The prospect of international intervention legitimacy: case study of 2011 libyan armed conflict

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFRICOM : United States Africa Commend

AP : Additional Protocol to Geneva Convention

AU : African Union

CNT : National Transitional Council

DRC : Democratic Republican of Congo

ETC : Et Cetera (and other thing)

EU : European Union

GC : Geneva Convention

IAC : International Armed conflict

Ibid : In The same place

ICC : International Criminal Court

ICJ : International Court of Justice

ICRC : International Committee of Red Cross

Idem : The same page

IHL : International Humanitarian Law

ILC : International Law Commission

OAS : Organization of American States

Op cit : Opera citato (in the work cited)

P : Page

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIAC : Non International Armed Conflict

SADEC : Southern African Development Community

SC : Security Council

ULK : Kigali Independent University

UN : United Nations

UNAMIR : United Nations Assistant Mission in Rwanda

UNSC : United Nation Security Council

UNSCR : United National Security Council Resolution

USA : United States of America

Vol : Volume

§ : Paragraph

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. Short Introduction

The principle of territorial integrity is an important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in its article 2, paragraph 4 (the prohibition of the use of force), as well as in other important texts, including those on self-determination, right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. The concept includes the inviolability of the territory of the State, including territory under the effective control and possession of a State.^1(*)

As a corollary of such a notion of States sovereignty integrity, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs is developed in parallel with it to preserve the State's jealousy to protect its sovereignty.^2(*) Those principles sometimes are violated for different reasons.^3(*) Even if the notion of international intervention exists, there are strong and valid arguments both supporting and condemning the international intervention as a legitimate action, reflecting thus a tension between two moral perspectives.^4(*) On one hand, it is argued that the respect of the ban on use of force in the international relations for the virtue of preserving peace and stability is an imperative and should make international intervention not only illegal but also illegitimate, on the other hand, it is argued that guaranteeing international justice and protection of human rights provide interveners with the legitimate right to intervene for the humanitarian purposes outside their own territory; it is a significant tool of a moral pressure on the countries to react to the human rights violations abroad.^5(*) The international intervention should be studied and understood with all debates and controversies that are raised on. In fact, international intervention is controversial both when it happens and when it does not.

Based on challenges and gaps faced by the practice of international intervention, this study is capable to generate a comprehensive experimental evaluation of international intervention, contributing thus with a new perspective on this controversial issue. If the international intervention as a concept was accepted to be legitimate, it would have a power to challenge its presumed illegality.^6(*)

The findings of this study discover that it is possible to improve the humanitarian situation in the targeted State by waging a military intervention for humanitarian purposes,^7(*) it would serve as an empirically supported illustration of an existing gap between legitimacy and legality of international intervention, and it would provide an argument for claiming that the legal framework should catch up. If the results of this study, however, suggest that the military interventions though intended to be humanitarian tend to make the humanitarian suffering even worse, it would be an indication that the moral arguments calling for the legalization of the right of international intervention are blind toward the actual negative effects of such interventions on the target state and that the legal obstacle to such interventionism makes sense and should be legitimately kept.

Briefly stating the case of Libya as the main concern of the research, from February 15, 2011 civilians in Libya gathered for peaceful protests against the regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, calling for democratic reform and respect for human rights .^8(*) The opposition group established the Interim Transitional National Council and enjoyed quick success in the beginning of the demonstrations. However, Qaddafi and his security forces responded by opening fire on crowds of peaceful demonstrators, and the situations in Libya rapidly turned into mass revolt. The victims of those firing were civilians who took part in events or delivered their testimony to the international media, activists or Foreign journalists and Egyptian and Tunisian citizens who have been arrested and mass expulsions because of their alleged links with the popular uprising.^9(*)

There are numerous uses of force against the popular revolt civilians into armed conflict after only a few days and extends several Libyan towns. On 27 February 2011, the opposition created the National Transitional Council in Benghazi, which present as the sole representative of the Libya.

The situation in Libya and the use of force against civilians are not left without the international reaction. And many international organizations have condemned the «mass violations of human rights and international humanitarian law "^10(*) and worried about this situation. On February 26, the Security Council voted for Resolution 1970 (2011), which allows referral to the International Criminal Court and the establishment of enforcement against the Libyan government.^11(*) This is the first resolution of this body for the revolt in Libya.^12(*)

On March 10, the African Union is taking a resolution at the 265^th meeting of the
Council for Peace and Security, including creating the ad hoc high-level African Union on Libya. Two days later, the Council of the League of Arab States requests the Security Council to establish non-fly zone.

Regardless of the international condemnations, Qaddafi continued the brutal crackdown and called on his supporters to attack the demonstrators.^13(*) The Security Council led to the adoption resolution 1973 determining that the situation in Libya continued to `constitute a threat to international peace and security' and called for an immediate `cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of civilians'.^14(*) The Council further authorized member nations to take «all necessary measures» to protect civilians. At the following, this authorization, the military coalition undertakes its first strikes against Libya.^15(*)

Before reviewing the course of the conflict, it is useful to recall the context in which the vote was resolution 1973 (2011) which was a solution for the cease fire and complete end of abuses against civilians. This allows the use of force by Member States or regional organizations to enforce compliance area to fly and to protect civilians. In this regard, the Security Council "to declare deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence and the heavy civilian casualties, condemn the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and executions summary".^16(*)

It is therefore appropriate to keep in mind this item to analyze more precisely the authorization is made by the Security Council. The researcher can now recall the course of the conflict in Libya, from the intervention of the international coalition.

The practice of international army in Libya had been contrary with its mission of enforcing compliance area to fly and protecting Libyan civilians when we refer to the article 51 regarding the use of force. Instead, the international intervention of NATO in Libya had deviated from its mission by helping the rebels against the government troops, but was blind to the human rights violations being committed by both Libyan sides.

* ¹ UN Charter, Article 2(3): «All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.» The UN Charter is reprinted in full in various compendia, including the International and Operational Law Department's Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement, and is also available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html, accessed on 6/4/2014.

* ² Ibid.

* ³ For example, under the terms of article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations, «The Security Council has the faculty of law to undertake, through the air, naval and ground and ground forces any action it deems necessary for the maintenance or restoration of peace and security».

* ⁴ Ibid.

* ⁵ Weiss, G. Thomas, `The Humanitarian Impulse'. In: David M. Malone (ed.), The United Nations Security Council After the Cold War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, pp. 37-54.

* ⁶ Legitimacy represents the `Validity' of a Given Social Order. D'entreves, P. Alexander. `Legality and Legitimacy', The Review of Metaphysics, 1963, 16(4): 687-702.

* ⁷ Parekh, Bhikhur, `Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention', International Political Science Review, 18, 1997 p.55-74.

* ⁸ First Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), the Office the Prosecutor, ICC, p.6. Available at http://www.hrw.org/node/96582, accessed January 05, 2013.

* ⁹ Ibid.

* ¹⁰ http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/21/libya.protest.east/index.html?hpt=T1 , accessed 28/12 2012.

* ¹¹ Communiqué of the 265th meeting of the Council for Peace and Security, PSC/PR/Comm.2 (CCLXV), 10 March 2011, p. 2.

* ¹² Ibid.

* ¹³ Aljazeera (23February2011).

* ¹⁴ UN Doc. S/RES/1973 available http//:www.un.org accessed on 28/12/2014.

* ¹⁵ Statement by Foreign Secretary William Hague Following the meeting Libya Contact Group in Doha, April 13, 2011.

* ¹⁶ Ibid.