Evaluation of the level of safety culture

IV.2- RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, from what we have observed in Biopharma, there are some basic steps that one should consider to address the safety culture issues for a rapid amelioration. Below are the recommendations which we proposed.

§ Create Awareness: Corporate and/or site leadership need an awareness of the importance of safety culture to safety performance through exercises, seminars or workshops related to safety issues.

§ Identify a Champion: While every member of the organization should be a supporter of a sound safety culture, Biopharma may require a Champion/leader. Whoever fulfils this role must understand the dynamics of safety cultures and the process for, and obstacles to, implementing cultural change.

§ Perform a gap analysis: Learn/evaluate how the culture is performing. Identify where the gaps are and prioritize a risk-based response to closing this gaps. It should not only simply be stated but must be implemented. Elders say «a melon cannot get rotten in one day» it is a gradual process. We wish to develop a health and safety policy followed by the implementation of 100% of its content before December 2013.

§ Steward cultural change: Acceptable behaviors must be modeled at all levels of the organization through leadership by example. Values must be communicated and reinforced frequently. By consistently reinforcing positive behaviors, linking them to the benefits they bring, and relating these benefits to our beliefs of why they are important, we should be able to gradually shift the values of the organization in a positive direction.

§ Keep the organization focused: Many organizations have already established sound safety cultures. Not uncommonly, these cultures have been developed in response to, and are reinforced by frequent reference to, significant loss events in the company's past. Those organizations who are fortunate enough not to have experienced such a similar event may find it helpful to draw the experience of others in their industries.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that our company, Les Laboratoires Biopharma S.A from what is observed within the two production units complies to the local laws related to safety. The assessment also indicates that Biopharma's top management and its personnel are committed to a certain degree above average this can be seen an appreciable level of safety culture.

In very near future things will be finalized with the approval of the proposed health and safety policy which we established during our research period. The company's management is gradually putting resources at the disposal of the newly created health and safety committee to help implement the health and safety policy indicated above and to attain the goal which is that of achieving the OHSAS 18001 distinction by 2014. The various datae bases being put in place will enhance the above certification.

Given that no human act can be perfect and also considering the short time allocated for this research, we shall appreciate that more studies in this same domain be done with emphases on the behaviours and perceptions of the workers outside Biopharma so as to evaluate well that safety matters are considered by them not because of the fear to loose their job but that of minimizing direct or indirect damages.

We should also have this saying in our minds: «If you think safety is expensive then try an accident»

REFERENCES

To carry out our research, we have gone through so many books which deal with the issue of safety culture. We also supervised a student engineer from ENSAI - NGAOUNDERE:

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