforts to address the causes of human security undermined.

Another point is that there are still a lot of inter/intra community tensions today in Mali and the development of democratic governance systems requires the active participation of the population. So, for a lasting peace, there is a need of repairing the social fabric of Malian society by means of an effective, inclusive reconciliation process through an active engagement of civil society in order to promote intra/inter-community dialogue to reframe perceptions of the conflict, mobilize constituencies for peace, contribute to reaching sustainable peace agreements, and help address the structural causes and consequences of violent conflict. According to Oxfam «any such process should start at community level and be based on traditional conflict resolution methods, as well as more formal legal

proceedings»⁴⁹. For Dr Elisabeth Sköns from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute⁵⁰ the natural role of civil society in such a process has been demonstrated by experiences in other countries but is also the logical consequence of any democratically based perspective.

Moreover, there are many criminal networks and extremist religious activists who have taken advantage of the security forces failure to take control of the north. Today, the government of Mali and the international partners must engage deeply in the Mali security sector reform. The aim should be to enhance the general ability of the sector to support efforts to restore a society where all individuals are treated equally and whose stability is based on broadly accepted and approved regulatory mechanisms. Once, the operational abilities of the security forces are strengthened by improving the legal framework, equipment, infrastructure and staffing levels, the national security forces in cooperation with other neighboring countries forces, will be able to deal efficiently with the security challenges in Mali and also in the Sahel.

The conflict in Mali is a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term fundamental grievances by diverse actors and groups. These grievances are related to the issues of political governance, particularly the issue of management of the ethnic diversity in the Malian society, economic governance, including corruption which led to a weak state.

Three distinct but interrelated types of conflicts have coalesced to produce the current crisis in Mali which unfolded in 2012. Firstly, it was caused by a secessionist rebellion by Tuareg ethnic groups who heavily armed attacked the Malian armed forces. Secondly, there is a political and constitutional crisis occasioned by the military overthrow of the democratically elected government by the army. Thirdly, the conflict is also an attempt by Islamist jihadists to militarily take over Mali and establish a terrorist state based on sharia law.

The crisis in Mali led to a range of external and regional political and diplomatic, and military interventions to resolve the conflict by foreign governments, and regional and international intergovernmental organizations among which the AU and its REC ECOWAS.

If significant efforts have been made by the two organizations to address the conflict through the implementation of the APSA, the least that can be said is that the response proved woefully inadequate. This is illustrated by the difficulties encountered to deploy the AFISMA in time before the crisis escalates, obliging the Malian government to call France for help, hence the deployment of Serval; and when AFISMA was deployed it encountered many financial and logistic, institutional issues in the field, hence its transformation to MINUSMA which took over since July 1, 2013.

Two important lessons for effective regional interventions in conflict resolution efforts in Africa should be drawn from the Malian experience. These are: (i) the need for more clarity in the implementation of the APSA and division of labor between the AU and RECs; and (ii) the importance of AU financial autonomy for support operations.

On the first point, even if the 2002 Protocol establishing the PSC defined various continental (AU) and regional (REC) Actors on conflict situations in Africa and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs brought further clarification to this issue, the Malian crisis showed that lots need to be done again for a fair and cohesive intervention in future conflict. AFISMA was perhaps one of the first experiences for a fully joint AU/REC peacekeeping operation.

The other point is related to the funding of AU peace support operations. One could argue that the disproportionate dependency of the AU and ECOWAS on external partners for the funding of AFISMA, the serious logistical challenges this mission encountered on the ground when such support lacked and its eventual transformation into a UN peacekeeping mission indicate that this slogan of finding African solutions to African problems proved wanting in the deployment of AFISMA. To make the slogan

realistic, African countries must work towards economic independence for their countries and their regional organizations, such as the AU and ECOWAS.

At the UN level, it is more necessary than ever to overcome the reluctance that characterizes its relationship with regional arrangements, in order to build a partnership adapted to the complex challenges to peace and security in Africa.

Abdalla, M. (2009) Understanding Natural Resource Conflict Dynamics: The Case of the Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

African Union (2002) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Art: 3.

Alao, C. A. (2000). Between Economic Fragility and Political Fluidity: Natural Resource Conflicts in Sub-Saharn Africa. Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter, .

Aning, E.K. (2015), Assessing the Responses of the Economic Community of West African States to the Recurring and Emerging Security Threats in West Africa

Aning, K., & Edu-Afful, F. (2016). African Agency in R2P: Interventions by African Union and ECOWAS in Mali, Cote D'ivoire, and Libya. International Studies Review 18 (2016) 1, pp. 120-133;.

Aning, E.K. and Bah, A.S. (2009), «ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats», Center on International Cooperation, New York.

Arieff, A (2013) Crisis in Mali. Current Politics and Economics of Africa 6: 25.

Bakary S (2012) The Crisis in Mali Origins, Developments and the Impact on the Sub-Region KAS International Reports.

BOAS, M. (2013). Mali 2013: A Year of Elections and Further Challenges. E-International relations. Boukhars, A. (2013). The Mali conflict: avoiding past mistakes.

Buyoya, P. (2013) African Union Perspectives on Mali and the Sahel Africa. Meeting Summary Chatham House London.

Cocodia, J. (2015). The African Union Operation in Mali and Questions on the Necessity of a Standby Force.

Col. Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare, P. (2015). The African Union and the Conflict in Mali: Extra-Regional Influence and the Limitations of a. National Open University of Nigeria.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) «Greed and Grievance in Civil War», Oxford Economic Papers, (56): 563-595

Collier, P. et al. (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, D.C., & New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Dires, B. (2012) The African Union Peace and Securirty Council: Challenges and Prospects. Institute of Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa University.

Emerson, S. A. ((2011). Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion. Small Wars & Insurgencies.

Francis, D. J. (2013). The regional impact of the armed. The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre .

Gain, M. A. (2018). Challenges to the African Union's Security Engagement in North Africa and the Sahel.

Hide, T. (2016), Are colonial-era borders drawn by Europeans holding Africa back?, American Economic Association

Hoeffler, A. (2014). Can international interventions secure the peace? International Area Studies Review.

Humphreys, M. & Ag Mohamed, H. (2005). Senegal and Mali. In P. Collier & N. Sambanis, eds.Understanding Civil War. Washington DC: The World Bank.

IMF (2013) Mali: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali 20132014. Country Report No 13: 111.

Konare, A.O. (2004) Security is the African Union's priority. African Geopolitics 13 Library of Congress Country Profile: Mali Federal Research Division.

Lake, D. A., & Rothchild, D. (1996). The orgins and management of ethnic conflicts.

Lecocq, B. & al. (2013). «One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: A multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali».

Mehari, T. (2013) African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA): Military ahead of Politics Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.

Neelakantan, M. (2013) Creating a Lasting Peace in Mali, Foreign Policy Journal.

Ndiho, P. (2010). African Union plays a significant role in conflict resolution. Washington D.C.

Nizeimana, J. B., & Nhema, A. G. (2015). The Malian Crisis: Multiple Actors with Diverse Interests and Values. Journal of Public Administration and Governance.

Poulton, R. & ag.Youssouf, I. (1998) A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Raineri, L. & Strazzari, F. (2015) State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali. African Security, volume 4

Shaw, S. (2013), Fallout in the Sahel: the geographic spread of conflict from Libya to Mali; Canadian Foreign Policy

Sidibé, K. (2012) Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms; Institute of Development Studies

Thurston, A., & Lebovich, A. (2013). Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis. The Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies Northwestern University.

Union, A. (2002). Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,.

United Nations (2004) Report of UN Secretary General on Ways to Combat Sub regional and Cross-border in West Africa. UN Doc. S/2004/200

Utas, M. (2013). The Malian crisis: causes, consequences, responses by Morten Bøås and Mats Utas.

Walther, O. J. & Christopoulos, D. (2014), Islamic Terrorism and the Malian Rebellion. Terrorism and Political Violence

WELZ, T., & WEISS, M. (2014). The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding?, International Affairs 90 4, pp. 889-905

Williams, P.D. & Boutellis, A. (2014) «Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship», African Affairs 113 pp. 254-278.

Wyss, M. (2014). Peacekeeping in Africa: The evolving security architecture, New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 171-189.

Yehudit, R. (2013). Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on the eve of the `Arab Spring' and in its aftermath: an anatomy of changed relations. The Journal of North African Studies .

Zounmenou, D. (2013). The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis. African Security Review.

Figure 1: Summary of some available key Timelines of the Mali Conflict from 2011 to October 2015

2011

August 9 - Amadou Toumani Touré launches his Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (French: Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement au Nord-Mali, PSPSDN)

August 26 - Ibrahim Ag Bahanga dies in a car crash

October 16 - Announcement of the formation of the MNLA out of the National Movement of Azawad

(MNA) and the National Alliance of Tuaregs of Mali (ANTM)

October 19 - AFP reports that three senior Tuareg officers - Colonel Assalath Ag Khabi, Lieutenant-

Colonel Mbarek Ag Akly, and Commandant Hassan Habré - deserted the Malian army to join the MNLA

Fall/Winter - Several attacks occur against military bases set up as part of the PSPSDN

December 12 - MUJWA releases a video statement announcing its creation

December 20 - Mauritanian news agency ANI reports the creation in northern Mali of Iyad Ag Ghali's Ansare Dine

2012

January 17 - The MNLA attacks Ménaka

January 30 - Military families begin protests in Kati

February 2 - Protesters surround the residence of President Touré

February 8 - The MNLA captures Tinzawaten

March 22 - Soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo take power in a coup

March 30 - The MNLA captures Kidal

March 31 - The MNLA captures Gao

April 1 - The MNLA captures Timbuktu

April 4 - Ansar al Din and AQIM fighters move into Timbuktu, displacing the MNLA from part of the city

April 5 - MUJWA fighters abduct seven Algerian diplomats from their consulate in Gao.

April 6 - The MNLA declares the independence of northern Mali as the «Azawad»

April 8 - Amadou Toumani Touré resigns as president

April 10 - Arab fighters announce the creation of an anti-MNLA, Arab self-defense militia, the FNLA

April 15 - AQIM commander Abou Zeid expels FNLA fighters from Timbuktu

April 17 - Cheick Modibo Diarra appointed interim prime minister

April 25 - Cheick Modibo Diarra announces 24-member cabinet

May 26 - Announcement of alliance between MNLA and Ansar al Din. Alliance broken two days later.

June 18 - Ansar al Din delegation headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla meets with President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou

June 27 - Islamist coalition captures Gao from the MNLA

June 30 - Ansar al Din fighters attack the mausoleum of Sidi Mahmud in Timbuktu

July 2 - Ansar al Din fighters attack the Sidi Yahya mosque in Timbuktu

July 10 - Ansar al Din fighters destroy two tombs at the Djingareyber mosque in Timbuktu

July 13 - Protests against Ansar al Din in Goundam

July 19 - Three European hostages kidnapped in October 2011 in southeastern Algeria released in Mali. Reports indicate that a ransom of approximately $18 million was paid, and three jihadist prisoners held in the region were released in exchange for the hostages

July 29 - In Aguelhok, Islamist officials carry out a sentence of stoning against an allegedly unmarried couple

August 5 - Protests against MUJWA in Gao

September 1 - MUJWA announces the execution of an Algerian diplomat, Tahar Touati

September 8 - AQIM leader in the Sahara Nabil Makhloufi (Nabil Abou Alqama) killed in a car accident in northern Mali

September 9 - In Diabaly, Malian soldiers shoot sixteen preachers from Jama'a al Tabligh

October 12 - UNSC adopts Resolution 2071, and «called on Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to provide, at once, military and security planners to [ECOWAS], the African Union (AU) and other partners to help frame a response to a request by Mali's transitional authorities for such a force, and to report back within 45 days.»

October 18 - Ansar al Din fighters destroy three mausolea in the Kabara neighborhood of Timbuktu

November 6 - Military experts present ECOWAS with a draft plan for the reconquest of Mali

November 11 - ECOWAS heads of state approve military intervention plan at a summit in Abuja, Nigeria

November 13 - AU approves military intervention plan

November 19 - MUJWA captures Menaka

November 28 - Ansar al Din captures Lere

December 11 - Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra resigns, and President Dioncounda Traoré appoints Diango Cissoko (alternative spelling Sissoko) as prime minister December 20 - The UNSC adopts resolution 2085 (text) authorizing the deployment of international forces to Mali

2013

January 10 - Ansar al Din fighters enter Konna

January 11 - Operation Serval begins with French airstrikes

January 14 - By this date, airstrikes have occurred in Konna, Lere, Douentza, Agharous Kayoune, and

Gao

January 16 - French ground operations begin

January 18 - Konna recaptured (some sources say Malian troops retook the town on January 12)

January 21 - Diabaly recaptured (some sources also list January 18 as the date of the recapture of

Diabaly)

January 21 - French and Malian forces enter Douentza

January 24 - Hombori captured; air raids on Ansongo

January 24 - Alghabass Ag Intalla announces the creation of the Islamic Movement of the Azawad (MIA), a breakaway faction from Ansar al Din, and its willingness to negotiate with Malian national authorities

January 26 - Gao captured

January 28 - Timbuktu airport captured

January 29 - Timbuktu reconquered

January 30 - Kidal captured

February 8 - Suicide bombing in Gao

February 10 - MUJWA fighters attack Gao

February 21 - Car bombing in Kidal

February 22-23 - Fighting between the MNLA and Arab Movement of the Azawad in In-Khalil, Kidal Region

February 26 - U.S. Department of State designates Iyad Ag Ghali as a Special Designated Global Terrorist

April 9 - France withdraws its first soldiers

April 21 - Fighting between the MNLA and the Arab Movement of the Azawad in Ber, Timbuktu Region

May 6 - Mohamed Ag Intalla presides over the creation of the High Council for the Azawad in Kidal

May 19 - The Islamic Movement of the Azawad joins the High Council for the Azawad, which renames itself the High Council for the Unity of the Azawad (HCUA). Intalla Ag Attaher becomes the HCUA's new president.

June 2 - In Ouagadougou, the MNLA and the HCUA sign an accord rejecting Malian army deployments in Kidal during the presidential elections, alleging Malian army abuses of northern Tuaregs and Arabs, and calling for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to provide security

July 15 - AQIM confirms it has killed hostage Philippe Verdon in Mali in retaliation for the French-led intervention

July 19 - Ethnic clashes in Kidal

July 28 - Mali holds first round of presidential elections

August 7 - Constitutional Court confirms results of the presidential elections' first round, certifying Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta's 39.79% of the vote and Soumaïla Cissé's 19.70%

August 11 - Mali holds second round of presidential elections

August 12 - Soumaîla Cissé concedes to Ibrahim Boubacar Keîta

2014

May 21 - Malian government army retreats from Kidal

June 9 - Creation of the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad

June 14 - Creation of the Plateform

July 16 - Malian government and armed groups begin inclusive peace talks in Algiers with the participation of AU and ECOWAS in the mediation team

August 14 - Creation of the Groupe d'auto-défense touareg Imghad et allies

2015

May 15 & June 20 - The «Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process» is signed in Bamako in two separate ceremonies

October- CMA and the Plateforme signed a peace pact at Anéfis.

Source : Atlas Jeune Afrique 2010', in Bossard, L., op. cit., OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club, 2015, 191

Source: CRS. Basemap created by Hannah Fischer using Esri Data 2012. Projection: Winkle II, November 29, 2012.

July 27^ - Goverrvnent creates Noticed Committee for the Coorchnation of the trnplementation of the Peace Aeree ment _by decree

Sept. 27"-0cl_ i i*' - Coardinatian I. Platform not° direct talcs wading ta the "Antis rood map

Oct. 14" - Truth. Justice and Reconcéalion Commission is oppoinled Oct. 28"-29 - DECO hosts international conference for the economic recovery and development of Mciii in Paris

Jon r8^- . rt.;low-Lip Ccr
·+m:itee hc.oS hiiesn-;ev.e Jan- 25'
· Coordination & Platform reach ogreerner1 on representation in Follow-Up Committee under auspices of AU high representative Feb. d" - Coorofnaticn L Platform ogee on progressrve shared management of Ride)

Mar. - Government creofes two new regions n Menoka & tovvderry Apr. 18" - Government hands over forty-Nola vehicles to me Operational Coordination Mechanism to launch lain patrols May 18 - Government seas decree on interiors authorities

May 20"` - Coordination â Platform suspend participation in Foiow-Up Committee

May 31`^. - Coordination 8. Plaitsr n sign memorandum of understanding June I - President appoints high representative for impiernantotian of agreemenT

June 19" - Government. Coorânation & Platform agree on moderates for estot siting inferen authorities and oesalcien i Opervfiacui Coordrna ton mechanism 1n five northern rag.on s

Oct. 14" - Government appoints members of interim authorities fa Goo. Oda L irnbektu regions but faces opposition from Coordination & PlaFTorrn Dec. - Coordination & Platform suspend participation in Follow-Up Committee unti Feb. ter

Jan. 5"' - 113 Coordination forces avive in Goo from Kidol to join frst joint potrpl

Feb, 1 U'
· Monitor^-rig Corrrrrllee holds high-level meeting. 0--mute--toil agreement on ruaw tyrnefrne for interim cuthcrrhes

Feb. 28"-tar. 3i^tl - Interim authorities ate installed in KCidctl. Gao JL Menke

Apr. 20" - esteem authorities ore instaled it Trri7uktu and Taouctenri May 1"- Holland Security Sector Reform Council is launched

Oct. 1d^{^} - Ansar Dine leader Pend Ag Ghal dancer--ices peace process and lhreafPns to intensity attacks against French farces and thee dies in Mali

Nov. ' - Al-Mpurobiloun cfaR6 terrorist aback on Rodrsson Mu hotel is Bamako

Jon.18" - Al-Matxdbltoun ck*ns attack on Operational COOrdwer fon Mechanism in Goo

JMIM. reiterates irsterrt to continue Fighting MOrian and ,nferrsotiond crewed farms

Jut^-se MINIjSMA mondote rs reneslot-"-: grvrng it o rnOte tOb lt oria oroo. ' .

mew_ 5" - two foe^-Soma MAA and CJA occupy Timbuktu checkpoints for live days

Apr. - France. AAd1f & FNeki s° Faso launat ioin operations °gcs l FIFA & Ansa d-titan in centra mort

Apr. 13" - AU aullxvi es 0.5 Sahel force June - NCw clashes break DUt i1 Nide! region