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Acknowledgment
I wish to express my most sincere gratitude and thanks to my
supervisor Mr. Gildas Le Voguer, for his constructive criticism and inspiring
comments and questions during the course of writing this thesis.
A heartfelt thank you goes to my teacher Mr. Florian
Tréguer, for taking time to evaluate and comment on my work.
My deepest thanks go to my brother
Abdillahi Mohamed Youssouf, Mrs. Fathiya, and my best friend Mohamed Ali Bileh,
for engaging in my thesis by always valuable and inspiring feedback. Thank you
for always backing me and believing in me.
I would also like to thank those who helped me during the
research process and assisted me with materials worth reading for my research.
These include Mrs. Mireille Chereul, who is part of the Central Library staff
at the University of Rennes 2. I am also thankful to the staff of the `PEB' of
the central library for their constant support. For all of my wonderful friends
old and new, thanks for always being there for me!
My profound thanks also go to Mahamed Dahir Afrax without
whose encouragement, suggestions and help it would have been difficult to write
this research project. My heartfelt gratitude goes also to Professor I. M.
Lewis whose encouragement and advice made my research possible. My sincere
thanks go also to the following that have assisted me in different ways Prof
Abdi Ismail Samatar of University of Minnesota, Abdullahi Abdille of the
International Crisis Group, Asha Abdiand Abdullahi Hassan of Human Rights
Watch.
Table of Content
I. The Horn of Africa: An
analysis of Its Geostrategic Significance
a) The importance of the Horn of Africa
b) Competing foreign powers in the geostrategic Horn of Africa
c) The Horn of Africa: A Playing Field of Foreign Powers
II. America's foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa
during the Cold War
a) The Horn of Africa in the shadow of the Cold War
b) U.S. /U.S.S.R. rivalry in East Africa
1.1 The U.S. Strategic Interest in Ethiopia during the Cold War
Era
1.2 The U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia during the Cold War
Era
1.3 The U.S. Strategic Interest Towards Kenya during the Cold War
Era
III. The Cold War and interstate relations
a) The impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations
b) Defining Inter-State Conflicts Patterns
1.1 Ogaden War
Conclusion
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AU African Union
ELF Eritrea Liberation Front
EPLF Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority for
Development
NFD Northern Frontier District
NSC National Security Council
CIA Community Intelligence Agency
OAU Organization of African Unity
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
TPLF Tigray People's Liberation Front
Introduction
The United States of America is defined today as one of the
most powerful countries in the world and its influence throughout the world
cannot be denied. In fact, the United States has known different political
environments when it comes to its foreign affairs since World War II and during
the Cold War to the present day. In addition, the term «foreign
policy» refers to a policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other
nations, designed to achieve national objectives.1(*)The foreign policy of the United States of America has
known different and complicated periods. It has started from 'isolationism',
`expansionism' in the nineteenth century to 'interventionism' and even possibly
`new imperialism' in the following centuries.
Another hallmark of American foreign policy, scholar Thomas M.
Magstadt holds, is the tension between power and principles.2(*) Foreign policy can be defined as
a set of ideas and strategies aimed at promoting the natural interests of
sovereign states in an environment of anarchy.3(*) Self-interests ought to be therefore understood as a
fundamental factor of a nation's foreign policy, and ought to be consistently
taken into account by policy makers. Foreign policy should also be based on by
a set of ideas and values. According to Magstadt, American foreign policy has
been characterized by a tension and struggle between the pursuit of power and
principles since the founding of the nation.4(*)This provides the main concept that the U.S. often sets
up the strategy to safeguard and put forward its foreign policy.
Previously, the United States of America did not pay attention
to Africa and used to associate Africa with negativity. Afterwards, very
briefly at the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. started to get interested in
Africa, especially the Horn of Africa. Africa is strategically located between
the United States of America and Asia, providing alternate air and sea routes
to the Far East and Middle East. The United States has established naval and
air facilities in Africa in order to ensure free and secure flow of Persian
Gulf and Southern African fuel and non-fuel minerals to the industrial
West.5(*) Additionally, the
end of colonialism left many African States politically unstable, which made
the region fit for great-power rivalry. The region drew the attention of
American for several reasons. The access to raw materials was perhaps the most
important: Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Namibia and South Africa were among the
largest suppliers of respectively cobalt, oil, manganese, uranium and platinum
for the USA.
Furthermore, the Horn of Africa is located in a strategic
place, so the U.S. was interested in intervening in this area during the Cold
War. The Horn of Africa, as defined by the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), stretches over an area of 5.2 million square kilometers
that comprises the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.6(*) The America involvement in those countries is to
enhance their economic and security. Basically, the United States' policy in
the Horn of African States provides more emphasis on its national rather than
for international laws and mutual benefit. This work research will explain the
interest that the USA has in this region in terms of militarization,
humanitarian aid, and drought aid. The goal is to show that the U.S. practices
interventionism in the Horn, especially through the interactions which link
both sides.
The most important purpose of this research is to describe and
explain the relationship between the U.S. and the HOA. The USA believes that
having a good relationship with the Horn of Africa is the key point to set up a
sustainable relation with the rest of the African states that the U.S. is
willing to establish a bilateral relation in the future. The current
relationship between the U.S. and the Horn of Africa is remarkable and
improving. Both sides have strong relationship. Unfortunately, The Horn of
African states do not benefit from this opportunity in the same way or they do
not have the same conception of how to deal with the U.S. foreign policy.
Furthermore, the U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa is
proof of the importance of the region not only for its potential resources but
also for all the superpowers such as the EU and China which have military bases
in order to protect their national objectives. The United States of America's
foreign policymakers have implemented strategies to establish strong and
lasting relations with each state in the region so that in return, the U.S.
will have the opportunity to keep its interest in the region. They contemplate
the best way to adopt a durable relation which is based on«win win»
cooperation. The United States gives priority to protecting the trade that
crosses the sea of ??Bab el Mandab to secure these goods composed of gas, oil
and petrol but also to fight against piracy that becomes an obstacle to the
international trade which crosses the Red Sea.
In addition, the United States has had the good fortune to be
able to maintain a successful wait-and-see policy in the Horn of Africa and the
country has a good relation with most of the Horn of Africa states. This essay
focuses on the foreign policy of the United States in respect to the Horn of
Africa in general and with each particular state during and after the Cold War.
It will argue that during and after the Cold War, the United States foreign
policy towards the Horn of Africa focused on providing development and
humanitarian assistance, settling conflicts, creating stability in the region
and resolving many kinds of conflicts and violence particularly on countering
international security threats i.e. terrorism. The United States has also been
encouraging good governance, rule of law, and respect of human rights, poverty
alleviation measures, etc ... As underlined in the foreign policy agenda of the
Department of State, which are "to build and sustain a more democratic, secure,
and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the
international community."7(*)
Notwithstanding, the strategic importance of the Horn Africa
has been dramatized in recent years by the area's proximity to the Middle East
oil fields and the Indian Ocean trade routes. The United States has a vital
interest in keeping open the strait of Bab el Mandeb, the port of Djibouti, and
the Red Sea for the free flow of international shipping, especially to North
America, Western Europe, and Israel. For these reasons, the Red Sea is today a
focus of East-West rivalry. Methodologically, this study employs qualitative
research methodology. Accordingly, the study uses primary and secondary source
of data; collected from books, published journal articles, published and
unpublished theses, governmental and non-governmental organization reports and
remarks, and other Internet sources. All the data gathered are qualitative; the
study employs qualitative data analysis techniques.
To answer to the key question posed by this study - what are
the implications for U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa during the Cold War?
- It is necessary to briefly consider the United States of America and the
region's relationship. In the first part of my work, I will put forward the
geostrategic importance of the Horn of Africa. Secondly I will discuss the U.S.
foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa during the Cold War. Finally, I will
describe the Cold War and interstate relations.
I. The Horn of Africa: An analysis of Its Geostrategic
Significance
a) The importance of the Horn of Africa
Historically, the region was a playing field for Ottoman
Turkey, Portugal and Egypt and during the colonial periods it was between
Britain, Italy and France. Additionally, during the Cold War between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union and now between Arab countries, Western, China and the
emerging powers notably India. The Horn of Africa, however, with the exception
of Ethiopia, was mainly colonized by the European powers at the end of the
nineteenth century and was divided between the French, the British, and the
Italians. Djibouti was designated French Somaliland in 1885, British Somaliland
included the region of the Gulf of Aden, and Italian Somaliland included
control of the region nearest the Indian Ocean, as well as the Red Sea colony
of Eritrea. Basically, Kenya was colonized by the British and after a long
struggle it gained its independence in 1963.
This essay puts forward the geostrategic location of the Horn
of Africa. In fact, it has potential resources so that the western superpowers
and the emerging countries are willing to construct a relation with the region.
The Horn of Africa is the single most geo-strategically important region in the
world. Its geostrategic significance is associated with the Red Sea, oil and
the «Nile factor.»The region is significant for maritime security,
international trade (exports and imports), anti-terrorism campaigns and
anti-piracy operations, access to the world's largest oil source in the Middle
Eastern Arab Gulf. Peter Woodward notices:
Furthermore, from the standpoint of great powers, for many
years the Horn has been as much as a strategic concern with regard of the Red
Sea shipping lanes, especially the potential southern pinch point of the Bab
al-Mandeb straits, as it has been a concern in relation to the rest of Africa.
In this regard the Horn has offered opportunities for base facilities not only
for the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, but also with potential use for the Gulf which
was off limits for the great powers bases during the Cold War it and effect
until the Gulf War of 1990-1991.8(*)
The region possesses a lot of opportunities because of its
location; those opportunities are the ones which push most foreign nations to
give particular attention to the region. Indeed, the notion of `geo-strategic'
interest may demonstrate the link between security, power and the geographical
area in the international world order. Geographically, the Horn of Africa,
almost equidistant from the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer, is an arid
region. The Horn of Africa (alternatively Northeast Africa, and sometimes the
Somali Peninsula) is a peninsula of East Africa that extends for hundreds of
kilometers into the Arabian Sea, and lies along the southern side of the Gulf
of Aden. It is the eastern most projection of the African continent.
Moreover, only a few miles from the Arabian Peninsula and thus
near seaways vital to the world economy, the Horn of Africa is a strategic
area. The Horn of Africa is both a geographical and political expression. In
general, the geographical meaning consists of rhino-horn shaped part of
Northeast Africa countries, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea.
Also, the Horn of Africa has close ties with the petro states of Arab
countries, especially with Egypt and Yemen. The Horn controls the Bab el Mandeb
Strait, which is one of the important global transportation routes which
dominates part of the Gulf of Aden, the gateway from the Mediterranean with
Suez to the Indian Ocean.
Indeed, the region benefits from its geostrategic location to
enhance its economy: the international trade that crosses the Red Sea which is
taxed by the states surrounded the Red Sea such as Djibouti. It is important to
notice that the Horn of Africa is one of the most politically dynamic regions
in the world, even though some of the region's states do not benefit equally
from this extraordinary opportunity. The core of this region has attracted once
again in its history the attention of great powers.
The strategic importance of the Horn Africa has been
dramatized in recent years both area's proximity to the Middle East fields and
the Indian Ocean trade routes. The United States has a vital interest in
keeping open the strait of Bab el Mandeb, the port of Djibouti, and the Red Sea
for the free flow of international shipping, especially to North America,
Western Europe, and Israel. For these reasons, the Red Sea is today a focus of
East-West tension between Arab leagues.
Furthermore, the Horn of Africa is considered today one of the
most strategic locations in the world mainly for the reason that the region is
full of natural resources, for instance oil, gas and petrol that are not yet
explored. Experts have asserted that the region is full of raw materials and
many other things. In other words, the region's states may reach a successful
development if the states that the HOA comprise come up with a strong
inter-state cooperation and of course if they construct a common foreign policy
that is based on the interest of the region in order minimize the external
powers' involvement, which is trying to divide the region's relation, and
strengthen the relation with foreign powers.
Despite the fact that the HOA is located in a strategic place;
it is its handling of internal problems which are weakening the region: The
Horn of Africa intra-State and inter-State conflicts and security has become a
frequent issue and it is one of the main obstacles that hold back the region.
In addition, droughts, famines, civil wars and the absence of peace in the Horn
have their roots in a long and complex history, in its political economy, the
state formation processes and struggles, the international interventions,
identity conflicts and environmental changes. Domestic issues overshadow the
region like the ever-lasting conflicts, droughts, human rights, civil wars,
extremist groups, and much more. The Horn of Africa remains largely
poverty-stricken and in need of development. Conflicts and restrictive
regulations in and between member countries do little to facilitate border
openness, trade, and infrastructural development such as railway and hospitals
and also critical components in the growth of a nation.
b) Competing foreign powers in the geostrategic Horn of
Africa
The Horn of Africa has been the heart of the Cold War and it
could be said that the region was one of the battlegrounds of this war between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union in that specific period. However, the Horn of
Africa has become, in the 21st century, the world's first ever-largest military
base of foreign powers. It can be argued that the region has become a
«military garrison»: in other words, it could be said that the HOA is
the heart of African politics.
The heart of the matter is to control the Red Sea, and
whatever the outcome may be, it is bound to have a major impact beyond the
Horn, affecting the course of superpower relation. The HOA is in a competing
field for foreign powers today. The HOA is a home for most of the superpowers
countries and at the same time the emerging countries such as Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and so on. All these countries mentioned above are implicated in
security and the stability of the region and effectively they are the competing
foreign powers in the geostrategic Horn of Africa.
The rise of superpowers' involvement in the Horn has increased
over the last two decades. There are some superpowers which are willing to have
bases in the Horn such as Russia and some that have already constructed their
bases in one of the Horn of Africa's states. The French, however, which
colonized Djibouti and many other superpowers, have already established
military bases in this tiny country Djibouti. It is important to remind that
Djibouti is located in a strategic place whereby it is surrounded countries
that are handling with instability such as Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia. This
has made Djibouti so different from other the Horn of Africa states.
Nevertheless, the countries that have already a military base in the HOA,
especially Djibouti include the U.S.A., France, Germany, Italy, Japan, China,
Saudi Arabia and Russia which will join very soon while Djiboutian officials
have rejected the Iranian request for a military base.
In addition, the coalition of the Arabic league led by
Saudi Arabia, especially the United Arab Emirates sometimes simply called the
Emirates, has requested Somaliland; a self-declared country located in the Horn
of Africa which declared deliberately its independence from the rest of Somalia
in 1991, to construct a military base in Berbera, a city near the capital
Hargeysa. The members of the parliament of the self-declared republic of
Somaliland agreed to allow the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to set up a military
base in the port of Berbera.9(*)The
Emirates which is part of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia that has fought
Houthi rebels and have imposed a naval blockade on Yemen since 2015, wants to
strengthen its power by having a military base in Berbera. At the same this
base will facilitate, the coalition led by Saudi, to double the air-attack
against the rebels Houthi in order to weaken the rebels and establish a
democratic government in Yemen.
c) The Horn of Africa: A Playing Field for Foreign Powers
The Horn of Africa has been the "battleground" for
foreign superpowers and at the same time it has been the «playing
field» of both regional and international powers. Most of the foreign
powers have a military base in Djibouti and of course this is absolutely due to
the regions' strategic location. In addition, the region is the subject of
«Big powers» competition and this has its own repercussion on the
region's states. But the region should pay more attention and basically it
should beware the consequences of these foreign military bases stationed in the
Horn.
Thus, the HOA has become the «springboard» for
foreign powers. Their involvement in the region have economic, political
and security implications for the countries of the region particularly
Djibouti, the military heart of the region. The region is a very fragile and
volatile. In it; conflict and war may take the form of interstate, intrastate,
ethnic, and war by proxies. Scholars and the region's political analysts
subscribe to the view that the region's instability is largely due to external
players. Thus, Ethiopia is a country torn between regional dynamics and
external players.
However, the U.S. has constructed its first military base
called «Camp Lemonier» (this camp was a former camp for the French
military in Djibouti) in Djibouti in 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. The United States of America has a good relation with
Djibouti but this base makes it easier for the U.S. to fight against terrorist
group that are spreading in the Gulf Arab states and as well as the HOA.
First, the United States cooperates with each state of the
Horn in order to safeguard its interests. Second, the U.S. military base in the
Horn is part of the strategy of the so-called «global War on Terror».
The spread of Islamic extremism in the region is a threat to the U.S. and its
regional allies because terrorist groups may control oil areas and thus
maritime security and oil fields might be at risk. In this regard, the
region is vulnerable to terrorism since the region is close to the Middle East.
In addition, seven of the nine states that line the Red Sea- Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia -identify themselves with
the Arab/Islamic world.
Moreover, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen are either the home to
Al-shabab-Al-Qaeda affiliated groups or supporters of terrorist groups. Thus,
the U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, is to neutralize
terrorist groups from Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
II. The American's foreign policy toward the Horn of
Africa during Cold War
a)The Horn of Africa in the shadow of the Cold
War
The Encyclopaedia Americana explains the Cold War as
«the conflict between the Communist nations led by the Soviet
Union and the Western nations led by United States, fought by all
means of ideological, economic, political, limited military action, and
short o f total war.»10(*) Mark Vogl describes the cold war as «a zero sum
global struggle between two ideologies, championed by two superpowers (USA and
USSR), which occurred within a nuclear weapons' environment...»11(*)The Cold War did not involve
direct fights between the superpowers, rather between proxies. It encompassed a
high degree of mistrust, spying and deception.
In fact, the Cold War was based on two opposing ideologies
explaining how people should live and how governments should rule. These two
ideologies which were in the center of the Cold War refer to the two great
superpowers: the Western Bloc (the United Sates, NATO and others) and on the
other hand powers in the Eastern Bloc (The Soviet Union and its allies). Also,
the «Cold War» is also a conflict over ideological differences
carried on by methods short of sustained overt military action and usually
without breaking off diplomatic relations; specifically, often capitalized Cold
War the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the
second half of the 20th century.12(*)It is important to underline that the term
«Cold» is used because there was no large-scale fighting directly
between the two sides, but they each propped up major regional wars known as
proxy wars.13(*)
However, the ideology was the underlying reason for East-West
tensions during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. emerged from
WWII as the world's most powerful nations, it was inevitable that their
conflicting governmental ideologies of capitalism and communism would lead to
hostility. Therefore, although not always directly involved, it put both
countries on a collision course and provided them with reason for sustained
suspicion, even during periods of Détente. Hence, the two political
ideologies used in the Cold War were democracy and communism. The United States
was a democratic country while the Soviet Union was a communist dictatorship.
In addition, Democracy and Communism were the two ideologies that were at war
with each other during the Cold War.The Cold War wasn't an extension and at the
same time it wasn't a war but hopefully it was a tense arm's race in which each
side "eyed" each other.
The majority of African countries began to gain independence
from their colonial masters after World War Two. In the aftermath of the
destruction and slaying of the World War II, it was obvious that a new world
order had emerged. Japan and Germany were defeated, Europe was in ruins both
physically and economically, and the old European colonial empires were
disappearing. The United States, however, emerged from the war relatively
unharmed, and a central question in geopolitical circles was the role that the
United States would play in this new world order, and the strategy that the US
would need to adopt to strengthen its foreign policy in order to become the
first influencer of this new world order.
The onset of the Cold War, however, began in 1947 just two
years after WWII. The political ideologies in the Cold War were in a state of
rivalry and tension between two blocs, the USA &the USSR. Basically, it was
a conflict that went on for over forty years. In addition, when John F. Kennedy
in his inaugural address asked the world what «together we can do the
freedom of man» his words inspired those who were searching the
independence in Africa as the continent shook off its colonial past and moved
closer to closer towards total independence.14(*) U.S involvement in Africa was confined before World
War II, with the exception of a few commercial treaties signed with a few
countries in West Africa. In general, Washington was not drawn to African
affairs and worded no real objection to European domination of the continent.
However, the country paid attention to Africa when, on January 18, 1918,
President Woodrow Wilson proposed his famous Fourteen Points declaration to a
Joint Session of Congress in which he underlined the principle of
self-determination and governance.15(*) At that time, President Wilson wanted to counter the
German threat which had transformed the American attitude toward European
Colonies. His posture had obvious influences for the millions of Africans
dominated by foreign rule.
The Atlantic Charter, signed in 1941 by President Franklin
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was another initiative to
achieve world peace by compromising imperialism. Both leaders admitted the
importance of colonial people's rights to self-determination and
self-governance.16(*)
After World War II, the Soviet Union joined world political affairs in opposing
Western domination and imperialism as Mr. P. Woodward notes:
An early post-World War II consideration for the US was that
of rising nationalism that affected the Horn and many other parts of the Third
World, as much of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America were becoming
known collectively. In general the US seemed sympathetic. Until the 1945 the
Third World was not a major issue for American foreign policy makers, both
because of the strength of isolationism after the World War I, and the
dominance of European empires in Africa, Asia and Middle East; however after
1945 nationalism was once more the march and the powerful force in
international politics. The US could identify with Third World nationalism
having itself fought a revolutionary war to throw off British imperial rule,
and the strain of thought was encouraged by such domestic developments as the
African-American civil right movement.17(*)
What is interesting to mention is the influence of the USA and
the Soviet Union had upon Africa, especially the HOA. The Horn of Africa has
long attracted the attention of external players, first in the era of European
colonialism and then during the Cold War when it became an arena for the global
struggle between East and West. By the time that Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed
the presidency in January 1953, the Cold War was well and truly on. A CIA
report prepared for the incoming president concluded that:
A war situation now exists between the Soviet Bloc and the
group of western nations under the leadership of the United States....The USSR
has virtually ended normal diplomatic relations with the West and has isolated
the peoples of the Bloc from the rest of the world. Trade relations have been
severely curtailed. Intense competition in armaments continues....The Soviet
rulers are implacable in their antagonism toward the free world. They have made
plain their intention to subvert or destroy it and to establish a communist
world dominated from Moscow.18(*)
The U.S. foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa between 1945
and 1990 was guided by a series of Cold War rationales that viewed the region
as a means for solving non-Africa problems. Specifically, the U.S. policymakers
did not perceive the countries and peoples of the Horn of Africa as important
in their own right but, rather, as a means of preventing the further advances
of Soviet communism. As a result, the U.S. relationships with various regimes
in the region evolved according to their perceived importance within an
East-West framework. Haile Selassie, for example, was courted from the 1940s to
the 1970s because of the importance of Ethiopia as part of a worldwide
telecommunication network directed against the Soviet Union.19(*)
Despite the ideology rivalry, the U.S. perceived Communism as
a monolithic force struggling for world supremacy. The America was against the
spread of communist ideology in Middle East, Asia and Africa as well. In this
regard, the U.S. established a strong foreign policy, especially in the Horn of
Africa where it wanted to defeat the communist ideology as Mr. Donna Rosa
Jackson states:
America interest in the Horn of Africa began in earnest with
the Cold War. Then, the geographically location of the Horn, with its proximity
to Middle East oil fields, the sea oil routes and the red Sea passage to the
Mediterranean, as well as its role as link in the technological chain of
Western communication and defense systems, made it strategically
important.......and the radical Arab disruptive activities.20(*)
Notwithstanding, the Soviet Union also understood the
strategic location of the Horn of Africa and put forward their policies for
expansionism of their ideology. Donna Rosa Jackson noted that:
The Americans were not alone in recognizing the strategic
importance of both the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular.
The Soviet Union strove to gain a foothold in the area and counted the
Ethiopian Emperor.21(*)
A hallmark of the U.S. policy toward the HOA was to halt the
expansion of the Soviet Union's ideology in the region regime's relation. The
relation of the regime had faced challenges coming from both
blocs and at same time the Horn of Africa states had no common goal namely
Ethiopia and Somalia, even though some states conquered their independence in
the aftermath of WWII such as Somalia and Kenya, of how to deal with this
external powers which wanted to create instability in the region.
The main perspective revolves around the perception that the
two blocs was willing to divide the region and create alliance in the Horn, and
of course defending, each one of the both sides, its political agenda. The U.S.
and The USSR planned to win in the competition by promising economy and
military fund for the vulnerable countries in the Africa continent. In fact the
main actors of the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR made allies inside the Horn
states promising each state, like Ethiopia and Somalia fund development,
military training, etc...But in return the states in question should have to
provide bases or other facilities that the U.S. and the USSR could develop to
spread their ideology influence around the world. For instance,
In 1953 Ethiopia and the U.S. signed an agreement in which
gave the United States access to military bases and in return the U.S. offered
for economic and military aid to Ethiopia that would endure for over twenty
years.22(*)
One of the most significant gains for the United States was an
access to a communications facility at Asmara, in the province of Eritrea, on
the Ethiopian coast. The facility was named «Kagnew Station»23(*), in honor of the Ethiopian
legion that had fought was part of the UN force in the Korean War,24(*) and mainly this Radio station
was useful for the American Intelligence Community to exchange news until the
1970s, while technology innovated in satellites and enhanced communication
which minimized the need of relay stations.
The U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa centered on
Ethiopia, where it acquired the Kagnew communications facility near Asmara in
1942. For more than two decades, it served as the most important U.S.
communications station in Africa and the Indian Ocean. Hence, Ethiopia was the
privileged American ally on the continent, and, between 1953 and 1970, received
20 per cent of all U.S. economic aid and half of all U.S. military aid to
Africa.
In general, African countries especially the Horn states were
perceived by the U.S. policymakers as a means for preventing further advances
of Soviet communism. Therefore the U.S. relationships with African regimes
evolved according to their relative importance within an East-West framework.
In research of a new ally, the United States set up a diplomatic relationship
with both Somalia and Ethiopia. In doing so, the United States devised a
strategy to defeat the Soviet Union and at the same time to halt the expansion
of Soviet Union's ideology in the Horn of Africa.
b) The U.S./U.S.S.R. rivalry in East Africa
1.1 The U.S. Strategic Interest in Ethiopia during the
Cold War Era
In 1953, Ethiopia was the main target country the Horn of
Africa states in the Cold War due to its area, covering an area of 455, 000
square miles; it was one of the largest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
also one of the most important countries, geographically, in the HOA. To meet
those interests, America gave priority to the Horn of Africa states. The U.S.
interest in Ethiopia shifted from trade to Cold War geopolitics. Similarly, the
Eisenhower administration recognized Ethiopia as the most important country
within the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
indicated that Ethiopia could «serve as base of operation to protect the
shipping lanes and the Fast East, Europe and the Middle East.»25(*) Thus, it was not surprising
that the policy goals towards Ethiopia, as explained in May 1953, included:
The maintenance of friendly and co-operative relations; the
prevention of Communist infiltration and influence and the continuance of
Ethiopia's orientation toward the West; the establishment of stable
administration in areas under Ethiopian sovereignty and the successful
development of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Federation within the terms of the UN
Resolution of December 2, 1950; the balanced and orderly development of the
economy of Ethiopia, and a successful Point IV programme; and the maintenance
of the right to use the military facilities required by the Department of
Defense in Eritrea and to the rights and privileges we desire in connection
therewith.26(*)
Basically, D. Eisenhower administration's main policy
objective toward Ethiopia was the «preventing of communist infiltration
and influence and the continuance of Ethiopia's orientation toward the
West,27(*)the major
feelings was that even though the U.S. was convinced about the Ethiopia's
relation and of course Selassie's following his political agenda, but it (the
U.S.) had no more options unless it loses this strategic place. On the other
hand, Haile Selassie realized that this tactics had literally paid
off.28(*)
Haile Selassie, the Ethiopia's emperor, was determined to
make Ethiopia the most powerful country in the continent and Addis Ababa
«the capital of Africa».29(*) Selassie's main strategy was to keep Eritrea, a
former Italian colony with 45,000 square miles in size, under Ethiopian
administration. In other words, he suggested to make federalism with Eritrea
and requested the U.S. policymakers to support his plan.
In 1949, although the United States was initially in favor of
Eritrea's independence after a period of trusteeship, this stance was modified
by the end of Truman's presidential term, with the US ultimately supporting
Ethiopian empirical claims to the region. While this could be explained as a
contradictory of the pro-independentist and anti-colonialist philosophy of the
U.S. The Cold War perspective that was being the most important issue in
America's policy formulation meant that the Horn should have to minimize the
Soviet Union influence. In order to realize this, the US should have to follow
its interest and should have to offer total support for Ethiopia's claim to
Eritrea. Donna R. Jackson states:
Truman's support for Haile Selassie's territorial ambitions
was motivated not just from a desire to please the emperor but also by more
pragmatic reasons. Located just outside the Eritrean capital of Asmara was
Radio Marina, a communications facility that had first been established by the
Italians and then utilized during the World War II, first by the British and
then by the Americans. With the onset of the Cold War, the need for such
facilities around the world increased exponentially and the importance of
Eritrea in this context was recognized.30(*)
An analysis made by the NSC (National Security Council)
concluded that Eritrea is an important site for strategic radio facilities. The
United States maintains an Army signal station at Asmara, with extensive relay
facilities serving to large of the Middle East. It would therefore appear
desirable to support such strategic interests in Eritrea.31(*) The U.S. Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, argued in a Security Council debate:
«From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the
Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic
interests of the United States in the Red Sea basin and considerations of
security and world peace make it necessary that the country has to be linked
with our ally, Ethiopia.» (Cited in Kaplan, 2003, p. 56)
On the other hand, unlike the United States' support of
federating Eritrea to Ethiopia, the Soviet Union was in favor of Eritrea's
independence (A former Italian colony, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in
1952 and annexed as the fourteenth province of Haile Selassie's empire in1962.)
and expressed their support to the Eritrea's rebels including EPLF (Eritrean
people's Liberation-Front) and ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front). Donna R.
Jackson notes:
The Soviet also supported Eritrean rebels who were demanding
independence from Ethiopia, in the hope that the unrest would led to a change
of leadership of the major country of the Horn to one that might prove more
receptive to Soviet overtures.32(*)
The America was convinced that Ethiopia was a leader power in
the Horn and it enjoyed a good relationship with Ethiopia as the U.S. regarded
Ethiopia as a crucial and fundamental ally in the Cold War era. Additionally,
the two countries established a long-lasting relationship in order to defeat
the antagonists [Soviet Union]. The United States' objectives in Ethiopia were
the «prevention of Soviet or communist influence over Ethiopia, and the
maintenance of Ethiopia's orientation toward the United States and western
Europe.»33(*)
In 1974, the mutual cooperation and the relationship between
both countries (Ethiopia & the U.S.) have grown until the collapse of the
Ethiopia emperor and the country is overshadowed by a military coup
d'état that led the country instability and fear of civil war. Haile
Selassie was overthrow by Mangistu Haile Mariam. In that specific period, the
leader of committee Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power and launched to
establish his policy to face the Cold War competition ideology. The soviet
hopes were boosted in 1974 when social problems and discontent within the
military over pay and conditions led to overthrow the Emperor Haile Selassie.
In his place, Ethiopia was ruled by the Provisional Military Government (PMG),
led by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) known as the
Derg, the Amharic word for committee.34(*)
With regard of Ethiopia's foreign policy, the two successive
Ethiopian recipient governments led by Haile Selassie (1941-1974) and Mengistu
Haile Mariam (1974-1991), was more dependants for the international donor
community preciously the U.S. fund aid supporting. Moreover, Ethiopia's new
regime turned clearly away from the United States, once its only arms supplier.
Although the United States upheld a large military assistance group in Ethiopia
for a time, the new regime became increasingly radical and anti-American, and
complained that too few arms were being provided. Early in 1977, the Carter
administration decided to put an end to military aid to Ethiopia altogether,
officially because of gross violations of human rights. In order to meet his
regards, Mengistu Haile Mariam cut off the relationship with the U.S. and went
a secret visit to Moscow for the purpose of making a new agreement of the USSR
and in turn Ethiopia will benefit economic and military aid. Protecting his own
interest Haile Mariam; Ethiopia emperor, accepted the proposal and signed the
amendment with the USSR. On the other hand, getting the advantage about the
border tension between Somalia and Ethiopia, the U.S. made a new ally with
Somali; an ancient pro-Soviet, and promised a military and economic support.
1.2 The U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia during the
Cold War Era
The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union
for the support of the newly independent nations was ever-present, and was
clearly reflected in all aspects of policy formulation including military and
economic aid, as well as in program such as Peace Corps. Somalia, a newly
independent country, acquired its independence from the respective colonies
Italian Somali and British Somaliland and set up the unification of the two
sides in 1960.
After almost a decade of democratic rule (1960-1969), major
General Mohammed Siyad Barre assumed political power through a blood less coup
and ruled the country recklessly and ruthlessly for about two decades. Despite
the fact that the country was under dictatorship, but the country was also the
focus of the two blocs trying each one to make ally the newly independent
nation of Somalia. It (Somalia) is the home of homogenous people, over then 14
million inhabitants, both linguistically and religiously. This turned out to be
one of the most strategic countries in the Horn of Africa. It has a potential
resource and locates the most strategic place both regionally and
internationally. In that main reason, Somalia appeared mainly important both
the U.S. and the USSR's political agenda in order to form an ally with
Somalia.
Subsequently the coup in 1969, the Soviet's role in
Somalia doubled as Somalia adopted socialism with a serious campaign o
f striving to break Somalis' allegiances to clans. Barre abolished the
constitution, prohibited all political parties and devastated democracy that
existed. The strategic position of the Horn drew the attention of the
superpowers' interests. It has proximity to the Gulf, which encompasses half o
f the world's oil and the origin of Islam. It is also located next to the Red
Sea, the bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and the old traditions of the Middle
East and Europe.35(*)
Ottaway describes the reasons for the superpowers' interests in Somalia as,
first, the country had the location and the physical
characteristics suitable for the establishment of a major communications
centre, second, it lent itself to serve as a link on air routes toward
India and the Far East; and third, as the only independent country
in Africa at the time, it afforded United Slates an opportunity to
establish a presence in the continent preparing itself to play a
greater role in the years to come.36(*)
Furthermore, the strategic position of Somalia at the mouth of
Red Sea fascinated the Soviet strategy. The USSR planed to control the Indian
Ocean as a powerful nuclear force country. Hence, it demonstrated continuous
interest in the Horn of Africa. This was pointed out, among others, by
continual arrangement of a naval squadron of about 18 ships in the
waters.37(*)Moreover, the
long animosity between Ethiopia and Somalia attracted the superpowers as the
superpowers could use these countries to fight each other.38(*)By 1980, therefore, the Horn of
Africa had become a microcosm of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and Cuba were
with Ethiopia and the Americans were supporting Somalia. The problems of the
region were seen through the Cold War prism, external powers involvement and
globalism seemed to have triumphed over regionalism.
Through the Cold War, Moscow gave high weight to the HOA in
terms of global competition with USA. The large and fast growth of Moscow's
relations with the HOA countries began in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when
they were achieving independence respectively. Pursued by 1956, Khrushchev
highlighted the importance of the `collapse of the colonial system of
imperialism' and declared the USSR's `irreconcilable struggle against
colonialism' at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
Supporting struggles for national liberation and social
progress was designed in the 1977 Soviet Constitution as a foreign-policy
objective. So, national liberation movements were acknowledged as `detachments'
of the world anti-imperialist struggle. (Arkhangelskaya & Shubin 2013,
p.6). American and Soviet foreign policy on the Horn of Africa generated more
conflict in the decade of the 1970's. Not coincidentally, in the 1970-1980s the
Horn of Africa was the field of strong game between the U.S. and the USSR for
supremacy in regional forward military presence.
Hence, once Somalia was declared an independent republic in 1960,
Khrushchev established relations, offered economic aid, and undertook a major
port expansion in Berbera, beginning in1962.39(*)The relationship between the USSR and Somalia was
constantly in growth owing of Somalia was an important ally in the Horn of
Africa states. In fact Moscow made a plan to defeat the U.S. foreign policy in
the region offering the support to Somalia as a new fragile and independent
state. It took a measure to counter-attack and minimize the U.S.'s spread
ideology in the Horn; this is offering Somalia all the equipment it needs and
at the same time it [Soviet Union] also successes to establish a vital
collaboration both Ethiopia and Somalia despite their political
disagreement.
What is required, above all, is a strategy for linking the
goal with concrete policy actions. The U.S. regarded Somalia as the main target
of America's ally after it recognized that Ethiopia allied with Soviet Union,
and at that time Ethiopia was led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. He broke the
diplomacy relation of the U.S. However, it is interesting to remain that the
interests of the US can be described in terms of securing some strategic points
like the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf also became major in the overall
American strategy about the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. It was,
accordingly, in the interests of the US to hold up any expansion of Soviet
power and influence, whether through proxies or not, in the Middle East, Indian
Ocean and the Horn of Africa (Mesfin 2011, p.19).
However, superpower competition was not the only factor for
Soviet activism in the Horn of Africa. During the Cold war era, the U.S.
National Intelligence Council Memorandum `Soviet Policy and Africa' (1975)
determined the USSR's interests Russia's Renewed Interests in the Horn of
Africa As a Traditional and Rising Power in the region as; reducing Western
influence, power, and presence; gaining political influence on the southern
edge of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea littoral, and supporting and
protecting its flanks in the Middle East; securing access to support facilities
for its naval forces in the Indian Ocean; countering Chinese influence. All of
the interests are linked not only geopolitical but also including economic and
culturally.
The USSR used military aid as the most effective means of
gaining influence and cooperation. In 1962, Moscow gave $ 32 million credit to
Somali in order to raise the number of soldiers to 14,000 and modernize the
army. When it came to 1965, the USSR found technical and military assistance to
build the Somali Navy. On the other hand, the USSR also made attempts to
establish the Ethiopia national armed forces. Socialist leader Mengistu Haile
Mariam also played an active role to strengthening of aid on Ethiopia. In 1976,
$ 100 million secret military agreement was signed between the two sides. An
estimated 20 000 Ethiopian were trained in the USSR, and thousands graduated
from military and political schools. (Öztürk 2016, p.294). In 1977,
The United States stopped all military aid, departing it without any influence
on the strategic important Horn. This significant loss of influence resulted in
total Soviet control over the Horn that made the situation even more complex
(Schulz 2011).
Nevertheless, Somalia-Soviet relations turned sour when
USSR started offering military aid to Ethiopia, Somalia's rival.
Somalia recognized this as betrayal. USSR attempted to reconcile the two
countries in vain. USSR honored to lead this reconciliation Fidel Castro of
Cuba, who travelled all the way to the region to meet Mengistu and Siad Barre
in Aden. He suggested creation of a federation comprising o f Ethiopia,
Somalia and People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen. However, his
suggestion was rejected, leaving the Soviets in dilemma.40(*)
Mengistu Haile Mariam signed two friendship agreements with
the Soviet Union and in publicized Moscow ceremony and a separate, unpublicized
military aid agreement appraised at $400 million more than the United States
had supplied to Ethiopia in three decades of alliance. The progressively close
relations between Addis Ababa and Moscow led to anger in Somalia, the Soviet
Union's longtime socialist ally in the area, and Somalia indicated to the
United States that it had cut off the relationship with the Soviet Union and
was willing to become for a new ally of the U.S., Saudi Arabia had started
furnishing $20 million to $30 million a year to Somalia for purposes of Saudi
security and Islamic solidarity, and early last year there were reports that
Arab oil states were offering $300 million to $350 million if Somalia would
break the relation with the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, Washington started to make new ally with
Barre's regime. The Somalia regime of Siad Barre, however, achieved greater
status in Washington because of Somali's importance as an access country from
which the United States could counter militarily any perceived Soviet threat to
Middle Eastern oil field.41(*) The U.S. preoccupation with anticommunism not only
was manipulated by the leaders to obtain greater levels of the U.S. economic
and military aid, more than $600 million for the Selassie regime and nearly
$800 million for the Barre regime, It also served as an important rational for
Washington's general disregard for the authoritarian excesses of these regimes,
as well as for a host of interventionist practices designed to maintain the
U.S. influence within the region.42(*)
It should be noted, however, that during the period from the
1954 to 1970 the United States also enjoyed cordial relations with Somalia and
expended almost the $60 million in aid.43(*) American engagement in Somalia could hence be seen as
an extension of America strategic policy known as
«containment».44(*) Somalia became an ally with the U.S. in order to
accomplish its political agenda which was base on the unification of the Somali
speaking population and it was convinced that the Ethiopia detained illegally
some of the Somali region called Ogaden region.
1.3 The U.S. Strategic Interest Towards Kenya during
the Cold War Era
The freshly come out independent African States soon became
the scene of Cold War battles. The US and the Soviet Union accomplished for
their allegiances, primarily through economic and military aid. These freshly
independent States saw themselves being economically dependent on great
superpower countries for development assistance. Their economic dependent made
these countries vulnerable to foreign influences and pressures. Thus, foreign
aid was offered the intention of capturing the political support of these new
States.
Basically, three years after Somalia's independence, Kenya
acquired its independence on December 12, 1963. Few days after its
independence, Kenya was become part of in the international aid game war. The
U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic partner and anchor state in East
Africa, and as critical to counter to the Soviet Union spread in the region.
Therefore, the U.S. immediately
recognizedthe
new nation and moved to establish
diplomatic relations and
effectively, the embassy in
Nairobi was established one
year after Kenya'sIndependence Day.
However, Soviet's attack of Afghanistan resulted in 1979 that
the horn played a vital role in the Cold War. It is sharply that there were
some doubts indicating Soviet military planning spread beyond Afghanistan into
Iran and Kuwait. Accordingly the United States convinced the threat coming from
its opponent and hopefully wanted and obtained military base rights, facilities
and the Red Sea utilization from the Horn of Africa countries near the Persian
Gulf. After Iran's revolution the America forgot the so called Carter Doctrine
that offered the United States to utilize military means to save American
interest in the oil rich Persian Gulf, according to Michael Clough this in turn
this risen the Strategic importance of the Horn.
Hence in keeping with Kenya's need to defend herself any
attack from her neighbors, the US signed the Facilities Access Agreement with
Kenya in 1980. The agreement supplied for over flights, landing rights at three
airfields, and access to the Mombasa sea port and was followed with military
assistance of twenty million dollars in 1980 and in a period of two years it
had increased to thirty million. This agreement authenticated the US as the
major provider of arms and military support to Kenya, a stance previously held
by the former colonial power. Kenya came to be considered as part of the
Central Command (CENTCOM) under the Kenya US Liaison Office (KULSO).45(*)12This office is still in
permanence to date and has obtained prominence particularly with the war on
terrorism in the region.
Hopefully, to understand Kenya's pro-Western posture it
interesting to evaluate Kenya's relationship with her former colony Britain, as
this had a major an impact in Kenya becoming of strategic interest to the US
during the Cold War. Mainly, Kenya was under British rule for over fifty years,
and by the time the country conquered its independence in 1963, strong
intricate/sophisticated commercial links had been united with Britain. Kenya
became among the largest beneficiaryof British aid in Africa during the Cold
War era.At independence Britain gave Kenya the resources it needed to help
establish the Kenyan Armed Forces, and thus became Kenya's largest supplier of
arms, it trained troops and gave them substantial assistance, therefore
establishing strong military ties.46(*) Kenya's strong relations with its former colony had a major
influence in Kenya staying a pro-Western country.
The U.S. government has long viewed Kenya as a strategic
partner and an anchor state in East Africa. In order to spread its ideology and
defeat the Soviet's vision to conquer the Horn, The U.S. policymakers
considered Kenya as a vital important, after Ethiopia, for its safeguarding
national interest and effectively to counter the Soviet Union expansion. Kenya
appeared in the agenda of the U.S. foreign policy just one year of being
independent state. As is being usually associated Kenya was previously among
one of the region's state that was dependent on foreign aid. In other words,
even during the colonial era, Kenya was more depended in British fund aid for
development and assistance.
Furthermore, from the beginning of the Cold War, Kenya was
regarded as the main pro-Western country in the region, and thus became a great
ally and aid recipients of the US in the Horn of Africa states.The United
Stateswas regarded Kenya as a vital staging point for US forces armies in the
Indian Ocean, somewhat because it was viewed/considered by the US as its
main/principlegarrison in the region leading to a severe increase/growth in
economic aid to the country between 1974 and 1985 as the US protected Kenya's
position. Congress explained the aid growth by arguing in 1984 that:
`Kenya occupies an important position on the Indian Ocean in
proximity to world energy resources. Our national security objective is to
ensure out continued access to the region in times of crisis. To do this we
must continue to contribute to Kenya's economic development, stability and
military preparedness.'47(*)
In addition, Kenya and the United States have long been close
allies and have enjoyed cordial relations. The United States provides equipment
and training to Kenyan security forces. This has come when Kenya frequently
felt threatened by Somali's vision for a greater Somalia particularly after the
NEP insurgencies and the Ogaden conflict in 1977. To protect
its territory, the country thus began a military build up.The government of
Kenyawanted much closer ties with the US. The country asked for a US military
survey on Kenya's protection requirements. This justified the birth of closer
military relations between Kenya and the US.
The United States and Kenya have established a close
diplomatic relationship for decades. In the late 1970s, for instance, at the
height of the Cold War, U.S. security cooperation with countries in the Horn of
Africa took on intensified strategic priority during contingency planning for
possible U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf, and Kenya's port in
Mombasa was regarded as a stable alternative to options in Somalia. Therefore,
Kenya and the US signed an agreement in which Kenya would offer a base to the
US and in return it would benefit a military aid and fund for development
assistance. This included till the Reagan administration's policy covered to
«contain» soviet impact in the region. In 1990, the aftermath of the
Cold War, United States gave the priority, when it came to its foreign policy,
to political and human right abuses by Moi's administration, even though
Kenya's strategic location and stability provided that relations remained
cordial, helped by Kenya's role as a hub for international humanitarian relief
operation in Sudan and Somalia
To Kenya-US relations during the Cold War, It looked at the
security concerns that emerged during this period and US foreign policy towards
Kenya driven influenced by these concerns. Immediately/Soon after independence
Kenya adopted a non-alignment policy as analyzed by John Okumu (1997). After
its economic link with its ex-colony the country depended on towards the West
as opposed to the East. Largely owing to the ideology posture Kenya favored and
its strategic position in the Greater Horn of Africa it became a strong ally
and major aid beneficiary of the US.
IV. The Cold War and interstate relations
c) The impact of the Cold War on the Ethiopia-Somalia relations
d) Defining Inter-State Conflicts Patterns
The word interstate/inter-state is a combination of two words:
inter, which stands for between or among, and state, which indicates a nation
or a country, identified by territory, authority, population, legitimacy and
government. Hence, interstate relations imply interactions between or among
nation states. The Oxford English Dictionary defines interstate/inter-state as
«lying, extending or carried on between independent states or between
states belonging to a union, federation, etc.»48(*) The opposite is
intrastate/intra-state, which includes activities within the state, while
interstate involves two or more states. Basically, the interstate relation
between the Horn of Africa states was been damage by the Cold War leaders
dividing the region into two camp. In addition, it created interstate war
between Ethiopia and Somalia and at the same time it has weakened the
relationship between Somalia and Kenya owing of Somalia was claiming
Somali-region in Kenya NFD (Northern Frontier District) that Somalia believes
still today that these regions belong to Somalia and the colonial powers gave
it illegally to Kenya one part, Ethiopia another part and finally Djibouti
which is also majority Somali inhabitant.
1.1. Ogaden War
Ethiopia and Somalia are two neighboring countries located in
the Horn of Africa. Both countries share a long and problematic border which
has troubled their relations since pre-colonial period. They had never
acknowledged on the exact location of their border. In 1977, the two countries
fought over the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden which Ethiopia grabbed during
African scramble the nineteen century and the issue still remains
unresolved.
In 1885, rival European powers such Great Britain, France, and
Italy divided among the land populated by the Somali ethnic kinship in the Horn
of Africa and added some of them in the neighboring countries such as Ethiopia
and Kenya.49(*)The main
issue in Somalia's future, though, was not the overwhelming poverty, but the
legacy of colonialism. After Somalia's independence, Somalia refused to
recognize the Anglo-Ethiopian demarcation which fixed its borders with Ethiopia
during the colonial period (The Geographer, 1975, pp. 3-6). Instead, the new
republic adopted a policy of irredentism for the creation of a Greater Somali
Republic.
However, the end of colonial rule in Africa had led to the
creation of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1960, formed from British
Somaliland and Italian Somalia, covering an area of 246,155 square miles and
with a population of some 3.2 million by the late of 1970s. However, as opposed
to the ethnic and religious diversity of Ethiopia, homogeneity characterized
Somalia: the country was 98.8 percent ethnic Somali, and 99 percent Muslim,
50(*) and arguably this
homogeneity contributed to the Somali people's support for Siad's determination
to reunite all ethnic Somalis in one nation. Nor could any Somali easily
overlook, or forget, the dream; both five parts into which Europeans had
divided the nation. Tom Farer, a professor at Rugers University and specialist
on the Horn region, remarked in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa
that the creation of the Somali Republic 1960 was «the first step toward
the consummation of the national unity», and warned that «it would
not be the last.»51(*)
In addition, in Siad's view, the European «scramble for
Africa» had destroyed Somalia in the nineteenth century, dividing the
country into five parts: British Somaliland, Italian Somalia; the French took
hold of what is today known as Djibouti, a tiny nation on the Red Sea
(previously called French Somaliland); the fourth part, Ethiopia also grabbed a
chunk of Somali land called the Ogaden; the fifth was Northern Frontier
District (NFD) now emerged with Kenya.52(*) The five-pointed star of the Somalia flag represented
each of the divisions, and many Somalis still dream today of the day when
Somali ethnics will be reunited one more time and build one nation (see Figure
1 & 2 below).
 
FIGURE 1: Political Map of Africa53(*)FIGURE 2: Map
of the HOA and Neighboring countries54(*)
In early 1955 Ethiopia further took over the Somali region of
Haud, a protected area which was the cornerstone grazing land for the Somali
pastoralists living along the Ethiopia-Somalia border on the basis of
Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 (Mukhtar, 2003, p. 93). The agreement of
Ethiopia and the United Kingdom changed the limits of British Somaliland to
expel most of the Haud in Ethiopia. The annexation accompanied a secret treaty
with Britain in 1954 and the departure of British authority from the
pastureland region in the same year (The Geographer, 1975, pp. 3-6).
Although a delegation from British Somaliland led by Mohamed
Ibrahim Egal, who later became prime minister in Somalia, requested Haile
Selassie the return of the Haud to Somalis in a meeting in Addis Ababa in May
1960, the Emperor persisted that the area is part of Ethiopian territory and is
nonnegotiable (Qaybe, 2013, p. 36). Thus, the modern Ethiopia-Somalia relations
are clearly characterized by mutual suspicion and antagonism that can be traced
back to this history.
The policy of the first two civilian governments in Somalia
was to get back the lost Somali territories in a peaceful way as stated in
article IV (4) of the Somali independence national constitution which says,
«The Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means, the union
of all Somali territories». But as Farah (2009) described in his
unpublished PhD Thesis `Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990', the
Somali civilian governments between 1960-1969 were encouraging and hosting
leaders from the Ogaden and NFD including the leadership of the Western Somalia
Liberation Group (WSLG) which was founded in 1961 to liberate Ogaden from
Ethiopia.
Although Emperor Haile Selassie and Somalia's first president
Aden Abdulle met during the 1963 OAU conference, the two leaders acknowledged
that all aggressions and media propaganda should be stopped (Ghalib, 1995, pp.
106-107). That was initially viewed as a positive step taken by both Ethiopia
and Somalia towards peaceful resolution of their border dispute. But the 1964
border war, Ethiopia's persistent efforts in holding the disputed territory and
Somalia's failure to restrict the activities of Ogaden rebels broke off any
possibility of improving the two country's relations (Ghalib, pp. 106-107).
But Somalia aborted support to the Ogaden rebels in the final
year of the civilian government led by Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal
(1967-1969) who tried to find self-determination for Somali people in the
disputed territories through diplomacy (Farah, pp. 115-117). From then
Ethiopia-Somalia diplomatic relations appeared to be improving due to the new
Détente policy approach by Egal. As a result, Ethiopia acknowledged the
existence of a territorial dispute with Somalia and was seemingly willing to
solve it through diplomatic channels (Farah, p. 117).
Furthermore, Siyad Barre, Somalia's president, planned to
invade the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with the assistance of the Soviet Union.
However, the latter did not support the invasion. Indeed, the USSR warned him
not to do so, as it was trying to reconcile both neighboring countries. Barre
did not pay attention to the USSR. He invaded the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in
1977. The Soviets were not sure which country to support. The USSR did not
feel comfortable to lose the military facilities in Somalia, yet Ethiopia was a
better choice considering its bigger size. The USSR was not actually in favor
in the policy of the Greater Somalia. It was only interested with the coast
and the military facility at Berbera. Ethiopia also needed arms for protection
against continuous conflicts with Somalia. There were conflicts every now and
then, especially along the Ogaden region. Somalia supported the ONLF (Ogaden
National Liberation Front) in the Ogaden region, and were behind the conflicts
every now and then along the Ogaden boundary
It is interesting to note that the European colonies' strategy
of dividing the Horn of Africa people had a major impact after the
colonization. In the case of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict it was due to the
outcome of the colonial system of division of the region. It could be said
that African states fall in a proxy war just few years of being independent
states. They had been influenced the ideology spread by the two superpowers
and without thinking deeply the feedback that it might have in the region. In
other words, the Horn of Africa did not take the full measure of how to handle
this new policy when the region is too' fragile to solve its own problems.
Unfortunately, each state gave the priority to its interest regardless of the
common interest of the region.
Despite the fact that the region was being manipulated by the
superpowers in somehow, but it is also important to underline that the
inter-state conflict was the outcome that created by the former colonies of the
region: Italy, Britain and France. In addition, during the cold war, the
preoccupation of regional security was narrowed to military security. The
superpowers did not solve the problem of regional conflicts. In fact, they
worsened internal conflicts with the free flow of arms. They were ready to
supply arms, which fuelled military based regional conflicts and worse,
diverted resources meant for development.
The superpowers were concerned with their selfish
interests of winning as many clients as possible. They were not after
development of their allies. Makinda adds, «The overriding interest of
the superpowers was not to help Somalia but to pursue their own global and
regional agendas.»55(*)The emphasis of the superpowers was military,
economic and nuclear competition, however, not in their countries lest
they cause damage and loss o f lives, but in the territories o f their
surrogates.
However, both sides (the Soviet block and the U.S. block) of
the Cold War leaders had shattered the Horn of Africa's peace and stability
creating an interstate conflict; this is the case between Somalia and Ethiopia.
In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia claiming that Ethiopia detains illegally part
of Somalia territory called "Ogaden region". This conflict had to do with the
Cold War since the Soviet and Cuban gave a military support to Ethiopia. In
order to rescue the Ethiopian army, which seemed to be defeated, the Soviets
and Cuba reinforced the help to the Ethiopian army in order to push the Somali
army back into conquered territory and defeat the Somalia army. In fact the
outcomes and impact of the Cold War era drove the region into proxy war and
truly the region emerged into interstate war which was basically, according to
the political analysts, the consequences of the external rivalry.
Somalia-Ethiopia conflicts played an important role for
Moscow to determine policy over these countries. In the beginning, The USSR
supported both rival states, Somalia and Ethiopia. Concerning this geopolitical
contest, the socialist bloc had achieved an important outcome. However, Ogaden
Battle between Somalia and Ethiopia changed the alliances in region and Somalia
joined the Western camp and demonstrated the cliché that «there are
no permanent friends and no permanent enemies'. While the United States was
arming Somalia, the USSR and Cuba were helping Ethiopia. Ogaden Battle became
one of the reasons of demise of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
II, Treaty in 1979) agreement and Détente between the Cold War
Superpowers. Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski went so far
as to declare that «SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden»,
signifying the death of Détente (Woodroofe 2013, p.2).
During the late 1970-80s, each government in the Horn
supported rebels fighting its neighbor and rival, but none of these opposition
movements received significant backing from the US or USSR. Even the Soviet
advisors and Cuban troops helped the Ethiopians in the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in
1978 (Griffiths 2005, p.135). Soviet support for Mengistu was not sufficient to
defeat the Eritreans or the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). After the
defeat of the military regime in Ethiopia in 1991, it seemed that there might
be a new peaceful order in the Horn. However, along with the end of the
superpower rivalry in the region, the United States no longer had any real need
for Somalia (Woodward 2002, p.150). The United States finally suspended all
financial aid, and it showed the Somali regime's full weakness and sudden
collapse. As a result of Soviet and American proxy war in the Horn of Africa
has been one of the most conflict-prone zones in the world (Abbink 2003). Lyons
and Samatar (1995) emphasized the failure of the U.S.-backed UN military
intervention in 1992-94, Somalia fell off Washington's radar screen (cited in
Lefebvre 2012).
In view of the historical background, the United States should
be flexible on Eritrea and Ogaden as long as Ethiopia is assured access to
Djibouti and Assab. Regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, should be
left to handle the situation in the Horn. The conflict is not ideological, but
above all strategic and military. The heart of the matter is the control of the
Red Sea, and whatever the outcome, it is bound to have a major impact beyond
the Horn, affecting the course of superpower relation.56(*) The analysts of the region's
politics asserted that the overriding concern of both leaders, however, was not
the resolution of the Ogaden conflict, but a shared desire to defuse external
conflict relations in order to free military resources for effectively dealing
with internal, regime-threatening guerrilla insurgencies.57(*)
According to Egypt treaty, the national claims of Somalia are
seen as de facto annexation. In this essence, Siad Barre turned to the United
States supplying a military support as well as equipment of weapons and so on
but in contrast, the awareness of Carter administration of Siad's violation of
human right had deliberately rejected to supply the aid into Somalia's regime.
Therefore, American foreign policy under Carter administration believed that
stabilizing Africa through» African solutions»58(*) would be a good way of
protection of the U.S. national interests.
Regarding the international border, the United States has
warned the Soviet Union, Cuba and Ethiopia against crossing into Somalia when
and if the attacking forces in the Ogaden are beaten or withdrawn voluntarily.
All three combatants guaranteed and underlined they have no intention of moving
into Somalia. But it is far from clear what could be done about it effectively
if they change their minds. Even though the doubling counterattack stops at the
border, the expected Soviet-Cuban victory in Ethiopia is likely to have major
consequences. In Somalia, the regime of Siad Barre is likely to fall or sharply
change direction. In Ethiopia, a fiercely radical regime will have been rescued
in time of crisis.
The history of Somalia and Ethiopia is joined by distrust,
enemy and war. Suspicion of neighboring expansionism and political and
religious extremism is deeply rooted in both states. Even though it can be
traced to the pre-colonial interaction, their misunderstanding has been led
principally by colonial legacy and arbitrary borders drawn up by the European
powers, economic interests and by the efforts to administrate scarce resources.
With the defeat of leaders from both countries to solve the
issue through diplomacy and negotiation connected with the United Nations (UN)
and the Organization of African Union(now the African Union) lack of regular
efforts in finding solutions had driven the border war of Ethiopia-Somalia in
1964 just four years after the latter's independence. Since then, both Ethiopia
and Somalia who share approximately 994 miles' long border had followed overt
and covert policies targeted at subversion at each other's statehood and
exchange alliances between the World's Super Powers -Soviet Union and United
States -during the cold war.
Ethiopia and Somalia's inability to solve the conflict has
also led to the use of military means including the Ogaden War of 1977 which
only complicated the situation. After the fall of the two countries'
dictatorial governments in early 1990s, there was high hopes for the beginning
of a new era and for solutions for the conflict. It is cornerstone to note that
the hope ended in vain. Ethiopia's post-cold war government took advantage of
the civil war in its neighbor and interfered in Somalia's domestic politics
progressively and continuously, created proxy factions/agent clans it armed and
weakened Somali's peace process.
Conclusion
In summary, the United States foreign policy in the Horn of
Africa has taken different forms: from isolationism to the Cold War era. The
U.S. also found its national interest through the region and was to strengthen
the relations of the region. America's foreign policy during the nineteenth
century was overshadowed by rival powers and this refers to Soviet Union
coalition. However, strategic interest in the Horn of Africa has waned with the
end of the Cold War. Irrespective of the current trends, the Horn of Africa's
global geo-political value will remain. The countries that border the Red Sea
are strategic as the Red Sea provides vital sea lanes to and from the Middle
East and South West Asia. The Red Sea is the shortest waterway connecting East
and West. For that main reason, the U.S. foreign policy is based on protecting
its interest in the region and at the same it wants to safeguard its ties with
oil explorer countries in the Middle East in which the U.S. tied strong
relationship and had cornerstone interest of protecting them.
U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil and
non-oil states since the early 1960s. Although presidents from Woodrow Wilson
to Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush have indicated that the United States has a
moral obligation to promote democracy, democracy promotion became a central
element of U.S. foreign policy after 1990. Scholars as well as policy makers,
however, have suggested that the United States has frequently sacrificed the
promotion of democracy and human rights in favor of other goals. In recent
years, although promoting democracy and good governance have been described as
leading U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, they may have been
overshadowed by two other goals: the global war on terror and energy
security.
However, the focus of the U.S. foreign policy during
the Cold War had a clear «us vs. them» dimension, with
«them» clearly as the communists and their ilk. Domination of
communism became vital for every administration's foreign policy during the
Cold War. At the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of
«them,» a new attempt was launched to divert American foreign policy
from war and give it a new objective. Last but not least, it is important to
note that the end of the Cold War initiated a new world order and this new
world order is called the War on Terror.
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*
1http://www.dictionary.com/browse/foreign-policy
* 2Thomas Magstadt, An
Empire If You Can Keep It-Power and principales in American foreign policy
(Washington: CQ Press, 2004).1
* 3Ibid. 5
* 4Ibid
* 5Pakistan Institute of
International Affairs US MILITARY BASES IN AFRICA
Author(s): Lutfullah Mangi Source: Pakistan Horizon,Vol. 40, No.
2 (Second Quarter 1987), pp. 95-102
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394247
Accessed: 02-03-2018 09:10 UTC
*
6https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region
*
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States#cite_note-2
(
"Bureau of Budget and
Planning". State.gov. Retrieved 18 February 2015).
* 8P. Woodward, US Foreign
Policy and the Horn of Africa, p.2, published 2016
*
9http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38956093
* 10John W. Spanier, «The
Cold War» in The Encyclopaedia Americana. Vol. 7 (int.
edition) (Danbury:
Americana Corporation, 1979) p. 222.
* 11Mark Vogl. Cold War:
When Did It Begin? When Did It End? op. cit.
*
12https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cold%20war
*
13https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War
* 14Kennedy Inaugural Address,
January 20, 1961; Speech Files, Digital Archives, Kennedy Library,
WWW.jfklibrary.org/Asset-viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-034-002.aspx.
* 15Paul Johnson, Modern Times:
The World from the Twenties to the Nineties (New York: HarperCollins, 1991),
429.
* 16Ibid., 21
* 17P. Woodward, UN Foreign
Policy and the Horn of Africa, p.10, published 2016.
* 18Report of President
Roosevelt in Person to the congress on the Crimea conference,» New York
Times, March 2, 1945.
* 19Peter J. Schraeder, THE OF
AFRICA: US FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ALTERED COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT, Middle East
Journal, Volume 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992.
* 20Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY
CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia,
p.36, published 2007
* 21Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY
CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia,
p.37, published 2007
* 22Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY
CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia,
p37, published 2007
* 23Kagnew Station was a
United States
Army base in
Asmara, Eritrea on
the
Horn of Africa. The
base was established in 1943 as a U.S. Army radio station, coming to power and
renovating a previous Italian naval radio station,
Radio
Marina, after Italian forces based in
Asmara
abandoned to the Allies in 1941. Kagnew Station served until April 29,
1977, when the last Americans left. The station was home to the United States
Army's 4th Detachment of the Second Signal Service Battalion.
* 24Samuel M. Makinda,
Superpowers Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa ( New York: St Martin's, 1987),
p.58
* 25National Security Council
Report, October 23, 1956; NSC series Box 19, NSC 5615/1- Policy Toward Ethiopia
(2), Eisenhower Library.
* 26Report, May 1953; RG59 Box
3, Military Assistance, National Archives II
* 27Report, Operation
Coordinating Board, September 13, 1956, NSC Staff Paper Box 28, OCB 091,
Eisenhower Library.
* 28Dulles to American Embassy,
Addis Ababa, October 16, 1956; Office of Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs Box 8, Policy Toward Ethiopia, Eisenhower Library.
* 29Henze, Horn of Africa, P.
162
* 30Donna R. Jackson, US
Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa: From Colonialism to Terrorism, p. 17
published in 2018
* 31NSC 19/1, A Report to the
Presidency by the National Security Council on Disposition of the Former
Italian Colonies in Africa, July 21, 1948; PSF Box 178, Meetings 17, Truman
Library
* 32Donna R. Jackson, JIMMY
CARTER and the Horn of Africa : Cold War policy in Ethiopia and Somalia,
p.39, published 2007
* 33Policy Statement, Ethiopia,
Department of State, March 1, 1951; RG59 Dept of State Decimal File 1950-54,
Box 2846, National Archives II.
* 34Report, the Horn of Africa,
House Committee on International Relations, November 11, 1976, H462-62, 95th
Congress, Washington, D.C
* 35African Studies Centre,
The Horn of Africa Forum (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania,
November 11, 1993).
* 36Marina Ottaway,
«Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of
Africa» in R. Craig
Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, The Soviet Impact in Africa
op. cit. p. 168.
* 37Richard B. Rcinnek,
«Soviet Policy in the Horn o f Africa: The Decision to
Intervene» in Robert H.
Donaldson, cd The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes
and Failures op. cit. p. 129.
* 38Christopher Clapharm,
Africa and the International System: The Politics o f State Survival
op. cit. pp. 135-136.
* 39Statement, Schaufele to
Senate Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, August 6, 1976.
* 40Cf. Marian Ottaway,
Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa op. cit. pp. 163-164.
* 41Peter J. Schraeder, THE OF
AFRICA: US FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ALTERED COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT, Middle East
Journal, Volume 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992.
* 42The Study of the U.S.
intervention in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War era has generated a
tremendous amount of scholarship. For a general introduction to this
literature, see David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United States and Soviet Union (
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); Jeffrey A. Lefebre, Arms
for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991 (
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); and Harold G. Marcus,
Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974: The Politics of
empire ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
* 43Statement, Schaufele to
Senate Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, August 6, 1976.
* 44Thomas Magstadt, An
Empire If You Can Keep It-Power and principales in American foreign
policy.9
* 45KULSO has the
responsibility to support all US military activities and interests in Kenya.
The senior
officer offers input, counsel and advice to the Ambassador and
embassy country team regarding the
military perspective or viewpoint of US government policy
vis-à-vis the host nation and region. KULSO is
still in existence to date. See, Karl E. Prinslow op. cit.
* 46Ibid.,p.369
* 47Congress in 1984 as quoted
in Wanjiru Kihoro, Kenya: The US Connection and Its Implication for
Development.(Thesis submitted Leeds University October 1987) p.
27
* 48J. A. Simpson and E. S.
C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. 8 (2nd edition) (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989) p. 1140.
* 49Scott Peterson, Me Against
my Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda (London: Routledge,
2000), 11
* 50 « Basic Data on
Sub-saharan Africa , » Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, NO
2036, March 1980, Library of Congress, Washington DC
* 51Testimony, TOM Farer to
House Sub-committe on Africa, March 28, 1977, foreign Assistance
legislationfor FY78 part 3: Economic and military Assistance Programs in
Africa, March 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, April 28, 1977, H461-37, 95th
congress, 1st Session, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
* 52 I. M. Lewis, ed.,
Nationalism and self-Determination in the Horn of Africa(London : Ithaca
Press, 1983), p.74
* 53World Atlas. Retrieved
March 17, 2018, from http://www.world-atlas.us/africa-map.gif
* 54Horn of Africa map, United
Nation, Retrieved March 3, 2018,
fromhttp;//www.un.org/Depts/cartographic/map/profil/horn-r.pdf
* 55 Samuel M. Makinda,
Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder:
LynneRienncr Publishers, 1993) p. 51
* 56 The Horn of Africa's
Dilemma, Author(s): Gérard Chaliand
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 30 (Spring, 1978), pp. 116-131
Published by: Washington post. News week Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148190
Accessed: 02-12-2017 06:11 UTC
* 57The Horn of Afria: US
Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment, Author: Peter J. Schraeder,
Middle East Journal, Volume 46, No. 4, Autumn 1992
* 58Ibid. 404
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